Archive for the ‘DPRK Policies’ Category

2009 Inspections by Kim Jong Il focus on economic, military sites

Tuesday, December 22nd, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.09-12-22-1
12/22/2009

The latest on-site visit by Kim Jong Il, in mid December, marked the 156th inspection of the year. This is an increase of approximately 170 percent over last year. Among those accompanying the ‘Great Leader’, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party Kim Ki-nam was seen most frequently, traveling with Kim Jong Il on 107 different occasions. Others seen frequently with Kim include Jang Sung-taek, brother-in-law and right-hand man, as well as Party Central Committee Vice-chairman Pak Nam-ki.

According to North Korean media officials, Kim Jong Il’s on-site inspections this year include 64 visits to economically important locations, 43 to military installations, 13 to sites related to foreign affairs, and 36 to other sites, for a total of 156 visits. Kim made only 90 visits during 2008.

Last year, 55 percent (50 visits) of Kim Jong Il’s on-site inspections were to military sites, while 26 percent (24 visits) of trips were to sites related to the economy. This year, 41 percent of site visits were to economically-relevant sites, while only 27 percent were to military sites.

These visits are linked to the recent ‘100-day Battle’ and ‘150-day Battle’ to boost domestic production in order to meet North Korea’s goal of being a ‘strong and prosperous nation’ by 2012.

North Korean authorities are undertaking massive construction projects across the country, such as the building the Huicheon Thermoelectric Plant, tens of thousands of new housing units, and other large-scale construction projects.

Broken down monthly, Kim Jong Il has ventured out to on-site visits 10-19 times per month, with the exception of July (8 visits). He has made 8 visits in December up until the 17th.

It is also important to note those who have travelled with Kim. As mentioned previously, Kim Ki-nam was seen 107 times and Jang Sung-taek travelled with Kim 82 times. In addition, Hyon Chol-hae, a former bodyguard of Kim Il Sung and confidant of Kim Jong Il, made 56 visits, General Ri Myong-su was seen with Kim 48 times, and Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army Kim Yong Chun was seen on 30 different occasions.

Of particular interest among all of Kim Jong Il’s public appearances this year is that in November he made a visit to the headquarters of the Ministry of People’s Security. Kim also visited the naval complex in Nampo in mid November, and made his first visit to the North’s very first free-trade zone, in Rason, North Hamgyong Province, inspecting the Rasong Dae-heung Trade Fishery Complex. Both of these followed the inter-Korean naval clash in the Yellow Sea on November 10th.

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North Korea revises economic management laws

Tuesday, December 22nd, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.09-12-21-1
12/21/2009

The Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) announced on December 16 that the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly Standing Committee has revised the North’s Real Estate Management Law, the Commodities Consumption Level Law, the General Equipment Import Law, and other laws related to economic management. This on the heels of the November 30th announcement, when authorities announced across-the-board currency reform measures, apparently in an attempt to regain control of the country’s market economy.

The KCBS reported that the Real Estate Management Law “regulates fundamental issues of real estate registration and inspection, use, and payment of user fees,” but offered no further details.

Since 2006, North Korean authorities established new offices in each city, county, and region throughout the country. These offices were responsible for surveying property, occupied and vacant, claimed by organizations and businesses, as well as recording the size of each structure on these lands.

In the mid-1990s, with the onset of serious food shortages, food rations to workers were halted and North Korean authorities from every branch and level (including the military, railway, business enterprises) were encouraged to distribute foodstuffs in ways more beneficial to themselves. These authorities planned to resolve food distribution issues through agricultural moves.

The new Real Estate Management Law appears to be aimed at labeling land used for private purposes as strategic nationalized land and strengthening the state’s ability to collect real estate taxes. However, the broadcaster failed to explain in detail how this restructuring would occur.

By enacting the Commodities Consumption Level Law, North Korean authorities can control the basis at which goods are injected into each production sector. This appears to be in preparation for taking cost-reduction measures for enterprises related to production in each region. The broadcaster explained that there were legal demands for the enactment and enforcement of regulations on the level of consumption.

The General Equipment Import Law newly regulates import plans, contracts, and the use of goods by factories, schools, hospitals, ships and broadcasters in an effort to control quality. In each sector, the measure prevents double-investment and controls consumption competition.

As these economic control measures are focused on factories and other bases of production along with importers, it appears that, in conjunction with the recent currency reform, North Korean authorities are attempting to control production quality on all levels. For example, as the North is suffering ongoing supply difficulties due to a lack of materials, the law on consumption levels is an attempt to restrict goods by forcefully managing demand. The law on imports appears to be in an effort to regulate general-use goods in light of the increased reliance on foreign equipment.

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Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Tuesday, December 15th, 2009

Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28, p.5.
Transcribed/HTML: Max, B. and Mike B.
(h/t Northeast Asia Matters)

July 11, 1967

The Chairman of the People’s Republic of China and the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, determined, in accordance with Marxism-Leninism and the principle of proletarian internationalism and on the basis of mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and mutual assistance and support, to make every effort to further strengthen and develop the fraternal relations of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to jointly guard the security of the two peoples, and to safeguard and consolidate the peace of Asia and the world, and deeply convinced that the development and strengthening of the relations of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between the two countries accord not only with the fundamental interests of the two peoples but also with the interests of the peoples all over the world, have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries:

   The Chairman of the People’s Republic of China: Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

   The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Cabinet of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

Who, having examined each other’s full powers and found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the the following:

Article I

The Contracting Parties will continue to make every effort to safeguard the peace of Asia and the world and the security of all peoples.

Article II

The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.

Article III

Neither Contracting Party shall conclude any alliance directed against the other Contracting Party or take part in any bloc or in any action or measure directed against the other Contracting Party .

Article IV

The Contracting Parties will continue to consult with each other on all important international questions of common interest to the two countries.

Article V

The Contracting Parties, on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and in the spirit of friendly co-operation, will continue to render each other every possible economic and technical aid in the cause of socialist construction of the two countries and will continue to consolidate and develop economic, cultural, and scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries.

Article VI

The Contracting Parties hold that the unification of Korea must be realized along peaceful and democratic lines and that such a solution accords exactly with the national interests of the Korean people and the aim of preserving peace in the Far East.

Article VII

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day of exchange of instruments of ratification, which will take place in Pyongyang. The present Treaty will remain in force until the Contracting Parties agree on its amendment or termination. Done in duplicate in Peking on the eleventh day of July, nineteen sixty-one, in the Chinese and Korean languages, both texts being equally authentic.
(Signed)
CHOU EN-LAI
Plenipotentiary of the
People’s Republic of China

(Signed)
KIM IL SUNG
Plenipotentiary of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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N.Korea in Fresh Attempt to Lure Foreign Investment

Thursday, December 10th, 2009

Choson Ilbo
12/10/2009

Even as North Korea struggles under UN sanctions and is in the midst of a controversial currency reform aimed at breaking the back of a nascent free market, the reclusive country is apparently in the process of changing laws in order to attract more foreign investment, an expert said Wednesday. It is even offering foreign companies wages cheaper than those paid to North Korean workers at the joint-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex, according to Jack Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington D.C.

Pritchard, who visited Pyongyang last month along with Scott Snyder, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation, told reporters in Washington. The North Korean trade department official they met there told them there are no strikes among North Korea’s skilled workers and were very aggressive in luring foreign investment. He added North Korean officials offered wages of 30 euros a month (around US$44), which was lower than the average $57 paid to workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The officials said they were also willing to offer various incentives to foreign companies interested in taking part in the construction of 100,000 homes in Pyongyang. North Korea appeared to be changing its attitude toward foreign countries as part of its goal to become a strong and powerful nation by 2012, he said.

In an article for Global Security [Posted below], the Internet-based provider of military and intelligence information, Snyder wrote, “North Korean colleagues at the Ministry of Trade appeared genuinely surprised and dismayed when we mentioned that UN Security Council Resolution 1874… contains provisions prohibiting companies from making new investments in North Korea.”

Snyder said North Korea’s interest in foreign investment as part of its goal to become a “strong and powerful nation” by 2012 is a new development and one that could play a role in resolving the nuclear stalemate.

But efforts to attract foreign investment and capital over the past 25 years have been a disaster. North Korea announced new regulations in September of 1984 to allow businesses from capitalist countries to operate there. It set up special economic zones in Rajin-Songbong in 1991 and in Sinuiju in 2002. But the Sinuiju project never got beyond the ground-breaking stage due to conflict with China, while empty factories litter Rajin-Sonbong.

North Korea aimed to attract $7 billion worth of foreign investment into Rajin-Sonbong, but actual investment amounted to only $140 million. According to the South Korean government and other sources, there are an estimated 400 foreign businesses operating in North Korea. Most of them are small businesses run by Chinese or North Korean residents in Japan. The shining exception is the Egyptian telecom company Orascom, which offers mobile phone services in the North. “It’s more accurate to say that there are no major foreign businesses operating in North Korea,” said Cho Dong-ho, a professor at Ewha Woman’s University.

North Korea forged its first pact guaranteeing foreign investment with Denmark in September 1996 and signed similar pacts with around 20 countries, including China, Russia, Singapore and Switzerland, as of 2008. There have been consistent reports that businesses in Europe and Southeast Asia were interested in doing business in the North, but hardly any made the move.

Cho Myung-chul, a professor at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, who taught economics at Kim Il Sung University in North Korea, said, “The reason why no listed foreign companies are operating in North Korea is because they may end up on the list of businesses subject to U.S. sanctions.” This is one of the reasons why North Korea has tried so desperately to be removed from the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring countries.

And even if foreign businesses are interested in investing in North Korea, its lack of infrastructure, including steady power supply and adequate roads and ports, make it impossible to operate factories there. Cho Young-ki, a professor at Korea University, said, “You have to build a power plant if you want to build a factory in North Korea. Cheap labor does not mean businesses will profit there.” The electricity used by the Kaesong Industrial Complex is provided by South Korea, while Hyundai Asan operates its own generator at the North Korean resort in Mt. Kumgang.

Dispatch from Pyongyang: An Offer You Can’t Refuse!
Global Security
Scott Snyder
12/07/2009

Every North Korean seems to have been mobilized for an all-out push to mark their country’s arrival as a “strong and powerful nation” in 2012, which marks the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth, Kim Jong Il’s seventieth birthday, and the thirtieth birthday of Kim Jong Il’s third son and reported successor, Kim Jong-Eun. Pyongyang citizens have cleaned up the city during a 150-day labor campaign, followed by a second 100-day campaign now underway. The Ryugyong Hotel in the middle of Pyongyang, unfinished for over two decades, has been given a facelift courtesy of the Egyptian telecommunications firm Orascom, which expects to have 100,000 mobile phone customers in Pyongyang by the end of the year. But it is still difficult to shake the feeling in Pyongyang that one has walked onto a movie set in between takes. Or that the used car looks good on the outside, but you really don’t know what you might find if you were able to look under the hood or give it a test-drive.

North Korean foreign ministry officials saw United Nations condemnation of their April missile launch as an affront to their sovereignty. This is the ostensible reason the North Koreans have walked away from six party talks. Having conducted a second nuclear test, North Korean officials want to be considered as a nuclear power, choosing instead to “magnanimously” set aside nuclear differences in order to focus on the need to eliminate U.S. “hostile policy” by replacing the armistice with a permanent peace settlement. Essentially, Pyongyang’s new offer–as a “nuclear weapons state”–has shifted from the denuclearization for normalization deal at the core of the 2005 Six Party Joint Statement to “peace first; denuclearization, maybe later.” There was no mention of “action for action” by our North Korean interlocutors.

But the North Koreans are likely to find when Ambassador Stephen Bosworth arrives in Pyongyang next week that the United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. There is virtually no area of agreement between the two governments on the nuclear issue based on public statements made by the two sides thus far, suggesting the likelihood that both sides will face a difficult conversation.

A new component of North Korea’s strategy for achieving its economic and infrastructure goals in the run-up to 2012 is its effort to attract investment from overseas. The Director of North Korea’s newly established Foreign Investment Board unveiled a new plan for attracting equity, contractual, and 100% foreign owned joint venture investments. On paper, the rules incorporate provisions for repatriation of profit, generous tax incentives, and a labor rate of thirty Euros per month. This rate undercuts the compensation of $57.50 per month currently offered at the South Korean-invested Kaesong Industrial Zone. Even more generous was the offer of special concessions in North Korea’s natural resources sector for companies willing to build 100,000 units of new housing in Pyongyang that have already been promised in the run-up to 2012.

North Korean colleagues at the Ministry of Trade appeared genuinely surprised and dismayed when we mentioned that UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which condemned North Korea’s May 25, 2009, nuclear test, contains provisions prohibiting companies from making new investments in the DPRK. This is all the more unfortunate because on paper, North Korean efforts to open its economy through foreign investment are exactly the course that should be encouraged, and North Korea’s goals for 2012 could be advanced significantly with inward investment from companies that might be willing to take the risk, but the nuclear issue stands in the way. This is not to mention that North Korea’s own economic retrenchment and anti-market policies, including the “currency reforms” announced earlier this week, stretch the credibility of the North Korean government to back up these laws. Recent surveys of Chinese investors suggest few demonstration projects for successful investment in North Korea and a high probability of getting scammed or fleeced on the ground.

But the North Korean plea for foreign investment does suggest a potential point of leverage that deserves careful consideration, and that is the possibility of an investment in a strategic commodity that is of special interest to the United States: North Korea’s plutonium stock. During the Clinton administration, former Defense Secretary William Perry led efforts to make similar purchases of nuclear materials from the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which had inherited stocks of nuclear materials from the breakup of the Soviet Union. These transactions advanced the cause of nuclear non-proliferation by ensuring that these countries would not become nuclear states. A 2004 report of a Task Force on U.S.-Korea Policy co-sponsored by the Center for International Policy and the University of Chicago, also suggested a plutonium “buy-out” proposal for North Korea, despite the obvious moral hazard of appearing to reward North Korea’s bad behavior. Any transaction with North Korea involves moral hazard, and North Korea has already proven that it will sell or sub-contract nuclear materials to the highest bidder. One positive of this approach is that any transaction involving removal of nuclear materials or capabilities from the North would be irreversible, in contrast to past practice of offering irreversible food-aid benefits to North Korea in exchange for participation in multilateral dialogue, but not for irreversible steps toward denuclearization.

In a post-9/11, post-North Korean nuclear test world, the Obama administration must find a formula that facilitates North Korea’s irreversible actions on the path toward denuclearization rather than agreeing to half-measures: North Korea’s immediate focus is on gaining the resources necessary to mark 2012 as a year of accomplishment, yet the North has been highly critical of Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” Proposal. Denuclearization needs to be placed on the North Korean agenda as an accomplishment that North Korea will be able to justify as part of its broader 2012 objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous state.” Unless a new formula can be found by which to bring these two objectives into line with each other, it is likely that the United States and North Korea will continue to talk past each other.

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North Korean labor market data (qualitative)

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009

I thank a reader for pointing out an interesting article in the Korean Political Science Association Journal which contains a plethora of qualitative data on the North Korean labor Market–survey data from a cross section of defectors.

Here is the citation:

Park, Young-ja, “‘Marginal Work’ and ‘Labor Market’ in North Korea after the 2003 General Market System”, Korean Political Science Association Journal Vol. 43, No. 3, September 2009

Read the full article here, or here.

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DPRK revalues currency

Friday, December 4th, 2009

UPDATE 20:  It might be possible that public anger over the government’s new monetary policy forced the govenrment to increase the maximum amount of currency that can be converted.  According to the AFP:

North Korea has backtracked on details of its shock currency revaluation following a riot by market traders that led to 12 executions, a report said Tuesday.

South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo newspaper said the hardline communist state had taken a series of steps to placate its people over the 100-to-one revaluation announced two weeks ago.

It said the concessions follow a riot by merchants in the eastern city of Hamhung on December 5-6 which stirred public sympathy. Twelve “masterminds” of the unrest were later executed, the paper said.

It was not possible to confirm the reported riot or executions. But there have been accounts of widespread anger since the regime revalued its currency earlier this month, requiring old banknotes to be exchanged for new ones at the rate of 100 to one.

Analysts said the move was aimed at curbing inflation and clamping down on a growing free-market economy to reassert the regime’s control.

But the initial limit of 100,000 won on the total cash that each person could exchange effectively wiped out many people’s savings in the impoverished nation.

On Sunday authorities raised the limit to 500,000 won, Chosun said, quoting sources in the North.

One hundred thousand won in old money was equivalent to 30-40 dollars at the previous black market rate.

The North also announced that eventually citizens would be allowed to exchange all their old bills for new ones if they deposit the money in banks, Chosun reported.

People reportedly shun banks because they fear investigations into the source of their savings, or restrictions on withdrawals as in the past.

In response, Chosun said authorities promised no probe into savings of up to one million won and unlimited withdrawals if savings of more than one million are properly explained.

The newspaper quoted a high-level North Korean source as saying authorities “are backtracking under pressure from market forces”.

UPDATE 19:  The Daily NK reports that DPRK authorities launched the monetary revaluation without establishing new wages and prices:

A source of Yangkang Provicne explained in a phone conversation with The Daily NK on the 11th, “Wages of workers used to ranged between 1,300 and 2,500 North Korean won.” “If this is put into operation, then the wages of the secretaries of the Provincial Committee of the Party would be leveled to approximately 1,000 won.”

“It was agreed that a precise measure relating to wages was not yet perfect and would be relayed to the accounting clerks at a later time,” the source adds. “Under the decree, all debt relations among existing enterprises would become ‘zero’ and foreign currency earning organizations will hereafter undergo adjustments. However, due to the fact that the size of liabilities between enterprises is not so significant, it is essentially a meaningless measure.”

Unusually, on the morning of the 9th, the lecture broke free from the customary one-sided presentation of the Party decree in favor of audience participation. Attendees stated one after another: “We must establish reasonable prices as soon as possible and stabilize the workers;” “If the food problem is not resolved, then we will not be able to prevent rising prices;” “The existing wages and [state mandated] food prices should be adhered to;” and so on.

In the end, the Yangkang meeting offered a temporary, partial settlement of enterprise wage and debt issues as well as the announcement that more follow-up measures will be introduced in the near future. Authorities also stated that “national course of action” on price-related matters will be subsequently delivered.

The only government-authorized pricing to be finalized involved railway shipping charges. A “temporary” train route table has been posted at the Youth Hyesan Station, with Hyesan-Pyongyang fare set at 46 won and Hyesan-Baegam fare at 18 won.

“When judging by distance, it is almost more expensive to operate intra-provincial trains,” the source observes. “Fixing the Hyesan-Pyongyang cost at 46 won was based on the temporary trains that ran when university students in Pyongyang would return to their hometowns during the early break. There is no other meaning.”

But the fact that other price measures were not announced at the cadres meeting helped maintain a sense of confusion among North Korean citizens. “Nowadays, even when two or three people gather, they will mutter, ‘Where is our country headed?’” bemoans the source. “The state should decide on wages or prices, so the markets can run normally.”

“But since the authorities have been dragging their feet, ordinary citizens have not been able to regain their senses.”

UPDATE 18: According to the Choson Ilbo, the DPRK has banned the entry of foreigners for a period of time and temporarily closed markets:

One source in China said that Pyongyang would bar foreigners from entering the country temporarily at the end or beginning of a year, when customs officials along the border with China are on leave for year-end holidays, but banning them until February is “quite uncommon.”

Experts say this could herald a visit by Kim Jong-il to China, since the paranoid North Korean leader likes to ensure maximum security along the route of his special armored train. Chinese President Hu Jintao invited Kim to visit at a “convenient” time when he met Choi Tae-bok, the chairman of the North’s Supreme People’s Assembly, in October. Kim has visited China four times, and twice (in 2001 and 2006) they fell in January.

But Good Friends, a Seoul-based organization which provides aid to North Korea, in its latest newsletter said North Korean authorities shut down open-air markets for three days starting on Monday after prices of goods soared following the currency revaluation. The North was to reopen the markets after prices adjust.

One researcher with a state-run research institute said, “For North Korea to succeed in its currency reform it needs stable supplies of food and other products, and Pyongyang may have decided that China is the only country it can rely on. That might also make it necessary for Kim himself to visit China.”

More on market closures can be found in Bloomberg.

UPDATE 17: The Daily NK reports that DPRK trading offices and companies on the Chinese border were raided in advance of the currency revaluation to confiscate capital which had accumulated in these offices.  The central government confiscated these resources apparently because they were under the de facto control of various nouveau riche 

UPDATE 16: According to Australian News.com:

North Korea has set new prices for staple goods after its shock currency revaluation, but most items are selling in markets for more than laid down by the regime, an aid group said overnight.

Citing informants in North Korea, South Korean group Good Friends said the new prices were published last Wednesday.

“Few items sell at the state-set prices, and most of them are trading at higher-than-set prices at the markets of major cities nationwide,” it said in a newsletter.

Rice is selling for 50 won per kilogram at markets in the northeastern port city of Chongjin, more than double the state-fixed price of 23 won, it said.

Other staples such as corn, wheat flour and beans are also selling for more than the government price, it said, adding that pork was a cheaper exception.

UPDATE 15: According to the Daily NK it seems the DPRK authorities are taking the week to educate the lower level party members on how the post-currency reform economy is supposed to function.  These are the same low-level party officials who probably bore the brunt of the DPRK’s monetary “reform” initiative:

Meetings and lectures were convened on the 8th to follow-up on the currency redenomination; explaining prices, wage standards, and payments between factories and enterprises.

A source from Yangkang Province reported the news on Wednesday in a telephone conversation with the Daily NK, “A lecture began at 2 P.M. yesterday. It was administrative education for managers of sub-Party organizations, Primary Party Committee secretaries and accounting clerks in factories.”

The source added, “The meeting was scheduled for the evening of the 9th, but if necessary it may continue on the morning of the 10th.”

These kinds of meetings were also held right after the fourth denomination replacement in 1992 and again after the July 1st Economic Management Reform Measure in 2002.

This time around, there are two kinds of lectures; one for cadres, and a separate one for administrative workers.

In the Yangkang cadres lecture there were major Party cadres from the People’s Committee of Yangkang Province, the Agricultural Accounting Committee of the province, People’s Safety Agency, May 16 Construction Bureau (a temporary organization overseeing each province’s construction projects) and Hyesan Steel Mill; office workers from the financial department of the Yangkang Province People’s Committee, accounting clerks and treasurers from factories and enterprises attended the administrative lecture. The lectures were held in the conference halls of the Provincial Party Committee.

The Hyesan Party Committee also reportedly convened lectures for cadres and workers in the same way in the conference hall of the Municipal Party Committee and the Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Ideology Institute in Hyejang-dong.

In the meetings and lectures, provision of payment and modes of transaction between factories, state designated prices for commodities and services and the setting of an upper limit for market prices were all rumored to be on the agenda.

Among them, wage levels and top limits for jangmadang prices are the most noteworthy items.

On the subject of wages, rumors apparently streamed out from around the conference halls; “They will maintain wage levels as was,” and, “Wage levels will be cut in half.”

If wages are maintained, or even cut in half, the monetary value of wages would increase from 50 to 100 times, or at least they would if prices remained the same.

To this end, the North Korean authorities are also expected to announce detailed rules whereby prices in markets may not exceed state-designated levels.

The source explained, “The state’s policy is to build a world where the people can live on their wages. The reason for the decree about the markets is to prevent prices rising.”

However, economists worry about the impact of these policies. If the authorities are not able to expand supply having raised wages substantially, and then they forcefully reduce market prices, in the long run hyperinflation will result and trading will become all-but impossible.

Especially, if the authorities take to printing money in order to pay for projects related to the construction of the “strong and prosperous state,” an unimaginable aftermath will be created.

Meanwhile, the source explained, “In some regions, food prices are already soaring. Traders don’t like this phenomenon, which at least reassures the authorities about the traders’ attitudes.”

However, he pointed out that even when the market works normally, price levels are not particularly stable.

UPDATE 14: The AFP notes that the currency reform has cripped the DPRK’s markets:

Private markets on which North Koreans rely heavily for necessities have been paralysed since the communist state’s shock currency revaluation last week, a report said Wednesday.

South Korea’s Hankyoreh newspaper quoted sources in China’s border city of Dandong as saying private transactions — which supplement the faltering state distribution system — have come to a virtual halt.

“The road linking Pyongyang and Sinuiju has been shut down. It’s been hard to get through to partners in the North by phone,” a Chinese businessman told the independent daily in Dandong, across the border river from Sinuiju.

A North Korean central bank official has been quoted by a pro-Pyongyang newspaper as saying the aim is to weaken the role of free markets and strengthen the socialist system.

Amid reports that some frustrated residents have been torching old bills, South Korean aid group Good Friends said authorities have threatened severe punishment for such an action.

Many residents would burn worthless old bills rather than surrender them to authorities, in order to avoid arousing suspicions about how they made the money, Good Friends said.

The banknotes carry portraits of founding president Kim Il-Sung and his successor and son Kim Jong-Il. Defacing their images is treated as a felony.

 UPDATE 13: Wall Street Journal  offers map of public discontent.

UPDATE 12: Entrepreneurship in China:  “Beijing markets offer counterfeit old N. Korean notes” (Kyodo).

UPDATE 11: Normally currency revlauations are coupled with institutional and organizational reforms to the monetary and public finance systems so that the public will have confidence that the new currency will maintain its value.  This is how inflation is defeated.  The DPRK has not announced any reforms of either the monetary or fiscal systems–in fact they did not even announce the currency conversion–so in addition to people losing their savings they have no expectations that the new currency will retian its value…so of course we will get instant inflation once again and probably worse than the original rate.  According to Bloomberg:

The North Korean won has plummeted 96 percent against the dollar after the government revalued the currency last week, according to reports by Yonhap News Agency and a South Korean aid group.

A North Korean bank in Sinuiju, near the border with China, offered to buy dollars for 35 won on Dec. 7, Good Friends, a Seoul-based rights group, said today on its Web site. Before the currency revaluation, the official rate was about 140 won, and as much as 3,500 won in the black market, Yonhap said.

Following the revaluation, rice prices have more than doubled, Good Friends said. One kilogram (2.2 pounds) of rice cost 50 won as of Dec. 5, compared with 16 won to 17 won on Dec. 2, the group, which obtains information through contacts within North Korea, said in its newsletter yesterday.

One in four school children were absent due to hunger on Dec. 3, indicating how widespread the struggle to find food had become, the group said, without saying how it derived the number.

Caveat Emptor on Good Friends reports. An alternate report claimed that school was ended early to prevent the spread of H1N1.

UPDATE 10: Institute For Far Eastern Studies (IFES)   (NK Brief No.09-12-4-1) 

At 8:00 A.M. on December 2, North Korea began transferring to a new currency throughout the country. According to Daily NK, the order to exchange currency was issued without explanation, as each regional branch of the Korea Central Bank began exchanging notes from 8:00 in the morning. ‘Good Friends’, ‘North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity’, and other defector organizations are reporting that the North is in the process of changing its currency.

North Korean officials first notified residents of the money swap on November 30. Citizens were advised that old notes were to be traded for new money, but there was significant resistance and locals refused, leading officials to issue a new order to exchange currency. The order stipulated that the exchange be carried out at ‘100 to 1’ and that for any family exchanging more than KPW 100,000, any additional monies are to be exchanged at a rate of 1000 to 1. Any remaining currency is to be deposited in the bank, and will be re-issued in new notes at a later date.

If anyone actually has as much as a million won in cash, they would be able to transfer the first hundred thousand into one thousand won of the new currency, and the next hundred thousand would be worth a mere 100 won. The remaining 800 thousand won of savings would have to be turned over to the bank on the promise that it would be accessible at some time in the future at an exchange rate that has not yet been determined. This has been met with considerable controversy within North Korean society.

On November 3, 1992, as the North went through a currency reform, old money was exchanged for new on a 1-to-1 basis, and on a standard of 300 won-per-family. Up to 200 thousand won could be deposited as savings in a local bank, but one month later it was announced that each family could withdraw no more than four thousand won in any three-month period. At the time, when banks failed to return savings to the people, many became disheartened. Markets closed and stalls were shuttered as growing numbers of people became worried that they would be unable to exchange their money for U.S. dollars or Chinese yuan.

Currency traders in Pyongsong markets, which are at the heart of North Korea’s manufacturing distribution network, were reduced to tears. Shoppers stayed at home and business travelers suddenly stopped coming. Rice traders were selling 1 kilogram for 2,200 won at the end of last month, but are now asking as much as 30,000 won (of the old currency). This means prices jumped to almost 13 times as much as they were just three days before the currency swap announcement. Currently, all of the North’s security forces are deployed to restrain the people, and not only have the Peoples’ Security Forces and the National Security Department been put on alert, but even the military has been put on emergency status. A 10:00 P.M. curfew is being enforced, and it has been announced that violators will be dealt with strictly.

With this currency exchange, the North’s middle-class is expected to suffer considerably. This is because the poorest have no savings, and the richest hold dollars or yuan. Food sellers are expected to suffer the most, since food sales across the country are carried out in cash.

UPDATE 9:  Although Good Friends reports have a reputation of being hit and miss, here is their report on the DPRK’s currency conversion.  The usual caveats apply.

UPDATE 8: Here is an English translation of an interview with the head of the North Korean Central Bank (PDF).  I got the interview here. (h/t Adam Cathcart)

UPDATE 7: The Choson Ilbo points out that monetary revaluation has been an on-and-off policy goal of the North Kroean government since 2002:

The large-denomination bills, such as those worth 5,000 and 2,000 won, bear the stamp “2008” on the upper left. Images of the 500, 200, 100, 50, 10 and 5 won bills and those on the back of 1 won, and 50, 10, 5 and 1 jeon coins bear the stamp “2002.”

“It seems that the North printed the new bills and coins in 2002 when it implemented the July 1 economic reform plan, where it introduced a modicum of market capitalism, but decided not to circulate the new currency that year apparently due to runaway inflation,” a source said. “And the North again apparently prepared for currency reform in 2008 by printing new large-denomination bills but postponed the reform because leader Kim Jong-il had a stroke.”

UPDATE 6: The rules continue to change.  According to the Daily NK:

“The maximum amount per household which could be exchanged in cash was initially set at 100,000 won, but overnight it increased to 150,000 won, then subsequently a new decree was handed down.”

“According to the new decree, the exchange rate is still 100:1 for 100,000 won, but now the authorities will only permit people to exchange the rest of the money at 1,000:1.”

As a result, if you take 200,000 won in cash to a bank, you get 1,100 won in new denomination bills. This emergency formula will do nothing other than destroy the fortunes of the people.

Another source reported that in the jangmadang practical trading had ceased, although rice was still on sale from traders dealing in the product from home. The price of a kilogram has apparently skyrocketed to 30,000 won in old denomination bills, a 15-fold increase.

Wealthy merchants generally do their business in Yuan or U.S. Dollars, so the harm to them is not so serious. At the other end of the scale, low end traders who live from day to day will not be hit too hard for the simple reason that they don’t have much cash.

However, people in the middle classes who have tended to hoard paper cash at home are facing a fatal beating.

UPDATE 5: The Daily NK and Yonhap have pictures of the new currency.

UPDATE 4:  According to the Daily NK:

In the three days since the start of the exchange, the authorities have changed the policy a number of times. First they planned to allow each household to exchange 100,000 won; 1,000 won in new denominations. Then they changed it to 150,000 won. Then they changed it again to 100,000 won, plus 50,000 won more per family member in a family of four. That is, a standard household can now exchange a maximum of 300,000 won.

Additionally, the authorities announced an extra new decree whereby one could put the rest of one’s money, which cannot be exchanged into new bills, in the bank.

This near continuous flow of policy amendments has exacerbated public confusion.

Regarding excess monies above the limit for direct exchange, the authorities originally proclaimed that people could exchange it at a 1000:1 rate, but several hours later on the same day, revised it to people being able to deposit 200,000 won in the bank at the 1000:1 rate. However, on the morning of the 3rd, the authorities implied that the state would allow the people to deposit as much as they have, saying, “The whole deposited amount will be dealt with appropriately by the state.”

Naturally, residents do not really believe in what the authorities say because they had a similar experience in 1992; the people deposited 20,000 won, but the banks gave only 4,000 won back the next year.

UPDATE 3: Marcus Noland hits the nail on the head.  He writes in the Wall Street Journal:

North Korea announced a surprise currency reform this week. The move isn’t about good economics, however; it is yet another stratagem by the central authorities to short-circuit the development of an entrepreneurial class independent of the state.

Currency reforms are not a bad thing in principle. Stable governments historically have used this tactic to draw a line under bad economic policies of the past, often after taming a hyperinflation. Good reforms typically involve knocking zeros off the old paper and issuing new currency, perhaps at approximate parity to major currencies such as the dollar or the euro to make it easier for citizens to hold their government accountable for macroeconomic performance. In recent years Turkey and Ghana, among others, have successfully implemented such reforms.

What occurred Monday in North Korea is different. Unlike a Turkish or Ghanaian-style reform, in which all citizens are encouraged to convert all their holdings of the old currency, the North Korean regime limits the amount of currency that can be converted. This renders excess holdings worthless, and has set off the frenzy this week to get out of old won and into anything else—dollars, Chinese yuan, physical goods—that will maintain value. Any economic “reform” also creates opportunities to parcel out benefits, as with a 2002 price and wage reform that favored the military.

This move is part of Pyongyang’s broader effort to curtail the rise of market activities and the development of pathways to wealth—and potentially power—beyond state control. Participants in North Korea’s bootstrap capitalism include everyone from laid-off factory workers to government officials who exploit their inside knowledge to deal privately in everything from grain to imported Chinese consumer goods.

In a society so highly atomized by the government, a private-sector market would be one of the few ways for North Koreans to interact with each other away from the state’s watchful eyes. So it stands to reason the regime would be worried about the market quite apart from any subversion of the state’s own economic machinery. Roughly every decade since the founding of the country in 1948, the government has initiated a currency reform or similar policy to confiscate the savings and working capital of private entrepreneurs.

There appear to be several particular spurs for the latest “reform.” North Korea relies on local production for about two-thirds of grain consumption, with most of the rest coming through aid. The recent harvest was reportedly poor and world grain prices are rising. This makes farmers more likely to divert food from government procurement to the black market. United Nations sanctions also are disrupting the country’s finances, affecting everyone and reducing the supply of luxury goods the regime dispenses as favors to supporters.

The upshot is that, despite both the currency reform and the legal crack-down on the private economy, the regime is not succeeding in stamping out the market entirely. The fact that Pyongyang has to keep trying indicates that North Koreans keep trying even harder to scrape together better lives for themselves. But the sheer ruthlessness of the Pyongyang regime and its extraordinary capacity for repression underline just what an uphill battle those North Koreans face against a regime determined to keep them down.

Also here are some more details from the Choson Ilbo:

Sources in North Korea say people have been told that money above the individual exchange limit must be deposited in banks, but the state also limits individual deposits to between 300,000 to 3 million won, and people are not allowed to freely withdraw money from their accounts. This has apparently stoked tremendous anger.

During the last currency reform in 1992, authorities permitted each person to deposit up to 20,000 won in the bank, but they were later allowed to withdraw only a few thousand won. Many were unable to withdraw any money at all.

Read previous posts on this topic below:
(more…)

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Hyesan getting a facelift

Friday, November 20th, 2009

Kangsong Taeguk 2012 comes to Hyesan! According to the Daily NK:

According to an inside source, the North Korean authorities have, at the behest of Kim Jong Il, been using the “Mt. Baekdu Tourism Fund’ for improving areas in and around the city of Hyesan in Yangkang Province.

The source relayed the news in a phone conversation with The Daily NK on the 11th, saying, “Recently, many changes have been taking place in Hyesan. At the General’s suggestion, the ‘Mt. Baekdu Tourism Fund’ was channeled to the city, and has been used to dramatically improve the road to and beautify the area around the Samsu Powerplant, as well as creating parks around the Kim Jong Suk Performing Arts Theater.”

In May 2007, after five years under construction, the North Korean authorities held a ceremony for the completion of the Samsu Powerplant. Subsequently, in preparation for an onsite inspection by Kim Jong Il, the beautification of the area around the plant was completed and a new, 24km section of the No. 1 Road running from nearby Wangduk Station (one of a number for the exclusive use of Kim Jong Il) up to the powerplant was constructed.

Construction of the road was apparently extremely difficult, involving removing mountainsides and filling in streams to facilitate the construction of the road, part of that which connects Hyesan with Samjiyeon.

North Korea mobilized around 100,000 people in the period between January 2007 and May 2008 for the work, including 30,000 members of the June 18th Shock Troop, workers from a nearby collective farm, Hyesan Factory and other enterprise laborers.

The construction funds, said to be in the region of $800,000, were sent directly, in cash, to the Party Provincial Secretary and the Provincial Trading Bureau in 2007. They even brought in iron rods, gasoline and diesel fuel from China.

It is apparently difficult for even the vehicles of officials to pass down the No. 1 Road due to the existence of an Escort Bureau checkpoint.

The source also explained about other projects, “Separate from this construction, the project to renovate the road which goes around Wangduk to the Chundong district of Hyesan (where the No. 10 Army Corps Headquarters is located) also began recently (in 2009), and $80,000 has been invested in a beautification project in the area around the Kim Jong Suk theater.”

The road construction project connecting Wangduk and the Samsu Powerplant and the project to repave the existing road from Wangduk Station to the No. 10 Army Corps Headquarters in Chundong were both completed between May 2008 and the end of the “150-Day Battle” in preparation for Kim Jong Il’s inspection of army units in the area.

The beautification of the area around the newly constructed Kim Jong Suk Theater is also noteworthy. The surrounding area contains the No. 7 and No. 8 apartments, which until recently were extremely worn out. Additionally, when an 8-floor apartment next to the No. 7 apartment collapsed in July 2007, some 30 people are said to have lost their lives.

The authorities, while remodeling the No. 7 and No. 8 apartments in an effort to clean up the area, renovated dilapidated apartments and even started a project to lay down Chinese paving blocks in the area.

The Daily NK’s source could not be sure what the original source of the funds was, but confirmed in particular that “it was first tapped under the General’s instructions. Most officials are aware of this.”

On a related note, work on the incomplete Mt. Baekdu-Samjiyeon Railway has still not resumed since its interruption in May. This would seem to indicate that even the Mt. Baekdu Tourism Fund was insufficient for the work.

Read the full story here:
Intensive Public Works Reported in Hyesan
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
11/20/2009

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Friday grab bag

Thursday, November 12th, 2009

North Korean defector poetry: I am personally not a big fan of poetry, but some poetry written by North Korean defectors has been translated into English and published.  Read it in Radio Free Asia.

North Korean Leadership Compounds: We have pretty much located all of the “easy to find” leadership complexes in North Korea on Google Earth.  However, not all of them are visible with high resolution imagery.  Here are a few I have recently taken care of:

1. Sinchon Compound (written about by Keji Fujimoto)

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Click image for larger version

Download Google Earth overlay here.

2. Island getaway: For the leader who has everything

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Download Google Earth overlay here.

3. Sugnam

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Click image for larger version

Download Google Earth Overlay here

Eight Scenic Views of the Songun Era:

1. Sunrise over Mt. Paektu. (See here)

2. Snow Covered Tapak Sol guard post in Mangyongdae.  (See here – Actually not sure where the guard post is, but this is Mangyongdae)

3. Royal Azaleas on the Chol Pass. (See here)

4. Illuinated night view of the Jangja River in Kanggye. (See here)

5. Ulim Waterfall. (See here)

6. Rezoned Handre (Handure) Plain on the Unhung Cooperative Farm in Thaechon County. (See here)

7.  Potato flowers in Taehongdan. (See here)

8. Poman-ri fish farm. (See here)

A Song was even written about these places.

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10,000 apartments under construction in Pyongyang

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-11-10-1
11/10/2009

North Korea is pouring all efforts into the construction of 10,000 family homes in Pyongyang by 2012. Whether this construction plan can be completed within the next three years will weigh on the success or failure of the regime’s goal of establishing a ‘Strong and Prosperous Nation.’

An article run on November 4 in the Chosun Sinbo, a newspaper of the Jochongryeon, the pro-Pyongyang Korean residents’ association in Japan, stated, “Currently, the construction of 10,000 family dwellings is underway in Pyongyang, and the efforts poured into this over the next 3 years will show the strength of the country.” It was also reported that “North Korean authorities are devising policies to concentrate all efforts into the construction area in order to see this through.”

The article also confirmed that the apartment construction project was part of the “effort to open the door to a ‘Strong and Prosperous Nation’,” and that completion of the project “would mean the complete solution of the people’s housing problems in Pyongyang.”

The newspaper claimed that the project is the largest project ever undertaken by the North. In the 1980s and 1990s, 5,000-unit apartments were built along Kwangbok Street and Unification Street over 4 to 5 years, but the current project is twice as large. The aim is to complete the project in 3 years. Each unit is said to be 100 square meters.

North Korean authorities are reportedly pledging that the ‘Strong and Prosperous Nation’ will not just be reflected through economic statistics or increased production, but that they are putting all efforts into increasing the standard of living for the people.

In order to meet the expected increase in demand for electricity, a hydroelectric power plant is being built in Huicheon, Chagang Province, and is expected to be complete by 2012.

It is expected that it will be difficult for the North to complete 10,000 apartments in the next 3 years, and so authorities are also conducting campaigns to repair and upgrade old production lines in factories and companies in order to meet the demand for materials. As well, Preparations are also underway to create a system of factories and businesses to produce needed materials within Pyongyang. The construction project has meant the removal of some military barracks in the area, causing some conflicts between soldiers and civilians.

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DPRK stresses economic ‘informationalization’

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-11-04-2
11/4/2009

The North Korean monthly publication “Chollima” stressed in a recent (September, 2009) edition the need to improve efficiency in production and administrative activities, emphasizing that if the North is to succeed at becoming an “economic power,” then economic management and administrative activities need to become “informationalized.”

In an article titled “Informationalization of Economic Management and Administrative Activity,” the magazine stated, “In order to meet the demands for science and technology development in the era of the information industry, improvement of the socialist economic management has emerged as an important issue.”

The magazine also offered a solution, suggesting that computers and IT resources be ensured first in order to “informationalize” economic management and administrative activities, and that communications equipment be modernized, stating that construction of basic facilities was an urgent task.

In addition, program industries used in the economic sector should be developed, and planning, statistical, and accounting programs, in particular, need to be connected across the country.

Along with this, the magazine noted that the development of information science is closely related to that of information technology, and that research efforts regarding information science need to be strengthened. The article called for further development of basic elementary management systems education, information theory research, and, of course, systems engineering, legal administration, and other economic science fields.

“Informationalization” of economic management and administrative activities is based on IT resources, and focuses on automating statistical and accounting practices in order to strengthen economic management controls and to boost productivity and efficiency.

On August 11, the Rodong Sinmun also emphasized “informationalization,” referring to the current times as the “information economy age” and the “informationalization age,” stating that “today’s war, absent the sound of gunfire, is a war of brains, a technology war,” and, “technological revolution is bravely marching forward at breakneck speed.”

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