Archive for the ‘Foreign aid statistics’ Category

Impact of the ROK’s May 24 economic sanctions against the DPRK

Monday, May 31st, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-05-27-1
5/27/2010

On May 24, the South Korean government announced, in response to the Cheonan incident, the cessation of inter-Korean exchanges and other sanctions against Pyongyang. These measures will directly impact the North, costing it 250~300 million USD. According to the Ministry of Unification, North Korea earned 245.19 million USD from inter-Korean cooperative schemes not related to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. This does not include additions monies for customs fees, transportation costs, mediation fees and other incidentals.

About 254 million USD worth of goods were produced on commission in the North after raw materials or partially manufactured products were sent from the South. 10~15 percent of this (25-38 million USD) covers labor and other costs. Therefore, by halting all exchanges and cooperative schemes other than the Kaesong Industrial Complex, North Korea stands to lose at least 200 million USD.

In particular, as the South has banned the import of North Korean sand and marine products, both known to be money-earners for the North’s military, it appears these sanctions have the potential to really pressure Pyongyang. In addition, preventing North Korean ships from using South Korean waters could cost an additional nine million USD. An additional 6 billion won-worth of government-related projects for the North has also been suspended. Ultimately, the cessation of inter-Korean exchange will cost North Korea 250~300 million USD.

The Korea Defense Institute estimates that through inter-Korean projects, tourism, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex, North Korea earned 180 million USD in 2004, but that jumped to 233 million USD in 2005, 341 million in 2006, and 534 million USD in 2007, before falling to 490 million in 2008, and 347 million USD last year.

It appears that the reduction in foreign currency earned by the North has somewhat impacted its economy. Now, the cessation of inter-Korean contacts means further reduction in the North’s access to foreign currency, possibly causing severe shortages of daily necessities because of a lack of trade and insufficient production capacity. If inter-Korean trade ceases, the North can no longer earn foreign capital from Seoul, and this could cause DPRK-PRC trade to drop off, if the North is unable to cover its bills.

It will also cause a loss of jobs for all those North Koreans involved in consignment production, fishing, farming, and other areas of the economy hit by the freeze in trade with the South. As the processing-on-consignment business has reached 30~35 million USD per year, labor involved in the industry nears that of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and could mean the loss of as many as 40,000 jobs.

While the government has decided to maintain the Kaesong Industrial Complex, it plans to downsize the ROK manpower by 40-50 percent. The reason given is to be able to ensure the safety of the workers, but if the number of workers is cut by 50 percent, this cannot help but have a huge impact on production, raising concerns with North and South Korean employees alike.

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Some recent sanctions statistics

Tuesday, May 25th, 2010

According to Reuters:

The state-run Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) said North Korea’s trade, including commerce with South Korea, fell 9.7 percent to $5.09 billion last year from 2008.

Excluding trade with the South, foreign commerce feel 10.5 percent to $3.41 billion last year, KOTRA said in a statement.

It said trade with China, the North’s sole supporter, amounted to about $2.7 billion.

The prospect of further sanctions as a result of the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel by a suspected North Korean torpedo in March would slow trade even more, KOTRA said.

“North Korea’s trade this year is seen shrinking further and depending more on China due to the U.N.’s continuous sanctions against the North and possibilities of further measures,” KOTRA said.

North Korea does not announce its own trade data and KOTRA said it compiled the data from the agency’s overseas offices.

Last week, Seoul released the findings of a report which concluded that a North Korean submarine had fired a torpedo that sank the Cheonan corvette, killing 46 sailors.

South Korea has repeatedly said it would not strike back at the North, aware that would frighten away investors already jittery about the escalating tension on the divided peninsula.

Washington has called for an international response, which could range from fresh U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea, although those might be opposed by China, to a statement of condemnation by the world body.

A range of international sanctions have been levied against North Korea in recent years for its missile and nuclear tests.

And according to Leon Sigal in 38 North:

… North Korean trade increased in the two years following the 2006 UN sanctions. Inter-Korean trade totaled $1.8 billion in 2007—about a 33 percent jump from 2006—then rose again to $1.9 billion in 2008. China trade also grew to roughly the same level in 2007, then shot up to $2.78 billion in 2008. North Korea’s total trade increased by more in 2008 than in any other year over the past decade and its economy grew by 3.7 percent according to the Bank of Korea.  

The most recent UN sanctions enacted in 2009 have had similar results. In response to the threat of sanctions, Pyongyang went ahead with a test-launch of a long-range rocket and a second, more successful, nuclear test. The UN Security Council, in response, enacted Resolution 1874 imposing sanctions on the DPRK. The prime target of the new sanctions was the bank accounts of North Korean entities involved in nuclear and missile trafficking. Given the many ways to circumvent the banking system, however, and the reluctance of governments to interpret Resolution 1874 as liberally as the United States did, it is still unclear how much of an impediment this will prove to be. As the Congressional Research Service concluded, “[F]inancial sanctions aimed solely at the DPRK’s prohibited activities are not likely to have a large monetary effect.”

Luxury goods were also a focus of the most recent U.N. sanctions—in the dubious belief that consumerism is as rampant among privileged North Koreans as it is in Georgetown or that Kim Jong Il’s hold on the elite can be loosened by denying them Rolexes or Mercedes imported from China. A Congressional Research Service analysis of Chinese trade statistics for 2008 indicates that Beijing’s exports of luxury consumer goods to North Korea was between $100 million and $160 million, mostly financed by Chinese credit. That trade is not likely to have dropped enough to make any appreciable difference on the loyalty of elites long accustomed to tight belts and even tighter social controls.

Again, the overall economic impact of the sanctions appears to have been limited. Overall, according to U.S. estimates, North Korea’s economy again grew at a 3.7 percent rate in 2009,[7] probably because of a more bountiful harvest. While North Korean exports to China are difficult to estimate because of the introduction of the new currency, imports from China in 2009 dropped sharply to below the 2007 level. Some of the drop was due to the global recession and price deflation.[8] Trade with South Korea fell 8.5 percent in 2009 but still totaled $1.7 billion—five times what it was a decade ago. Trade with Japan was cut to a pittance, though it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which cash remittances from Koreans in Japan still manage to circumvent sanctions. For instance, Tokyo discovered that the DPRK was exporting sanctioned food items such as mushrooms to China and they were then sold to Japan at higher prices. The only losers may have been Japanese consumers.

As for international cooperation to curb the North’s arms sales, the net effect is probably overstated. In 2005, even before sanctions were imposed, the global market for missiles—the big-ticket item—had dried up, as buyers like Iran and Pakistan opened their own production lines, although technological assistance still generated revenue for Pyongyang. Since the UN arms embargo, at least four shipments of arms have been interdicted. Their total value, never mind net profit, fell far short of the estimated $500 million a year North Korean arms sales are supposed to generate. How many of its exports evaded capture is not known.

Read the full stories here:
Sanctions hit North Korea’s crumbling economy: report
Reuters
Cheon Jong-woo
5/23/2010

Looking for Leverage in All the Wrong Places
38 North
Leon V. Sigal

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RoK ministries asked to suspend aid to DPRK

Wednesday, May 19th, 2010

According to the Donga Ilbo:

The Unification Ministry said Monday that it has asked ministries to suspend aid to North Korea requiring government budget.

The ministry had issued recommendations to delay the signing of new contracts and the shipment of materials to the North to companies involved in inter-Korean cooperation.

Ministry spokesman Chun Hae-sung said, “We sent official letters to 10 related ministries, including the Strategy and Finance Ministry, the Health and Welfare Ministry, and the Korea Forestry Service Friday asking for the temporary suspension of assistance projects for North Korea run by those ministries.”

“This measure has been taken in light of the North’s seizure of South Korean real estate in the Mount Kumgang area and the grave nature of inter-Korean relations of late.”

Seoul has also begun efforts to survey inter-Korean projects conducted by the 10 ministries. Last year, the ministries ran a budget of six billion won (5.2 million U.S. dollars) to assist the North.

The Unification Ministry also contacted companies involved in inter-Korean cooperation, excluding those operating at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, to refrain from making new contracts, investment and visits Tuesday and Wednesday last week.

With analysts saying Seoul has taken a series of measures in the wake of the Cheonan sinking, a Unification Ministry source said, “Since the situation in inter-Korean relations has gotten grave and highly treacherous, we informed related ministries as a preemptive measure to reduce risks.”

Unification Minister Hyun In-taek also told reporters Monday, “We can hardly say that we’ve taken any practical countermeasures.”

Read the full story here:
Ministries Asked to Suspend Aid to N. Korea
Donga Ilbo
5/18/2010

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UN to send review mission to DPRK

Tuesday, May 18th, 2010

According to the AFP:

The United Nations will send a team to North Korea in May to assess how aid funds have been used in the country, a spokeswoman from the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs told AFP Tuesday.

“A working level UN mission will go to DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) in late May to review the implementation of central emergency response fund (CERF) funded projects there,” Elisabeth Byrs said, in response to queries from AFP.

“The mission will comprise four UN staff from OCHA and from the CERF secretariat,” she said, confirming Japanese media reports.

The team would meet heads of UN agencies on site, in order to “better understand how funds provided by CERF are used,” said Byrs.

The spokeswoman did not know if the team would also meet North Korean authorities.

The UN has allocated eight million dollars in 2010 in emergency relief funds for North Korea, which has suffered more than two decades of natural disasters.

While UN agencies such as the World Food Programme, Unicef and the World Health Organisation have offices in North Korea, visits by UN missions to the secretive communist nation are extremely rare.

In the past months, however, high-level UN officials have been travelling to the country, a sign that Pyongyang may be opening up, a source close to the UN said.

UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe visited the country in February, and in April UN health agency chief Margaret Chan also made a trip there.

Chan said following the visit that North Korea’s health system would be the “envy” for most developing countries although it faced challenges.

“Based on what I have seen, I can tell you they have something that most other developing countries would envy,” the WHO director general told journalists, despite reports of renewed famine in parts of the country.

Good Friends, a Seoul-based welfare group with contacts in the North, had said in February that 2,000 people had starved to death there this winter.

Well that was not very subtle.

Read the full story here:
UN to send review mission to North Korea
AFP
5/18/2010

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Inter-Korean trade nearly doubles to $200m in March

Saturday, May 1st, 2010

According to Yonhap:

Trade between South and North Korea nearly doubled last month compared with a year ago amid a nascent economic recovery in the South, a government report showed Wednesday.

Inter-Korean trade jumped 88.5 percent from a year ago to US$204.03 million in March, according to the report by the Korea Customs Service. Compared with two years ago, before the South Korean economy was hit by the global financial crisis, trade between the two Koreas rose 29.7 percent in the reported month.

South Korea imports a range of labor-intensive goods such as clothes and watches from the joint Kaesong industrial complex in North Korea, as well as seafood and some agricultural produce. North Korea imports textiles such as cotton and other staple fabrics, along with electronics products including computers and machinery.

South Korea’s outbound shipments to the North came to $84.36 million while its imports from the communist country amounted to $119.67 million. This marked the highest trade deficit for the South in 17 months at $35.31 million, the report said.

The surge came on the back of an economic turnaround in the South. Inter-Korean trade did not seem to be affected by ongoing political tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

During the first quarter of this year, two-way trade soared 64.3 percent from a year earlier to $526.72 million, it said.

Bilateral trade has increased steadily over the past decade from $328.65 million in 1999 to $651.68 million in 2002 and surpassing the $1 billion mark for the first time in 2005.

Inter-Korean trade reached $1.79 billion in 2007 and peaked at $1.82 billion the following year before falling slightly to $1.66 billion last year.

Read the full story here:
Inter-Korean trade nearly doubles to $200 mln in March
Yonhap
4/28/2010

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An update on the DPRK’s economic relations

Sunday, April 18th, 2010

Francoise Nicolas has written a data-driven survey on the DPRK’s changing trade and investment relationships.  The paper can be downloaded here (PDF).  This paper has also been added to my DPRK Economic Statistics page.  Here is the paper’s conclusion:

This brief analysis of the current external economic relations of the DPRK leads to a number of conclusions.  First, the North Korean economy maintains very limited exposure to the outside world and, as a result, to external influence.  In terms of volume North Korea’s trade is miniscule, even in relation with the size of its economy.  This is also the case for foreign direct investment inflows.

Secondly, although North Korea is less isolated than often thought, its trade and investment flows are very heavily polarized both geographically and sectorally, limiting de facto their potential impact.  In contrast to what was the case during the Soviet era, North Korea’s main economic partners are not ideological partners but neighboring economies, namely China and South Korea.  They are major partners in trade as well as in FDI.  Russia still plays a non negligible role but is in no way comparable to what was the case before the demise of the Soviet bloc.

Thirdly, North Korea’s external economic relations are very much dictated by political considerations.  Politics accounts both for the choice of partners and for the nature of the economic relations.

Fourthly, and more importantly, the very distinct nature of the DPRK’s connection with the rest of the world, and primarily with its two major economic partners, sets it apart from other transition economies and in particular from China, but also from Vietnam.  In the case of North Korea, economic openness, although announced time and again as an official objective, cannot be seen as an instrument for enhancing competitiveness or as part of a development strategy.  The recent, renewed signs of reform in the direction of increased openness should thus be interpreted with utmost caution.

Fifthly, the structure of the country’s external trade is indicative of an economy in survival mode.  The substantial aid component in the inter-Korean trade and FDI relationship undoubtedly further substantiates such a claim.  Surprisingly, relations between North Korea and China are more often based on a market-economy logic, although this only holds true for trade flows and not FDI flows.  The Probability of change through trade appears still very limited.

Lastly, the role the European Union may play in the region remains very much an open question but the margin of maneuver is limited.  Given the state of play described earlier, it would be extremely naive to believe that a European engagement strategy vis-à-vis the DPRK could contribute to economic change.  In addition the country’s lack of attractiveness for potential investors is a further obstacle.  However, the persistent uncertainty and the lack of visibility over the political and economic evolution of the DPRK should not deter European investment in the region and, far to the contrary, should provide a strong incentive to closely monitor the economic moves made in Pyongyang.

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Handling the Next North Korean Famine

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

According to the Wall Street Journal:

As severe hunger looms, the question for donors is whether to resume food aid to North Korea and, if so, how to ensure the assistance reaches the people most in need and is not diverted to the military. Proper monitoring is essential. Some critics think it would be impossible to monitor food deliveries, as the North Korean government would simply reject such a condition, fearing foreigners would learn too much about the world’s most secretive state.

But there is some precedent for meaningful, if not optimal, monitoring of food aid. For instance, the United Nations’ World Food Program conducted an average of 388 monitoring visits a month in 2005, and 440 a month in 2004. For much of these two years, U.N. employees had access to 160 of the country’s 203 counties and districts. More than half of the World Food Program’s international staff, numbering 32 at the end of 2005, were directly engaged in food aid monitoring during the year, and some of them spoke Korean. Such monitoring meant at least some of the young children, the elderly, the disabled, and pregnant and nursing women received food aid.

The North Korean government can hardly afford another period of severe nation-wide hunger. The country’s leaders know that at some point a social explosion is possible as people become desperate. During the years of the famine in the 1990s, North Koreans were still so brainwashed by government propaganda that they died in massive numbers at home, waiting for rations that never came, not letting go of their faith in Pyongyang to save them. North Koreans are now better informed about the outside world, and know whom to blame for their hunger. The survivors have learned that it is foolish, even dangerous, to blindly depend on the government to deliver food.

This means renewed massive hunger could pose a risk to the continuity of the North Korean government. As the Dear Leader, Kim Jong Il, works to ensure another leadership succession to his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, he should consider that North Koreans may not endure another epoch of massive hunger as quietly as they did the last one.

That political imperative may force Pyongyang to act sooner, rather than later. Given that, the foreign-aid community can—and should—insist that aid workers be allowed to properly monitor aid distribution according to standard international protocols for transparency and accountability. The North Korean government must also pledge to end discrimination in government distribution of food in favor of ruling party officials, the military, the intelligence services and the police—and against the “hostile” classes deemed politically disloyal to the government. Otherwise, most donors will remain reluctant to give food aid to North Korea. And that would be a tragedy, on a truly massive scale.

The DPRK  has yet to ask for assistance. 

Read the full story here:
Handling the Next North Korean Famine
Wall Street Journal
Kay Seok
4/13/2010

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ROK aid group to send food to DPRK

Tuesday, April 6th, 2010

According to the AFP:

A South Korean aid group said Tuesday it would send 300 tons of flour and other supplies to needy North Koreans this week amid reports that dire food shortages are worsening.

A ship carrying 60 containers of food, daily supplies and educational needs such as pencils will leave the western port of Incheon Saturday, said the Join Together Society.

“The shipment will benefit some 12,000 marginalised people at 50 orphanages and other institutions across the country,” society spokesman Seo Dong-Woo told AFP.

It includes 300 tons of wheat flour, 360,000 packs of soy milk and other foodstuffs, enough to feed 12,000 people for three months, he said, declining to disclose the cost.

South Korean officials and aid groups say the already severe food shortages are expected to worsen this year after a poor grain harvest in 2009.

A bungled currency revaluation last November has reportedly played havoc with distribution networks, aggravating food shortages and sparking inflation.

North Korea has relied on foreign aid to feed its people since a devastating famine in the 1990s killed hundreds of thousands.

Overseas donations for programmes run by the UN’s World Food Programme and others have fallen sharply because of the standoff over the North’s nuclear and missile programmes. Pyongyang has also rejected some aid.

South Korea’s government has since 2008 suspended annual shipments of fertiliser and food to the North amid rising tensions, but private aid groups continue to send shipments.

Read the full story here:
S.Korean aid group to send food to North
Associated Free Press
4/6/2010

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ROK’s planned food aid for DPRK tied up

Sunday, March 7th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

South Korea’s planned shipment of its first food aid to North Korea in years has hit a snag due to sourcing difficulties, an official said Saturday.

The South has been preparing to send 10,000 tons of corn to the impoverished neighbor since mid-January, right after Pyongyang accepted its aid offer made months earlier. The shipment would mark Seoul’s first food assistance to the North since President Lee Myung-bak took office in early 2008.

The government has since approved a 4 billion won (US$3.5 million) budget to fund the assistance and notified the North of a shipping route, based on a plan to buy corn in China and ship it directly to the North from there.

“Considering shipping costs, it would make the most sense to send Chinese corn” to the North, a government official said on customary condition of anonymity.

The official said, however, that the plan has faltered because of China’s “grain export quota,” which places restrictions on food exports in order to meet the country’s rising domestic demand.

The delay has raised concern that the planned aid may not be delivered by the time the North needs it the most — usually between March and May when food shortages in the country worsen — because it usually takes at least a month after the purchase is made for such to be delivered.

But the government official said that he believes the problem will be resolved soon, though he did not elaborate.

Read the full article here:
South Korea’s planned food aid for North Korea hits snag
Yonhap
3/6/2010

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RoK improving health care in DPRK

Thursday, March 4th, 2010

According to the Associated Press (via the Washington Post):

North Koreans are getting better medical treatment as the result of a joint program between the two Koreas that has trained thousands of doctors, provided modern equipment and renovated hospitals, the World Health Organization said Thursday.

Maternal mortality has declined by over 20 percent since 2005, and diarrhea cases and deaths in operations have also dropped, said Dr. Eric Laroche.

The World Health Organization has helped in the wide-ranging program, which started in 2006 and is funded by South Korea. It has cost a total of $30.2 million so far.

The program has trained more than 6,000 doctors and nurses in emergency obstetric care, newborn care and child illnesses, said Laroche, who assessed its progress in a four-day visit to North Korea.

The specialization marks a change in health strategy in North Korea, which has about 90,000 family doctors who care for about 130 families each, according to Laroche.

“They know each family one by one,” he said. But, he added, “they’re extremely keen to be trained.”

Laroche said hospital staff have been trained in hygiene and clinics have received better material for operations, blood transplants and other medical interventions.

Numerous hospitals have been renovated, and material has also been distributed to 1,200 rural clinics.

Between 2007 and 2009, the number of patients dying in operations fell 73.4 percent, said Laroche, citing a study by the University of Melbourne.

He declined to give an overall view of the health system in the isolated communist nation. But he said services were well-spread among cities and communities.

Read the full article here:
WHO: Korean cooperation boosting health in north
Associated Press (via Washington Post)
Elaine Engler
3/4/2010

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