DPRK Policies « North Korean Economy Watch

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DPRK preparing for jump in construction demand

Friday, August 14th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-8-13-1
2009-08-13

As North Korea continues to pursue the creation of a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012, it is now reportedly building a large-scale construction materials facility to meet expected growth in building demand. North Korean authorities have designated the Daedong River Tile Factory, visited by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il on the 13th of last month, as a large-scale construction materials distribution center, and expect the second stage of its construction to be complete by April 2012.

The Tongil Sinbo, a weekly North Korean publication, printed in its recent (July 18) edition that upon completion of the second stage of construction, the facility would be capable of producing 225 million cubic meters of tiles, shingles, plastic materials and other building supplies. The first stage of construction began in July 2003, and was only recently completed, after five years and nine months, opening on April 15. North Korea is expected to invest 10.5 billion Won (80.77 million USD) into completing the second stage of construction, a considerable investment in light of the troubles facing the North‘s economy.

Upon completion of the facility, taking up more than 225 thousand pyong, it will produce indoor and outdoor tile, polished marble tiles, composite glass tiles and other porcelain and plastic products, as well as pre-fabricated housing components and coal gas. According to the newspaper, it will also house its own electrical generator.

When Kim Jong Il visited the factory, located near the Chollima Steel Complex in South Pyeongan Province, he declared the site to “hold a critical role in the development of the country’s construction industry,” stating that upon completion of the second stage of construction, the factory would serve as a “large-scale base for all modern construction projects.”

North Korea is currently pressing ahead with large-scale redevelopment projects in Pyongyang and other major cities, with one goal being the construction of 100,000 new homes by the year 2012. The Workers’ Party of Korea newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, has called for all citizens to “make something from nothing” in an effort to build up each region. One point of interest to North Korea-watchers as this massive construction scheme unfolds is that a new position was created to oversee the project, and Kim’s third son, Kim Jong-un, was appointed.

Posted in 2012 Strong and Prosperous Nation (Kangsong Taeguk), Construction, Light Industry, Manufacturing | Comments Closed

DPRK aims to increase food rations

Wednesday, August 12th, 2009

Kim Jong il sets sights on increasing processed food rationing in order to improve the daily lives of the people
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-8-10-1
8/10/2009

North Korean authorities, recognizing that rationing of processed foods is directly linked to the daily lives of the residents of North Korea, are concentrating on a policy of increasing distribution as part of the campaign to build a ‘Strong and Prosperous Nation’ by 2012. The policy calls for the construction of regional food processing facilities throughout the country and using domestic ingredients for all processed foods. In addition, the government plans to undertake diversification of small-scale factories in order to produce soybean paste, soy sauce, cooking oil and other staples, as well as noodles, rice-cake and other foods, all kinds of side dishes, and alcoholic beverages.

This movement was announced in concurrence with Kim Jong Il’s visit to the Samilpo Special Products Factory and Store, both run by the military, on April 7, just two days after the North’s launch of a long-range rocket. This factory, on the bank of the Daedong River, produces over 350 kinds of edibles, including noodles, rice-cakes, oil, sweets, alcoholic drinks, processed meats and fish products. During his visit, Kim Jong Il is said to have stated, “Today, I am happier than during the launch of the Kwangmyeongseong 2,” emphasizing his interest in boosting food production.

On July 15, (North) Korean Central Broadcasting announced the formation of construction offices in Jagang, North Pyongan and other provinces to oversee the building of food production complexes, and the dispatch of “shock troops” to bolster construction efforts.

Recently, the construction of large-scale factories to produce foodstuffs out of each region’s local stock has been pursued in every province in the country. Even at the Cabinet level, a ’Production Workers’ Conference’ was held, bringing together responsible authorities and local production experts to discuss a course for quickly improving services provided to the general population.

In order to effectively implement the North’s policy of increasing rations of foodstuffs, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly issued an order to establish a Ministry of Foodstuff and Daily Necessities Industry.

As North Korea tries to implement this type of measure to boost production and rationing, failure to improve food shortage conditions and economic hardships while at the same time mobilizing the population in a drive to establish a Strong and Prosperous Nation has led to growing outcries among residents. North Korean authorities appear to be introducing these measures in order to placate these complaints.

Posted in 2012 Strong and Prosperous Nation (Kangsong Taeguk), Cabinet, Food, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Ministry of Foodstuff and Daily Necessities Industry, Supreme Peoples Assembly | Comments Closed

2012 plan extends to Sungri Motors

Thursday, July 16th, 2009

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s sole home-grown automaker seeks to expand its annual production capacity to 10,000 units by 2012, a level not reached since its peak in the 1970s, a pro-Pyongyang paper said Tuesday.

The Sungri Motor Complex, which started production in 1958, has gone downhill as the country suffered economic downturns and severe famine in the decades following the 1970s.

The Choson Sinbo, a Tokyo-based newspaper that relays Pyongyang’s position to the outside world, said the automaker is aspiring to return to its record production capacity by 2012, the target year for the country to become a “strong, prosperous and powerful nation.”

“As production decreased from the 70s, the workforce of the motor company fell to 75 percent of the peak years,” the paper said.

“During economic hardships in the late 90s, the company was close to not breathing. But now, anyone active in production is talking about the ‘promised revival,'” it said.

The paper noted North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s trip in March to the complex, located at the foot of Mt. Sungni in South Phyongan Province, during which he stressed that the “modernization and scientification of the complex” is the most important factor in increasing output.

Kim then “guaranteed” state support to introduce computer numerical control machines to the complex, it said.

The automaker started producing hundreds of trucks named “Sungri 58-type,” “Sungri 61-type” or “Jaju (independence) 64-type” in late April, but output is “still in their early stage,” the paper said.

North Korea seeks to build a “strong, prosperous and powerful nation” by 2012, the centenary of the birth year of Kim Il-sung, the nation’s founder and father of North Korea’s current leader, Kim Jong-il, who will turn 70 that year.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean automaker aims to return to peak production by 2012
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
7/14/2009

Other links:
1. Background on Sungri Motors here.

2. I believe this is the location of the Sungri Motor Plant. If anyone has evidence to the contrary, please let me know.

3. Read about another DPRK auto manufacturing plant here.

Posted in 2012 Strong and Prosperous Nation (Kangsong Taeguk), Automobiles, Manufacturing, Transportation | 1 Comment »

Pyongyang Strikes Back: North Korean Policies of 2002–08 and Attempts to Reverse “De-Stalinization from Below”

Wednesday, July 15th, 2009

Andrei Lankov
Asia Policy 8, July 2009
The National Bureau of Asian Research

Download the article (PDF) here.

Executive Summary
This article explains why the North Korean government has attempted to reassert state control over society—which had been eroding from 1994–2002—and offers predictions regarding the impact that this shift will likely have on North Korean society.

Main Argument
From 1994 to 2002 North Korean society changed tremendously: state-run industry collapsed, the rationing system ceased to function, and free-market activity, though still technically illegal or semi-legal, became most citizen’s major source of income. Although not initiated by the government, in 2002 some of these spontaneous changes won the belated and conditional approval of the regime.

The evidence emerging in the last three to four years demonstrates, however, that the North Korean government has chosen not to tolerate those changes. This policy of recrudescence, while economically self-destructive, makes political sense because the existence of an affluent and free South Korea makes North Korea far more insecure. The leadership in Pyongyang has reason to believe that any domestic liberal reform in North Korea would lead to a regime collapse.

Policy Implications
1. Pyongyang’s decision to reject reformist policies is based on a rational and well-informed assessment of North Korea’s domestic and international situation. Therefore, the outside world can do very little to influence the regime’s position, and thus there is no chance of meaningful reform in North Korea in the foreseeable future as long as the current regime remains in power.

2. Because the current policy makes sustainable economic growth impossible, the North Korean government will need to rely on stratagems to secure vital foreign aid, with the U.S. being one of the main (but not only) targets of these maneuvers. The “North Korean problem” will remain a part of the international landscape in the foreseeable future.

3. If the current attempt by the government at counter-reform fails, this failure will create additional avenues for influencing the North Korean government from within.

Download the article (PDF) here.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Black markets, Economic reform, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Political economy | 1 Comment »

DPRK market closure reports deemed rumor

Wednesday, July 8th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-7-8-1
7/8/2009

North Korea’s main wholesale market, in Pyongysong, was temporarily closed for just over a week during mid-April, but it has reportedly been open and operating normally since then. It was rumored, and reported [previously (see below)], that the Pyongysong Wholesale Market was shut down in mid-June. There was a report that officials felt the market had grown too large, and there was a plan to divide it into East and West Markets. However, reports of these plans have now been deemed nothing more than rumor.

A source in Kangdong-gun stated that there has been much talk of closing markets since the beginning of the year, but that no measures have been enforced and everything is operating normally. Another source reported that many traders are traveling to and from Sinuiju and Pyongysong, and that their numbers have been growing since the onset of summer. While rumors still abound regarding market closures, the source noted that there is significantly less talk of such measures compared to earlier in the year.

In January, North Korean authorities released a statement indicating that general markets would be transformed into farmers’ markets, and only open once every ten days. However, six months has already passed, and there has been no action taken. There have been no measures to transform even some of the largest markets, in Hyeryong, Hyesan, Musan and Sinuiju. That said, it is always possible that the North Korean authorities proceed with plans to close or transform the markets.

The majority of North Koreans trading in the markets do not believe the authorities could easily carry out market-closing measures. Due to the likelihood of large-scale civil revolts, the regime must come up with an alternative to the markets if it intends to close or transform them. The current food issues faced by the North make it impossible to close markets. In addition, transforming general markets into farmers’ markets would force residents to buy daily necessities and other manufactured products at department stores or government-run shops, but these shops have nothing in stock. Furthermore, preventing residents from selling in the markets makes it more difficult for them to acquire the food necessary to sustain themselves and their families. The number of empty stalls in markets appears to be slowing increasing, but a complete shutdown of the market would likely lead to protests.

Original Post:
North Korea begins closing general markets
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-26-1
6/26/2009

It has been reported that North Korea’s market closing measure is slowly beginning to be enforced. The June 23 27* issue of North Korea Today, a newsletter from the South Korean group Good Friends, announced that the Pyongsong general market has now been shut down, in what some call the most prominent omen that all general markets will be shut down throughout the country. As the Pyongsong general market served as the central wholesale market for the entire North, some believe it was shut down first in order to encourage the use of smaller, more local traditional markets. In addition, central Party authorities have ordered department stores and general stores in Pyongyang to stock up on Chinese goods. The North Korean government has announced, on a number of occasions since last year, that general markets would be closed and turned into farmers’ markets, but for a variety of reasons, the measure has been on hold for over six months.

Regional authorities were also ordered to import various goods from China, in accordance with the demands of local citizens and regional conditions, in order to head off any concerns that daily necessities might not be available after the markets are closed. This series of measures indicates that the government is concerned that attempts to forcefully close the markets may lead to citizen revolts, as clashes between traders and police occurred previously when the North attempted to enforce market restrictions.

One official in Pyongyang stated that this measure put citizen’s concerns and inconveniences first, stating, “[The Party] must unconditionally get rid of markets. But on the inside, they see that there will be huge opposition from the citizens if they only use force, so this time they decided to combine it with conciliatory policies.” The source added, however, that authorities plan to continue to operate restricted markets while at the same time, completely changing the market system before the end of this year.

Currently, as the 150-day ‘battle’ campaign to improve the economy is underway, more and more lectures are also being given. One week after the North’s second nuclear test, propaganda speeches were given in each factory and business in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, stating, “Now there is no one in the world that can face off with our military might,” and, “If the United States and those countries that kowtow to it carry out an economic blockade against our country, we will see it as an act of war and stand against it with military power. If only we carry out the 150-day battle well this year, we will completely attain a Strong and Prosperous Nation. [All the people] must follow after the revolutionary military spirit of the People’s Army and open the door to a strong and prosperous nation without one day’s delay.”

UPDATE: According to the Daily NK, the closing of the Pyongsong Market was not successful:

Despite North Korean official attempts to shift general markets onto an agricultural format, the general markets are operating as normal because of popular resistance to change.

A source residing in Kangdong-gun, Pyongyang told Daily NK, “In mid-April, a wholesale market in Pyongsung was shut down for around ten days, but after that it reopened and continues to operate.” He added that, “I’ve heard that the existing market was supposed to close early this year and be changed into an agricultural market, but there have actually been no shutdowns at all.”

He continued, “I don’t know the exact reason for the closure of Pyongsung market in April, but I’ve heard that there was an investigation of the individuals who manage the big wholesale businesses there. Traders strongly opposed it, so the closure of the market could not be completed.”

The source added, “In Kangdong-gun and other districts of Pyongyang, there have been many rumors about market closures, but there have not been any so far. Markets are operating normally.”

A source from Shinuiju confirmed it. “Many rumors of market closure have circulated, but they are working as usual,” the source said, “Markets in Pyongsung are operating as well, so there are still many traders coming and going between Shinuiju and Pyongsung. Especially, as summer approaches, trade is increasing.”

He added, “People still talk about the closure of the markets, but they don’t talk about it as much as earlier this year. In truth, if the jangmadang is closed, it will be hard for even the cadres to live, let alone ordinary residents. So cadres also have a negative opinion of the measure, and for that reason it will be difficult to shift to agricultural markets.”

Read the full story here:
Markets Continue Despite Official Bluster
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
7/3/2009

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Black markets, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Good Friends, Institute for Far Eastern Studies | 4 Comments »

More on the market closing measure

Sunday, July 5th, 2009

Barbara Demick has an informative article in the Los Angeles Times. The whole piece is worth reading but here are some themes and excerpts.

Market restictions ordered

In the markets of Kilju, a city of 100,000 near North Korea’s eastern seacoast, the ruling Korean Workers’ Party has ordered the removal of Chinese-made cookies, candies and pharmaceuticals.

Even soybeans, many articles of clothing and shoes are now forbidden.

It is all part of a great leap backward taking place in the secretive autocracy. North Koreans interviewed in China in recent weeks say that the regime of Kim Jong Il has made a concerted effort to roll back reforms that had over the last decade liberalized the most strictly controlled economy in the world.

…

So many Chinese goods are now taboo that markets stock only about 35% of the merchandise previously available, some say.

Import substiution policy implemented?

“They want to promote our own products made in North Korea, but since everything is ‘made in China,’ there is nothing to buy,” said Kim Young Chul, a civilian working for the North Korean military who had come to China to sell wild ginseng on behalf of his employer.

Exports curtailed

Kim Chol Hee, a trader from Yanji, a Chinese city near the border with a large ethnic Korean population, said it was harder now than at any time in the 10 years he’s been in business to import from North Korea.

“I used to bring in squid, crab, steel parts from Chongjin. We can still buy seafood, but the North Korean government won’t let us buy steel,” he said Kim. “They say they need to keep all their resources for themselves.”

Restrctions inefective

Kilju residents have not dared to hold public protests against the restriction. But the Korean Workers Party nonetheless might be fighting a losing battle. Much of the trading is done by people with powerful connections in the provincial government and the military. Many state-owned enterprises do illegal trading to raise cash for their operations.

For example, trader Kim Young Chul says he is responsible for raising about $900 each year for his work unit by selling ginseng, while he and his partners keep any additional profits.

“I have a lot of freedom. They don’t dare ask me too many questions in North Korea, because I work for the ministry,” said Kim.

Just as quickly as the Korean Workers’ Party issues a decree, people find a way to circumvent it. Vendors banned from the market bring out their mothers and grandmothers, while secretly running the businesses from behind the scenes. Others sell banned good from their homes, or simply stash it behind other merchandise.

“If you want to buy cosmetics in Kilju, you still can find them, but they are usually hidden underneath the table,” Lee said.

Once a loyal member of the Workers’ Party, Lee said she had remained devoted to Kim Jong Il up to her departure from North Korea in May, vowing that she would return home as soon as she got money for her family.

“Even the day I left, I was singing songs about Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in my house,” said Lee. “Now that I’ve come to China, I’m not so sure.

Read the full article here:
North Korea moves to restrict economy
Los Angeles Times
Barbara Demick
7/5/2009

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Black markets, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade | Comments Closed

The Political Economy of North Korea: Implications for Denuclearization and Proliferation

Tuesday, June 16th, 2009

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
East-West Center Working Papers
Economics Series, No. 104
Download paper here (PDF)

Abstract:
Despite North Korea’s turn away from economic reform and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, the country has in fact become more economically open. But it has emphasized closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. Yet the U.S. can still exercise economic leverage by going aggressively after third-party financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the United States Treasury has identified as money laundering or proliferation concerns.

There is some evidence that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority, but in the absence of such interest and as legitimate trade, investment, and aid dry up, the incentives to intensify proliferation activities increase.

The internal organization of the North Korean economy has important implications for any policy seeking transformation via engagement. The economy is structured in such a way that outside economic ties are still largely monopolized by stateowned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires very close scrutiny. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North Korean counterparties believe that they are ultimately political in nature, subsidized and thus vulnerable to blackmail. If economic ties are truly commercial in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a supportive policy environment.

Paper prepared for the conference on “North Korean Nuclear Politics: Constructing a New Northeast Asian Order in the 21st Century,” University of Washington, June 4-5, 2009. We would like to thank the Smith Richardson, MacArthur, and Korea Foundations for financial support and Jennifer Lee for research assistance.

UPDATE: A shorter version of this paper can be found here.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Arms shipment, Banking, China, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Illicit activities, Military | Comments Closed

DPRK not about to collapse

Sunday, May 31st, 2009

Newsweek has an interesting article which makes the case that the DPRK economy is not as bad as the public tends to think. According to the article:

…North Korea isn’t broke—and its economy has been moving away from collapse in recent years-. The Hermit Kingdom may not be getting rich—the CIA estimates its GDP at roughly $40 billion, ranking 96th in the world. But it’s not failing either, and for the past decade, its economy has grown at an average rate of about 1.5 percent a year, according to South Korean statistics. While Seoul estimates that the North’s GDP shrank by 2.3 percent last year, some analysts say it actually expanded, arguing that South Korea’s recent figures on the North are deflated for political purposes.

To understand how the Dear Leader has managed this, you must first drop a few of the myths surrounding his country. First, the North Koreans haven’t been living in caves for the past two decades, nor is their economy de-industrializing, as is sometimes reported. Instead, with help from Beijing, Pyongyang has revamped its outdated infrastructure in recent years and repaired the mining facilities that were battered by massive floods during the mid-’90s. It now aims to shift from recovery to growth, with a focus on steel production, mining and light-industrial manufacturing.

Second, the North doesn’t have to rely on the black market to support itself. True, Pyongyang has sold missiles to Iran, Syria and Pakistan, and annual revenue from such exports is roughly $100 million, but analysts say that other illicit activities like drug trafficking and counterfeiting add very little to that sum. According to a former U.S. diplomat in East Asia who asked not to be named discussing sensitive intelligence, during the Bush years Washington investigated the oft-heard counterfeiting accusations, and found that the notes in question had actually been produced privately by former Chinese military officials, in China. “The Treasury Department couldn’t find a single shred of hard evidence pointing to North Korean production of counterfeit money,” the American says.

The biggest myth is that North Korea remains isolated. Despite supposedly comprehensive sanctions, Pyongyang today has diplomatic and commercial relations with more than 150 countries, including most European Union members. North Korea trades its abundant gold reserves—estimated at 1,000 to 2,000 tons—in cities like London, Zurich and Hong Kong, and buys and sells shares on the New York Stock Exchange via a legitimate London-based brokerage firm it essentially owns. While there are no figures on the volume of such transactions, the former U.S. diplomat says that such activities are “a substantial source of hard currency for North Korea.” In recent years, European firms have also begun eyeing investment opportunities there; In 2004, the London-based energy firm Aminex signed a 20-year deal with Pyongyang for exclusive rights to explore on- and offshore oil-and-gas deposits. Other companies are looking for ways to exploit the North’s cheap labor supply, and while most of these deals have yet to take off for technical and political reasons, ties to the outside world are expanding. In 2008, the country’s overall trade rose 30 percent from the previous year, reaching a record $3.8 billion, including imports of $2.7 billion, according to Seoul’s Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency.

North Korea has proved adept at avoiding restrictions: when Tokyo slapped it with sanctions five years ago, Pyongyang simply reshuffled its deals, turning to the BRIC economies as well as South Korea and Singapore. Meanwhile, China now accounts for nearly three quarters of North Korea’s total trade, sending it crude oil, petroleum and manufactured goods in exchange for coal, steel and rare metals like tungsten and magnesite. The North’s natural resources have become a major growth engine: the Musan mine in the country’s northwest is now said to be one of the largest iron-ore fields in Asia, and could eventually yield 10 million tons of ore a year.

Finally, there’s the southern connection. Despite deteriorating relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, factories at the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex are still operating at full gear, earning the North about $35 million annually—enough for eight or nine No-dong missiles. And that figure was projected (before the current crisis hit) to jump to $100 million by next year, says Lim Eul Chul of Seoul’s Kyungnam University.

I should point out that the CIA estimate of the DPRK’s GDP is among the highest. Most other estimates are below $30 billion for 2008.

Read the full article here:
How Kim Affords His Nukes: The myth of a failing economy.
Newsweek
5/30/2009

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Aminex, Arms shipment, Counterfeiting, Drug smuggling, Economic reform, GDP statistics, Illicit activities, International trade, Statistics, Trade Statistics | 2 Comments »

On the North Korean legal system

Monday, May 18th, 2009

From Slate (regarding the upcoming trial of Euna Lee and Laura Ling):

We do have some basic understanding about how the North Korean justice system is organized. The journalists will be tried by the Central Court, the nation’s highest judicial body. Usually, the Central Court only hears appeals cases from the lower, provincial courts, but for grievous cases against the state, it has initial jurisdiction. The Central Court is staffed by judges elected by the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s one-party parliament. The North Korean Constitution stipulates that each trial is to be conducted by one judge and two “people’s assessors”—i.e., lay judges—though special cases may be heard by a three-judge panel. (Appeals cases usually get the panel.) Legal education or experience is not an official prerequisite for becoming a judge, and rulings from the Central Court are not subject to appeal.

North Korean law does recognize the right of the accused to defend herself and to be represented by an attorney. According to the country’s penal code, either the defendant, her family, or her “organizational representatives” may select the defense attorney. As the two arrested journalists were not allowed access to any counsel during pretrial investigation, however, there are doubts that they will actually be allowed to select their own counsel. According to the U.S. State Department, there is “no indication that independent, nongovernmental defense lawyers [exist]” in North Korea in the first place.

The proceedings will be conducted in Korean, but the North Korean Constitution does grant foreign citizens the right to use their own languages during court proceedings. Trials are supposed to be open to the public, unless they might expose state secrets or otherwise have a negative effect on society. According to testimony from North Korean defectors, though, trials are often closed in practice. Announcements of the court’s findings and executions of sentences are often carried out in public as a means of educating the citizenry.

Thursday’s announcement from North Korea’s news agency did not specify what crime the two journalists are being charged with, though Pyongyang has previously accused them of “hostile acts” and illegal entry into the country. If they were prosecuted under a law regarding foreigners who “abuse” or “provoke national difficulty in order to antagonize” the North Korean people, they would face five to 10 years of “re-education” in a labor camp. Illegal entry carries a sentence of two to three years.

Previously, prisoners could be sentenced to death for a number of vague crimes, such as “ideological divergence” or “opposing socialism.” But subsequent to the enactment of a new penal code in 2004, the death penalty is reserved for four crimes: participating in a coup or a plot to overthrow the state, terrorism, treason, or “suppressing the people’s movement for national liberation.” In practice these four crimes seem to cover a wide range of activities, including, in one reported case from 2007, the making of international phone calls. Judicial proceedings are apparently not required for executions to be carried out.

As supplemental material, I have posted numerous DPRK statutes on this web page. To see the full list, scroll down the menu to “DPRK policies,” under which you can see them all. Of course, the DPRK is not a “rule of law” country, so the statutes themselves and even the constitution are not worth that much in terms of defining the “rules of the game” or defining/predicting the scope of “legitimate” government activity.

There have been several foreign law firms that have attempted to set up shop in the DPRK. Currently the only firms with legal offices or a periodic presence are: Hay, Kalb, and Associates, Kelvin Chia Partnership, and Chiomenti of Italy (formerly Birindelli e Associati ).

Read the full article below:
Objection, Dear Leader!
Slate.com
Nina Shen Rastogi
5/14/2009

Posted in DPRK Policies, Supreme Court, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

North Korea’s Refugees: A Window into North Korea

Saturday, May 2nd, 2009

From the Peterson Institute event last week:

As North Korea once again makes headlines with its provocations, the Institute hosted an event April 29, 2009, to present new research by Senior Fellow Marcus Noland based on a recently completed survey of North Korean refugees in South Korea, a companion survey to one done earlier in China by Noland and collaborators. The new survey provides extraordinary insight into the changing pathways to power, wealth, and status within North Korea, as well as the rise of inequality, corruption, and disaffection in the decade since the famine of the 1990s, along with the refugees’ assessments of the regime, its motivations, and its capabilities.

Dr. Noland’s findings can be downloaded in PDF here.

Noland and Haggard conducted a similar survey in China last year. You can download it here.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Food, International Aid | 2 Comments »

North Korean Economy Watch