Archive for the ‘Manufacturing’ Category

Kaesong output declines

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

Production at a South Korea-financed factory park in North Korea fell for a second straight month in May, figures showed Tuesday, as manufacturers complained of a decrease in orders amid tension between the divided states.

Production at the joint complex in the North Korean border city of Kaesong stood at US$27.79 million in May, a 1.2 percent decrease from a month earlier, according to the Unification Ministry in Seoul.

The number, however, marked a 56 percent increase from a year earlier, the ministry said, a sign that the complex is expanding on a yearly basis.

Despite the deadly March sinking of a South Korean warship, which was blamed on North Korea and ignited the ensuing tension along the border, the number of North Korean workers in the complex topped 44,000 recently. More than 120 South Korean companies employ the workers to produce labor-intensive goods such as utensils and garments.

The companies have recently called on the Seoul government to ease its restrictions on their operations, including a cap on the number of South Korean workers allowed to travel to Kaesong daily.

South Korea has also banned the companies from new investments in their businesses within the complex, which opened in 2004 and represents the last remaining major symbol of reconciliation between the Koreas.

According to Yonhap:
Output at inter-Korean factory park declines for second month
Yonhap
7/13/2010

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CNC – Juche’s industry power

Wednesday, June 30th, 2010

For those of you who have recently visited the DPRK or who spend too much time perusing Elufa.net or reading KCNA, you are undoubtedly aware of the DPRK’s recent emphasis on something called “CNC”.  I had no idea what CNC was, so I began collecting as much information as I could find on the net and I have posted it below.

Here is the Wikipedia page for CNC.  For those of you in China, here is what it says:

Numerical control (NC) refers to the automation of machine tools that are operated by abstractly programmed commands encoded on a storage medium, as opposed to manually controlled via handwheels or levers, or mechanically automated via cams alone. The first NC machines were built in the 1940s and ’50s, based on existing tools that were modified with motors that moved the controls to follow points fed into the system on paper tape. These early servomechanisms were rapidly augmented with analog and digital computers, creating the modern computed numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools that have revolutionized the design process.

In modern CNC systems, end-to-end component design is highly automated using CAD/CAM programs. The programs produce a computer file that is interpreted to extract the commands needed to operate a particular machine via a post processor, and then loaded into the CNC machines for production. Since any particular component might require the use of a number of different tools—drills, saws, etc.—modern machines often combine multiple tools into a single “cell”. In other cases, a number of different machines are used with an external controller and human or robotic operators that move the component from machine to machine. In either case, the complex series of steps needed to produce any part is highly automated and produces a part that closely matches the original CAD design.

That description is not nearly as helpful as this video on CNC: Click here (Might not work for readers in China).

The Asia Times ran a story which included a short history of CNC in the DPRK:

The name of the game is CNC – Computer Numerical Control – machine tools that have revolutionized the design process and said to be developed in the DPRK and already exported, for example, to China. Top exponents are the Korea Ryonha Machine Tool Corporation and the Taean Heavy Machine Complex. CNC billboards are all over Pyongyang. Inevitably CNC has its own dedicated patriotic song (no music video yet). Here are the lyrics, as translated by Andray Abrahamian, a doctoral candidate at the University of Ulsan in South Korea:

If you set your heart on anything
We follow the program making the Songun era machine technology’s pride
Our style CNC technology

(chorus)

CNC – Juche industry’s power!
CNC – an example of self-strength and reliance!
Following the General’s leading path
Breakthrough the cutting edge

Arirang! Arirang! The people’s pride is high
Let’s build a science-technology great power
Happiness rolls over us like a wave

So the narrative of building a “socialist paradise” is now being supplanted by the narrative of developing and producing state-of-the-art technology to, as the Pyongyang Times indelibly put it, “improve the people’s living standard on the word level”. This is how the DPRK is mobilizing its people to “open the gate to a thriving nation in 2012”. South Korea, watch out.

By way of luck, I managed to obtain a copy of the DPRK’s CNC song. You can download the MP3 by right clicking here.

UPDATE: A reader did find this DPRK karaoke version of the CNC song complete with lyrics (in Korean).  Watch it here.

UPDATE 2: A reader also sends in this acoustic version of the CNC song (YouTube).

If you are itching to know what the DPRK’s CNC machines look like, here is one display at the Three Revolutions Museum in Pyongyang:

cnc1-thumb.jpg cnc2-thumb.jpg cnc3-thumb.jpg

Click images for larger versions

And here is some CNC propaganda that has appeared around Pyongyang:

cnc-prop-1.jpg cnc-prop-2.jpg cnc-prop-3.jpg cnc-prop-4.jpg

Click images for larger versions

UPDATE: here is an additional photo taken by an anonymous tourist:

 

cnc-pool.JPG

UPDATE: Here are some CNC postage stamps:

 

dprk-cnc-stamp.gif

UPDATE: And CNC made part of the 2010 Mass Games (You Tube at the 1:25 mark). See a photo here.

KCNA has published plenty of news stories about CNC.  You can see them here courtesy of the Stalin Search Engine. CNC was first first mentioned on January 15, 2002 (KCNA) .  One phrase that is frequently mentioned is that thanks to innovations like CNC the DPRK is “Pushing back the frontiers of science”.  Indeed North Korean economic policy seems hell-bent to do just that.  Hopefully we will soon see them change their policies to “push back the frontiers of ignorance”.

CNC machines are produced by the Ryonha Machine [Tool] Factory (KCNA) and they have been widely promoted in the official media (here, here, here, here, and here for example).  It appears also that the Ryonha Machine Tool Factory has partnered up (with someone) to form a JV company which focuses on international trade, the Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Here is a PDF flyer of their products taken from the KFA web page, and some of the items they are selling can be seen here and here.

They Ryonha Machine Joint Venture Company, however, seems to have a history that might scare away many potential customers.  According to the US Treasury Department:

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated eight North Korean entities pursuant to Executive Order 13382, an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles.  Today’s action prohibits all transactions between the designated entities and any U.S. person and freezes any assets the entities may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

“Proliferators of WMD often rely on front companies to mask their illicit activities and cover their tracks,” said Stuart Levey, the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI).  “Today’s action turns a spotlight on eight firms involved in WMD proliferation out of North Korea.  We will continue to expose and designate these dangerous actors.”

Today’s action builds on President Bush’s issuance of E.O. 13382 on June 29, 2005.  The Order carried with it an annex that designated eight entities – operating in North Korea, Iran, and Syria – for their support of WMD proliferation.  The President at that time also authorized the Secretaries of Treasury and State to designate additional entities and individuals proliferating WMD and the missiles that carry them.

Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID), which was designated in the annex of E.O. 13382, is the parent company of two of the Pyongyang-based entities designated today, Hesong Trading Corporation and Tosong Technology Trading Corporation.  These direct associations meet the criteria for designation because the entities are owned or controlled by, or act or purport to act for or on behalf of KOMID.

Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, also named in the annex, is the parent company of the remaining six Pyongyang-based entities designated today.  These entities include Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation, Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company, Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation, Korea Pugang Trading Corporation, Korea Ryongwang Trading Corporation, and Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation.

As subsidiaries of KOMID and Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, many of these entities have engaged in proliferation-related transactions.

I have been unable to locate the Ryonha Machine Tool Factory on Google Earth. If anyone has any pointers, please let me know.

Here is a list of factories the DPRK claims to be using CNC technology:

Amnokgang Daily Necessities Factory (KCNA)
Amnokgang Gauge and Instrument General Factory (KCNA)
Cholima Steel Complex (KCNA, Naenara)
Chonma Electrical Machine Plant (KCNA)
Feb 8 Vinalon Complex (KCNA)
Hamhung Wood Processing (KCNA)
Huichon Machine Tool Plant (KCNA)
Kangdong Weak Current Apparatus Factory (KCNA)
Kanggye General Tractor Plant (KCNA) (Underground)
Kanggye Knitted Goods Factory (KCNA)
Kanggye Wine Factory (KCNA)
KimChaek Iron and Steel Complex (KCNA)
Kusong Machine Tool Factory (KCNA)
Kwanmobong Machine Building Plant (KCNA)
October 10 Factory (KCNA)
Pukjung Machine Complex (KCNA)
Pyongyang Cornstarch Factory (KCNA)
Rakwon Machine Complex (KCNA)
Ryongsong Machine Complex (KCNA)
Sinuiju Spinning Machine Factory (KCNA)
Suphung Bearing Factory (KCNA)
Sungri Motor complex (KCNA)
Taean Heavy Machine Complex (KCNA)
Taedonggang Brewery (KCNA)
Tahungsan Machine Plant (KCNA)
Unsan Machine Tool Factory (KCNA)

I know the locations of many of these factories but not all.  If anyone has any information on their coordinates, please let me know.

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DPRK promotes environemntal efforts

Wednesday, June 23rd, 2010

According to Reuters:

There are no private cars in North Korea and countless factory chimneys have not belched smoke in years, but state media said on Tuesday scientists were inventing new ways to cut air pollution and protect the environment.

The country “has directed a great effort” to research environmental protection, the state news agency KCNA reported.

“Researchers have developed a new material for removing exhaust fumes from automobiles so as to cut the greenhouse gas emissions and reduce air pollution 35-40 percent,” it said, without elaborating.

It also said “units” in the capital, Pyongyang, that caused pollution had been registered, suggesting that dirty industries were under pressure to get clean.

“They are now developing a gas and dust arrester necessary in production processes and new materials needed to secure environmental safety of products,” it said.

The isolated communist country’s state-run media periodically boasts revolutionary innovations in science and technology, despite a moribund economy and chronic food shortages.

Perhaps the most visible in recent years have been related to the relatively well-funded — and well-fed — military. North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests since 2006 and several missile launches, upsetting its neighbours.

North Korean scientists also invented a device using “locally available materials” to incinerate hospital waste, KCNA said, and the Environmental Protection Institute of the Ministry of Land and Environmental Conservation had intensified research into pollution-free vegetable production.

Here is the original KCNA story:

Scientific Achievements of Environmental Protection
 
Pyongyang, June 22 (KCNA) — The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has directed a great effort to scientific researches for environmental protection.

Researchers have developed a new material for removing exhaust fumes from automobiles so as to cut the greenhouse gas emissions and reduce air pollution 35-40 percent.

They have also put the environmental management of industrial establishments on IT basis.

Meanwhile, they have registered units causing environmental pollution in Pyongyang and confirmed methods and procedures for preventing pollution. They are now developing a gas and dust arrester necessary in production processes and new materials needed to secure environmental safety of products.

Besides, they have invented a new device to destroy by fire such wastes from hospitals as contaminated injector and bandage with locally available materials.

Scientists of the Environmental Protection Institute of the Ministry of Land and Environmental Conservation have intensified a research in pollution-free vegetable production.

Read the full Reuters story here:
N.Korea says puts “great effort” into environment
Reuters
6/22/2010

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DPRK shakes up elite in order to meet 2012 “strong and prosperous” goal

Tuesday, June 15th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-06-14-2
6/14/2010

During the third session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly, convened on June 7, Kim Jong Il promoted his brother-in-law Jang Sung Thaek to vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC), named a new premier, and replaced several department heads and ministers. This appears to be an attempt to shore up the regime as it seeks to “open the door to a strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung. Kim Jong Il made a personal appearance at this latest assembly meeting, unlike the SPA meeting held in April. The leader’s presence hints at the importance of the latest gathering.

This promotion of Jang Sung Thaek and shake up of Cabinet positions appears to be part of efforts to realize the quickly approaching goal of establishing a ‘strong and prosperous nation’ by 2012, assigning those most able to positions of responsibility, regardless of age or experience. Most notably, Jang, widely thought to be second-in-command in North Korea, was promoted to vice-chairman of the NDC. He was first appointed to the NDC at the first meeting of the 12th SPA in April 2009, making his climb to vice-chairman in a mere 14 months.

Before the latest promotion, Jang held the position of vice-director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a newly created position that he was the first to hold. In this position, Jang oversaw national security offices, police, and the courts, putting him in a position of power difficult for anyone else to achieve. Having traveled to both South Korea and China, Jang Sung Thaek was likely promoted to present the image of a strong military and, at the same time, establish stable relations with the international community in order to ensure a smooth transition of power as well as to resurrect the economy by 2012. When Kim Jong Il led a delegation to China last May, the Chinese government treated Jang very well, ignoring standard protocol for someone in his position.

In addition, Choe Yong Rim was named the North’s new premier, and eight new vice-ministers were appointed. Regional Party secretaries were allowed to participate directly, allowing those who are most knowledgeable of local conditions to impact the decisions of the administration. Most of the new appointments were very experienced elites, including Choe Yong Rim (80) as premier, and Kang Neung Su (80), Kim Rak Hui (77), Ri Thae Nam (70), and Jun Ha Chul (82). The regime is promoting a number of veterans who are making their “last stand for the motherland” as part of the effort to ensure stable transformation of power after Kim Jong Il.

With Kim Rak Hui’s appointment as vice-premier and new appointments to the Ministry of Foodstuff and Daily Necessities Industry as well as the head of the Light Industry Ministry, North Korea seems to be pursuing the improvement of standards of living promised in the 2010 New Year’s joint editorial. Pyongyang Party officials appear to be attempting to reassert a centrally planned economy in the aftermath of botched currency reform efforts; however those witnessing regional economic conditions appear much more able to come up with appropriate economic policies. North Korea has been unable to make any significant progress in resolving its food shortages or its inability to provide daily necessities to the public, leading the regime to scapegoat some high-ranking officials. Now, many in and outside of North Korea are watching closely to see if the regime can launch economic efforts capable of successfully ‘opening the door to a Strong and Prosperous Nation’ in the next two years.

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Pyongyang Shifts Rhetoric at Home

Tuesday, June 15th, 2010

Evan Ramstad writes in the Wall Street Journal about some interesting developments in the North Korean media:

North Korea’s state media over the last two weeks stepped up an anti-South Korea campaign after being accused of sinking a South Korean warship, with reports repeatedly portraying angry citizens vowing to work harder to “get back” at the South.

The reports have dominated TV newscasts monitored in Seoul and appeared in newspapers that arrive in South Korea more than a week after publication.

The volume ramped up when Seoul on May 24 announced penalties, including a trade ban, against the North, which it blames for sinking a warship in March and killing 46 South Korean sailors.

Amid the heightened tension between the two Koreas, the North’s reports are not focused on the prospect of conflict but instead seek to connect its government’s anger at Seoul with the need to improve the North’s impoverished economy.

That shows the North Korean regime has latched onto the sinking incident not just to preach about perceived external threats but as a new way to shift responsibility for the country’s troubled economy away from itself, said Brian Myers, an American professor in South Korea who has studied the North’s propaganda operations since the early 1990s.

“They’re using hatred of the outside world to inspire people to work harder,” he said. “The extent of it is quite striking.”

In a typical example of the reporting, Kim Myung Ho, manager of a collective farm, said on a state TV newscast last Friday that workers now “dash to work in the mindset of destroying the enemy’s schemes by doing the work of two or three men. As a result, the speed of rice planting is getting better everyday.”

…”They’ve been vilifying Lee Myung-bak for two years, but this is the first time I’ve seen it connected to growth in production,” said Mr. Myers, who teaches at Dongseo University in Busan and recently published a book on the history of the North’s propaganda. The reporting underlines the view in the North Korean regime that economic growth is not an end in itself but a means to strengthen the country, he said.

Many of the workers portrayed in North Korean media over the past two weeks directed their criticism at Mr. Lee, often in the same words used by government statements, and said their anger at him inspired them to work harder.

“We will churn out as much steel as possible in the spirit of tossing the Lee Myung-bak group of traitors in a warmongering frenzy into the burning furnace,” Ri Myung Nam, a worker at a steel factory said on a TV newscast on June 3.

This Monday, another TV report showed soldiers at a construction project who, an anchorwoman said, were “flaming with hatred” against “Lee’s group of traitors.”

“Enraged by traitor Lee Myung-bak, we sped up our work,” soldier Kim Nam Il said in the report, adding his group last month achieved 150% of its goal, which was unspecified. “We will keep speeding up and mercilessly knock out their plot.”

Read the full story here:
Pyongyang Shifts Rhetoric at Home
Wall Street Journal

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Kaesong firms urged to withhold payment to DPRK entities

Monday, June 7th, 2010

According to KBS:

The Unification Ministry has asked South Korean companies that trade with North Korea to put off paying for goods manufactured in the North.

Ministry spokesman Chun Hae-sung told reporters Monday that the ministry made the request in consideration of sanctions and the suspension of inter-Korean trade following the North’s sinking of the “Cheonan” naval ship.

South Korean companies operating at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex manufacture labor-intensive goods using North Korean manpower.

The South Korean government suspended inter-Korean trade except for production at the Gaeseong complex last month to punish the North after the Cheonan incident.

Read the full story here:
Firms Asked to Put Off Payments to NK
KBS
6/7/2010

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German Parliamentary delegation visits DPRK

Thursday, June 3rd, 2010

Here is the report (PDF).  It is in German, but Stephen Smith (who does English, German, and Romance language translations) produced an English language version for all of us:

It was without a doubt one of the strangest official visits I have ever taken, more like Cuba than anything else.  The same slogans, the same ever-present security services, and the same absurd rules on taking pictures and communicating with the outside world.  Compared to the loose Cubans, the North Koreans have an uncompromising assiduousness and iron resolve.

What I saw in North Korea lies somewhere between between what we were shown by our minders, and the one-sided Western impression of the country as the world’s poorhouse.  Many foreign observers have praised the North Koreans’ high levels of education, along with their will and discipline to see their projects though to completion.  Economic liberalization by the regime and an end to the sanctions would result in a rapid economic recovery.

Although we had little opportunity to speak to North Koreans not pre-selected by the regime, the signs of malnutrition among the rural population and even parts of the urban population of Pyongyang were unmistakable.  Here a comparison with impoverished African living standards would be completely appropriate.  With regards to its sometimes-crumbling infrastructure, however, North Korea is at least at the level of a poor emerging market.  The drive to maintain and modernize the infrastructure – the roads and housing stock, for example – is also unmistakable.

Surveillance in North Korea is all-encompassing: even for North Korean citizens, trips to other provinces are only possible with official authorization.  The landline phone networks of foreigners, the government, and ordinary North Koreans are strictly separated by technical means.  Nobody knows who’s doing the informing, who or what they’re informing on, or who they’re reporting it to.

To a European, the personality cult of the two North Korean leaders, Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il, seems grotesque.  Upon each visit to factories and state enterprises, attention is called to the number of visits “by the president” or “by the general,” and what “notes and guidelines” they gave.  These can range from instruction on the proper feeding of ostriches, to the more efficient operation of machines, to the proper way to store old books.  Kim Jong-il is said to have tested new varieties of apple trees in his own garden before they were distributed across the country.  The veneration of the founder and “eternal president” of the People’s Republic, Kim Il-sung, who died in the 1990’s, is indeed quite noticeable in rare face-to-face discussions with North Koreans.

Before our trip, tensions between the two Koreas ran high, due to the dispute over the responsibility for the sinking of the South Korean warship “Cheonan” and the deaths of its 46 sailors.  The German Foreign Office didn’t want us to make the trip, but our group considered it important, especially given the circumstances, that relations are not severed.

Our group consisted of representatives of the trip’s organizers, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiffung, Frank Hantke, and Werner Kamppeter; WAZ [trans. note: a German newspaper] senior editor Richard Kiessler; WAZ journalist Jutta Lietsch; August Pradetto, professor of political science at the Helmut-Schmidt Armed Forces University; former MP and federal justice minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin; MP and speaker Johannes Pflug; and myself.

Sunday/Monday, May 23/24, 2010

Departure from Frankfurt.  Most of the other participants have already arrived, for example via China.  Flight to Beijing, arrival on Monday morning, then another trip to Pyongyang.

Upon arrival in the tiny Pyongyang airport we were met by representatives of the North Korean Workers’ Party, and spoke briefly in the main hall of the airport.  We’d like to emphasize that we considered it important to come for a dialogue during this tense time.  We took this opportunity, as well as others in the next few days, to indicate to the North Koreans that a flexible reaction, and not the immediate threat of “total war,” would strengthen their position.

We had to leave our cell phones at the entryway, though they wouldn’t have worked anyway.

We had dinner at the hotel, at the request of our hosts, and the conversation was rather diplomatic, followed by short group meetings.  Johannes Pflug, an Asia expert who has been to North Korean several times, was our spokesman.

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Before we left the hotel, Mr. Tong, responsible Western European affairs within the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, related to us the official position on the Cheonan accident as reported in North Korean newspapers.  The North Koreans indirectly threatened to use their nuclear weapons, and especially intensified their criticism of the expert panel’s findings, stressed North Korea.  Many statements were disputed in detail and they demanded that North Korean experts also be allowed access to the evidence, and that the surviving South Korean sailors be given permission to testify before international experts.

Before our first meeting we visited the house in Mangjongdä where Kim Il-sung was born, a simple peasant house for a cemetery caretaker, which was arranged as a memorial.  From a hill closeby there was an outstanding view of nearby Pyongyang.

Exchange of ideas with Mr. Ri Jong-chol, vice commander of the international division of the Korean Workers’ Party.  At our request he expounded upon his ideas of North Korean’s present situation: “We have designed a new form of synthetic fiber, which could improve our clothing supply,” “We have developed a new chemical fertilizer through anthracite gasification, to raise the level of food production” (because of the sanctions, North Korea suffers from a fertilizer shortage), “In 2009 there will first be 151 days of action during which new houses, hydroelectric dams, and orchards will be created, followed by an additional 100 days” (part of the preparations for 2012, the 100th year anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung), “Reunification as our biggest wish,” “The South Koreans’ current policy towards the North is confrontational,” “We have proposed a US-North Korea peace treaty,” “American policy towards North Korea has again been put in the hands of hardliners because of the desire by American Democrats to win seats in the US Senate.”

Our questions as to why China supported the recent UN sanctions against North Korea and what, specifically, a peace treaty with the USA would include (currently there is only a ceasefire agreement) were not addressed.  In North Korea’s view the Non-Proliferation Treaty is unfair, according to Mr. Ri, for the “atomic threat by the USA still remains.”

In the early afternoon we had a discussion with the leader of the European section of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Kim Chun-guk, followed by a visit to the monument to the Juche ideology of Kim Il-sung, which differs from Marxist ideology in that it places a strong emphasis on national autonomy.  A focus of the discussion was the tension surrounding the sinking of the Cheonan.  The North Koreans put forth the same arguments as on Monday morning, and we criticize the immediate threats of war by North Korea, and encourage a political rather than military solution.  The conversation turns to the poor relationship with Japan, North Korea being accused of never having revealed the fate of Japanese citizens kidnapped in the ’70s and ’80s.  The accusation was rebuffed, notwithstanding the admissions of kidnapping in the 1990s.  The North Koreans say that they freed all the surviving abductees, and that Japan has yet to apologize for the “death, kidnapping, and forced prostitution” during the 1910-1945 colonial occupation.

Later in the afternoon we had a discussion with the chairman of the Korean-German parliamentary friendship group, Mr. Ri Jong-hyok, who studied in East Germany in the 1960s and was a classmate of Kim Jong-il.  During this discussion it was worth paying special attention to the nuances in his answers, despite his evasiveness in answering our questions.  He expressed fear that because of the tensions, the Special Economic Zone, supported jointly by North and South Korea, may no longer be tenable.  We interpreted this as suggesting that the North Korean leadership has not yet decided on a specific reaction to further South Korean sanctions.  The tensions surrounding the sinking of the Cheonan played the biggest role in our discussion, in addition to North Korea’s energy supply.  At the end we gave him a list of eleven names of German citizens who are children of North Korean exchange students in East Germany in the ’50s and ’60s, and who are seeking contact with their fathers and half-siblings.

In the evening, there was a banquet at the German embassy.  The German ambassador would soon be sent from North Korea (diplomatic relations since 2001) to Guatemala.  The German embassy lies on the ground floor of the former East German embassy, which it currently shares with the British and Norwegian embassies.

Wednesday, May 26, 2010

In the morning we paid a visit to a glass factory constructed by the Chinese and a Yellow Sea lock built in the 1980s, which included an 8-kilometer long dam, which turned a lagoon into a freshwater lake.  The glass factory built in 2005 is of the highest technical standard.  According to the factory leadership, 50% of the production is for the domestic market, with the other 50% destined for China.  One thousand employees build not only window glass, but also stained glass, plate glass, bulletproof glass, and glass doors.  One branch builds bottles and blenders with the cooperation of the German firm Tekal.  They are especially proud of their CNC machines, with which all sorts of glass jewelry and various pre-cut parts can be built.  The introduction of CNC in North Korean firms is part of the current modernization campaign by Kim Jong-il.

On the way to the Yellow Sea lock we noticed the poor overall supply situation.  But more specifically we noticed that, after the two typhoons in the 1990s hit, peasants have cut down trees for their own private use, and have planted crops on the steep hills.  These fields yield few crops, but have totally eroded the soil.  Only 16% of North Korea’s acreage is provisioned for agriculture.

At the Yellow Sea lock we were also met by a pretty, young girl, dressed in quasi-traditional costume.  Ultimately this turned out to be standard operating procedure; young girls are trained specifically for this job.  Each enterprise has a large mural of Kim Il-sung and/or Kim Jong-il in the entryway – a large stone tablet (30 meters on one side) with laudatory verses and a room dedicated to the history of the enterprise, with special attention paid to visits by North Korean leaders.

The Yellow Sea lock was built by 30,000 workers in 1981-86 in order to prevent the encroachment of saltwater fifty kilometers up the river to Pyongyang, and thus to ensure safe drinking water for agriculture, residential use, and industry.  The enormous dam is broken into three lock chambers, allowing ships of up to 50,000 gross registered tons to pass through.  Despite the seven meter tidal range, the dam only generates enough electricity to power the lock.

There are many people out in the rice fields since the planting season is just beginning, and the office workers must regularly help.  Many soldiers can also be seen in the fields, and incidentally at road and housing construction sites as well.  In contrast, over the next few days there were barely any armed soldiers to be seen; no signs could be seen of a general mobilization, as many Westerners assumed would occur after the Cheonan incident.  In the West it is known that the North Korean army employs 1.3 million of the country’s 24 million citizens.  Not known, however, is the fact that the army must to a large extent finance itself, mostly working domestically in agriculture and building projects, and therefore is not constantly under arms.

The mobilization of North Korean troops, presumed by South Korea, is nowhere to be seen, and in addition hardly anybody among the population or in government expects a war due to the Korean crisis.

Outside of Pyongyang there are barely any cars on the enormous eight-lane arterial highways.  The traffic in Pyongyang itself has, however, definitely increased.  In terms of mass transit there is a subway, surface trams (constructed similarly to East German trams, because of the earlier COMECON bond), buses, and trolley buses (in horrible condition).  The populace, however, covers considerable distances by bicycle and by foot.  Women are apparently forbidden by Kim Jong-il from riding bicycles, as he once witnessed a woman in a bicycle accident, though there seemed to be no lack of women in the streets.

At lunchtime we had a discussion with the Swedish ambassador, which was, at his request, off the record.

After lunch we visited the Pyongyang textile factory and the ostrich farm on the airport road.  Here we heard a typical history lesson, this time including the story of why Kim Il-sung is called “father”: as he visited workers and heard from them that their fathers couldn’t visit them, Kim is supposed to have said that he would be the father to all Koreans.  Otherwise stated: those who in our country look to the Bible for metaphors, allegories, and quotes would in North Korea look to the country’s founder, Kim Il-sung.

Nine thousand workers (mostly women, aged 17 to 55) worked in the textile factory, which was shown to us by the party secretary in charge.  This stands in contrast to the history lesson given at the start, where it was suggested that an earlier “heroine of work” is still working at age 70.  They answered my query by stating that the female workers themselves choose when they’d like to retire, at which point free general healthcare is provided by the state.

The fabrics produced used to be exported, but the factory came to a standstill in the ’90s, and now only serves the domestic market.  Exports should resume in 2011, after further production increases.  Those looms which we could see were thoroughly modern, though the condition of the machines in other rooms remains an open question.  The party secretaries of the concern are depicted in photos as being on equal footing as the director.  A third of the seamstresses in the factory are party members, who must apply and prove their worth to be chosen.

There are very few small traders on the streets, hawking snacks, drinks, or – as we saw once – popsicles.  Refrigeration is, however, a huge problem in North Korea, due to a lack of cooling units and unreliable and inadequate power supplies.

The ostrich farm, whose animals are used for meat, has been around since 1998 and has gradually increased its population to 10,000 animals over the span of one year.  The meat was until recently exported, but now, on the advice of Kim Jong-il, serves only the domestic market.  Because of transportation and refrigeration issues, the animals are slaughtered when restaurants or businesses request them, on the order of about 20-30 per day, each animal yielding about 100 kg of meat.  It must be noted that meat is not part of the average Korean’s diet, but rather goes largely to restaurants which serve foreigners and better-off North Koreans.

Five hundred people work in the ostrich farm, the processing factory, and in feed production.  The ostriches can survive temperatures as low as -10 degrees in the harsh Korean winter, but any lower and they must be moved inside.

A side note: North Korea is a very clean country.  Not only because people barely have anything to throw away, but also because it doesn’t occur to anybody to throw away trash (not even plastic bags, which one sees everywhere in the countryside of other developing countries).

At the end of the day we visited NOSOTEK, a joint venture software firm.  Founded by the German programmer Volker Eloesser in 1970, the firm mostly develops cell phone and Flash games, but also ports video games for consoles.  The customers usually don’t want there to be any references to North Korea in the games, some of which are well known.  Thirty five people work for the firm in Pyongyang, ten are on loan from other firms, and there are ten more at the Chinese branch.

The idea came to Mr. Eloesser during a visit as a member of a delegation in 2005, and by the end of 2007 the firm was founded.  While the education of programers and graphic designers in North Korea is top rate, he had to introduce quality assurance, teamwork, and entrepreneurial thinking.

Because of North Korea’s internet restrictions, he only has access in his private home.  He must bring his business data with him to work every morning, and take it back home every night.  From his personal phone (part of the foreigner network) he cannot reach any of his Korean colleagues directly.  Since as a foreigner he is forbidden from using phones intended for Koreans, he must, in case of an emergency, go to, for example, a restaurant and ask a Korean to call his colleague and pass along the message.

Despite all of this, Mr. Eloesser is very happy with his decision to found a North Korean firm.  He works pragmatically around the everyday problems of North Korea.  He gets by okay because the the North Koreans know that he wants neither to denigrate the leadership nor start a counterrevolution, but rather just to run the company.  We agree to have dinner the following day.

In the evening we had a meeting with Kathi Zellweger from the Swiss development agency, which has been in North Korea since 1993.  They have implemented programs dealing with biological pest control, crop rotation, government control of the hillsides, rehabilitation of river power plants, and building of educational capacity.

A side anecdote: When Mrs. Zellweger was accompanied on a trip by a Hong Kong hair stylist, North Korean acquaintances of Mrs. Zellweger wanted haircuts like Angela Merkel.

Thursday, May 27, 2010

The next morning we had a meeting with Mrs. Hong Son-ok, vice chairperson of the Union for Cultural Connections Abroad.  In addition to a general cultural exchange, we and the ambassador encouraged the willingness of the North Koreans to allow an exchange of North Korean cultural treasures in Germany, including the world-famous Chinese lacquered baskets found in Pyongyang in 1931.  Because they are seen as un-Korean, these lie in the museum’s storage facility and are presently not on display in Pyongyang.  We told them how proud we are of our Roman heritage.

Our suggestion of sending a scholar to Helmut-Schmidt University was received with reservations, as was our wish for more journalist visas, for example for the film festival at the end of the year.  She said that they hadn’t had good experiences with journalists.  Johannes Pflug calls attention to our different understand of media relations and suggested that the next parliamentary group issue more visas to journalists.

After this we took a trip to the Museum of National Friendship, a good 120 kilometers north of Pyongyang.  Here, among the wondrous mountainside, gifts given to Kim Il-sung (128,000) and Kim Jong-il (65,000) are on display in monumental buildings with corridors and rooms dug deep into the mountain.  At various points we guessed that there is more hidden in the mountain than just the museum.

The gifts were at times awe-inspiring, such as the 9.5 ton block of jade.  There are many gifts from the former GDR, as well as from the SED and the LDPD, which merged with the FDP.  Kim Il-sung was depicted as a wax figure in a special room with a birch tree landscape, artificial wind, and music.

There were a few things that suggested to us a parallel society.  Gifts given by small, unimportant countries and international organizations that we didn’t recognize were among the collection.  Among German newspapers, only the “Rote Fahne,” the central organ of the KPD (which has fewer than 200 members), has written positively about Kim Jong-il.

Afterwards they took us through a narrow, hilly, picturesque tributary valley, where they had a barbecue prepared.  This was followed by a visit to the 700-year-old Pohyon Temple, where 800-year-old books were on display.  The temple also has significant to the Workers’ Party of Korea: Kim Il-sung saw himself as following in the tradition of its abbot, who was the leader of the national resistance against a 1359 Japanese invasion.

We then took a detour to the Pyongyang football stadium and spoke with young footballers about their role models, hopes, and assessment for the World Cup.  Ballack and Zidane were named as role models, and the kids wanted only to play in a World Cup.  Their goal for North Korea in South Africa was eighth place.

Later came dinner, where we met once again with the German businessman Volker Eloesser, who told us about his experiences in North Korea.

The next morning we visited the Kim Won-gyun College of Music, named after the composer who wrote the national anthem and the Kim Il-sung song, among others.  Eight hundred students, more than half of whom were women, were being trained in singing, composition, western musical instruments, and traditional Korean music.  Founded in 1949, the school got a new campus of 50,000 square meters, with classrooms, demonstration rooms, music halls, and dorms.  Everything is of the highest level and is still in top shape.

Our visit is thoroughly organized, with many high quality demonstrations.  Ms. Berg, an envoy at the German embassy, told us that North Korean kindergartens place a heavy emphasis on singing and dancing.

Shortly after 10 o’clock we met with the speaker of the People’s Assembly, Mr. Choe Thae-bok, a member of the highest governing body, who studied in Germany [trans. note: doesn’t indicate East or West] at the end of the ’50s.  The discussion themes were the same as in other conversations (Cheonan, visas for journalists, exchanges by North Koreans to Germany).  Mr. Choe is more open and sophisticated in his answers – an important talk that allows for some interpretation of current debate in North Korea.

In the early afternoon we visited an orchard in bloom.  With modern cultivars, the 700 hectares produce apples for the city’s population.  The first crop was just produced last year.  Housing for all 700 workers is under construction, with some already ready.  1,200 bees are responsible for pollination, and the plantation has a drip irrigation system.  The capacity should end up yielding over 35,000 tons of apples per year.

As part of the agricultural policy there is a pig farm, a chicken farm, a fish pond, and a turtle hatchery in the neighborhood, in order to use the excrement as fertilizer.  Pests (wasps, dragonflies) are managed both biologically and with pesticides.

On our journey across the country it struck us that there were newly built houses almost everywhere along the route we took.  Whether this applies to the whole country I cannot say, though it was confirmed by other observers.

At four we visited a copper cable factory in the middle of Pyongyang, founded in 1959, with over 1300 employees.  It manufactures everything from basic wires to high-voltage submarine cables, as well as plugs for export and plastic utensils made from the PVC remains of the insulation.

Our two journalists did not accompany us because they were invited to a “press” conference for the diplomatic corps, where North Korea expresses its opinion on the Cheonan sinking for the first time.

Shortly after five we visited the last of the projects, but one which is encouraging for the future of the country: on the outskirts of Pyongyang there were fifteen vegetable greenhouses constructed by Welthungerhilfe [trans. note: an NGO funded largely by Germany, the EU, and the UN].  Thanks to Pyongyang’s good sunlight (39th degree of latitude, corresponding to Sicily), various vegetables can be harvested without heating for ten months out of the year.  The output per hectare is 200 tons of vegetables, many times that of traditional rice cultivation.

As much of the harvest will be sold as covers its cost, with the rest given free of charge to schoolchildren and kindergartners to prevent malnutrition.

The harvest can begin as early as one year after building a greenhouse, which is a good option for a country with little arable land.  The plants lay in a nutrient solution rather than in the earth.  The project leader praised the North Koreans for their knowledge and dedication.

Small greenhouses for balconies and gardens are also being developed, and at 300-800 euros they are very affordable.

In the evening we were seen off with a communal meal with our escorts, interpreters, and drivers.

Saturday, May 29, 2010

Return trip to Germany, again via Beijing.

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The short life of the Sunchon Vinalon Complex area

Tuesday, May 25th, 2010

UPDATE (2011-5-31): New Google Earth imagery, dated 2009-5-27, reveals the Sunchon Vinalon Complex area continues to shrink:

Here is an overview of the facilities in question.  Note the two yellow boxes:

Below are images from the complex in the yellow box on the left (March 2004 – May 2009):

Below are images from the complex in the yellow box on the right (March 2004 – May 2009):

ORIGINAL POST (2010-5-25): The Sunchon Vinalon Complex was launched in 1985.  It was intended to produce 100,000 tons of Vinalon as well as methanol, vinyl chloride, sodim carbonate, caustic soda, nitrogenous fertilizers, albuminous feed.  In October 1989 the government announced that the first-stage had gone into production (50,000 tons of vinalon).

Using Google Earth imagery and clandestine video footage we can see, however, that much of the Sunchon Vinalon Complex, what I believe is that largest industrial complex in the DPRK (in terms of geographic size), is now a shrinking pile of scrap materials.

Below is an overview of the Sunchon industrial area.  It is composed not only of the Sunchon Vinalon Complex, but also the Sunchon Thermal Power Plant and Sunchon Cement Complex.  I believe the Sunchon Vinalon Complex is actually composed of three distinct hubs. The two I will be looking at are highlighted in red in the below satellite overview image:

sunchon-overview-2004.JPG

The  red box on the right has seen the most changes.  Between 2004 and 2006 it was nearly entirely stripped:

sunchon-area1-2004.JPG sunchon-area1-2006.JPG

The red box on the left has been stripped as well–though not nearly to the same extent:

sunchon-area2-2004.JPG sunchon-area2-2006.JPG

Recently KBS broadcast clandestine video shot at the Sunchon complex and someone posted a short clip on the web.  You can watch it here.  Below I have matched the clandestine video segments with the satellite imagery which shows just how derelict the facility has become. Satellite image dates are in the upper right hand corner.

sunchon-vinalon-video1.JPG sunchon-sattelite-video1.JPG

sunchon-vinalon-video2.JPG sunchon-sattelite-video2.JPG

sunchon-sattelite-video3.JPG sunchon-vinalon-video3.JPG

sunchon-vinalon-video4.JPG sunchon-sattelite-video4.JPG

sunchon-vinalon-video5.JPG sunchon-sattelite-video5.JPG

The third zone of the complex seems unaffected over the years.  You can see it here.  I suspect this is the successfully launched “first stage”.

Additional Information:

1. Google Books has a blurb about the complex from North Korea: A Strange Socialist FortressSee the blurb here. I own this book and recommend it.

2.  Global Security asserts that the facility produces chemical weapons.

3. Here are all of the KCNA stories that mention the Sunchon Vinalon Complex (Courtesy of the invaluable STALIN Search Engine)

4. The Sunchon Vinalon Complex is the second vinalon facility to be constructed in the DPRK.  The first is the 2.8 Vinalon Complex in Hamhung.  This facility was recently reconstructed and opened after falling into disrepair during the Arduous March.

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Waiting for an [economic] miracle

Monday, May 24th, 2010

Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

Kim Jong-il’s recent visit to China was somewhat unusual: instead of going straight to Beijing, Kim visited a number of sites which are associated with China’s economic development.

He went first to the port city of Dalian and spent time there inspecting the harbor and hi-tech centers located nearby (including even a semi-conductor plant operated by Intel). While in Beijing, he continued such visits.

Had this happened a few years ago, we would expect a wave of optimistic speculation: such interest in modern technology would have been interpreted as a sure indicator of North Korea’s readiness to launch Chinese-style reforms. This time, it seems that even the optimists have become tired of making prophecies which never come true.

Nonetheless, the trip once again demonstrated a peculiar feature which the North Korean regime shares with the now-extinct Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe. The Pyongyang leaders have an almost religious belief in the miraculous power of modern technology.

They hope that all their problems can be easily and quickly fixed once a proper technology is found and applied (of course, application has to be done by state). However, the social dimensions of the economic problems are ignored.

It sounds very non-Marxist: after all, the founding fathers of Communism explicitly stated that it is the social structure and property relations, not technology, which determines the economic productivity. But their supposed disciples would never agree that the economic woes of the Communist countries were brought by the less than perfect social system.

This unwillingness is understandable: social change might become dangerous for those who are in power. Therefore they have a vested interest in presenting their system as perfect.

So, if there are problems, those problems should have an easy technocratic decision ― and the only force which can find and introduce such decision is, of course, the regime in power.

When in the early 1950s the Soviet agricultural industry was clearly in trouble, Stalin decided to do something about it. His solution was a program of planting forest strips which would decrease soil erosion.

Stalin was also much interested in the grotesque promises of Trofim Lysenko, a notorious charlatan who was talking about “educating” plants into yielding greater harvest.

Lysenko also enjoyed the support of Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor. Khrushchev’s pet technology was corn production, and insisted that the nationwide switch to this wonder plant would miraculously raise productivity.

However, corn, being a Mesoamerican plant, did not grow well near the polar circle, and plants did not show any sickness of being susceptible to `education’. Russia, once a major exporter of grain, became an increasingly voracious importer of food.

Of course, the problems of the Soviet agriculture were caused not by the insufficient attention paid to corn production. It was the social problems that made the Soviet agricultural system so inefficient: farmers, being badly paid employees of the government-run farms, had no reason to work diligently.

When they toiled the small patches of their own land, which they were legally allowed, they showed a remarkable level of productivity. But this was not what the Soviet government was willing to see.

It was Mao’s China, though, which produced the weirdest examples of belief in wonder technologies. It reached its height during the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s.

Mao wanted small furnaces to be built everywhere: during the Great Leap even schools and farms were required to make their own steel in the backyard furnaces. Predictably, the home-made steel was useless because of the low quality.

Simultaneously, Mao told the farmers to use “close cropping.” Seeds were sown far more densely than normal on the “politically correct” assumption that “seeds of the same class would not compete with each other” (of course, crops were ruined).

The farmers were also ordered to plough two meters deep, since this would “encourage plants to develop extensive root systems.” The result was famine which killed between 20 and 30 million people. However, it seems that Mao and his henchmen never abandoned their belief in miraculous technologies.

North Korea is no different. Its leaders also are firm believers in the power of technology, if this technology is carefully selected by the state and introduced by its agents. Kim Il-sung, being a son of a farming family, paid special attention to the agriculture.

Among other things, he was a great enthusiast for terrace fields. He wanted to transform the barren hills of North Korea into rice-producing areas, and kept reminding his officials that no efforts should be spared to do so.

Predictably, the result was a disaster: in the 1990s terrace fields were washed away by floods while the few remaining became unusable since a large electric pump would be necessary to provide those high-rise fields with water.

Kim Jong-il shares the belief in wonders, but in his case the major hope is modern industrial technology, preferably related to computers (an approach clearly influenced by gadgetry).

The Dear Leader reputedly said that it was a great folly not to study computers, and most of his technological initiatives are clearly related to IT.

Since last year, for example, the Pyongyang streets have been covered with posters which tell about wonders of the CNC technology (in an unusual twist, the English acronym is used). CNC stands for “computer numerically controlled” technology and, to put it simply, describes computer-controlled industrial equipment.

It is remarkable that the present author heard the same slogans many decades ago, in the 1970s. Indeed, the Soviet leaders also had much hope about the CNC and worked hard to introduce it as a cure for the Soviet economy ― with the predictable lack of success.

Therefore, not much should be read from Kim Jong-il’s visit to Intel. He might dream of computer-operated giant plants, but he lives under severe political constraints, and these constraints ensure that North Korea will remain a very inhospitable environment for high technology (apart from some ultra-cool gadgetry for the chosen few, of course).

This might be changed only if the system itself will be changed, but this is clearly not what Kim wants.

Read the full story below:
Waiting for a miracle
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
5/24/2010

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Myanmar buying DPRK military equipment

Sunday, May 16th, 2010

According to Interconnected World:

Secrecy normally shrouds military relations between Burma and its strategic allies such as China and North Korea, but intelligence sources suggest ongoing military ties with these two countries are helping the Burmese generals’ to achieve their military ambitions, including that of becoming a nuclear power.

Intelligence sources said top junta generals have held late- night meetings in Naypyidaw in the last two months, discussing military modernization, foreign relations, tension with ethnic groups and suppressing dissidents in urban areas.

They said the junta bought weapons from China and North Korea including mid-range missiles and rocket launchers in April, and suggested the war office in Naypyidaw chose the month when the Burmese celebrate new year in order to avoid public scrutiny.

Equipment necessary to build a nuclear capability was reportedly among imported military supplies from North Korea that arrived at the beginning of the holidays.

A report from Rangoon in April also referred to an undisclosed vessel believed to be connected with North Korea that was seen at Thilawar Port, near Rangoon. Burmese officials at the time said the vessel was there to load Burmese rice destined for North Korea.

Military relations between Naypyidaw and Pyongyang have been attracting attention from analysts, diplomats and journalists in recent years. In August 2009, an article in Sydney Morning Herald alleged the Burmese junta aims to get an atomic bomb in five years using Burmese enriched uranium and North Korean nuclear technology.

Apart from nuclear know-how and equipment, Pyongyang has also provided the Burmese junta’s armed forces with truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles and technology for underground warfare since the early 2000s, according to experts on Burma’s military like Andrew Selth.

“Pyongyang needs Burmese primary products, which Naypyidaw can in turn use to barter for North Korea arms, expertise and technology,” wrote Andrew Selth in the Australian Journal of International Affairs in March.

Read the full article here:
Burma said buying arms from China, North Korea
Interconnected World
5/10/2010

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