Archive for the ‘Foreign aid statistics’ Category

“Let’s plant more trees!”

Friday, March 6th, 2009

letsplantmoretrees.JPGAs regular Google Earth users are aware, the DPRK has experienced significant deforestation in recent decades from both private and state actors. The former have cleared land for fuel/heat and private food production. The latter have felled forests to export lumber. However, without private property rights over the lumber and corollary price signals, we have witnessed yet another “tragedy of the commons”–the over extraction of a common-pool resource. 

As can be seen in the image above, official reforestation campaigns have been launched several times.  According to Good Friends, the most recent was announced last September, shortly before the DPRK appointed a new forestry minister, Kim Kwang-yong.  According to the Yonhap article below, however, South Koreans and Europeans have been supporting reforestation projects in the DPRK for nearly ten years:

North Korean workers and students rolled up their sleeves Monday for Tree-planting Day, state-run media said, amid continuing aid from South Korea despite damaged political relations.

North Korea has a high deforestation rate, as residents have cut down trees for fuel. Deforestation is closely linked to the country’s chronic food shortages, as barren mountain slopes leave rice farms prone to severe flooding by summer monsoons, according to aid workers in Seoul.

The North Korean government has banned cutting trees and sought to make its country greener with aid from South Korea and some European governments.

“Covered with trees are mountains and fields of the country from the foot of Mount Paektu, the sacred mountain of the revolution, to the military demarcation line and from the eastern coast to the western coast,” the Korean Central News Agency said in an English-language report titled “Greening and Gardening Campaign Gets Brisk.”

“The tree-planting campaign is being briskly undertaken everywhere in the country … changing the appearance of the country beyond recognition day by day,” it said.

South Korean government and civic groups have been operating sapling fields in the North Korean cities of Kaesong and Pyongyang, as well as near the North’s scenic resort Mount Kumgang, providing seedlings, equipment and technology since 1999. The project has cost South Korea some 9 billion won (US$5.7 million), according to the Ministry of Unification.

Aid workers said the inter-Korean forestry project has continued even though Pyongyang cut off all government-level dialogue in response to Seoul’s hardline policy toward it that began last year.

Ahn Sun-kyong, an aid worker from Green One Korea, an umbrella group of over a dozen non-governmental organizations in Seoul, said it plans to build a seed preservation facility and an apple farm in Pyongyang as new projects this year.

“There may be certain limitations, but this non-governmental exchange project will continue,” Ahn said.

Hwang Jae-sung from the Korean Sharing Movement, which operates the Kaepung sapling field in Kaesong as a member of Green One Korea, said most trees are prematurely cut by residents, who also rake up fallen leaves for fuel.

“Deforestation is directly linked to the food problem,” Hwang, who last visited Kaesong in November, said. “We believe tree planting in North Korea is not only useful for preventing floods, but also can be another means of resolving the food shortages in the North.”

The aid groups say 16-18 percent of North Korean forests, or 1.5-1.6 million hectares out of the North’s 8.9 million hectares of forests, are believed to be deforested. About 80 percent of North Korea is covered by mountains.

Although the support offered by these groups is necessary to restore ecological health and productive power of the DPRK’s agricultural lands, an unfortunate consequence will likely be growing restrictions on private food production which will necessarily require the North Korean people to once again rely on the state for food distribution.

Read previous posts on forestry and environmental protection here.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Koreans work to make country green on Tree-planting Day: report
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
3/2/2009

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IFES February 2009 recap

Thursday, March 5th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
(NK Brief No. 09-3-3-1)
3/3/2009

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
As February began, North Korea continued to publicly warn that the two Koreas were on a path toward war, stating on February 1 that downward spiraling relations between the two Koreas were brought on by ROK President Lee Myung-bak The (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) printed that Lee’s policies toward the North were “the very source of military conflicts and war between the North and the South,” and warned that tensions on the peninsula “may lead to an uncontrollable and unavoidable military conflict and war.”

Poll results released by the Korea Economic Research Institute on February 2 indicated that 68.4 percent of South Koreans support President Lee Myung-bak’s aid-for-denuclearization policy toward the North, and a separate poll by Gallup Korea showed on February 23 that 62 percent of South Koreans blame North Korea for strained inter-Korean relations.

A South Korean official stated on February 4 that 3,000 tones of steel plates that were to be sent to North Korea as part of the energy aid-for-denuclearization deal reached in 2007 would be delayed due to the North’s recent saber-rattling. According to the official, “It is hard to predict when we will send the steel plates. For now, we are not even seriously considering the timing…North Korea should first change its attitude.”

The South Korean government has shot down a project by an ROK journalist organization that would allow the exchange of news with North Korea. It was reported on February 4 that a Unification Ministry Spokesman Kim Ho-nyoun stated, “There are concerns that the exchange of news articles may undermine national security, public order and the interests of the general public.”

On February 16, it was reported the ROK Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee has mandated field commanding officers in all branches of the South Korean military to immediately respond to any North Korean provocation without first seeking permission from superiors. This has further heightened concerns over the possibility of a naval confrontation in the Yellow Sea around the disputed Northern Limit Line.

On February 19, North Korean media warned, “Now that the political and military confrontation between the North and the South has gone into extremes, a physical clash may break out at any moment,” and, “North-South relations have reached such a pass that there is no way to improve them or bring them under control.”

INTER-KOREAN TOURISM
Hyundai Asan, the South Korean company running the Kumgang Mountain tourist resort and the Kaesong City tours in North Korea is on the brink of bankruptcy. A Hyundai representative stated on February 4, “We are reaching a critical situation…unless the tours resume by April, it will be difficult for us to stay afloat.” Hyundai Asan brought in 255.5 trillion Won, or approximately 170.3 million USD, through tour sales in 2007, but in 2008, the company sold only 228.8 billion Won, or 152.5 million USD-worth of tours in 2008. The company employed 1,084 workers when tours were in operation, but has cut back to 479 employees. Of those, approximately 20 percent are receiving only 70 percent of their wages while they work from home. The tours have been on hold since a South Korean tourist was shot and killed at the Kumgang resort last summer.

ROK lawmaker Song Hun-suk stated on February 22, “Since the suspension of the [tourism] program, dozens of South Korean businesses and approximately 1,000 travel agents that offered organized trips to the North have gone to the brink of bankruptcy,” and he reported that approximately 30,000 North and South Koreans were on the verge of unemployment due to the travel ban, with 80 percent of shops and restaurants in South Korea’s Gosung, Gangwon Province, which is near the border, have been forced to close due to the absence of tourists passing through.

INTER-KOREAN TRADE
On February 3, the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) launched a new website, “Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Information Center”, at http://interkoreatrade.kita.net. The website is designed to provide information and education on North Korean investment and inter-Korean cooperation

On February 8, South Korea’s Unification Ministry released statistics for 2008 regarding the Kaesong Industrial Complex. According to the ministry, production in the complex was up 36 percent over the previous year, reaching a value of 251.42 million USD. The total value of goods produced in the complex since it began operations in 2005 comes to 524.84 million USD.

The Economic Times ran an article on February 15 titled, “Ever heard of Gaesung? Gear up for its products,” in which it reports that the India-South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) soon to be signed will mean that India recognizes goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex as South Korean goods.

ROK UNIFICATION MINISTER
On February 12, Korea University Professor of Political Science Hyun In-taek was sworn in as the new South Korean minister of unification. At his inauguration, Hyun stated that he is willing to meet with North Korean counterparts “at any time, at any place” in order to repair inter-Korean relations. Hyun has been criticized as being a hardliner, and an architect of the Lee Myung-bak administration’s “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” policy. Hyun was a key advisor during Lee’s presidential campaign, at which time Lee introduced the Vision policy, and was also a member of Lee’s presidential transition team, which at one point had advocated the shuttering of the Ministry of Unification.

U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS
A group of high-ranking former U.S. officials now advising the Obama administration on the DPRK visited North Korea during the first week of February. The group included Stephen Bosworth, Jonathan Pollack, Morton Avramowitz, and Leon Sigal. The delegation reported that North Korea does not appear to be rushed, and that they had taken a “wait and see” attitude in Pyongyang. Bosworth stated that “[North Korean officials] understand the Obama administration will need some time to sort itself through the policy review and the expressed patience, there is no sense of alarm or urgency.” He also noted that the officials were willing to move forward with denuclearization talks.

Leon Sigal stated on February 1, just prior to his visit to the North, “the Obama administration should promptly send a high-level emissary, perhaps former President Bill Clinton or former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to Pyongyang.” Sigal also wrote in an online opinion piece that Obama should “hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in return for North Korea disposing some of its plutonium.”

On February 2, the U.S. State Department announced that it would impose sanctions on three North Korean companies for missile export violations. In accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, Executive Order 12851 of June 11, 1993, Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, the Korea Mining and Development Corporation, the Mokong Trading Corporation, and Sino-Ki are subject to Nonproliferation Measures and Category II missile sanctions.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated on February 13 that the Obama administration would be willing to normalize bilateral relations with North Korea if the North is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate its nuclear weapons program. She stated that the U.S. would have a “great openness” to North Korea, and added, “It’s not only on the diplomatic front,” but that Washington had a “willingness to help the people of North Korea, not just in narrow ways with food and fuel but with energy assistance.” Two days later, North Korea’s head of state Kim Yong Nam reaffirmed that North Korea would “develop relations with countries that are friendly toward us.”

On February 17, Clinton reiterated the U.S. offer of a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War, normalization of relations, and aid, but stated, “The decision as to whether North Korea will cooperate in the six-party talks, end provocative language and actions, is up to them,” and , “If North Korea abides by the obligations it has already entered into and verifiably and completely eliminates its nuclear program, then there will be a reciprocal response,” indicating that North Korea will have to make the next move.

During a trip to South Korea, Clinton stated that North Korea was “badly miscalculating” if it thinks it can “drive a wedge” between Washington an Seoul, and that “North Korea is not going to get a different relationship with the United States while insulting and refusing dialogue with the Republic of Korea.”

U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY TO NORTH KOREA
Following his return from a trip to North Korea at the beginning of the month, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Steven Bosworth was named by Secretary of State Clinton as the Obama administration’s special representative for North Korea. He will remain dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, but will now be responsible for coordinating U.S. policy regarding the DPRK. Special Envoy Sung Kim is responsible for ‘day-to-day’ negotiations with Pyongyang.

UK-DPRK RELATIONS
A British parliamentary delegation arrived in North Korea on February 3, coinciding with a visit to London by a DPRK Workers’ Party of Korea delegation. EU Parliament member Glyn Ford stated that he hoped to reopen dialog that was broken off in 2005 on human rights, and denuclearization, hinting that restarting dialog could lead to the transfer of renewable energy technology to the North.

PRC-DPRK TRADE
It was reported on February 24 that trade between China and North Korea reached 2.78 billion USD in 2008, a 41.2 percent increase over the previous year. DPRK imports were up 46 percent, at over 2.03 billion USD, while its exports to China grew 29.7 percent, to 750 million USD. Mineral resources made up 54.7 percent of North Korea’s exports to China, and machinery and electronics made up the majority of imports.

DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM

(NKeconWatch: Although this is simply a reprint of the IFES report, I have been notified by NTI that this report is inaccurate. According to NTI Communications Director Cathy Gwin:

“I am writing to respond to your post that referred to erroneous reports that the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is preparing to open an office in Seoul ” in order to help prepare DPRK nuclear scientists for peaceful civilian employment.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has worked in the past to develop ideas on how governments could apply cooperative threat reduction (CTR or “Nunn-Lugar”) approaches as part of a solution to the North Korean nuclear challenge.  However, we have no current program to carry out those activities ourselves, nor do we have a program to retrain North Korean scientists.  In addition, we have no current plans to open an office in South Korea, and we do not have branch offices in Ukraine or Kazakhstan.  We have a main office in Washington, DC and a presence in Moscow.

January 31 was the deadline for North Korea to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear reactor as part of 6-Party negotiations, but it failed to meet the deadline. Christopher Hill stated on February 3 that the U.S. would “hold on for a few more days,” but that “we’re not happy that the DPRK essentially has missed this very important deadline.”

On February 2, it was reported that the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) would open a new office in Seoul in order to help prepare DPRK nuclear scientists for peaceful civilian employment. The NTI is in the process of building a program to retrain the North’s experts, and “is also considering ways to support not only nuclear scientists at Yongbyon, but also farmers near Yongbyon who provide them with rice,” according to Roy Kim, a professor at Drexel University.

The U.S. government criticized Pakistan’s decision on February 6 to release Abdul Qadeer Khan from house arrest. Khan as been under house arrest for the past 5 years, after admitting to selling nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, as well as Iran and Libya. In 2004, A.Q. Khan took full responsibility for selling the nuclear secrets, stating that the military and government were unaware of his actions. He recanted this confession last year, stating that he had been a scapegoat.

DPRK MISSILE LAUNCH PREPARATIONS
Several countries have reported intelligence pointing to a launch by North Korea of a Taepodong-2 long-range missile. The U.S. State Department warned on February 3 that “a ballistic missile launch by North Korea would be unhelpful and, frankly, provocative,” while the ROK Foreign Ministry noted that a missile launce would “constitute a clear breach of the UN resolution” adopted in 2006. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated, “We hope all the parties can recognize that maintaining stability is in the common interest of the people of the Korean Peninsula.” Preparations appear to be underway at its Musudan-ri base, near the DPRK-PRC border. A Taepodong-2 is thought to have a range of 6,700 kilometers (4,150 miles).

Amid reports that it was preparing the missile launch, North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun printed, “The DPRK’s policy of advancing to space for peaceful purposes is a justifiable aim that fits the global trend of the times. There is no power in the world that can stop it,” and, “ As long as developing and using space are aimed at peaceful purposes and such efforts contribute to enhancing human beings’ happiness, no one in the world can find fault with them.” North Korea continues to deny preparations for a long-range missile launch, and insists that it is preparing to launch a satellite

According to a researcher at the South Korean Agency for Defense Development, if North Korea were to launch a satellite, “given the size of the rocket, the satellite will likely be a low-orbit device,” and low-orbit devices usually need to be fired toward either the North or South Pole in order to successfully reach orbit. This would mean North Korea would need to use Chinese, Russian, Japanese or South Korean airspace.

JAPANESE FIRM, DPRK MISSILES
On February 26, Japanese police raided Toko Boeki, a Tokyo trading company with ties to the DPRK residents’ association in Japan. The company is suspected of trying to export magnetic measuring instruments that could be used to manufacture missiles to North Korea via a third country.

DPRK MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
It was reported on February 5 that North Korea’s new 3G cellular network, built by the Egyptian company Orascom Telecom, has been very popular. Orascom Telecom Chairman Naguib Sawiris stated, that in the first two weeks of service, “so far we have about 6,000 applications. The important point is that they are normal citizens, not the privileged or military generals or party higher-ups. For the first time, they have been able to go to a shop and get a mobile phone.”

DPRK SPORTS
North Korea’s soccer squad defeated South Arabia 1-0 as it moved closer to the World Cup finals. The North now has seven points in Group 2, after four games, and is in second place, with only South Korea having more points. North Korea has not been in the World Cup finals since 1966.

KIM JONG IL BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS
Kim Jong Il’s 67th birthday was marked on both sides of the DMZ. In the North, ceremonies were held throughout the country on February 16, and special rations were provided to the people of the country, with extra noodles, rice and other grains given out to mark the day.

In South Korea, the Abductees’ Family Union marked the day by flying 100,000 leaflets with North Korean currency and criticisms of the North’s leader. South Korean authorities announced plans to investigate, as it is illegal for South Koreans to possess North Korean bank notes without permission.

DPRK SUCCESSION
More rumors were heard in February concerning who might succeed Kim Jong Il as leader of the North Korean regime. Kim’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un has reportedly registered as a candidate for the March 8 parliamentary elections, which would launch his political career. In addition, an editorial marking Kim Jong Il’s 67th birthday stressed the “inheritance of bloodline of Mount Paektu,” further stoking rumors that one of Kim’s sons may be next in line.

DPRK CENSUS
Results of a preliminary census by the United Nations Population Fund were released in February. According to the data, there were 24.05 million North Koreans as of October last year, with 11.72 million males and 12.33 million females. South Pyongan Province was the most populous, with 4.05 residents. 3.26 million people reside in the North’s capital, Pyongyang. This census, conducted by the United Nations Population Fund, was the first in 15 years to be conducted in North Korea.

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The DPRK food situation: Too early to break out the champagne

Wednesday, February 18th, 2009

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
Asia Pacific Bulletin
No. 27, February 5, 2009

Abstract
North Korea has suffered chronic hunger problems for two decades. A famine in the 1990s killed up to one million people and shortages have remained endemic. Most observers believe that the recent harvest is the best in years, but even under optimistic scenarios, food-related distress is likely to continue. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland discuss North Korea’s current food situation and the prospects for the future.

Download the full paper in PDF here

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Remittances to DPRK grow

Tuesday, February 10th, 2009

From the Choson Ilbo:

The number of North Korean refugees who remit money to their families in the North is rising. “Some 15,000 North Korean refugees have settled in the country, and over 6,000 of them are remitting money to North Korea,” a government official said. “We understand the size of the remittances is also growing.” An official with a refugee organization said there must be more than 10,000 who remit money to their families in the North.

If some 6,000 North Korean refugees here send money North, and a refugee remits US$1,000 a year, some $6 million is sent to North Korea per year. To that should be added 20,000-30,000 of the 100,000 North Koreans estimated to live in China.

Remittance routes are clandestine. Money is remitted to a Chinese broker, who contacts another in North Korea, who pays the recipient with his own money and settles the account with the Chinese broker later, leaving no documentary trail.

Currencies are usually American dollars and Chinese yuan. Commissions range between 15 and 20 percent, according to sources. “Remittances through brokers designated by North Koreans generally reach the recipient without a hitch, but Chinese brokers contacted in China are liable to steal the money,” a refugee said. The brokers handle tens of millions of dollars and are linked to organized gangs.

In the past, remittances required enormous bribes. First a man had to be sent to North Korea to bribe guards, with commissions exceeding 40 percent. But with the emergence of remittance brokers and the establishment of an organized system, the amount of money that reaches North Korean families has increased substantially.

The North Korean won is practically worthless in international exchange. A North Korean workers’ average salary was between W2,500 and 3,000 as of the end of 2008. Given that US$1 is traded at W3,200, $1,000 is the equivalent of 100 years’ worth of earnings and buys two apartments in places like Chongjin, North Hamgyeong Province, or Hamhung, South Hamgyeong Province.

In the past, the DPRK has promoted remittances—particularly to Koreans repatriated from Japan and their families.  The DPRK government then extracted its share of these funds by offering western goods for sale in hard currency shops at inflated prices.

The DPRK could do worse at promoting its legitimacy than to adopt the same policy in regards to remittances from every other country.  If the DPRK allowed remittances to flow through official channels, the government could simply extract a service fee equal to or slightly below the black market rate.  That is a win-win (except for the smugglers).

UPDATE: Japanese goods were (are?) historically sold at the Ragwan Deaprtment Store next to the Changwang Hotel (North-West of the Central District).

Another point to consider is the unfortunate role of politics in preventing the adoption of efficiency-enhancing economic reforms.  In the case of remittances, the DPRK would certainly have political problems with letting defectors send money to their relatives back home.  Under this particular constraint smuggling might be the next best option.  Since the operation is clandestine, the government does not have to acknowledge it exists, yet at the same time people can receive their remittancs and (some part of) the governance structure collects “taxes”.  

What “taxes”? The few people who are carrying out the financial transactions will have pay decent protection money to a sponsor high in the food chain.  The work is risky for numerous reasons, but we know some important people are behind it becuase the operation requires managers to keep enough hard currency on hand to cover the monthy/anual remittance payments from 6,000+ defectors. 

Read the full article here:
Refugees’ Remittances to N.Korea ‘Growing’
Choson Ilbo
2/10/2009

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Korea Business Consultants Newsletter (1/09)

Wednesday, February 4th, 2009

Korea Business Consultants has published their January newsletter.

Here is a link to the PDF.

Topics covered:
New Year Joint Editorial
Year of DPRK-China friendship
UNDP to resume DPRK operations
Buddhist Leader to Head DPRK’s ROK Affairs
DPRK Railroad Engineers Study in Russia
Housing Construction Progresses Apace
Orascom Opens Bank in Pyongyang
DPRK Tackles Clothing Shortage
“DPRK Harvest Best in Years”
China to Invest in NK Coal
US$ 3.75 Million in Australian Aid for DPRK
The Principles of the DPRK’s Foreign Trade
ROK Farmers Send Rice to DPRK
New SNG Kaesong Plant Idle
“Inter-Korean Trade Slides Due to Weak ROK Won”
ROK to Build Nursery in Kaesong Complex
DPRK Opens Consulate in Dandong
DPRK, China Foreign Officials Meet
Seoul Forum Highlights DPRK Films
“NK Martial Arts Team Best in World”
PUST Opening Delayed
DPRK TV Takes Note of Park Ji-sung
The Korean War

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Assessment of the 2008 DPRK economy, outlook for 2009

Monday, February 2nd, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
ICNK Forum No. 09-2-2-1
2/2/2009

ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY FOR 2008

In the 2008 North Korean New Year’s Joint Editorial, Pyongyang established the year 2012 as “The Year of the Perfect Strong and Prosperous Nation,” while labeling 2008, “The Year of Turnabout,” and, “The Year of the Betterment of the Livelihoods of the People.” As the year marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the regime projected a highly motivated façade, but there was no sign of new changes in the North’s economic policies.

Faced with the inability to produce any substantial results in the realm of international economic cooperation, North Korean authorities focused on how to put a positive spin on international conditions that were tied to the progress of 6-Party Talks. However, no visible measures appeared to emerge. Internally, North Korea’s chronic supply shortages drove further disparities between official and market pricing and monetary exchange rates as authorities were unable to stabilize the domestic economy. The growing global economic instability also caused economic policy makers to act more conservatively.

In 2008, North Korea’s food production in 2008 amounted to 4.31 million tons, recording a 7.5 percent increase over the previous year, while energy production is estimated to have grown by approximately 10 percent. Through joint development projects for North Korea’s underground resources, the North received raw materials for light industries (soap and shoes) amounting to 70 million USD in 2007, and 10 million last year. In addition, DPRK-PRC trade and inter-Korean economic cooperation both grew (DPRK-PRC trade increased significantly, while North-South cooperation grew only slightly), but it is difficult to measure the extent to which these increases impacted the North’s economy.

It appears that overall, North Korean trade and industry has improved since 2007, and the 2008 economic growth rate was positive. However, when estimating the North’s economic growth rate in light of the quickly rising exchange rate for South Korean won, DPRK economic growth for 2008 could be seen as a negative value.

While North Korea’s overall industrial production grew in 2008, when compared to previous years, and the primary reason for such was the refurbishment of equipment in most stable industries, development assistance and heavy oil aid as part of the 6-Party Talks, the provision of raw materials for light industries by South Korea, and the rise in prices on goods internationally.

Because of favorable weather conditions and increased production of fertilizer in the North, the agricultural sector showed a relative increase in production in 2008, despite the suspension of fertilizer aid from South Korea. Grain production was up 300 thousand tons, for an estimated total of 4.31 million tons last year. Boosted energy production was helped by improvements in hydroelectrical production and heavy oil tied to 6-Party Talks, and the provision of parts and materials for power plants, which considerably increased power production, at least in the first half of the year. This played an important role in the increase in industrial operations, as well. As electrical supply is the biggest obstacle to raising the operating rate of production facilities, more power resulted in overall production increases.

The construction sector has focused efforts on Pyongyang, and in particular on efforts to improve the lifestyles of its residents. Housing (averaging 20,000 family dwellings per year), restaurants, waterworks, roads, and other construction and repair projects have been aggressively undertaken.

North Korean authorities emphasized the science and technology sector in 2008, although it appears that the actual impact of this campaign topped out at the supply of some practical technology and the at production facilities, power plants, and other factories, and the promotion of modernization and normalization of industrial production.

At the mid-point of 2008, inter-Korean trade had grown by 1.2 percent compared to the same period the year prior, reaching 1.82 billion USD. The freeze on the annual supply of 400 thousand tons of rice and between 300~350 thousand tons of fertilizer from the South had a negative impact on the North’s food situation. On the other hand, DPRK-PRC trade from January-November 2008 jumped by 29.3 percent over the same period in 2007, considerably more than the 14.9 percent recorded in 2005, the 14.9 percent seen in 2006 and the 16.1 percent rise last year.

The increase natural resource development and improvements in core industries, the possibility of expansion of markets, and the advantage of low-cost labor give China, Russia, and other adjacent countries positive perceptions regarding investment in the North, and as Pyongyang continued to expand economic cooperation with these countries last year, it also improved economic relations with Europe as well as Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.

PROSPECTS FOR THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY IN 2009

If one looks at North Korea’s domestic economic policies, one will see that basically, in the 2009 New Year’s Joint Editorial, North Korea’s domestic and international economic policies have not undergone any significant changes. However, in order to accomplish the goal of establishing a Strong and Prosperous Country by 2012, it is expected that all efforts will be poured into reviving the economy. Based on the Joint Editorial, this year, the North’s economic policy is not one of reform due to transformation of the outside environment, but rather a revival of pas, conservatively grounded economic policy. Regarding international economic relations, the 2008 Joint Editorial specifically stressed the building of an economically strong nation based on the principle of the development of external economic relations, but there was no particular reference to this in 2009.

In 2009, resolution of agricultural problems was again prioritized as the task most necessary for the realization of a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012. Along with this, the North’s economic policy for 2009 will prioritize the modernization and normalization of the economy’s ‘vanguard sector’, and it is expected to continue to strengthen efforts to revive the economy. As it continues to work toward creating an environment in which it can concentrate efforts on the building of an ‘Economically Strong Nation’, North Korean authorities are expected to issue new measures to strengthen the economic management system, including the planned industrial system, the distribution and circulation framework, and an effective market management system. The North is also expected to further emphasize efforts to modernize the People’s Economy, as it considers modern vanguard science and technology to be the answer to recovery from its current economic crisis.

There is a possibility North Korea’s foreign trade, including that with China, will shrink in the future, as its external economic activity is hit by the current international economic situation and the rising value of the U.S. dollar and Chinese Yuan. Just as was seen in 2008, with the shrinking growth of the Chinese economy, DPRK-PRC trade will be hit negatively. Progress on the rail link being promoted between Rajin and Hasan, as well as the redevelopment of the Rajin Harbor is also expected to face difficulties. This is likely to lead to further efforts by the North to expand economic cooperation with the EU and Middle Eastern countries.

Despite North Korea’s removal from the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring states, because sanctions against North Korea still remain, the North will need to make progress in non-proliferation, human rights improvement, and marketization in order to see real economic benefits from improved relations with the Obama administration. However, because of a lack of confidence regarding market reform, differing stances between the U.S. and DPRK on denuclearization, and deeply rooted mistrust, there is a more than a small chance that progress on the nuclear issue will be stretched out over the long term.

Looking at prospects for the main domestic economic sectors of North Korea, firstly, the amount of development in the energy and mining sectors could take a favorable turn if there is movement on the nuclear issue, and this would have an overall positive effect on the entire industrial sector. The drop-off of demand due to the international financial crisis could have a considerable impact on the North’s mining sector, making it difficult to see much growth past the levels seen in 2008.

In 2009, the supply-demand situation regarding North Korean grains is expected to improve over last year. North Korea requires 5.2 million tons of grain, and is expected to harvest 4.9~5 million tons, falling only 200~300 thousand tons short. This is an improvement over the 790 thousand ton shortfall the North suffered in 2008. However, the actual amount of grains distributed to the people may not increase, because some of the 2008 shortage was relieved through the release of emergency rice reserves, and so some portion of the 2009 harvest will need to be set aside to restock that emergency reserve.

In the manufacturing sector, the increase in electrical production and increase in large-scale equipment operations in metalworks, chemicals, construction materials, and other heavy industries, the supply of materials for light industries as well as fertilizer will be extended, but the reduction of inter-Korean economic cooperation and foreign capital will mean a reduction in the ability to import equipment and materials, making it difficult to meet 2008-level growth in industrial production numbers.

In the construction sector, housing construction in Pyongyang and other areas will not fall off suddenly, but with the anniversary of the founding of the Party Museum upcoming and the impact of the furious construction activity that has been underway, it is likely to slow down in 2009. With North Korean authorities restricting private-sector economic activity, controlling the size of markets, and other measures controlling commerce in the North are expected to strengthen, which will considerably restrict anti-socialist commercial activity. To what extent official commerce networks will absorb this activity will be pivotal.

Trade between North Korea and China is expected to shrink as the global economic crisis drives down the price of raw materials that the North exports to the PRC. Following the North Korean authorities’ enforcement of a measure reducing inter-Korean economic cooperation on December 1, 2008, without improvement in the North Korean nuclear issue, and in U.S.-DPRK relations cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang will gradually shrivel. Trade with other countries is also expected to fall as a result of the current global economic situation. Therefore, reduction of inter-Korean economic cooperation, North Korea’s principle provider of foreign capital, and sluggish trade between Beijing and Pyongyang will weaken the North’s foreign reserves supply-and-demand situation.

As for the investment sector, if North Korea is to succeed in its push to build a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012, it must attract foreign investment through aggressive policies of opening its economy. In order to improve the investment environment, Pyongyang must work more aggressively to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, but despite the demands of the surrounding countries, it is likely North Korea will insist on recognition as a nuclear power, making it difficult to expect progress on this front. Therefore, foreign investors’ interest in North Korean markets, and North Korea’s assention into international financial institutions through improved relations with the United States, appears to be a long way off.

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Russia to complete fuel supplies to DPRK this month

Monday, January 19th, 2009

According to RIA Novosti:

Russia is to supply a total of 200,000 metric tons of fuel to North Korea as part of a denuclearization deal. Moscow hopes that in exchange for heating oil deliveries Pyongyang will complete the phasing out of its Yongbyon nuclear complex.

The full article can be found here:
Russia to complete fuel supplies to N.Korea in Jan.
RIA Novosti
1/16/2009

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DPRK agriculture update

Thursday, January 15th, 2009

On May 12, 2008, The DPRK formally asked the UN World Food Program for emergency food assistance.  In June 2008, the UN WFP/FAO launched the “Rapid Food Security Assessment”.  They confirmed…

…a significant deterioration in food security in most parts of the country.3 Close to three quarters of respondents have reduced their food intake, over half are reportedly eating only two meals per day (down from three) and dietary diversity is extremely poor among two thirds of the surveyed population. Most families have daily consumption consisting of only of maize, vegetables and wild foods, a diet lacking protein, fats and micronutrients.

and

FAO forecasts that the October/November 2008 harvest will be 70-75 percent of an average year’s output due to inadequate fertilizer supplies, meaning the current food shortages will extend into the next agricultural year. The risk that the country will again suffer summer flooding remains, which could lead to further crop destruction and/or require general food distributions of emergency food aid. In such an event, WFP will have contingency stocks available in the country to rapidly respond. (UN Operations Report)

The UN launched a coordinated response lasting from September 2008-November 2009 which targets over 6 million people with 600,000 metric tons of food assistance.

But according to the Daily NK (Jan 13, 2009):

According to North Korean authorities, the total agricultural yield including rice, corn, potatoes and others reached its highest point since the food shortages of the 1990s this year, at 4.7 million tons.

According to the Joongang Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper, a Chinese official involved in the agricultural business who had just gotten back from North Korea quoted a North Korean official as saying that they “had presumed the failure of last year’s harvest due to low temperatures in the Spring and Fall, but in fact recorded the highest level in recent years, 4.7 million tons.”

Regarding this, a researcher from the Korea Rural Economic Institute, Kwon Tae Jin said in a telephone conversation with the Daily NK that, “When I visited Pyongyang in December of last year, Ri Il Sok, Director of the Foreign Cooperation Team in the North Korean Ministry of Agriculture said to me that grain output last year was 4.67 million tons, up by 17 percent over a year ago.” (Daily NK)

Andrei Lankov, writing in tomorrow’s Asia Times (Jan 16), confirms the Daily NK story:

These worries seemed well-founded and the journalists who penned them were often among the most knowledgeable on North Korean issues. Furthermore, most of these stories were based on reports produced by reputable international organizations. By early September, North Korean watchers agreed almost unanimously that a great disaster was set to strike North Korea this coming winter.

Now it has become clear, however, that these were false alarms. The predicted famine has not materialized and does not appear likely to do so in the near future. North Korea has had its best harvest in years, and until next summer no North Korean is likely to starve to death – although some may remain severely malnourished.

This is good news. However, the contrast between the reality and recent predictions is remarkably stark. In recent years, we have come to believe that there are at least a few things about secretive North Korea which are known for sure. Yet the recent turnaround of events has again shed light on the severe limits of outside information about the Hermit Kingdom.

Lankov offers a couple of scenarios that could explain how this happened:

For example, why did reputable international organizations make such a serious mistake in estimating the North’s food shortage? It cannot be ruled out that international observers were deliberately misled by their North Korean minders. Perhaps foreign observers were shown the worst fields because the North wanted more food aid then would otherwise be available?

It also seems that some basic assumptions about North Korean agriculture are wrong. Unless the 2008 harvest was the result of incredible luck, it seems to indicate that fertilizer is far less important than previously believed. It is possible that North Korean farmers have devised strategies to deal with fertilizer shortages.

The false alarms of a disastrous famine in North Korea are a sober reminder that when dealing with the world’s most secretive society, predictions should be treated with the greatest caution.

To learn more, read the following documents/stories:
Emergency Operation Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Title: 10757.0 – Emergency Assistance to Population Groups Affected by Floods and Rising Food and Fuel Prices
UN World Food Program

2008 Agricultural Yield of North Korea
Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
1/13/2009

North Korea reaps a rich harvest
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
1/16/2009

North Korean Economy Watch topic archives:
Food, AgricultureForeign Aid Statistics

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Australia grants aid to DPRK

Tuesday, January 13th, 2009

According to the AAP via The Age (Australia):

Australia has granted $3.75 million in humanitarian aid to North Korea.

Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith said the funds comprised $2 million for the World Food Program for emergency food for North Korea, $1 million for Unicef for emergency water and water sanitation supplies and $750,000 for the Red Cross.

Read the full story here:
Australia grants $3.75m aid to N Korea
The Age
1/13/2009

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Rice on the way, but still no tangerines

Wednesday, January 7th, 2009

Although the South’s annual tangerine shipment to the DPRK has been suspended reduced (and Seould has suspended direct financial support), food aid from other South Korean groups continues unabated.  According to Yonhap:

The Korea Peasants League said they have arranged to have a ship collect rice from across the country at ports along the coast. The boat left the southern island of Jeju on Monday and will depart from the port of Incheon, west of Seoul, on Friday. It will likely arrive at the North Korean port of Nampo on the same day if weather conditions at sea are normal, they said.

Non-governmental aid has continued amid the political stalemate. The South Korean government suspended its customary food and fertilizer aid to the impoverished state last year as North Korea cut off dialogue and intensified an anti-Seoul media tirade.

A Seoul-based Buddhist organization, the Jungto Society, shipped food aid worth 380 million won (US$293,436) intended for mothers and children in North Korea last week.

This week’s shipment by the Peasants League includes some 60 tons of rice donated by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, a labor umbrella group. The union group and the farmers are calling for legislation that would implement the regular delivery of rice aid to North Korea.

Read the full article here:
S. Korean farmers to send rice to N. Korea amid frozen relations
Yonhap
1/7/09

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