Archive for the ‘DPRK Policies’ Category

Mirim’s second Kim Il-sung Square

Tuesday, January 31st, 2012

UPDATE 1: By coincidence NK Leadership Watch and I posted on a similar topic today.  See his post and analysis here.

ORIGINAL POST: Today the Daily NK reported that preparations were underway for another KPA military parade:

A high level government official revealed today, “North Korea has been mobilizing military personnel and equipment to practice for the military parade at Mirim Airfields near Pyongyang. This practice has been taking place since even before the death of Kim Jong Il.”

The official explained the reason for the ongoing parade practice as part of preparations to commemorate Kim Il Sung’s birthday (April 15) and the Mlitary Foundation Day (April 25).

The military parade practice has so far involved the Worker and Peasant Red Guard, which is made up of currently-serving soldiers and reservists, mobilized with the latest-model tanks, armored cars, as well as short and medium range KN-02 and Musudan missiles.

The official added, “North Korea conducts parades on anniversaries such as the Military Foundation Day and other national holidays. Looking at the speed and scale of preparations currently underway, it seems more likely that the parade will take place in April rather than on February 16, Kim Jong Il’s birthday.”

The logistics of these parades are enormous.  I learned a lot about them back in November at a meeting with Osamu Eya in Japan. Among the many things we discussed, I asked him where the North Korean military practices their parades through Kim Il-sung Square. He answered with a single word: “Mirim”.

Now I am kind of embarrassed to admit that I never saw the resemblance (because I thought of the Mirim area as a runway strip and because the two places are not geographically laid out in the same directions). Once you rotate the satellite images and set them next to each other, however, there is no denying that the KPA has a Kim Il-sung Square-sized practice area from which to rehearse its grand military parades.

 

Pictured above (Google Earth): (L) Kim Il-Sung Square, (R) Mirim parade practice area.

Looking at the most current Google Earth satellite imagery (2010-10-6) we can see vehicles already practicing for their next parade:

In this Google Earth image (2006-11-11) we can see people practicing in the area:

Going back to the oldest available satellite image on Google Earth (2000-6-12) the use of the facility as a practice area is a little more clear.  We can also see some of what remains of the original landing strip in this photo:

But Mirim is not just a practice filed.  It also contains facilities to house and feed the thousands of people who come to practice. Just to the left of the field is the April 25 Hotel:

 

According to KCNA (1998-9-30):

The April 25 Hotel has been built on the outskirts of Pyongyang as a monumental edifice in the era of the Workers’ Party. The hotel with a total floor space of more than 134,000 square metres and accommodation for 20,000 guests has bedrooms, cultural and welfare facilities and cook equipment on a highest level. It will serve servicemen and civilians who participate in national military and civic events. Soldier-builders successfully finished this gigantic project–erection of buildings, assembling of equipment and arrangement of the area–in a little more than one year. A ceremony for the completion of the hotel took place on Tuesday. Present at the ceremony were Jo Myong Rok, Kim Il Chol, Kye Ung Thae and others. A congratulatory message of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee was conveyed to the soldier-builders and helpers who had performed feats in the hotel construction. The message noted that the April 25 Hotel, a monumental edifice of the era, has been built in a short span of time under the present conditions that all the people have to overcome manifold trials and hardships in their advance. it could be done only by the revolutionary army of Korea who knows no impossibility, and it is a proud fruition produced by the might of the army and people rallied around the party as one in mind, it stressed. Highly praising the soldier-builders and helpers for demonstrating again the potentials and stamina of socialist Korea by completing the hotel, the message expressed the belief that they would make greater success in carrying out their revolutionary duties. Jo Myong Rok made a report at the ceremony. The reporter said that the heroic and proud feats performed by servicemen in the noble work to carry out the WPK’s grand plan for construction will be always remembered by the fatherland and handed down to posterity.

 

KCNA reported on 1998-10-8 that Kim Jong-il visited the hotel:

Pictured above: Kim Jong-il giving “on the spot guidance” at the 4.25 Hotel

[Kim Jong-il] then went to the April 25 Hotel which was newly built on Mirim plain. Looking round the interior and exterior of the hotel including a bedroom, a washroom, a dining hall and a kitchen, he learned how the hotel had been built. He highly praised soldiers and helpers for having built the hotel in a short span of time and contributed to demonstrating the potential and stamina of socialist Korea once again. He said the construction of the hotel in a short span of time is a miracle that can be worked only by the heroic Korean People’s Army (KPA) which is intensely loyal to the party. He added that the country will always remember the soldiers’ heroic feats and proud achievements in socialist construction. He called for equipping the hotel, an asset of eternal value for the army and people, with better facilities, planting many trees around the hotel, creating a pleasure park and providing those who stay in the hotel with good conditions for cultured life. As many servicemen and civilians will use the hotel, they should be given best services, he said, and gave the hotel important tasks for its management and operation. The Chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission was accompanied by director of the General Political Department of the KPA Jo Myong Rok, chief of the general staff of the KPA Kim Yong Chun, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Kim Il Chol and general officers of the KPA.

This hotel was built at the time the DPRK was experiencing the “Arduous March” (Forced March)–a famine which killed up to a million people. Despite the acute shortage of food and a breakdown of the DPRK’s revolutionary social contract, KCNA listed this hotel as one of the great accomplishments of the North Koreans during this time (1998-12-31):

This year proud successes have been reported from the DPRK in face of difficulties brought on by the combined effects of the never-ceasing campaign of the imperialists to stifle the DPRK and years of natural disasters. The most remarkable success gained in the forced march this year is artitifical satellite “Kwangmyongsong 1” which was launched into orbit on august 31. The scientists and technicians of Korea launched into orbit the first artificial satellite, a product of their own wisdom and technology, fully demonstrating the national power of Korea with a powerful scientific and technical force and the solid foundations of the independent national economy. Bulky April 25 Hotel and September 9 Street sprang up in Pyongyang to commemorate 50 years of the DPRK (September 9). The hotel with modern equipment and accommodation for 20,000 is on the east outskirts of the capital city. The street linking Pyongyang Airport to the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, the sacred temple of Juche, gave a major face-lifting to the northwest area of the capital city with bridges of special characteristics, flats for thousands of households, ornamental forests, scores of metres wide, on either side of the highway in good harmony with landscape. Thousands of minor power stations were built across the country this year. The locally-built minor power stations in Jagang Province meet the needs for the lighting of the flats for more than 100,000 households and the production of local-industry factories. Flats for 10,000 households in Chongjin, an industrial city, benefit from electric heating. A growing number of cities, counties and units are offsetting the demands for electricity with electric energy turned out at minor power stations. The Huichon General Machine Tool Plant produced hundreds of machine tools in a matter of a few months. In the railway transport diesel engine locomotives were converted into electric locomotives called “forced march.” 60 kilometre-odd-long railroad between Haeju and Ongjin, between singangryong and Pupho in the central area of the country was switched over to a broad-gauge one. The Pyongyang Integrated Circuits Factory, salt refineries and other industrial establishments were commissioned or completed throughout the country. As a result, a more solid economic foundation of the nation was laid.

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North Korean trade and aid statistics update

Tuesday, January 17th, 2012

According to Business Week:

North Korea’s trade expanded more than 20 percent in 2010 to $6.1 billion on growing business with China even as the economy shrank for a second year, South Korea’s national statistics office said.

Trade volume increased 22.3 percent in 2010 after a 10.5 percent decline in 2009, Statistics Korea said in its annual report today in Seoul. Commerce with China accounted for 57 percent, or $3.5 billion, of North Korea’s foreign trade, up from 53 percent in the previous year. The totalitarian state doesn’t report economic statistics.

North Korea’s gross domestic product contracted 0.5 percent to 30 trillion won ($26.1 billion) in 2010, compared with South Korea’s 1,173 trillion won, the Bank of Korea said in November. Per capita income was 1.24 million won compared with South Korea’s 24 million won.

Kim Jong Un took over as leader of North Korea in December after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. The regime has relied on economic handouts since the mid-1990s and an estimated 2 million people have died from famine, according to South Korea’s central bank. The United Nations and the U.S. increased sanctions on the country aimed at curtailing its nuclear weapons program after 2010 attacks that killed 50 South Koreans.

Chinese aid to the stricken country will probably increase as the government in Beijing seeks to avoid a flood of refugees from crossing the 880-mile (1,416 kilometer) border it shares with North Korea, analyst Dong Yong Sueng said. While food shortages have contributed to rising defections, North Korea has shown no willingness to ease sanctions by abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

Economic Dependence

“North Korea’s economic dependence on China will inevitably increase for the time being unless there’s some resolution to the nuclear situation,” said Dong, a senior fellow at the Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul. “China wants a stable North Korean regime and succession to avoid a potential influx of refugees.”

North Korea had a shortfall of as much as 700,000 metric tons of food last year, which could affect a quarter of the population, according to the United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization. China provides almost 90 percent of energy imports and 45 percent of the country’s food, according to a 2009 report from the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations.

China is preparing to consent to a North Korean request to provide 1 million tons of food in time for the April 5 anniversary of the birth of the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung, Japan’s Fuji Television said on its website. The report didn’t say where it obtained the information.

Providing Assistance

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin today told reporters in Beijing that while he wasn’t aware of the report, “we have always been providing assistance to the DPRK within our capacity which we think will be conducive to the stability and development of the country.” DPRK is an acronym of North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Kim’s military had over one million soldiers in active duty and 7.7 million reserve troops as of November 2010, today’s report said, citing South Korean Defense Ministry figures. The North operates under a military-first policy and has remained on combat alert since the Korean War ended in 1953 with a truce and not a peace treaty.

North Korea’s population rose to 24.2 million in 2010 from 24.1 million in 2009, about half of South Korea. Inter-Korean trade rose 13.9 percent from a year earlier to $1.9 billion last year, Statistics Korea said.

South Korea plans to set up a fund to raise as much as 55 trillion won to pay for eventual reunification with North Korea, Unification Minister Yu Woo Ik said in an interview with Bloomberg last October.

Read Sangwon Yoon’s full article in Business Week here.

The data in this article was pulled from a recent publication by Statistics Korea (Korean, English). You can read a press release of the publication here (in Korean). You can read the press release in English here (via Google Translate). It is not very good, so if a reader would care to take the time to translate this article, I would appreciate it. You can also download the press release as a .hwp file at the bottom of the article (download a .hwp reader here).

Statistics Korea did set up a North Korea Statistics page which you can see here. Unfortunately, it is only in Korean! I have, however, added it as a link on my North Korean Economic Statistics page.

UPDATE 1: The Daily NK also covered this story with the following report:

The income gap between North and South Korea is becoming ever wider, according to statistics released yesterday by Statistics Korea showing that South Korea’s per capita Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010 was $27,592, 19.3 times that of North Korea at $1,074. Last year the gap was 18.4 times.

In the (legal) foreign trade sector, the two Koreas also lived very differently. South Korea’s 2012 trading volume was $891.6 billion, 212.3 times North Korea’s $4.2 billion. North Korea’s exports were worth just $15 billion, its imports $27 billion.

As expected, North Korea’s trade reliance on China was highly significant (56.9%), partly because as strained inter-Korean relations started to bite, so inter-Korean trade declined as well: from 33.0% in 2009 to 31.4% in 2010.

Meanwhile, 61.0% of adults in South Korea are economically active, a number which rises to 70.2% in North Korea. Conversely, there are 3,134,000 college students in South Korea, but only 510,000 in North Korea.

In the energy industry sector in 2010, South Korea imported 872,415,000 barrels of crude oil, 226.4 times more than North Korea’s 3,854,000. The electricity generating capacity of South Korea is 10.9 times more than that of North Korea, too, though the generated amount was actually around 20 times bigger, the statistics allege.

Automobile production was no better; in South Korea (4,272,000), 1,068 times more than North Korea (4,000). Steel production in South Korea was 46.1 times that of North Korea, cement was 7.6 times more, and fertilizer 6.1 times.

UPDATE 2: The Hankyoreh adds some critiques of the data:

“With inter-Korean relations so tense, it is no longer possible for us to do the kind of North Korean grain production estimates that were possible under the previous administration,” a government official explained on Tuesday.

2010 production figures for rice, corn, barley, beans, and other major grains were left blank in a Statistics Korea report on major statistical indicators in North Korea. The numbers were included in statistical data released in 2008, 2009, and other years.

A Statistics Korea official said, “We made several requests to the organization in charge, but they didn’t provide materials, so we couldn’t print them.” The Rural Development Administration is responsible for investigating North Korean grain production. Early every year, it has estimated and released North Korean grain production figures for the previous year. Since 2011, however, it has failed to release figures.

A government official explained, “Since inter-Korean relations were decent during the previous administration, it was possible to go to the North and get samples to use as a basis for estimates.”

“With inter-Korean exchange all but completely halted under the current administration, the basis for releasing estimates has disappeared,” the official added.

Some observers said the decision was motivated by concerns that South Korean public support for food aid to North Korea could grow if low figures are presented. The argument is that there is no reason the kind of grain production estimates that were possible in 2008 and 2009, while the Lee administration was in office, would not be so for 2010 alone. Observers are also expressing bafflement at the fact that only agricultural products were omitted from estimates at a time when even the number of cars is being estimated in the area of industrial products.

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University, said, “Recently, food aid negotiations have been taking place between North Korea and the US, and I suspect the government may have decided not to announce [the estimates] because it was too concerned about public sentiment in South Korea.”

The North Korea figures released Tuesday also showed South Korea‘s per capita gross national income of $20,759 to be 19.3 times North Korea’s $174 for 2010.

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North Korea enacted its first “corporate law”

Thursday, January 12th, 2012

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-1-12

The adoption of Act No. 1194 by the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK was recently confirmed. “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Corporate Law” or the “Corporate Law” was reported to have passed more than a year ago in November 11, 2010.

The “Corporate Law” is evaluated as an important indication of the direction of the economic policy of North Korea since Kim Jong-un was appointed as the next successor at the Third Party Conference held on September 28, 2010.

The law consists of five chapters: 1) Basic Principles of the Corporation; 2) Organization of the Corporation; 3) Management Organization of the Corporation; 4) Business Management Activities of the Corporation; and 5) Projects of the Corporation.

The first article of this act “The Mission of the Corporate Law” states that the law was enacted to, “contribute to the development of the people’s economy and to secure the management system of the socialist corporations by establishing the system and order for the organization and management activities.”

The second article, “The Definition of Corporation” defines a corporation as an “economic unit that operates as an organization that directly handles the labor, facilities, equipment, materials, and finances for the production or volunteer activities.”

Article 9, “The Legal Rights and the Legal Protection Principles,” indicates that the “legal rights and interests of the corporations are protected by the government.” Article 10, however, specifically states that this particular law does not apply to the special trade zones and the foreign investment companies.

Article 18, “The Organization of the Corporation,” has a clause that states “the managing organization has the jurisdiction to close down corporations for unreasonable or lack of prospects that does not meet the standards and the demands of the national policy and reality.”

Article 21 depicts a manager as a “person representing the corporation and responsible for the entire business.” The manager, chief engineer, and assistant manager’s specific responsibilities were also explicated. The hierarchy was clearly indicated where the assistant manager was to report to the chief engineer and the manager while the chief engineer has to report to the manager.

Article 29 affirms that a business is to be managed based on established business and corporate strategies in which every year a draft of the people’s economy plan must be submitted to the appropriate authorities. The written economic plan must be followed on a daily, monthly, quarterly, and by index basis (Article 30).

Articles 31 to 37 include specifics on the improvements of production technology while Articles 38 to 43 include regulations to enhance the management system.

In particular, Article 42 stipulates that the corporation must promote sales based on supply plans and contracts. Those sales that do not follow the plan and the contract cannot be sold.”

Article 44 states, “The appropriate amount of labor is scientifically determined and managed based on the socialist distribution principles and a precise socialist wage system must be implemented.”

In other words, socialist principles will be applied to both the sales of merchandise and wage system. While the corporation will receive autonomy in many areas, clear regulations are provided for sales in addition to evaluation and incentive system for labor.

In recent years, North Korea has continuously passed economic laws for economic construction and enhancing the lives of the North Korean people. Such laws include the following: The Agricultural Law passed on November 3, 2009; Real Estate Management Law on November 11, 2009; the Country of Origin for Export Law on November 25, 2009; and Comprehensive Equipment Import Law on November 11, 2009.

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New report claims 2009 DPRK economy is 86.5% of 1995

Monday, January 9th, 2012

NOTE: I have not seen this report yet, so I cannot directly comment.  If you see a copy, please send it to me.

Here is the story in the Daily NK:

If 1995 represented a baseline level of 100 for the North Korean economy, then by 2009 it had declined to 86.5 following sharp reductions in inter-Korean aid over the preceding year, according to newly released economic analysis.

The analysis, ‘Research into the State of Inter-Korean Change Seen through Statistics,’ was produced by the Sejong Institute pursuant to a request from Statistics Korea, the South Korean state statistics body.

The report incorporated ten different statistical variables, including North Korea’s estimated food and electricity production, trade and finance volumes and levels of international aid.

During the March of Tribulation, the mid-1990s famine that killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans, the economy declined to a nadir of 70.3 (in 1998), according to the report’s findings; conversely, at the very peak of ‘Sunshine Policy’ aid deliveries in 2007, it reached a level of 104.7.

Elsewhere, North Korea’s food production had risen to 119 by 2009, while coal and electricity production had reached 107.6 and 102.2 respectively, it also reports. Conversely, steel production declined to 81.8, marine production to 63, and oil imports to 47.1.

Analyzing the situation, it goes on, “Steel and electricity production, the core of the North Korean command economy, did not change much so they could not have much of an effect. The decline of industrial facilities is serious, and due to this worn out equipment mineral production is slumping and there is never enough electrical power for smelting.”

The report notes pessimistically that current difficulties are set to continue, adding that even if North Korea embarked on root and branch reform tomorrow, in many cases it would already be too late for recovery without massive and sustained investment.

“In a society like North Korea where politics dominates everything else and the biggest impediments to state development, dictatorship and the 3rd generation succession, normal economic development is impossible,” it concludes.

The Donga Ilbo also reported on the study:

North Korea`s economic prowess has deteriorated due to stalled inter-Korean relations since peaking in 2007 due to expanded aid from South Korea and trade with China, a report released Monday in Seoul said.

The North`s economic ability peaked to 104.7 in 2007, up from the benchmark score of 100 in 1995, but plunged afterward to as low as 86.5 in 2009, the Sejong Institute said in the report prepared at the request of Statistics Korea. The Stalinist country`s economic prowess was based on 10 indicators including steel and electricity production, trade volume, state budget and the value of the South’s assistance to the North.

The North Korean economy began to deteriorate from the mid-1990s, when millions of people starved to death due to famine, and the economic ability figure fell to as low as 70.3 in 1998. It rose again, however, and reached 104.7 in 2007.

South Korean assistance to the North surged to raise the indicator to a high of 236.9 in 2007, a huge leap from the baseline score of 100 in 1995. The communist country`s trade volume also jumped 43.4 percent due to the expansion of trade with China.

The North`s economy began to shrink from 2008, when the South halted aid. Notably, the indicator fell to as low as 86.5 in 2009 to tie the record-low set in 2000. Due to deterioration of inter-Korean relations, the volume of South Korean government assistance to the North tumbled over the period to 36.2 in 2009, down 84.7 percent from that in 2007.

A decline in external trade except with China due to tougher international sanctions against Pyongyang also hastened the deterioration of the North Korean economy. Due to the participation by Singapore, one of the North`s top five trading partners, in the sanctions, the combined volume of the North`s trade fell about 10.7 percent, resulting in the indicator falling from 186.3 in 2008 to 166.3 in 2009.

The think tank said,“Considering that production of steel and electricity, the cornerstone of the centrally planned North Korean economy, remained largely unchanged, the recent deterioration of the North Korean economy stems from reduction of South Korean aid and contraction of the North`s overall trade volume.”

Here is a link to the Statistics Korea page on North Korea.

Read the full stories here:
NK Economy Lagging Heavy in 2009
Daily NK
Cho Jong Ik
2012-01-09

N.Korean economy plunges after hitting high in 2007: report
Donga Ilbo
2012-1-9

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2012 Joint Editorial

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012

Some thought it was possible that Kim Jong-un might deliver a new year’s address (as Kim Il-sung always did), but instead the leadership has chosen to follow the practice of the Kim Jong-il era by issuing a “joint editorial” by Rodong Sinmun, Joson Inmingun, and Chongnyon Jonwi.

Since I am writing this post well after the joint editorial has already been published, numerous commentators have already weighed in: Choson Exchange, Daily NK, Washington Post, CNN, Business Week, Hankyoreh, IFES, Xinhua.

Below is the full text of the Joint New Year Editorial c/o North East Asia Matters. My hat off to anyone who actually reads the whole thing:

(more…)

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North Korea’s new class system

Saturday, December 3rd, 2011

Andrei Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

It is often overlooked how much North Korea has changed over the past 20 years. Its Stalinist and militaristic facade is carefully maintained by the state, but in the new circumstances it is increasingly misleading. Behind this official veneer of militant posters and goose-stepping soldiers, the society itself has changed much.

In a nutshell, the past two decades were the time when the state was steadily retreating from the private life, and also was losing its ability (perhaps also its will) to control the daily activities of its subjects as well as how they made a living. One of many significant changes has been the steady decline in the significance attached to family background (known as songbun in North Korean parlance) – once the single most important factor that determined the life of a North Korean.

Family background did matter in other communist countries as well, but to a much lesser extent. For example, in the Soviet Union immediately after the 1917 communist revolution, scions of aristocrats, descendants of priests, and merchants faced many kinds of discrimination. It was more difficult for them to enter a college or to be promoted, and they were more likely to be arrested for alleged political crimes. However, this discrimination had disappeared by the late 1940s, so in the days of my youth, in the 1970s and 1980s, it had become quite normal in the USSR to boast about real or alleged aristocratic family roots.

North Korea is very different. In 1957, the authorities launched a large-scale and ambitious investigation of the family backgrounds of virtually all North Korean citizens. As a result of this and subsequent investigations, by the mid-1960s the entire population was divided into a number of hereditary groups, somewhat akin to the estates of medieval Europe. Career chances and life prospects of every North Korean were determined, to a very large extent, by his membership in one of these strictly defined groups.
The major criteria of classification were quite straightforward: the songbun (origin) of the North Korean was largely defined by what his or her direct male ancestors did in the 1930s and 1940s.

The official songbun structure was quite elaborate and changed over time. However, at the first approximation, there have been three groups in North Korea, usually known as “core”, “wavering” and “hostile” classes. Every single North Korean had to belong to one of these groups.

The “hostile class” included people whose ancestors in or around 1945 were engaged in activities that were not to the regime’s liking. Among others, this group included descendants of clerks in the Japanese colonial administration, Christian activists, female shamans, entrepreneurs, and defectors to the South. Members of the hostile class faced the greatest number of restrictions: They could not live in Pyongyang or other major cities and they could not be admitted to good colleges or universities. People whose songbun was exceptionally bad would not even be drafted into the military.

Members of the “core class” included those whose direct male ancestors contributed toward the foundation and strengthening of the Kim family regime. They were descendants of anti-Japanese guerrillas, heroes of the Korean War, or party bureaucrats. For all practical purposes, over the past half-century, only these people could be promoted to key positions in the North Korean state and party bureaucracy. They constituted the hereditary elite.

In the days of Kim Il-sung’s rule, from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, songbun was of paramount significance. It determined where people lived and worked and even what they ate. Most marriages were also concluded between people of the same or similar songbun.

It was also important that the songbun was, in essence, unchallengeable. It was inherited from one’s father and was then bestowed on one’s children. The mother’s songbun did not matter. I know a couple where the husband’s songbun was bad (he was a “landowner’s grandson”), but the wife had the best songbun imaginable, being a descendant of a family that once was involved with the anti-Japanese guerrillas of Kim Il-sung. Frankly, such a marriage was rare and unequal – in most cases women of such standing would be as reluctant to marry a man of low origin as, say, a European noble lady from the 17th century. However, in this particular case the marriage did take place, much against the resistance of the girl’s parents.

In due time, though, the spouses discovered that the wife’s songbun did not really matter. Their daughter, a promising athlete, could not be sent for further training, since her songbun was bad: the great-granddaughter of a minor landlord could not compete on the national level and, for that matter, could be accepted only to a junior college.

In Kim Il-sung’s era – that is, before 1994 – the state was in near-complete control of an individual’s life. The only way to achieve high status and affluence was to climb the official bureaucratic ladder. As a North Korean friend put it in the late 1980s: “I hate officials, but I want to become an official, because in our country, only officials can live well.” Indeed, in Kim Il-sung’s North Korea all material goods were distributed by the state and almost all income was derived from work in state industry or the state bureaucracy.

But things started to change dramatically in the early 1990s. The state sector, suddenly deprived of Soviet subsidies, collapsed. North Koreans suddenly discovered that food rations were no longer forthcoming and their official monthly salary would only buy 1 or 2 kilograms of rice. Predictably, mass starvation followed, killing at least a half-million people.

To survive, the North Korean people literally rediscovered capitalism. Estimates vary, but the consensus is that over the past 10-15 years, the average North Korean family has come to draw most of its income from what can be described as black-market activities. Actually the so-called black market is not particularly black, since the government – in spite of occasional crackdowns – has tacitly tolerated its existence since the mid-1990s. Nowadays North Koreans work on individual fields on steep mountain slopes, they establish private workshops to produce garments and assorted consumer goods, and they smuggle and trade.

The new and increasingly dominant unofficial economy is in essence capitalist. As such, it rewards those who are sufficiently industrious, greedy, intelligent, ruthless and disciplined – and in some cases, it rewards them handsomely. Social inequality is growing and many a successful merchant or workshop owner lives better than a middle-ranking bureaucrat. A successful entrepreneur might have all trappings of luxury – including, say, a Chinese motorbike or a refrigerator, which in North Korea can be seen as roughly equivalent to a Lexus and a yacht.

The success in the emerging new economy is usually unrelated to one’s songbun. In fact, sometimes it seems that people with bad songbun tend to be more successful nowadays – perhaps because back in the 1990s they had no expectations of the state and were the first to jump into the murky waters of the emerging North Korean market economy.

Of late, the previously attractive career avenues have lost much of their allure. For example, in the past, many North Koreans were willing to do their long and tedious military service, which lasted some seven to 10 years. This popularity was easy to explain: For a person with average songbun, this would be the only way to get into the bottom tiers of the bureaucracy. As a North Korean told it, recalling the time of her youth, the 1970s: “The only way to become somebody was to go into the military, join the Korean Workers Party while on the active service, and then come back to become an official.”

Recently, however, military service has lost much of its popularity. Few people would be willing spend 10 years in a squalid barracks so as eventually to become a minor official in the city administration. Such a job is still attractive, to be sure, but it seems preferable to become a smuggler or a merchant, whose income far exceeds that of a petty bureaucrat.

Still, on the very top, songbun is important, since the key administrative positions are held by those with good songbun, and a mid- or high-level official can make a nice income by milking the private economy. Hence people with good songbun still often think about capitalizing on the real or alleged contribution of their ancestors to the establishment of the North Korean regime. However, for a majority the emergence of markets opened a new, faster and more attractive (but also more risky) avenue of social mobility.

North Korean society has become defined by one’s relationship to money, not by one’s relationship to the bureaucracy or one’s inherited caste status. Money talks, and for better or worse, in North Korea, money talks ever louder. As a female refugee in her early 40s put it recently: “Under Kim Il-sung, songbun was very important, it decided everything. Under Kim Jong-il, things are different – your family background still matters, but money nowadays is more important than social background.”

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s new class system
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
2011-12-3

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Aidan Foster-Carter on what’s wrong with the DPRK economy

Saturday, November 26th, 2011

Aidan Foster-Carter writes a compendium of problems facing the DPRK economy in 38 North.

Paraphrasing the ailments he cites: Socialism, militarism, royal economy, cult costs, potempkinism, leadership whims, rigidities, coordination problems, unwise leadership priorities.

Read the full story (which is full of fantastic anecdotes) below:
Whim Jong Il: North Korea’s Economic Irrationalities
38 North
Aidan Foster-Carter
2011-11-26

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Some interesting recent publications and articles

Thursday, October 20th, 2011

1. “Relying on One’s Strength: The Growth of the Private Agriculture in Borderland Areas of North Korea”
Andrei Lankov,Seok Hyang Kim ,Inok Kwa
PDF of the article here 

The two decades which followed the collapse of the communist bloc were a period of dramatic social and economic transformation in North Korea. The 1990-2010 period was a time when market economy re-emerged in North Korea where once could be seen as the most perfect example of the Stalinist economic model. The present article deals with one of the major areas of socioeconomic change which, so far, has not been the focus of previous studies. The topic is about the growth of private agricultural activities in North Korea after 1990. This growth constitutes a significant phenomenon which has important social consequences and also is important from a purely economic point of view: it seems that the spontaneous growth of private plots played a major role in the recent improvement of the food situation inside North Korea.

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3. Korea Sharing Movement anti-malarial program (Via Cancor)
Read a PDF of on the project here

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4. What is it like to teach at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST)?
Find out from one instructor here. More on PUST here.

 

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Hamhung traders taxed to fund Pyongyang construction projects

Tuesday, October 18th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean authorities in Hamheung are demanding 150,000 won from each trader in local markets to support construction projects in Pyongyang, according to a source from the city.

“Since the start of October, Hamheung Municipal People’s Committee has been taking money from market traders on the premise that ‘You have to give material support to Pyongyang construction workers,’” the source told the Daily NK today. “In the case of traders in the markets in Hoisang and Sapo, they are being asked for as much as 150,000 won each.”

Hamheung is the most famous industrial city in North Korea, and as such has larger markets than many other places. Thus, given that each of the two markets mentioned by the source has more than 500 traders, if the authorities were to reach their goal figure then they would be able to take 75,000,000 won from each one.

However, the Market Management Office for each market already receives 300-500 won per day from traders in the form of a ‘stall tax’, with sellers of home appliances and other high priced goods paying 500 won and those who sell food only paying 300 won. Thus, 150,000 won represents a huge cost, and many traders are apparently reacting to the demand with incredulity.

The source also noted that this does not appear to represent a central Party directive, with only traders in South Hamkyung and Yangkang Province having been hit by it to date.

“In Hyesan Market in Yangkang Province, it is 100,000 won per trader,” the source revealed, adding, “It seems like a case of the provincial Party preparing funds to support Pyongyang construction by taking money from traders.”

Elsewhere, although traders are now angry at the demand for funding, everything else is good, with official market controls being very lightly implemented at the moment, according to the source.

“The market is open from morning to night, and with the exception of the usual crackdowns on grasshopper traders there are no notable inspections,” he revealed.

But then, he added sarcastically, “They are taking money from the market as if it were some kind of state industry, so maybe that’s why they are leaving it alone.”

Read the full story here:
To Hamheung Traders: 150,000 Won for Pyongyang!
Daily NK
Lee Seok Young
2011-10-18

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Lankov on measures of economic freedom in the DPRK

Friday, September 23rd, 2011

Pictured above: An annual index measure of economic freedom in the DPRK from 1995 to 2011, published by the Heritage Foundation’s and Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom.

Andrei Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

[The] Heritage foundation and the Wall Street Journal recently published a new edition of their annual index of economic freedom, according to which North Korea has the world’s least-free economy. One can hardly argue about this – North Korea has for decades worked hard to take Stalinism to its logical extremes, and slightly beyond that.

However, one gets perplexed when looking at the grades of unfreedom that are given by the Heritage Foundation to the North through the 1995-2011 period. According to the index, the level of economic unfreedom in North Korea was essentially the same throughout the entire 1996-2005 period. Then, in 2005 it deteriorated considerably and has continued a slow downward slide until now.

This depiction is bound to raise the eyebrows of anyone who is familiar with actual economic trends in North Korea. The graph is correct when it says that the economy became more restrictive in 2005, when the government tried to re-introduce the rationing and reconfirmed the ban on the private sale of grain (such a ban had existed since 1957, but ceased to be enforced around 1990).

However, the 2005 measures were, essentially, a backlash, an attempt to reverse the half-baked reforms of 2002 – and those reforms can be described only as liberalizing.

On balance, the 2002 reforms should not be overestimated. Nonetheless, the 2002 reforms legalized a significant part of the black economy, and also granted managers of state-owned industrial enterprises a measure of managerial freedom they had not had for many decades.

If this was not an increase in economic freedom, what was it? But the Heritage Foundation graph does not give any hint of this change: the line that purports to depict the level of economic freedom remains on the same low level in 2002.

This is more interesting because 1997-2002 was when actual economic freedom increased dramatically. The old hyper-Stalinist laws remained technically effective, but nobody bothered to enforce these restrictions. It is estimated that in the early 2000s, the average North Korean family drew some 80% of its income from various market activities.

This was technically illegal, but the authorities were ready to turn a blind eye to the re-emergence of some form of a market economy, and in 2002 they even grudgingly and partially legalized the already flourishing market economy.

However, these improvements – both de-facto and, in 2002-2005 de-jure – find no expression in the flat line of the Heritage graph which, however, does not fail to notice that after 2005 the situation again began to deteriorate due to a government backlash against the private economy. The backlash was not particularly successful, but it lasted until 2009, and this is correctly reflected by the downward line at the graph.

However, then the graph begins seriously misleading again – and again, seemingly due the same implicit assumption that in North Korea things can go only from bad to worse. The graph depicts 2009 as a year when the level of freedom went even lower – and this is a correct assumption, since in 2009 the authorities undertook currency reform.

The reform’s main, if not sole, purpose was to annihilate the private economy that had survived the 2005-2009 backlashes surprisingly well. There is little doubt that North Korean decision-makers really want, above all, to revive the hyper-Stalinist economy that alone guarantees the regime’s long-term political stability (or so they – and the present author – believe).

However, the 2009 bold attempt to go back to the Stalinist ways ended in complete and pathetic failure – and the government, fearful of the chaos its inept reform created, backpedaled immediately.

The failure of the 2009 currency reform was followed by another wave of economic liberalization. In May 2010, the government lifted all restrictions and bans on private retail trade that were introduced in the 2005-09 backlash. In fact, the North Korean economy nowadays is roughly as free (or rather unfree) as it used to be immediately after the 2002 reforms. But there is no hint of this roller coaster changes in the slowly descending line of the Heritage Foundation Index.

The same is applicable to the economic situation. Every year, we get reports about a looming famine in North Korea – and this year is no exception. A quick look through headlines of major newspapers can clarify that such reports surface with predictable regularity every year.

In March 2008, the International Herald Tribune ran a headline “Food shortage looms in North Korea”. In March 2009, the Washington Post headline said “At the Heart of North Korea’s Troubles, an Intractable Hunger Crisis”. One year later, in March 2010, the Times of London warned: “Catastrophe in North Korea; China must pressure Pyongyang to allow food aid to millions threatened by famine.” In March 2011, The New York Times wrote: “North Korea: 6 Million Are Hungry.” The predictions of gloom come every year, but famine does not.

Actually, from around 2002-2003, we have seen a steady but clear improvement in North Korea’s economic situation. North Koreans are still malnourished, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, they are not starving any more – at least not in significant numbers.

However, opponents of the regime cannot admit that people are not starving or report about (however marginal) improvement of the food situation, since, as I have said, from their viewpoint nothing can possibly improve in North Korea. At the same time, supporters of the regime will not admit that the North Korean people are still malnourished, and the regime itself is active in presenting exaggerated evidence of a looming famine (or perhaps, even fabricating such evidence when necessary) – as this will help it get more free food from the outside, and this is what Pyongyang needs.

One can see the same trends everywhere. For example, human-rights non-governmental organizations keep telling us about a further deterioration in the human-rights situation in the North. However, the evidence tells a different story. Human rights are still by far the world’s worst, but they are better than 20 or 30 years ago.

Just one example of this under-reported improvement will probably suffice. Until the mid-1990s, the entire family of a political criminal – that is, all people who were registered at the same address as he or she, were by default shipped to a concentration camp. Some 10 or 15 years ago, this approach ceased to be universal, so families of many political criminals – including some prominent activists based in Seoul – remained free.

There is little doubt that families are harassed, and even distant relatives of dissenters are denied good jobs and/or the right to reside in Pyongyang and major cities. Nonetheless, there is a great difference between inability to live in a major city and incarceration in what might indeed be the world’s worst prison camp system.

However, this change is seldom reported. Human-rights advocacy groups obviously cannot bring themselves admit that something can get better under the Kim family regime. Probably, they think that such admission would make the situation look less urgent and thus would help the Kim family regime in some indirect way. These worries might be even well-founded – but the result is the tendency to ignore a particular type of “politically incorrect” news.

Paradoxically, regime sympathizers – whose presence is especially noticeable among the South Korean left – are equally reluctant to attract any attention to these minor improvements. It is understandable, since we are talking about changes from the awful to the very bad, and Pyongyang champions cannot bring themselves to admit how brutal and inefficient the regime actually is.

For example, if pro-Pyongyang media outlets report that the “family responsibility” principle does not apply in many cases, they would have to admit that in the supposed “paradise” of national purity and/or anti-globalist determination in North Korea, not only dissenters, but their families as well were shipped to concentration camps until quite recently. No member of South Korea’s radical nationalist left could bring him or herself to admit this fact.

One cannot imagine a pro-North Korean leftist blogger in Seoul triumphantly writing something like this: “In the past, if somebody watched a South Korean melodrama, he would be arrested, beaten unconscious and then sent to prison for life together with his entire family. Nowadays, things are so better: only his teeth – not ribs! – are likely to be broken during an investigation, and then he or she will spend in prison merely a couple years, and his family are now allowed to keep their freedom. What an improvement!”

The sad irony is that this change is actually an improvement, but neither side of the political debate is going to report it. This is confirmation to the old truism: political passions make people oblivious to the obvious. However, propaganda is a poor substitute for honest and objective analysis – even when such propaganda is produced by people who believe it themselves.

Read the full story here:
It’s not all doom and gloom in Pyongyang
Andrei Lankov
Asia Times
2011-9-23

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