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ROK religious groups push for government food aid to the North

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-08-31-1
8/31/2010

An organization representing several major South Korean religious organizations crossed the DMZ on August 27 to deliver over 300 tons (thirteen 25-ton trucks) of flour to the city of Kaesong, with plans to distribute the aid to North Korea’s children and poverty-stricken. This is the first overland delivery of aid since Seoul’s May 24 measures restricting exchanges in response to the Cheonan incident.

Nine members of the organization, representing Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, travelled to the North. The group intends to visit one or two nurseries, and distribute flour to Kaesong City as well as Jangpung, Keumchon, Daechon, Chongdan and Yondan districts. The delegation is also delivering six boxes of nutrition supplements for children in Kaesong’s nurseries. Before crossing over into North Korea, the group held a press conference in Paju City’s Imjin Park. At the conference, a representative stated that while the aid shipment was later than desired, the organization thanked the South Korean government for making the decision to allow the delivery while facing a difficult situation in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident.

The organization also stated, “Peninsular denuclearization is also important for bringing peace and security to the Korean Peninsula,” but it is necessary to make ensuring the lives of those in both North and South Korea a top priority, and the group “earnestly hopes that the [South Korean] governments’ active support of humanitarian assistance can save the lives of North Korean residents and help to realize inter-Korean reconciliation and peace.”

The organization also stressed that religious teachings emphasized the need to exert all efforts for the desolate and the starving. The group is devoted to helping resolve the North Korean plight caused by starvation and malnutrition, and through these efforts, bringing about peace on the Korean peninsula. The organization, representing those of Jewish, Catholic, Buddhist, Protestant, Korean Buddhist, and Chongdo religions, as well as the United Religions Initiative of Korea, continues to pursue renewed government assistance to North Korea.

The Korean Conference of Religion and Peace (KCRP) issued a statement on August 27 declaring that the South Korean government needed to send aid to the North not only in response to the critical situation caused by recent flooding, but in order to help resolve the chronic food shortages causing ongoing hardship for the people of North Korea. In highlighting the plight of North Koreans, the group emphasizes familial and national ties, stressing Korean unity in calling for government assistance for ‘brethren’ in the North. The group also calls for both Seoul and Pyongyang to “open [their] hearts and hold talks on peninsular peace and unification” rather than continue with the current confrontational policies.

Posted in Food, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, International Aid, Korean Conference of Religion and Peace (KCRP), South Korea | Comments Closed

DPRK farm life worsens on market price instability

Thursday, August 26th, 2010

Institutie for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-08-25-1
8/25/2010

The quality of life among North Korea’s agricultural workers has reportedly worsened sharply in recent times. It appears that the aftermath of last November’s currency reform measure has finally reached as far as the farmhouse. According to a report by the group Daily NK, in the town of Onsong, North Hamgyong Province, only 4~5 families per neighborhood unit (around 30 families) manage to eat rice, in the way of ‘corn rice’, three times per day. Most households eat boiled ears of corn or gruel-like corn soup.

While it was thought that the currency reforms would ease the food shortages of farming households, their lives have grown more difficult due to the sudden fluctuations of market prices, driving down the number of farmers able to sell their yields at market. In the Onsong market, rice sold for an average of 1050 won per kilogram on August 20. Compared to the beginning of the month, prices were down approximately 100 won, but are still more than twice as high as just a few months ago. This is, in part, due to the foreign currency exchange rate. One Chinese Yuan is trading for 215 North Korean won.

Actually, North Korean farmers were about the only beneficiaries of the currency reform. Last December saw the biggest public distribution of goods ever. Commerce was up around 15~20 percent over the year prior. In addition, follow-up measures allowed families to collect 10,000-20,000 won each. However, as market prices became increasingly unstable during the first half of this year, it became harder for farmers to sell their goods. Because rice prices would double or triple, then drop again, month after month, it was difficult for a farmer to take 20~30 kilograms of corn to market and get the price they wanted. On top of this, the price of household goods was climbing, driving up the cost of living.

In North Korea, all farmers are obligated to work on cooperative farms, but are also allowed private plots to raise goods for supplementary income. Therefore, when they have an opportunity, most make their way to a local market to sell their goods. The regime considers this ‘supplementary’ income, but actually, the money earned from this practice is what most live off of, using profits from their corn sales to buy other food or necessities. For these farmers, not only is it difficult to sell their crops, but circumstances make it tough even to harvest them. In the case of one farmer in Onsong who works a 1500 pyong private plot, he harvests approximately three tons of corn per year. As those at the cooperative farm receive only 300 kilograms of corn in rations, three tons is not an insignificant amount. However, due to the cost of fertilizer, bribes to authorities, bribes to inspectors, etc., he is left with only around one ton. With fertilizer shortages this spring, considerably less fertilizer was available for private plots.

Even if the farmer saw yields similar to last fall, at today’s prices, he would be able to make only around 500,000 won. This is little more than the 40,000 won/month market traders can make. Farmers with plots of only 500~600 pyong have an even more difficult time. A source explained, “As stories of growing starvation in Kangwon Province spread, people are becoming more distraught,” and, “a family of four lives off of gruel made from one kilogram of potatoes or corn per day.”

Posted in Agriculture, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Institute for Far Eastern Studies | 1 Comment »

North Korea expanding farming areas

Friday, July 30th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.10-07-30-1
7/30/2010

North Korean media outlets are reporting large-scale development of tidelands as part of ongoing economic projects. There have been reports on a land reclamation project in the tideland area of Daekye-do, in North Pyongan Province, that was completed on June 30. The Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) and the Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun both ran stories on July 1 stating that the Central Committee of the Workers Party sent a letter of congratulations to the construction workers and supporters of the project, calling it, “A massive project of reclaiming Mother Nature, no less significant than the construction of the West Sea Flood Gates.”

The project, completed at the end of last month, reclaimed tideland in North Pyongan Province from Dasa-do, off the coast of Yeomju and Cholsan villages, to Kacha-do, Soyondong-do, Daekye-do, Tokye-do, and the Cholsan peninsula. It comprises 13.7 km of shoreline and more than 87 million square meters of land.

On July 22, the Choson Sinbo reported that North Korea planned to reclaim more than 59.9 million square meters or farm land by the end of 2012. The story also noted that the second phase of the land reclamation project in North Pyongan Province was in full swing, and that the first phase of a second project around Ryongmae-do, South Hwanghae Province, was scheduled to be completed by 2012.

The massive Daekye-do project completed at the end of June would be more than 10 times the size of Seoul’s Yeoui-do area, with more than two thirds of the area being reclaimed land. As background for the article, the newspaper explained, “As one way to expand crop production in [North Korea], the focus is being placed on the expansion of farmland through tideland reclamation.”

Related to this, the KCNA reported on July 15 that Kim Jong Il had visited the Daekye-do project, and said, “Land reclamation is an important project in the nation’s rich and powerful development.” Such a statement is tantamount to ordering the expansion of reclamation activities. Kim Jong Il also called for focusing national interest on difficult and massive reclamation projects to be carried out in the future, demanding that “policies necessary to support these projects must be thoroughly implemented.”

It was reported that Kim expressed ‘extreme satisfaction’ over the successfully completed Daekye-do project. After inspecting the area, he stated that the reclaimed farm land needed to be used “to full effect,” while at the same time more land reclamation projects should be carried out in order to completely resolve the North’s food shortage. North Korean media reported that Kim Jong said, “What is important here is to continue strongly extending the land reclamation project.” The KCNA also reported that North Korean state authorities, Party and Cabinet ministers, and supervisors from central government agencies accompanied Kim Jong Il on his tour of the Daekye-do land reclamation site.

On July 4, Korea Central Television (KCTV) reported, “Power plants throughout the country produced 1.2 times more electricity in the first half of this year than they did last year,” and the KCNA emphasized increased production in a number of factories, stating that compared to production plans, “In the Bakchon Silk Factory, rug production was 101%, regular cloth production was 107%, and ramie cloth liner production was 130%” of production quotas. In addition, “Along with the Pyongyang Daily Goods Factory production increase of 120%, the Nampo Glorious Soldier Shoe Factory, Hyeechon Silk Factory, Pyongyang Textile Factory and others are all meeting production goals.”

Posted in Agriculture, Energy, Institute for Far Eastern Studies | Comments Closed

DPRK-PRC trade up 18.1% from January to May 2010

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.10-07-08-2
7-8-2010

As inter-Korean commerce has all but dried up in the wake of the Cheonan incident, trade between North Korea and China appears to have continued to grow. According to Chinese customs statistics released on July 6, trade with North Korea from January to May amounted to 983.63 million USD; 18.1 percent more than the 833.07 million USD reported for the same period last year.

North Korea imported 727.192 million USD-worth of Chinese goods (29 percent increase over the same period last year), but exports dropped by 4.9 percent, amounting to only 256.438 million USD. This indicates a 60 percent increase in North Korea’s trade deficit with China, which was 470.757 million USD in the first part of 2009. With South Korean sanctions against the North halting all inter-Korean trade outside of the Kaesong Industrial Complex following the sinking of the Cheonan, it is expected that Pyongyang will become even more economically dependent on Beijing.

During this period, crude oil accounted for most of North Korea’s imports from China, as Pyongyang bought 254,000 tons (slightly more than the 247,000 tons in early 2009). However, due to rising international fuel prices, this oil cost the North 157.097 million USD, a 76 percent increase over what Pyongyang spent during this period last year.

In addition, rice (24,400 tons), corn (31,400 tons), beans (20,500 tons), flour (34,000 tons) and other necessary food imports totaling 11,300 tons reflected a 41 percent increase over the same period in 2009. The cost of fertilizer imports also jumped sharply, amounting to 81,943 tons, or 115.6 percent more than the 38,004 tons imported from January to May 2009. Increasing imports of food and fertilizer are a result of the growing agricultural difficulties being faced in the North. Based on current prices, aviation fuel imports also grew by 46.8 percent, freight trucks by 98.7 percent, automobile fuel by 47.4 percent, and bituminous coal by 137 percent.

The top ten official imports of Chinese goods by North Korea were as follows: crude oil (21.6 percent); aviation fuel (3.1 percent); freight trucks (2.9 percent); automobile fuel (2 percent); bituminous coal (1.9 percent); fertilizer (1.8 percent); beans (1.6 percent); flour (1.6 percent); rice (1.5 percent); and corn (1.1 percent).

North Korea’s exports to China were mainly underground natural resources. The top ten exported goods were: iron ore (17.1 percent); anthracite (16 percent); pig iron (9.6 percent); zinc (5 percent); Magnesite (3.6 percent); lead (2.4 percent); silicon (2.3 percent); men’s clothing (2.2 percent); frozen squid (2.1 percent); and aluminum (1.9 percent).

Posted in China, Energy, Food, Foreign aid statistics, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, International trade, Oil, Price liberalization, Statistics, Trade Statistics | 1 Comment »

Kim Jong-il visits Sinuiju, successor Kim Jong-eun takes up on-site guidance

Thursday, June 24th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-6-23-2
6/23/2010

Kim Jong Il visited Sinuiju on June 17, spending three days inspecting industrial facilities with third son and possible successor Kim Jong Eun. One visit was to a shoe factory, at which Kim Jong Il observed modernized technology and production equipment. On another stop, at the Sinuiju Cosmetics Factory, Kim Jong Il met with the factory manager and foremen, providing them and the laborers with encouragement. Kim Jong Eun also made an appearance at the meeting, indicating that the effort to install him as the next North Korean leader has progressed to the point at which he is being directly introduced to the people.

According to a Daily NK report quoting a source in Sinuiju, Kim Jong Il’s automobile procession to Sinuiju was “impressive”, and was “about twice as large” as previous processions. The report also noted that Kim Jong Eun exited a care and met directly with workers at the cosmetics factor and at Rakwon Machine Complex, and that “Kim Jong Eun took most of the responsibility for [Kim Jong Il’s] protection entourage and for the on-site guidance.”

That on-site guidance parties have grown considerably larger than in other years is partly due to the fact that Kim Jong Eun is accompanying his father, but also because many more other officials are also traveling with Kim Jong Il. On-site guidance has transformed from that of giving business advice to actively promoting succession by Kim Jong Eun. According to one source, Kim Jong Eun took the lead on everything from succession issues to on-site guidance during this latest visit. In addition, central authorities were said to have encouraged business and city officials to follow Kim Jong Eun.

Last December, documents for indoctrinating cadres were distributed by Party officials. The propaganda praised Kim Jong Eun, calling him ‘the number-one guard of [Kim Jong Il], stepping first to the General’s on-site guidance visits to every site without regard to any conditions; in all weather, any temperature or wind and any landscape.’ In the documents, Kim Jong Il is quoted as saying, “The Captain has been assisting me with lots of my work,’ noting that Kim Jong Eun is taking part not only in his father’s security, but also in on-site guidance.

Kim Jong Eun’s actions during the latest visit to Sinuiju show that he has gained enough power in the protection bureau to be directing the bodyguard contingent assigned to his father, and his influence and authority is evident through his on-site guidance. Kim Jong Il’s visit to Sinuiju, which serves as a gateway for trade with China, could be part of preparations for large-scale economic cooperation with the PRC. Last December, Kim Jong Il visited Rason City, the site of the country’s first free trade zone, and declared Rason a ‘Special City’ in an effort to attract foreign investment from Beijing and abroad. Sinuiju and Rason will serve as conduits for economic cooperation and trade with China.

Posted in Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Political economy | Comments Closed

DPRK-PRC summit and the outlook for bilateral economic cooperation

Wednesday, May 12th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-05-11-1
5-11-2010

As North Korean leader Kim Jong Il spent four nights and five days in China, meeting with President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jaibao, and other top Chinese leaders, it appears that the issue of bilateral economic cooperation was high on the agenda, and was discussed in depth.

‘Strengthening economic and trade cooperation’ was one of the five proposals for bolstering PRC-DPRK relations made by Hu Jintao during the May 5 summit meeting with Kim Jong Il, giving some indication of just how much emphasis he and Kim were putting on economic cooperation during the latest visit.

Hu stated that strengthening cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang would help both countries build their socialist systems, and would be in their shared interests as it would further development and help to bring peace, stability and prosperity to the region. According to China Daily, the five suggestions made by Hu Jintao are as follows:

1) To maintain high-level contacts. The leaders of the two countries should keep in touch by exchanging visits, as well as sending special envoys and messages.
2) To reinforce strategic coordination. The two sides should exchange views in a timely manner and regularly on major domestic and diplomatic issues, international and regional situation, as well as on governance experience.
3) To deepen economic and trade cooperation. The relevant departments of the two governments should discuss and explore ways of expanding economic and trade cooperation.
4) To increase personnel exchanges. The two sides should expand exchanges in the cultural, sports, and educational fields, and the contacts between the youth in particular to inherit the traditional friendship from generation to generation.
5) To strengthen coordination in international and regional affairs to better serve regional peace and stability.

In response, Kim Jong Il expressed his appreciation for Hu Jintao’s heartfelt invitation and warm greeting, and agreed with Hu’s five suggestions for developing bilateral cooperation. He highlighted the construction of a new bridge over the Yalu River as the latest sign of friendly cooperation between China and North Korea, and added that he “welcomes investment in North Korea by Chinese companies and boosting bilateral working-level cooperation based on the principle of mutual prosperity.”

Economic issues were at the heart of Kim Jong Il’s meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao, as well. Following their meeting, Wen said, “PRC-DPRK economic cooperation has great potential,” and that he actively supports bilateral efforts. He stated that he had high hopes for infrastructure projects and other cooperative efforts in the border region.

He went on to say, “China actively supports North Korea’s economic development and improvements in the lives of its people,” and that he would like to introduce to North Korea “Chinese-style know-how” by sharing China’s experiences with reform and economic construction.

In October of last year, Premier Wen introduced the “Chang-Ji-Tu Development Plan” during his visit to North Korea, pushing hard for the North’s cooperation in developing the border region. That, along with North Korea’s extension of the contract giving Chinese companies access to Rajin Port and the latest talks during Kim’s visit to China give a clearer picture of the future direction of PRC-DPRK cooperative economic efforts.

The Chang-Ji-Tu plan to develop the Jilin and Tumen River regions calls for the establishment of an economic ‘beltway’ by 2020, and the revival of the antiquated industrial areas of China’s three northeastern provinces. To be successful, the plan requires North Korean cooperation on securing access to the East Sea. In 2008, North Korea granted China usage rights to Pier 1 in Rajin Port, and then signed an agreement with China last November on the joint development of the port into an ‘international distribution hub’ providing a link for China to the global market. China’s Jilin Province has already earmarked 3 billion yuan (500 billion won) for Rajin Port’s development.

This, along with the construction of a new border-crossing bridge on the Tumen River and other similar projects, reflects the infrastructure development plans for the border region. Construction on the new 33 meter-long bridge began last October, and China is bearing the burden of a 1.7 billion yuan (290 billion won) price tag. In March, China also began restoration of the bridge over the Tumen River linking Hunchun and North Korea, and is expected to move forward quickly with a road construction project linking the bridge to Rajin Port.

Another cooperative effort is focused on the development of the Hwangeum Industrial Complex, a free trade zone on Hwanggeum Island, in the Tumen River. Ryongaksan General Trading Company, which currently holds the development rights to Hwanggeumpyeong and Uihwa islands, is actively seeking to attract foreign investment. Kim Jong Il’s latest trip to China is seen by some as an opportunity to push for increased Chinese investment and assistance in developing the region.

Workers’ Party of Korea Unification Strategy Department Director Kim Yang Gong, as chairman of the Korea Taepung International Investment Group, traveled with Kim Jong Il in China, and it appears to have been in order to more strongly call for investment in North Korea, and the development of Rajin Port, in particular.

Beijing permitting North Korean sight-seeing tours and joint development in its three northeastern provinces indicates its support for the increasing pace of bilateral economic cooperation with Pyongyang.

Posted in China, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Korea Taepung International Investment Group (Daepung Investment Group), Political economy, Ryongaksan General Trading Company, Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | 1 Comment »

DPRK authorities slash all prices by 99 percent

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-04-12-1
4/12/2010

As inflation and food worries continue to grow in North Korea, social unrest is palpable. According to the group ‘Good Friends’, North Korean officials slashed prices on all goods to 1/100th of their going rate in an effort to ease the public. Considering the fact that North Korea revalued its currency by the same ratio on November 30, it appears that Pyongyang is effectively acknowledging the reform’s failure.

The Good Friends newsletter reports that the Korean Workers’ Party cabinet had handed down an order to reduce the price of all goods by a factor of 100:1, while the people of North Korea were told during local meetings that currency was revalued at 100 to 1, but not in order to reduce the sale of goods by 100 to 1, as well.

It also stated that at the first cabinet meeting in March, there was discussion on the fact that it was rumored that prices had climbed several times higher than official prices, and would continue to rise. It was decided that, at first, people thought of the currency reform as a 100-fold increase in prices, and that the same was true of management in state-run organizations. Later, at the second meeting of the cabinet, it was decided that a ‘100 to 1 Price Plan’ would be distributed to each city and town.

Now, People’s Committees and security forces in each city and town are enforcing the ‘100 to 1 Price Plan’ while the central Party’s 100:1 commerce committee has distributed a class syllabus in support of the price modifications, which was lectured on throughout the country from March 16-18. This indicates that the government is again controlling all prices throughout the country.

With no goods or aid flowing in from outside, it is likely that the price and exchange rates will continue to climb. On December 9, rice sold for 23 won, but the value of the new currency falls daily, and starvation is striking people in several areas throughout the country. Anger over government policies and general feelings angst are not hard to find in families and labor groups. The government is trying to control the prices of daily necessities, but if it is unable to do so, this situation cannot avoid becoming explosive. The central government has also sent officials out to different areas of the country to enforce a rice price of 25 won/Kg. This is the highest rice sold for in markets prior to the currency reform. Enforcing the same price throughout the country is an attempt to stabilize markets, and is a temporary measure to try to keep residents’ tempers from flaring.

The November currency reform was the first currency revaluation in 17 years, and was part of a set of strong measures to restrict markets, along with market closures and bans on foreign currency. However, since last February, the inflation sparked by the currency revaluation has grown severe and internal unrest has increased, leading authorities to reopen markets and set price caps. Now, the price of rice in North Korean markets appears to have stabilized at 400 won per kilogram, but due to the unrest over the last 100 days, many middle-class residents have fallen into poverty.

Posted in Cabinet, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Good Friends, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

DPRK legal efforts to strengthen planned economy follow currency reforms

Monday, April 5th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 10-04-05-1
4/5/2010

It has recently been verified that following the currency reforms at the end of last year, North Korea passed 11 laws revising and reforming the system of government control over the economy. Among these measures is a law banning the black market sales of grain.

The North’s food administration law, revised last November 3, clearly bans the black market trade and smuggling of grains, and sets the punishment for such activities as the confiscation of the grains in question. In addition, an order was passed down stating that when food supplies are rationed to a labor management office, they are to be distributed in accordance with a worker’s efforts, position, and productivity. On the same day, a new agricultural law was passed that stated if organizations and groups that were granted land for private plots failed to meet state-set harvest quotas, the plots could be confiscated.

In November and December of last year, North Korea also enacted the Real Estate Management Law, Goods Consumption Standard Law, Construction Materials Import Law, Import/Export Country of Origin Law, Waterworks Law, Labor Quantity Law, Farm Law, Sewer System Law, and the Mariner Law. Among these, the Labor Quantity Law sets the number of laborers per hourly production demands, stipulates labor contracts, and determines remuneration in accordance with worker performance. This law is unprecedented in that it allows the responsible organization or business managers or supervisors administrative and even penal authority by giving them power over labor evaluations and payment.

The Farm Law allows each farm to retain some of its harvest, and making it responsible for selling its goods to the state, while on the other hand, forbidding illegal agricultural production. This law, by strengthening state control over agricultural goods, appears to be an effort to restart the Public Distribution System.

The Real Estate Law, a mechanism to collect user fees, stipulates, “Real estate cannot be lent or left to different individuals, groups, organizations or enterprises without the permission of the applicable authority.” Along with this, the law on consumption includes a clause that links consumption of particular goods with those goods’ production in order to prevent waste, as well as a clause designed to reduce or eliminate the use of imported goods.

The law on the import of construction materials gives the government leverage in all aspects of such activity, including planning, processing, transfer, inspection, construction and testing. In addition, if someone from an enterprise or organization imports construction goods without government authorization, changes an import plan, distributes, transports, or wastes construction wares, he or she is subject to administrative punishment.

Ultimately, economic legislation enacted or revised after the currency reform appears to be aimed at strengthening the planned economic system while increasing government control over public revenue and encouraging efforts to recover without outside assistance.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Farm Law, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Labor Quantity Law, Real Estate Management Law | Comments Closed

DPRK launches all-out offensive to meet 2010 economic goals

Wednesday, February 3rd, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.10-02-03-1
2/3/2010

In order to meet this year’s economic goals, North Korean authorities are calling on the people to launch an “all-out offensive”. Day after day, North Korea media outlets are calling for “continuing reform” and “continuing improvements,” even introducing a new motivational song titled, “It’s a war of attack.”

The slogan “all-out offensive” is designed to encourage the people of North Korea to pour all efforts into attaining the best results in each area of the economy. It is not uncommon for the North to use military terms such as this to motivate its citizens for non-military mobilization drives.

According to the (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the front page of the January 29 issue of the Rodong Sinmun carried an editorial titled, “Raise the fighting spirit of 10 million soldiers, and advance the all-out fighting spirit of this year,” while the second page of the same paper carried a political commentary titled, “Let’s practically demonstrate.”

The editorial called on citizens of the North to work toward improving the standard of living and improving the lives of the people, and stressed, “The on-going ideological campaign is an all-out offensive for remarkably increasing the speed of the advance for effecting a great surge with the might of the perfect unity of the leader and all the service personnel and people and a charge for giving fullest play to their mental power so that events adding luster to the era of Songun may take place one after another,” and, “The on-going general offensive is sure to triumph when all the people live and struggle as the brave, staunch and devoted vanguard in the advance for effecting a great surge.” On January 20 and 22, the same paper had run similar articles, calling for the “spirit of victors” and “marching forward as quickly as possible.”

That North Korean authorities have gone so far as to launch the song “It’s a war of attack” gives the impression that there is an air of urgency surrounding these ongoing efforts to mobilize the people. Also reflecting this urgency is the fact that this year, Kim Jong Il has carried out more public activities than during January 2009. As of January 26, Kim Jong Il had made 14 public appearances. This was 56% more than the first month of last year, during which Kim had made the most visits since launching the 1st Kim Jong Il regime in 1998.

Of those 14 appearances, 7 were on-site inspections of enterprises and other economic sites, while only 6 visits were military-related. The remaining visit was to the central court; There were no meetings with foreign dignitaries or other foreign diplomacy-related activities. One military-related visit of interest was to a self-sufficient pig farm run by the army. January’s visit was Kim’s third to the farm, where he advised managers to “raise more pigs and provide more pork and pork products to the soldiers,” an indirect reference to the seriousness of food shortages among the North’s military.

Posted in Food, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Political economy | Comments Closed

2009 Inter-Korean trade tops US$1.6 billion

Monday, January 18th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No.10-01-19-1
2010-01-19

Last year, despite the impact of the economic recession, North Korea’s second nuclear test and other issues hindering inter-Korean exchanges, the previously sharply shrinking value of North-South Korean trade appeared to steady.

According to a report from the South Korean Customs Administration released on January 18, inter-Korean trade last year was down 8.5 percent from the previous year, amounting to 1.66608 billion USD. Exports to North Korea were worth 732.62 million USD, while 933.46 million USD worth of goods were brought into South Korea, giving Seoul a 200 million dollar trade deficit. Inter-Korean trade hit its lowest point last year in February (100.89 million USD), but since then showed slow-but-steady growth, hitting 173.18 in September.

In the aftermath of last year’s economic recession, together with the North Korean nuclear test, naval clashes in the West Sea in the area of the Northern Limit Line, etc., there were many difficult issues in 2009, but as inter-Korean trade numbers recovered in the fourth quarter, tensions eased slightly. Despite strained political tensions between the two Koreas, trade seemed not to be seriously affected, as DPRK goods were offloaded from a North Korean ship at Incheon Harbor and replaced with silica used for metal casting just six days after a clash between North and South Korean naval ships.

While growing trade is positive, this is the second year in a row South Korea has recorded a trade deficit with the North. In 2008, Seoul’s cross-border imports exceeded imports by 53.96 million USD. With Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008 and the economic stagnation that followed, the South continued to record trade deficits for 15 straight months, until November of last year.

In December 2009, South Korean trade was back in the black (23.91 million USD) for the first time in 16 months. Looking back over time, it can be seen that inter-Korean trade has improved considerably over the years, recording a mere 705.68 million USD in 2004, 1.08872 billion USD in 2005, climbing to 1.3796 billion in 2006 and 1.79494 billion USD in 2007, and 1.82078 billion USD in 2008.

The import of North Korean sand, mushrooms, and smokeless charcoal briquettes in October 2009 required the permission of the South Korean government. This reflects Seoul’s more strict controls over management and oversight of inter-Korean trade following the sanctions and heightened concerns over cash deliveries to Pyongyang after its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Since the nuclear test, the South Korean government has limited the import of North Korean goods to only those that could ease losses being suffered by South Korean manufacturers.

According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, among North Korean exports to the South in 2008, sand was the largest (according to value) export, with charcoal ranking ninth and (pine) mushrooms ranking eighteenth.

Yonhap offered a short blurb:

Trade between South and North Korea declined 8.5 percent on-year in 2009 due mainly to the worldwide economic slowdown that sapped demand and investments, a government report said Monday.

The Korea Customs Service (KCS) said inter-Korean trade reached US$1.66 billion last year, down from a record high of $1.82 billion tallied for 2008.

Read the full article here:
Inter-Korean trade falls off 8.5 pct in 2009
Yonhap
1/18/2009

Posted in Institute for Far Eastern Studies, International trade, South Korea, Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch