Chinese investment in DPRK

April 8th, 2009

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Evan Ramstad offers some information on China’s investments in North Korea:

The diplomatic minuet is taking place after China increased trade with North Korea over the past four years. Last year, trade between China and North Korea jumped 41% to $2.79 billion, with most of that coming from increased exports by China.

 On Tuesday, truck traffic between the two countries resumed after a break Monday for a Chinese holiday. Dozens of trucks made the crossing in Dandong, a major city along the North Korean border.

China has been North Korea’s chief political and economic sponsor since the Soviet Union collapsed nearly 20 years ago. For much of that time, it served as donor of last resort, making up the difference when energy, food and donations to North Korea dropped off from other countries. That often amounted to $100 million to $200 million in aid.

China broke from that pattern in 2005 by boosting its exports and widening its trade surplus with North Korea. Outside experts view China’s trade surplus as the chief measure of its economic aid to North Korea because North Korea has no measurable debt instrument and little ability to narrow the trade gap.

Chinese companies, sometimes with help from the Chinese government, are investing heavily in North Korea’s mining industry, construction and light manufacturing such as textiles. Chinese consumer goods line store shelves and market stalls in North Korea.

Many executives of Chinese companies in North Korea say it’s a difficult place to operate. Among the challenges: getting money out of the country. China helped Panda Electronics Group, based in Nanjing, start a computer assembly factory with Taedong River Computer Corp. in North Korea five years ago.

North Korea’s currency, the won, can’t be converted. To move money out of the country, Panda must buy commodities in North Korea and sell them in China for cash, an executive said.

The increased business activity in North Korea reflects China’s desire to treat North Korea more as a “normal country” rather than a socialist brother entitled to unlimited assistance, scholars and analysts in China say. They say China also hopes its companies in North Korea will encourage the North’s government to open its economy as China began to do in the 1980s.

Wang Kai, a manager of Liaoning Fuxin Tianxin Technology and Development Co., says the company decided to build a pipe-making factory in North Korea because the country’s economy has few places to go but up.

“North Korea’s situation and economic status are pretty similar to China’s before the start of the opening up and reform policy,” Mr. Wang said in an interview before the rocket launch.

Others note China’s desire is to prevent North Korea’s collapse, which might pour refugees into China’s northeast.

The increased business is yielding a payoff in political influence for China in Pyongyang that’s become more important since North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il was incapacitated by illness in August. One signal that Mr. Kim was back in control came when he met in late January with a delegation of visiting diplomats from Beijing.

Read the full story here:
Economic interests shape Beijing’s Pyongyang Policy
Wall Street Journal Online
Evan Romstad
4/8/2009

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Noland on DPRK trade sanctions

April 7th, 2009

Marcus Noland, co author of The North Korean Famine and Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics, wrote a short policy piece in the Asia Pacific Bulletin calling for more effective sanctions on North Korea to deter Pyongyang’s belligerence:

Regrettably, toothless trade restrictions have provided inadequate to deter Pyongyang ex ante, and the world is now faced with dealing with the situation ex post.  Willingness to impose a comprehensive set of sanctions–trade, aid, travel, energy assistance, and finance–might reign in reckless North Kean behavior before another provocation fundamentally destabilizes the situation in Northeast Asia. (Noland, 2009)

The Asia Pacific Bulletin article draws from a thorough empirical study Noland conducted on the (non) impact of UN sanctions on North Korea’s trade. “The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea” can be downloaded here.  Here is the abstract:

Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications in Asia. Based on a visual inspection of the data and statistical models, this study finds that, although the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the export of heavy arms and luxury goods to North Korea within one week of Pyongyang’s nuclear test, the imposition of these sanctions has had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with the country’s two largest partners, China and South Korea.
policy implications:

1. North Korea appears to have calculated correctly that the direct penalties to its foreign trade for establishing itself as a nuclear power would be modest (or, alternatively, Pyongyang put such a high value on demonstrating the country’s nuclear capability that it outweighed the downside risks, however large). Presumably this experience will condition the reactions of North Korean policymakers in the future—making deterrence with respect to this issue and other sources of conflict more difficult.

2. Despite pre-test diplomatic warnings not to test, the post-test behavior of public and private sector actors in China and South Korea has been accepting of North Korea’s nuclear status. Thus if such warnings are to be heeded in the future, they must embody credible threats of penalty, be much more enthusiastically implemented, and be more broadly targeted.

Though I have tremendous respect for Dr. Noland’s work, I am fairly skeptical about the ability of economic santions to change the DPRK’s policies or behavior.  Carrots and sticks are essential tools for any diplomatic negotiation, but China, the DPRK’s strongest political ally and largest trading partner is simply not interested in implementing rigid economic restrictions vis a vis North Korea (for many rational reasons).  Given the uncanny ability of the North Korean elite to remain in power despite severe economic problems, I am afraid that any achievable sanctions regime would only make life more difficult for “ordinary” North Koreans with little possibility of delivering changes at the top.

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Unha-2 (Kwangmyongsong 2) Compendium

April 5th, 2009

UPDATE 7: Here is the Wikipedia Page.

UPDATE 6 (2009-4-5):  The DPRK claimed to have successfully launched its second satellite, the Kwangmyongsong-2.  (Aside: “Kwangmyongsong” means or “Lodestar” in Korean and it is a nickname officially attributed to Kim Jong il–the lodestar of the 21st centuryin a poem by his father.)

According to KCNA:

Scientists and technicians of the DPRK (North Korea) have succeeded in putting satellite Kwangmyongsong-2, an experimental communications satellite, into orbit by means of carrier rocket Unha-2 under the state’s long-term plan for the development of outer space.

Unha-2, which was launched at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground in Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province at 11:20 (3:20 a.m. British time) on April 5, accurately put Kwangmyongsong-2 into its orbit at 11:29:02, nine minutes and two seconds after its launch.

The satellite is going round the earth along its elliptic orbit at the angle of inclination of 40.6 degrees at 490 km perigee and 1,426 km apogee. Its cycle is 104 minutes and 12 seconds.

Mounted on the satellite are necessary measuring devices and communications apparatuses.

The satellite is going round on its routine orbit.

It is sending to the earth the melodies of the immortal revolutionary paeans ‘Song of General Kim Il-sung’ and ‘Song of General Kim Jong-il’ and measured information at 470 MHz. By the use of the satellite the relay communications is now underway by UHF frequency band.

The satellite is of decisive significance in promoting the scientific researches into the peaceful use of outer space and solving scientific and technological problems for the launch of practical satellites in the future.

Carrier rocket Unha-2 has three stages.

The carrier rocket and the satellite developed by the indigenous wisdom and technology are the shining results gained in the efforts to develop the nation’s space science and technology on a higher level.

The successful satellite launch is symbolic of the leaping advance made in the nation’s space science and technology was conducted against the background of the stirring period when a high-pitched drive for bringing about a fresh great revolutionary surge is under way throughout the country to open the gate to a great prosperous and powerful nation without fail by 2012, the centenary of the birth of President Kim Il-sung, under the far-reaching plan of leader Kim Jong-il.

This is powerfully encouraging the Korean people all out in the general advance.

The US and South Korea claim that two of the rocket’s stages and its payload fell into the ocean and that the satellite did not reach orbit.

So if we can believe the North Korean media, there are now TWO satellites in orbit broadcasting the “Song of General Kim il Sung” and the “Song of General Kin Jong il” at 27 MHz and 470 MHz.  Too bad short wave radios are so rare in the DPRK.

To date, however, no other country has verified the Kwangmyongsong No. 1 is in orbit–with one minor exception.  That minor exception came from the Russian space agency which seems to have offered a temporary confirmation of the satellite (followed by a quick retraction) so the DPRK could assert that another country verified the satellite’s existence.

Repeating history, Russian Foreign Ministry “verifies” Kwangmyongsong No. 2 satellite launch:

The DPRK sent an artificial Earth Satellite into a low-Earth orbit on the morning of April 5. According to Russian aerospace monitoring data, the launch trajectory did not pass over the territory of the Russian Federation. The parameters of the satellite’s orbit are being specified.

The DPRK had informed the Russian side ahead of time about the launch.

We call on all concerned states to show restraint in judgments and action in the current situation and to proceed from objective data on the nature of the DPRK launch.

We intend to watch further developments attentively, remaining in close touch and holding consultations with all concerned sides.

Note that the above quote is from the Russian Foreign Ministry—not its space agency—and it is coupled with a call for political restraint.  This is entirely a political statement, not a scientific acknowledgement of the satellite’s existence.  Essentially, this quote asserts that for the purposes of public diplomacy, the Russian Foreign Ministry classifies this event as a satellite launch rather than a missile test. This follow up story in RIA Novosti is much more agnostic.

But the original satellite’s importance to domestic politics seems to have faded.  Even KCNA’s coverage has significantly tapered off over the years.  Below is a table of KCNA mentions of the Kwangmyongsong No. 1 satellite from its launch date through today:

 

kcna-satellite.JPG

Let’s see if 10 years from now reporting on the Kwangmyongsong No. 2 is any different.  Meanwhile, we can all feel sorry for the people at KCNA who will now have to report on TWO satellites that do not exist.

Below are additional links and media related to this story:

1. Satellite image of the rocket lift off

2. Joint US-EU statement

3. Scott Snyder identifies the missile’s political targets

4. Evan Ramstad focuses on the recket’s use in domestic politics

UPDATE 5 (2009-3-16): The Choson Ilbo reports that the DPRK spent at least $30 million on the missile:

Experts speculate that impoverished North Korea spent at least US$30 million on development of a missile it is apparently poised to launch. While the North says it is launching a rocket to propel a satellite into orbit, many in the West are convinced this is in fact a Taepodong-2 long-range missile.

When North Korea test-launched seven medium and long-range missiles in July 2006, South Korean military authorities estimated the total cost at about $63.69 million (about W60 billion according to the exchange rate at that time).

Grand National Party spokesman Yoon Sang-hyun on Friday said his party estimates North Korea spent about $30 million test-launching the Taepodong-2 missile three years ago. “They should have spent the money to feed and clothe their people,” Yoon added.

North Korea spent approximately $20 million test-firing the Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, and experts guess it cost more this time since performance and capabilities including the airframe and range of the Taepodong-2 missile have been improved by more than 10 percent since the rocket fizzled ignominiously in a test three years ago.

A researcher with a government-funded think tank said, “North Korea may have spent between W800 billion and W900 billion (US$1=W1,488) developing and manufacturing the rocket for the Taepodong-2 alone.”

UPDATE 4 (2009-3-16):  Martyn Williams informs me that the North Koreans have closed air routes throught their controlled airspace:

North Korea will close two aerial routes through its controlled airspace from April 4 to 8 in order to launch what Pyongyang claims is a communications satellite, Japan’s transport ministry said Saturday. (Kyodo)

And the routes to be closed:

A0027/09 – ATS RTE SEGMENTS CLSD:
R452 KICHA-SESUR
G346 KICHA-RASON
DUE TO LAUNCH OF A COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE. GND – UNL, DAILY 0200-0700, 04
APR 02:00 2009 UNTIL 08 APR 07:00 2009. CREATED: 21 MAR 03:22 2009

These waypoints have been added to a Google Earth application which you may download here.

UPDATE 3 (2009-3-15): Martyn Williams was kind enough to send me the NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) from Fukuoka (Japan) Air Traffic Control—posted below in full. The NOTAM provides the best estimate of the date and time of the launch.

Using this information, I have mapped out the Musudan launch path and areas of falling debris on Google Earth:

 

Unha-2-NOTAM

Click on image for a larger view.

Download this .KMZ file (with additional closed air routes) to your Google Earth here.

 

FUKUOKA NOTAM

J0732/09 – ALL ACFT INTENDING TO FLY WI FUKUOKA FIR ARE ADVISED TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. A SATELLITE IS EXPECTED TO BE LAUNCHED FROM NORTH KOREA.

THE LAUNCHING IS EXPECTED TO OCCUR AS FLW,
1.LAUNCHING DATE AND TIME : BTN 0200UTC AND 0700* UTC DAILY FM APR 4 TO APR 8
2.POSSIBLE FALLING AREA OF THE FLYING OBJECTS AND/OR THEIR DEBRIS
AREA(1): AREA BOUNDED BY STRAIGHT LINES
CONNECTING FOLLOWING POINTS.
404140N1353445E 402722N1383040E
401634N1383022E 403052N1353426E
AREA(2): AREA BOUNDED BY STRAIGHT LINES
CONNECTING FOLLOWING POINTS.
343542N1644042E 312222N1721836E
295553N1721347E 330916N1643542E
WHEN FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS SATELLITE LAUNCHING OBTAINED, REPLACED NOTAM WILL BE ISSUED. SFC – UNL, 12 MAR 23:40 2009 UNTIL 08 APR 07:00 2009 ESTIMATED. CREATED: 12 MAR 23:41 2009

*(11:00am-4:00pm in Japan)

UPDATE 2 (2009-2-24): The DPRK has officially announced that it intends to put another “satellite” into orbit.  According to KCNA:

The preparations for launching experimental communications satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 by means of delivery rocket Unha-2 are now making brisk headway at Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground in Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province.

When this satellite launch proves successful, the nation’s space science and technology will make another giant stride forward in building an economic power.

The “Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (TSLG)” is also known as the “Musudan-ri Launching Station.” TSLG is a new name, and today is the first time that KCNA has ever used it!

The full KCNA story can be read here.

Below you can find previous posts on the DPRK’s efforts to put a satellite into orbit—including information on the mysterious Kwangmyongsong-1.

UPDATE 1 (2009-2-13):  The Daily NK is reporting that the DPRK plans to launch “another satellite” called the “Kwongmyongsong No. 2.”

Senior Technical Analyst at Globalsecurity.org Charles P. Vick stated, “North Korea is expected to flight test one or two Teap’o-dong-2(sic) class missiles, either as a satellite launch attempt, or a ballistic missile flight, or both, in the spring or summer of 2009,” in a report entitled “The Latest up-date in North Korean Ballistic Missile & Space Booster Developments.”

North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS) reported on the 12th news from its source in North Hamkyung Province, which seemed to confirm the satellite theory; “The Kwangmyungsung-2, an artificial satellite, will be launched soon at the missile site in Moosudan-ri, Hwadae (county),” the source announced.

According to the NKIS report, the Kwangmyungsung-2, allegedly a communications satellite, was developed by the Institute of Electronic War under the Academy of Sciences for Defense.

If they go through with it, KCNA will have to report on two satellites that are not in orbit.

Read the full story here:
Taepodong-2: Missile or Satellite?
Daily NK
Jeong Jae Sung
2/13/2009

ORIGINAL POST: Shortly after the Onion reported this, the Australian tells us that the Kim Jong il government has declared it is actively pursuing a “space program”:

“The DPRK’s (North Korea) policy of advancing to space for peaceful purposes is a justifiable aim that fits the global trend of the times. There is no power in the world that can stop it,” the newspaper said in an editorial.

“As long as developing and using space are aimed at peaceful purposes and such efforts contribute to enhancing human beings’ happiness, no one in the world can find fault with them.”

It noted that Iran on Monday successfully launched a satellite carried by a home-built rocket, setting alarm bells ringing among Western powers because of the implications for the range of its ballistic missiles.

Rodong said North Korea had long been working on space research and development.

“Currently, our scientists and engineers, in keeping with the international trend, are actively pushing ahead with projects aimed at utilising space for peaceful goals,” it added. (The Australian)

Of course North Korea has used its purported space program as political cover for missle tests before.  Back in 1998, Pyongyang informed the world about the successful launch of the “Kwangmyongsong No.1” satellite (which coincided with a previous round of missile tests).  The satellite supposedly circles the earth playing the Song of General Kim il Sung.  Although no one has been able to verify it is in orbit, as far as the North Korean people are aware the satellite is still circling the earth!  KCNA just reported on it in January.

I should also point out that Pyongyang has consistently emphasized space travel as a policy goal in the mass games. See this photo at Pyongyang’s Moranbong Middle School and this photo in the Mangyongdae Children’s Palace.

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DPRK market restrictions ineffective

April 3rd, 2009

Granted that information from the DPRK is nearly impossible to verify, it seems likely that the DPRK government continues to encounter difficulties implementing its most restrictive market regulations.  They have tried repeatedly to impose rules which dictate who may work in the markets, how to allocate vending slots, what goods may be sold in the markets, what prices may be charged, and when markets may open. 

With each new rule vendors and entrepreneurs respond by fighting back against the authorities (sometimes violently) or simply moving to the black market, which (as in other communist countries) composes a significant portion of the nation’s GDP.

The DPRK’s most recent market regulation (issued in the autumn of 2008) is the 10-day rule—prohibiting markets from opening except every tenth day.  This rule was supposed to take effect in March 2009, yet it has not been successfully implemented—even in the areas where Pyongyang exercises the most control (large cities).

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean authorities issued a decree in October, 2008 aimed at shifting the existing market system over to a 10-day market system and restricting the range of items being sold, but by mid-March of this year there was no market where the decree had been properly implemented.

Decrees attached to the entrances to markets were all removed and only the specific list of restricted goods is posted there. However, secondhand goods have been strictly regulated in some regions, so conflicts between citizens have arisen.

Each story about the failure of market restrictions stresses the inconsistency with which the rules are imposed across the country.  In other words, local conditions predict the effectiveness of Pyongyang’s dictates.  This is perhaps due to the DPRK’s market governance structure.  Local markets are controlled by a local Market Management Office which is in turn subordinate to each City People’s Committee.  According to the Worker’s Party organizational chart (view here), each City People’s Committee is subordinate to a Provincial People’s Committee (PPC), and all PPCs are subordinate to the Central Committee of the Workers Party.  

This governance structure puts three layers of bureaucracy between the Central Committee and the actual markets, perhaps allowing local leaders to exercise significant discretion over market operations.  True, random inspection units from the central authorities can make surprise visits, but their numbers are likely too small to enforce country-wide compliance, particularly when local officials can benefit from accomodating traders.

Still, these kinds of stories are both disconcerting and pleasing.  Why disconcerting?  Because the expectation by “Western” analysts (including myself) that market legitimization signaled a stable policy shift by Pyongyang has proven unjustified.  The good news, however, is that the DPRK’s markets are proving surprisingly robust.

In 2003, North Korean authorities “legalized” markets throughout the country by converting previously existing “farmers’ markets” into “combined general markets” and allowing all traders sell their wares. After the legislation was passed, markets began to spring up in neighborhoods across the country–even in Pyongyang.

Although it is clear now that this was a politically defensive move on the part of the central government,  North Koreans now reportedly spend more than 80 percent of their incomes in these markets.  Despite authorities’ efforts to assert more control over the markets, they have (paradoxically) become the social safety net of socialist Korea. 

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Seoul stock market at 5.5 month high…

April 1st, 2009

UPDATE: According to the Wall Street Journal, Friday was even better:

The Korea Composite Stock Price Index, or Kospi, gained 6.78 points, or 0.5%, to end at 1283.75. The index is up 3.7% on this week following last week’s 5.7% gain.

“Improving economic data and overnight gains in offshore markets lent support to the market, but Asian markets generally lagged U.S. and European peers as they needed to slow down after steep gains over a short period,” said Kim Hak-kyoon, an analyst at Korea Investment & Securities.

“But the upward march has not stopped and foreigners continued to show strong appetite for local stocks again today,” added Kim.

Meanwhile, market participants didn’t react much to news that North Korea may launch a rocket as early Saturday.

“Isn’t it the fact that North Korea will launch a rocket? The key to determine the mood in the financial market will be how South Korea and the U.S. will handle the case. So far market participants, in particular foreigners, don’t seem to worry too much about that,” said Kim at Korea Investment & Securities.

Market analysts continued to treat the potential missile launch as a short-term event to the financial market.
“North Korea’s main goal seems to be to push for a lifting of current sanctions and get economic aid flowing by showing off its ability to attack the mainland of the U.S.,” said You Seung-min, an analyst at Samsung Securities. “In reality any direct military clash seems to be unlikely….The stock market will likely return fast to its normal track after experiencing short-term volatility caused by the launch.”

ORIGINAL POST:Just the news I expected (sort of).  According to Reuters:

Meanwhile investors largely ignored news that North Korea had begun fueling a long-range rocket it plans to launch between April 4-8, starting a process that experts say means the rocket will be ready for lift-off in three to four days.

“Yes, the North will probably launch the missile, and that certainly can’t be good. But markets will probably bounce backafter a couple days as they always do…market participants have learned over time to remain calm to North Korea-related developments,” Lee added.

Read the full articles here:
S Korean Shares End Tad Up On Econ Recovery Hopes
Wall Street Journal
Soo-Kyung Seo
4/3/2009

Seoul shares hit 5-½ mth high;North news ignored
Reuters
Jungyoun Park
4/1/2009

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Western apparel popular in DPRK

March 31st, 2009

(Hat tip to Gavin) A reader recently visited the DPRK and took these pictures of children playing in Pyongyang.  There was no shortage of Western brands on display:

bmw.JPG weetbix.JPG

puma.JPG snoopy.JPG

Pictured above: BMW, Ronaldo, Weetbix (Weetabix), Puma, and Snoopy  

Thanks to entrepreneurial Chinese and DPRK merchants, Western brands are getting their foot in the door with some free advertising.  If BMW keeps up this covert strategy they might be able to knock Mercedes out of the top position some day!

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Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984

March 30th, 2009

From the Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project:

The North Korea International Documentation Project is pleased to announce the publication of the latest addition to NKIDP Document Reader Series, Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984.

The collection was specially prepared for the joint NKIDP-United States Institute of Peace conference, North Korean Attitudes Toward China: A Historical View of Contemporary Difficulties, and contains newly obtained documentary evidence on North Korea’s relations with China throughout the Cold War from Russian, (East) German, Albanian, and Hungarian archives. The 24 documents contained in the reader shed new and invaluable light on Pyongyang’s perspective of the Sino-DPRK relationship, and may force a reevaluation of the U.S. strategy of relying on China’s political leverage over North Korea to resolve contemporary disputes over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Limits of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984 was edited by NKIDP Coordinator James Person with indispensable assistance from Tim McDonnell. NKIDP is part of the Center’s History and Public Policy Program directed by Dr. Christian Ostermann. This publication, like all NKIDP publications, was made possible by a generous grant from the Korea Foundation and is available for download free of charge from the NKIDP website.  

Download a PDF of the NKIDP reader here.

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Musudan rocket set up

March 29th, 2009

isis-musudan.JPGThough this web page is not focused on military affairs, today the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) sent out a picture of North Korea’s Taepodong 2 missile sitting on the launch pad at Musudan-ri. According to their email:

ISIS has obtained commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken at approximately 11:00 AM local time on March 29, 2009 of the Musudan-ri missile site in North Korea. The missile is clearly visible in this image. It is also casting a shadow that is clearly differentiated from the missile launch gantry. According to news reports, the missile was installed on or after Tuesday, March 24, 2009. Since the missile is so easily seen in this image versus in imagery over the past several days since March 24 , it is likely that North Korea was previously shrouding the missile.

You may see the ISIS report here.

You can see the launch trajectory mapped out on Google Earth here.

As the T-2 will not threaten US territory, Uncle Sam has no plans to interfere with the launch.

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The first red Koreans

March 27th, 2009

Writing in the Korea Times, Andrei Lankov points out the interesting history of Koreans within the early communist movement:

The [Russian] revolution was followed by the Civil War which lasted to 1922, and during this conflict few ethnic groups supported the Communist Red Army with the same devotion and enthusiasm as the Koreans.

Some 8,000 Koreans joined the Red forces. This might not appear to be a large number, but the ethnic Korean community was roughly 100,000 strong in 1917, so it means that roughly one out of four able-bodied males joined the Communist army.

In most cases these people were volunteers, not draftees: for a long time, the Russian Far East was beyond the reach of the regular Red Army, so operations were conducted largely by guerrillas who relied on wide popular support.

At the same time, there were very few ethnic Koreans who chose to fight on the other side, with the anti-Communist Whites.

Such enthusiasm for the militant left was easy to explain. First, the battle cry of the Communists was “land to the farmers!” Most Koreans were farmers, but they often faced serious discrimination.

Russian authorities preferred to give land to the ethnic Russian settlers whose plots were then often toiled by Korean tenants. The Communists explicitly promised to change the situation by distributing land equally among all people who needed it.

Second, Koreans faced a certain amount of discrimination in old Russia, and Communists, being patiently anti-imperialist and anti-racist, promised that in a Communist Russia there would be no ethnic or racial discrimination whatsoever.

Third, in the Russian Far East the anti-Communist forces were supported and supplied by the Japanese. A large Japanese expeditionary force was actually dispatched to Siberia.

Taking into consideration that most Korean intellectuals (and nearly all politically active Korean leaders) had been active in the national liberation movement, they naturally enough became allies with their enemies’ enemy, that is with the Reds ― even if they did not initially harbor much sympathy for the Communists’ radical social program.

Thus, the Koreans entered the red guerrilla ranks in large numbers ― and in the early Communist armies they knew how to indoctrinate soldiers.

A number of those people, especially Russian speakers, soon became devoted Communists and active propagandists of the new teaching among their fellow Koreans.

The first prominent leader of the Korean Communists was a woman, Alexandra Stankevich (Nee Kim). Actually, she was more Russian than Korean in culture and education.

Her Korean father, a fluent Russian speaker and a professional interpreter, died when she was very young, and the girl was adopted by her father’s friend and his Russian family.

Alexandra received a good education, married (unhappily) a Russian man whom she later divorced, and traveled far across Russia.

From around 1915 she became very involved with underground socialist politics. In 1917-18 she was a prominent Communist leader in the maritime province and also a chief foreign policy negotiator for the local Communist government.

When in 1918 the government was overthrown by the Whites and their Japanese allies, Alexandra Kim was captured and killed.

Around the time of Alexandra Kim’s death, Yi Tong-hwi, a former officer of the Korean army, and by then a guerrilla commander, established the first Korean Communist group, called the Korean Socialist Party.

This happened in the city of Khabarovsk, and most party members were local Russian Koreans. Soon afterward, Yi Tong-hwi was even invited by Lenin to have a discussion about the Korean situation, in Moscow, and his small group became the first sprout of the Korean Communist movement, which for better or (more likely) worse influenced Korean history for the next hundred years.

Read the full story here:
First Red Koreans
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
3/26/2009

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EU backs radio broadcasts into DPRK, RoK backs VOA

March 27th, 2009

Several foreign organizations are broadcasting radio content into North Korea: Free North Korea Radio, Open Radio for North Korea, Radio Free Chosun, Voice of America and  Radio Free Asia.   

According to Yonhap, the EU government and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) are throwing financial support behind FNKR, ORNK, and RFC:

The European Union (EU) and an international group of journalists forged a deal on Tuesday to provide 400 million won (US$290,000) to help anti-Pyongyang radio broadcasting stations run mostly by defectors from North Korea.

The EU and the Reporters sans Frontiers (RSF) signed the deal with three stations — Free North Korea Radio, Open Radio for Korea and Radio Free Chosun — in Seoul to fund their programs for the next three years.

The stations have been producing and sending shortwave anti-communism and human rights radio broadcasts across the border. In the past, North Korea has asked South Korea to suspend the stations, calling them an obstacle to unification.

In a related Associated Press story, the South Korean government is allowing Voice of America access to South Korean transmission equipment for the first time since the 1970s:

That makes the signal much clearer than VOA’s long-running shortwave broadcasts from far-flung stations in the Philippines, Thailand and the South Pacific island of Saipan. Moreover, it’s an AM signal, so listening in doesn’t require a shortwave radio.

“Radio can play a big role in changing people,” said Kim Dae-sung, who fled the North in 2000 and is now a reporter at Free North Korea Radio, a shortwave radio broadcaster in Seoul. “Even if it’s simply news, it’s something that North Koreans have never heard of.”

Still, the move could be seen as yet more provocative policymaking by a government already at loggerheads with the North over Lee’s tough policy on Pyongyang, and comes at a time of heightened regional tensions over North Korea’s plans to launch a rocket early next month. Nuclear envoys from South Korea and Japan flew to Washington for talks Friday with top U.S. diplomats about North Korea.

Since Jan. 1, VOA has been using the antenna facilities of the Far East Broadcasting Company-Korea, a Christian evangelical radio station, for half of its three-hour nighttime broadcast into the North. The antenna is only 40 miles (65 kilometers) from the border.

South Korea prohibited VOA from broadcasting from its soil for carrying a 1973 report on the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, then a leading South Korean dissident. The authoritarian Seoul government at the time is widely believed to have been behind the abduction.

North Korea condemns such broadcasts as “U.S. psychological warfare” and often jams the signals. So far, it has not interfered with VOA’s new AM broadcast, said radio expert Park. Doing so requires more equipment than blocking shortwave signals, and the fact that North Korea isn’t doing so may indicate the North is struggling economically, he said.

Read the full stories here:
EU, reporters promise 400 million won to promote radio broadcasts into North
Yonhap
3/24/2009 

VOA wins powerful base for broadcasts into NKorea
Associated Press (via Herald Tribune)
3/28/2009

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