Archive for the ‘Mining/Minerals’ Category

CNN interviews Hyun Jeong-eun

Thursday, October 22nd, 2009

The article was not as informative as I hoped.  But here are a few lines that I thought were interesting:

Q: When you were talking with Kim Jong Il, was it your impression that he wants more investment from South Korea? That he wants to do more business with your country?

A: He showed a lot of enthusiasm. He said he hopes the North and South Korean government can talk things through so to have a lot of South Korean companies enter the North, and he also said that since they have the natural resources and the South has the skills to sell, if both sides work together he expects the North and South to prosper.

Comment: There is a vast literature on the relationship between natural resources, economic growth, and conflict.  Natural resources tend to be the kiss of death for widespread economic development and “democracy.” Unfortunately, given the way the North Korean system is managed, I would expect most of the revenues from increased natural resources exports to go to the DPRK leadership with little tangible benefit to the North Korean people.

The Kaesong industrial complex, the joint facility run by North and South, what is the future of that complex?

Currently we are only operating the first block, but I am sure that once things get settled down by both governments, we have many plans for the second block as well. A hotel needs to be built. We need to have hospitals, post offices, so I am expecting gradually that we will expand business there.

I am more optimistic about the Kaesong Zone than I am about the DPRK’s desire for increasing natural resource exports because the workers at Kaesong actually process resources to build the textiles.  As a result, their productivity has increased over time and the workers have been able to capture some of that extra value themselves in the form of higher incomes (although at a ridiculously steep “tax rate” since the DPRK government keeps the vast majority of their salaries).  If Kaesong was closed down the workers would certainly be worse off, and so would all of those who depend on them.  Despite the DPRK’s efforts to increase tensions this year, business never closed down at Kaesong.  It could be that the DPRK leadership now considers Kaesong too big to fail.

Read the full interview below:
Doing business in North Korea
CNN
10/19/2009

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“150 Day Battle” production campaign stories

Monday, October 12th, 2009

150-speed.jpg

Photo by Eric Lafforgue

North Korean claims record production gains through ‘150-day battle’
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

NK Brief No. 09-10-12-1
10/12/2009

It has been boasted that North Korea’s ‘150-day Battle’ to boost the economy (April 20-September 16) resulted in record-breaking jumps in DPRK production numbers, and it has been suggested that that by 2012, some enterprises will “attain production numbers higher than the best numbers recorded at the end of the 1980s.” This claim was made by Ji Young-il, the director of the Chosun University Social Science Research Institute, which is run by the pro-Pyongyang “General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan.”

In “Professor Ji Young-il’s Monthly Economic Review: The 150-day Battle and Prospects for Building an Economically Powerful Nation,” an article in the federation’s newspaper, Choson Sinbo, the author wrote, “There are more than a few enterprises that have set production goals for 2012 at more than three times the current level of production.” He also claimed that some enterprises in the mining, energy and railroad transportation sectors had set goals of as much as 6 times today’s production numbers.

Professor Ji went on to write, “Basically, it is an extraordinary goal ensuring growth of 1.3-1.5 times (a growth rate of 130-150%) per year.” He also explained that surpassing production rates as high as those seen in the late 1980s is one of the fundamental markers on the road toward “opening the door to a Strong and Prosperous Nation.”

Citing North Korea’s “Choson Central Yearbook,” he gave production numbers in various sectors of the DPRK economy at the end of the 1980s: electricity, 55.5 billion kWh (1989); coal, 85 million tons (1989); steel, 7.4 million tons (1987); cement, 13.5 million tons (1989); chemical fertilizer, 5.6 million tons (1989); textiles, 870 million meters (1989); grain, 10 million tons (1987).

Director Ji claimed that during the recent ‘battle’, production in the metals industries was up several times that of the same period in previous years, while energy producers generated several hundred million kWh of electricity, coal production was up 150%, and cement and other construction materials were up 140%. He pointed out that in 14 years of the Chollima movement, beginning in 1957, during which socialist industrialization took place in the North, the yearly average production growth was 19.1%, and he stated that the annual growth of 9 to 10% in industrial production over the past several years was a noteworthy record.

Moving to the agricultural sector, Director Ji also noted that while overseas experts have critiqued this year’s harvest, there has been a definite breakthrough in grain production with land cultivation hitting previously unseen levels over the past several years.

Previous 150-day battle stories below:
(more…)

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China and DPRK mineral wealth

Tuesday, October 6th, 2009

According to the Financial Times:

North Korea’s mineral wealth is receiving close scrutiny, with South Kor­ea’s government this week valuing reserves at $6,000bn (€4,070bn, £3,670bn). Encouraged by data on metals, Goldman Sachs last month predicted the economy of a unified Korea could rival Japan’s by 2050.

Trade with China is growing, reaching $2.8bn last year from about $2bn in 2007. But military authorities in North Korea are perceived as hostile to the changes in society and infrastructure that foreign investment could bring.

“If the North opens its mineral resources to foreign countries, that is tantamount to taking a military, social and political gamble, jeopardising their security,” said Lim Eul-chul, of Seoul’s Institute of Far Eastern Studies.

A South Korean diplomat closely involved with nuc­lear talks doubted Pyong­yang would allow China to make big investments inside its border. “They cannot permit that kind of influence,” he said.

Although they were long communist allies, North Korea and China have a mutual mistrust, partly tied to territorial claims.

Still, limited foreign investment in the sector is not impossible. Colin McAskill, executive chairman of Koryo Asia, says he has signed a letter of intent and memorandum of understanding to invest in North Korean metals and argues his model would not interfere with sovereignty issues that concern Pyongyang.

Switzerland’s Quintermina has posted reports on its website saying it is looking to extract magnesite in North Korea.

Chinese investors are believed to have some metals interests and are also involved in coal mining.

“The Chinese companies that have tried to do business in North Korea complain a lot that the regulations change frequently and that the power supply is erratic,” said a Chinese academic in Beijing.

One quote in this article struck me as a little off:

A South Korean diplomat closely involved with nuc­lear talks doubted Pyong­yang would allow China to make big investments inside its border. “They cannot permit that kind of influence,” he said.

First of all, China has already made plenty of investments inside the DPRK and the Chinese government and companies already exert influence.  There is a difference between having influence and being in control.  Secondly, China is the largest market for North Korean exports.  Even though they might not “own” the North Korean assets from which they purchase the goods, the North Koreans are limited in terms of who will/can trade with them.  In this sense China earns surplus through either bulk purchase discounts or monopsony power.

Read the full story here:
China eyes N Korea’s mineral wealth
Financial Times
Christian Oliver
10/6/2009

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Graft Mars North Korean Trade

Tuesday, October 6th, 2009

Radio Free Asia
Junho Kim
10/6/2009

North Korea is launching a crackdown on official corruption in its key mineral export sector, a crucial source of foreign exchange for a country where millions go hungry and the ruling party has total control of resources.

“[North Korea] is currently restructuring mineral exporting companies, because such trading entities have been found to be corrupt and inefficient and involved in various abuses,” said the China-based representative of a company importing minerals from North Korea.

The source added that many importers dealing with North Korean exporters had been negatively affected by their lack of professionalism and reliability.

“The overwhelming majority of North Korean trading companies are involved in exports of minerals, so the need to revamp them is evident and understandable,” the source said.

More than 58 percent of North Korea’s U.S. $1.13 billion exports in 2008 consisted of minerals and mining products.

The restructuring would target companies with unexplained gaps in their financial accounts and those that embezzled funds during the export process, the China-based source said.

Investigation slows exports

North Korea is a key source of magnesite, a mineral used in steel-making, synthetic rubber production, and the preparation of magnesium chemicals and fertilizers.

A China-based ethnic Korean businessman surnamed Nam said Chinese importers are having trouble filling orders for molybdenum, a metal used to make heat-resistant aircraft parts, electrical contacts, industrial motors and filaments.

“For about a month, discussions on imports of molybdenum from North Korea to China were suspended at the request of the North Korean authorities, who asked their Chinese counterparts to be patient and wait a little more,” Nam said.

In an attempt to further tap abundant mineral resources, the authorities are attempting a clean-up of the mineral export sector, the China-based source said.

Following an investigation of corrupt and inefficient mineral-exporting North Korean companies, export quotas might be assigned to such companies, and those found guilty of abuse could be imprisoned, the source said.

Swiss-based mining venture Quintermina was recently formed to secure magnesia materials from North Korea, the company said on its Web site.

It said the magnesite resources of North Korea, an extension of the magnesite-talc belt from the northeastern Chinese province of Liaoning, China, are estimated at 3 billion tons, and capable of producing around 100,000 tons per year.

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Quintermina AG

Monday, September 21st, 2009

*Note, this information was posted in 2009 and is now outdated.

ORIGINAL POST (2009-9-21): Swiss mining company Quintermina AG seems to have a stake in North Korea. According to their web page (Feb 2009):

IT’S ALL HAPPENING in the magnesia supply market. Further to last month’s lead news report on Russian magnesia supply breaking into the European market through a German trader (see IM January ’09, p.6), IM has learned that the considerable magnesite resources of North Korea are to be made available to the global market through Quintermina AG of Switzerland.

Although the company was unable to disclose details at time of press, IM can reveal that the new business is to facilitate supply of North Korean “competitive quality magnesia” for agricultural, industrial, and refractory applications.

The main focus is caustic calcined magnesia (CCM; low iron grade, agricultural grade, including 90200, 92200, 94200), and dead burned magnesia (DBM; including 9003, 9010), and later, perhaps fused magnesia (including 96%, 97% MgO).

Quintermina is headquartered in Chur, Switzerland, and is managed by David Coplet, who is also the Managing Director of Steinbock Minerals Ltd.

Details that are available in the public domain reveal that Quintermina is a joint venture between RHI and Coplet.

It would seem that RHI and Steinbock have formed a joint venture to secure magnesia materials from North Korea.

The magnesite resources of North Korea, an extension of the magnesite-talc belt from Liaoning, China, are considerable, amounting to some 3,000m. tonnes. Current production is in excess of 100,000 tpa DBM.

Sourcing magnesite from North Korea over the last few decades has been tackled by few, and even fewer have succeeded. Key challenges include lack of fuel and power supplies, basic infrastructure for freight, and modern technology, not to mention dealing with a very sensitive government.

However, Steinbock and its associates, notably the logistics company Yasheya Ltd, have a respected pedigree in dealing with North Korean minerals going back many years. Steinbock told IM that it has managed to regularly ship lots of 5-10,000 tonne CCM and DBM on a monthly basis over the last two years.

RHI, a leading refractories producer and consumer of magnesite, has made little secret of its intention to secure and invest in raw material resources worldwide (see IM October’08, p.6).

Outside China, North Korea stands out as the relatively untouched “Eldorado” of magnesite. Last month we reported “North Korea as an alternative [magnesia source] is looking no closer to coming to large scale commercial fruition.” Perhaps we are about to be proved wrong.

IM intends to publish a more detailed report on Quintermina in a forthcoming issue.

David Coplet of Quintermina will be speaking on Supply of magnesite from North Korea and China at MagMin 2009, 10-12 May 2009, Amsterdam – see p2&3. (PDF)

There is more information and pictures published from May 2009 here and here.

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China pulls out of DPRK mining deal

Thursday, July 30th, 2009

According to the Choson Ilbo:

A Chinese investment company developing a copper mine in North Korea with a North Korean company sanctioned by the UN Security Council has reportedly called an abrupt halt to the project.

An industry source in China said the investment firm sent a letter to NHI Shenyang Mining Machinery, the company it had commissioned to build facilities for the mine in Hyesan, North Korea, telling it to stop construction. An estimated 400,000 tons of copper are deposited there.

The Chinese firm had signed an agreement with (North) Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) [NKeconWatch: a.k.a. Korea Mining Development Corporation) to develop the mine in November 2006. But the North Korean partner was blacklisted by the UN Security Council after North Korea carried out its latest nuclear test.

The industry source said, “When Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang in June last year, he pledged full support for the development of the Hyesan copper mine so that it could become a model for investment by Chinese business in North Korea. This prompted NHI to hurry construction so that production could start in September this year.”

But he added the Chinese government apparently persuaded the investment firm to stop the project as Beijing takes part in the UN sanctions. “Otherwise, it’s unusual for a project to be stopped at this late stage,” he said. The investment firm reportedly gave NHI no reason for the cancellation.

Looking at Hyesan on Google Earth, this appears to be the only large-scale minig operation in Hyesan.

Read the full article below:
N.Korea Mining Project Buckles Under UN Sanctions
Choson Ilbo
7/31/2009

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North Korea exports total USD $1.13 billion in 2008

Wednesday, July 22nd, 2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-7-22-1
7/22/2009

According to a report released by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), mineral products again topped the list of DPRK exports, accounting for 41.3 percent of goods sent out of the country last year. The KOTRA report, “2008 DPRK Trade Trends,” states that the North’s 2008 exports, totaling 1,130,213,000 dollars, increased by 23 percent over the 918.77 million USD-worth of goods exported in 2007.

With the exception of plastic and wooden goods, North Korean exports grew in all areas. Mineral products accounted for 41.3 percent; non-ferrous minerals made up 16.8 percent, textiles accounted for 10.6 percent; chemical plastics made up 7.6 percent; electrical and electronic machinery made up 7 percent; and animal products accounted for 3.6 percent.

Mineral goods were up 33.5 percent over last year, recording sales of 465.44 million USD. This sector has shown continuous growth over the last five years. In 2004, trade in these goods brought in 152.28 million USD; in 2005, 243.66 million USD; in 2006, 244.43 million USD; and in 2007, 349.58 million USD.

Since 2003, North Korea has concentrated on invigorating the light-industrial sector, and has emphasized the export of manufactured goods. However, last year, exports of mineral products and non-ferrous minerals combined to make up a total of 58.1 percent of all exports; the North has been unable to restructure its export sector or satisfactorily boost light-industrial manufacturing.

North Korea’s imports grew as well, to more than twice that of exports. Bringing in goods worth 2,685,478,000 USD, imports grew by 32 percent over the 2.023 billion in imports during 2007. In 2008, mineral products accounted for 25.9 percent of imports; fibers accounted for 11.9 percent; electrical and electronic machinery, 11.5 percent; processed food items, 8.8 percent; chemical and heavy industrial goods, 7.5 percent; and non-ferrous minerals, 6.6 percent. Import of fibers, processed food, and mineral products grew, while the import of animal products, vegetable products and automobiles fell.

Crude petroleum, the North’s largest import item, was imported exclusively from China, and was up 46.9 percent (414.31 million USD) over 2007 (281.97 million USD). However, due to the loss of other sources of fuel, overall imports of crude grew by a mere 1 percent.

Import of grains fell in 2008, recording only 86.24 million USD – a fall of 25.6 percent from the 115.86 million USD in grain imports during 2007. KOTRA explains that due to instability in the grain market, imports from China of rice and barley were halted in April, while corn imports were halted in August.

(Note: Here is the KOTRA web page.  It is not a user-friendly site and I was unable to find the report in English.)

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Bank of Korea releases 2008 DPRK economic stats

Sunday, June 28th, 2009

North Korea doesn’t release official economic data.  Since 1991, the South Korean central bank has released its own estimates of the North Korean economy to fill the void.  Its figures are derived from information provided by the ROK’s National Intelligence Service and other sources.  The 2008 statistics can be downloaded here.

According to coverage by the Associated Press:

The North’s gross domestic product for last year was estimated at $24.7 billion, a 3.7% increase from 2007, Seoul’s Bank of Korea said in a news release. The impoverished North’s economy shrank 2.3% in 2007 and 1.1% in 2006.

The central bank said the North’s economic growth was mainly because of “temporary factors” such as favorable weather conditions that resulted in an increase in agricultural production, and the arrival of oil shipments under an international disarmament deal on its nuclear program.

The size of North Korea’s economy, however, was still about 2.6% of South Korea’s, the bank said, adding it was “difficult” to determine whether last year’s growth means the country’s internal economic conditions have improved.

The bank said the North’s agricultural production increased 10.9% last year compared with 2007. The production of coal, iron ore and other minerals expanded 2.3% and the manufacturing industry 2.5%.

…and BBC coverage:

Agricultural production rose nearly 11% in 2008 compared with 2007. And coal, iron ore and other mineral production grew 2.3% for the year.

UPDATE from Business Week:

The surprise underscores the tiny size of the North Korean economy, which could be easily swayed by such factors as weather and outside assistance. Just over two-thirds of the 3.7% growth came from the agricultural sector, and that is heavily dictated by weather. North Korea’s agricultural output increased by 10.9% in 2008 after falling by 12.1% in the previous year as it managed to escape from major floods and drought. Its 2008 manufacturing production also grew by 2.5%, compared with a gain of a mere 0.8% in 2007, thanks to heavy oil supplies by the U.S. and its allies as a result of Pyongyang’s agreement last year to begin dismantling its nuclear facilities.

Even as hope builds in South Korea about a recovery, with the U.S. and China showing signs of revival, prospects for North Korea’s economy are looking grimmer. North Korea’s nuclear test in May and the regime’s missile tests this year have led to an end to outside help and economic sanctions by the U.N. This heralds a poor performance in the manufacturing sector, which will almost certainly face an acute shortage of oil and electricity this year.

Pyongyang can’t count on the agricultural industry for any major contribution to economic growth in 2009, either. Even if North Korea manages to maintain the 2008 grain output of 4.3 million tons, which will be difficult to achieve unless last year’s exceptionally good weather is repeated, it won’t help the economy grow as it starts from a high base.

Those factors make North Korea’s economic growth last year an anomaly. “There’s no indication that North Korea’s growth engine has improved in any fundamental way,” says Bank of Korea economist Shin Seung Cheol. Even with last year’s extraordinary growth, North Korea’s gross domestic product was 1/38 of South Korea’s $935 billion and its trade volume was 1/224 of the South’s $857.3 billion in 2008. As long as North Korea’s reclusive leader Kim Jong Il refuses to open up his country, the gap is bound to keep expanding.

I have collected the most commonly referenced North Korean economic statistics here.

Read more here:
South Korea’s Central Bank Says North’s Economy Grew in 2008
Associated Press
6/28/2009

North Korea’s GDP Growth Better Than South Korea’s
Business Week
Moon Ihlwan
6/30/2009

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DPRK military strenghtens hold on economic interests

Wednesday, June 10th, 2009

UPDATE: IFES has contacted us with an update to this report:

“North Korea exports between 2-3 million tons of coal, collecting approximately 200 million USD.”

Original Post:
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-9-1
6/9/2009   

The North Korean military, which has recently taken a hard-line position internationally with rocket launches, a nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch preparation, appears to be strengthening its position domestically, as well. It has reportedly taken charge of coal exports, previously the responsibility of the Cabinet, and other key economic interests.

According to sources inside North Korea, authority to export anthracite, the North’s most valuable export item, was transferred from a trading company under the control of the Cabinet to a military trading company earlier this year. North Korea exports between 200-300 tons of coal each year, collecting approximately two billion USD in foreign currency. Previously, this was shared among branches of the government, with the military, the Korean Workers’ Party and the Cabinet all similar export quotas.

One source stated, “Recently, China’s trade minister signed a contract for 60,000 tons of coal from a military-run trading company, and delivered one million USD-worth of corn as payment,” noting, “previously, North Korea’s trade partner [with China] was the Cabinet-controlled trade company.” The same source went on to note that it was “exceptional that as North Korea suffers from foreign capital shortages, it demands payment not in cash, but in corn…it looks like it is measure for military use.”

Other sources reported that, as of this year, the military has also taken control of the Bukchang Thermoelectric Power Plant, the country’s largest steam-powered electrical station. The Bukchang plant, built with Soviet supplies in 1968, can produce up to 2 million kW of electricity. It was formerly operated by the Ministry of Electric Power Industry, which is under the control of the Cabinet, but at the beginning of year, some authorities were purged on charges of bribe-taking and providing power designated for government facilities to foreign capital enterprises and other businesses. Since then, the military has run the plant.

The increased number of economic assets in control of the military reflects the military’s recently-strengthened position within the regime. The North Korean economy can be divided into several sectors: Kim Jong Il’s private fund, managed by Party operations; the military-industrial ‘second economy’; and the official economy, under the control of the Cabinet. The military’s increasing control over the official economy appears to be a move to completely implement ‘Military-first Politics.’

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Commodity price decreases vs. sanctions

Thursday, April 16th, 2009

Writing in Reuters, Lucy Hornby and Tom Miles point out that the DPRK faces greater economic uncertainty from falling commodity prices than from new sanctions.  Below I have posted excerpts and charts:

Lower commodity prices may prove more painful to North Korea than the tightened sanctions, which will likely blacklist certain firms known to deal in military goods.

“Sanctions won’t have a big effect, they won’t change their actions,” said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.

“There will be no impact on trade with China, which is mostly grains and basic materials … Sanctions may have some influence on luxury goods, but only a weak effect on overall trade volume.”

The isolated country’s $2 billion annual trade with China, equal to about 10 percent of the North’s annual GDP, is its most important economic relationship.

North Korea profited from strong prices for minerals and ores over the last few years, ramping up exports of zinc, lead and iron ore to resource-hungry China.

Most of those exports have dropped again since last summer, in line with sharp decreases in metals prices buffeted by the global economic crisis.

china-trade.jpg

The North’s mineral deposits could be worth $2 trillion, according to an estimate by the South’s Korea Resources Corporation. But dilapidated infrastructure and a broken power grid hinder mining and the transport of minerals out of the country.

The irregular pattern of North Korea’s alumina imports implies that its smelter only runs in fits and starts. Other ore exports are equally ragged, possibly indicating that North Koreans are only digging the easily accessible ores.

Chinese companies that have tried to invest in North Korean mines complain of constant changes in regulations and report that the North tries to tie mining access to commitments to build mills and other industrial projects.

“China and North Korea are friendly neighbors and we will continue to develop friendly cooperative relations with North Korea,” Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said on Tuesday after the North’s withdrawal from the six-party talks.

Diplomats’ expectations that China might use trade to influence its prickly neighbor rose when China cut off crude oil shipments in September of 2006, as North Korea prepared to test a nuclear bomb. It had tested ballistic missiles that July.

In fact, energy trade data shows that China is reluctant to apply trade pressure. Increased oil products shipments offset the brief cut in crude supplies in 2006.

“The imposition of these sanctions (in 2006) has had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with the country’s two largest partners, China and South Korea,” wrote Marcus Noland, of the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Data since early 2006 show that Chinese crude shipments have in fact been overwhelmingly consistent, at 50,000 tons a month.

china-trade2.jpg

North Korea has imported very little Chinese grain since the 2008 harvest, reflecting the better harvest. Flooding and a disastrous harvest in 2006 and 2007 required heavy imports of grains from China in those years.

Chinese corn shipments to North Korea since August have dropped to 2,670 tons, from 136,595 tons in the previous twelve months and 32,186 tons in the year before that.

Rice and soybean shipments show a similar pattern.

china-trade3.jpg

Read the full story below:
Little leverage left for North Korea sanctions
Reuters
4/14/2009
Lucy Hornby and Tom Miles

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