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Welcome to capitalism, North Korean comrades

Saturday, December 4th, 2004

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
12/4/2004

A creeping revolution, both social and economic, is under way in North Korea and it seems there’s no turning back. For decades, the country served as the closest possible approximation of an ideal Stalinist state. But the changes in its economy that have taken place after 1990 have transformed the country completely and, perhaps, irreversibly.

For decades, Pyongyang propaganda presented North Korea as an embodiment of economic self-sufficiency, completely independent from any other country. This image sold well, especially in the more credulous part of the Third World and among the ever-credulous leftist academics. The secret of its supposed self-sufficiency was simple: the country received large amounts of direct and indirect aid from the Soviet Union and China, but never admitted this in public. Though frequently annoyed by such “ingratitude”, neither Moscow nor Beijing made much noise since both communist giants wanted to maintain, at least superficially, friendly relations with their small, capricious ally.

But collapse of the Soviet Union made clear that claims of self-sufficiency were unfounded. From 1991, the North Korean economy went into free fall. Throughout 1991-99, the gross national product (GNP) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nearly halved. The situation became unbearable in 1996, when the country was struck by a famine that took, by the best available estimates, about 600,000 lives. The famine could have been prevented by a Chinese-style agricultural reform, but this option was politically impossible: such a reform would undermine the government’s ability to control the populace.

The control on daily lives was lost anyway. What we have seen in North Korea over the past 10 years can be best described as collapse of what used to be rigid Stalinism from below. In the Soviet Union of the late 1950s and in China of the late 1970s, Stalinism-Maoism was dismantled from above, through a chain of deliberate reforms planned and implemented by the government. In North Korea the same thing happened, but the system disintegrated from below, despite weak and ineffectual attempts to keep it intact.

In the 1960s, North Korea was unique in being the only nation in the world where markets were outlawed. The retail trade in a strict sense almost ceased to exist since virtually everything, from socks to apples, was distributed through an elaborate public distribution system with money payments being rather symbolic. The rations depended on a person’s position in the intricate social hierarchy, which eventually became semi-hereditary. In Kim Il-sung’s North Korea, there was almost nothing that could be sold on market since production outside the state economy was almost non-existent.

Unlike governments of other communist countries, until the late 1980s the North Korean government did not even allow its farmers to cultivate kitchen gardens – the individual plot was limited to merely 20-30 square meters, hardly enough to grow enough chili pepper. This was done on purpose. In many other communist countries, farmers had bigger plots and made their living from them, ignoring their work obligations to the state-run cooperative farms. Without their own plots, farmers would work more for the state – or so believed the North Korean government. In the utopia constructed by Kim Il-sung, every single man or woman was supposed to work for the state, and was rewarded for his and her efforts with officially approved rations and salaries.

In 1969, Kim himself admitted that the anti-market policy had been a failure. Thus private markets were gradually legalized, but remained small and strictly controlled. However, as late as late 1980s, markets were still considered inappropriate for a “socialist paradise”. They were something to be ashamed of, so they were pushed to the margins of the city. Until the early 1990s, most markets were in places more or less hidden from view, inside residential blocks and behind high concrete walls. In Pyongyang, the main city market was set up under a huge viaduct at the easternmost part of the North Korean capital, as far from the city center as possible.

However, the economic disaster of 1991-95, and especially the subsequent famine, changed the situation. Markets began to spread across the country with amazing speed. From 1995-97, nearly all plants and factories ceased to operate. The rations were not issued anymore: in most areas people still received ration coupons but these could not be exchanged for food or other rationed goods. Only in Pyongyang and some other politically important areas did food continue to be distributed. But even there, the norms were dramatically watered down. In such a situation, the ability and willingness to engage in some private business became the major guarantee of physical survival.

The government also relaxed the restrictions on domestic travel. Since around 1960, every North Korean who ventured outside his native county was required to have a special “travel permit” (an exception was made for one-day travel to neighboring counties). However, in the mid-1990s, the authorities began to turn a blind eye to unauthorized travel. It is not clear whether it was a deliberate relaxation or just inability to enforce regulations when the state bureaucracy was demoralized. After all, a bribe of some US$5 would buy such a permit from a police officer.

The tidal wave of small trade flooded the country, which once came very close to creating a non-money-based economy. People left their native places in huge numbers. Many sought places where food was more available while others enthusiastically took up the barter trade, including smuggling of goods to and from China. Women were especially prominent in the new small businesses. Many North Korean women were housewives or held less-demanding jobs than men. Their husbands continued to go to their factories, which had come to a standstill. The males received rationing coupons that were hardly worth the paper on which they were printed. But North Korean men still saw the situation as temporary and were afraid to lose the trappings of a proper state-sponsored job that for decades had been a condition for survival in their society. While men were waiting for resumption of “normal life”, whiling away their time in idle plants, the women embarked on frenetic business activity. Soon some of these women began to make sums that far exceeded their husbands’ wages.

The booming markets are not the only place for retail trade. A new service industry has risen from the ashes: private canteens, food stalls and inns operate near the markets. Even prostitution, completely eradicated around 1950, made a powerful comeback as desperate women were eager to sell sexual services to the newly rich merchants. Since no banking institution would serve private commercial operations, illegal money lenders appeared. In the late 1990s they would charge their borrowers monthly interests of 30-40%. This reflected very high risks: these lenders had virtually no protection against the state, criminals and, above all, bad debtors.

In North Korea, which for decades was so different, this meant a revolution. The new situation undermined the government’s ability to control the populace. People involved in the new market activities are independent from (or inured to) subtle government pressures that had ensured compliance for decades. One cannot promote or demote a vendor, transfer him or her to a better or worse job, nor determine his or her type of residence (though admittedly, most people still live in the houses they received when the old system was still operating).

The growth of new markets also undermined some pillars of old North Korean hierarchy. Of course, many people who became affluent in the new system came from the old hierarchy – as was the case in most post-communist countries. Officials or managers of state-run enterprises found manifold ways to make an extra won. These managers often sold their factories’ products on the market. But many hitherto discriminated-against groups managed to rise to prominence during this decade. The access to foreign currency was very important, and in North Korea there were three major groups who had access to some investment capital: the Japanese-Koreans, Chinese-Koreans and Korean-Chinese.

The Japanese-Koreans moved into the country in the 1960s (there were some 95,000 of them – with family members, children and grandchildren, their current number can be estimated at 200,000-250,000). These people have relatives in Japan who are willing to send them money. Traditionally, the authorities looked at Japanese-Koreans with suspicion. At the same time, since money transfers from Japan have been a major source of hard currency for Pyongyang, their activities were often tolerated. This particular group even enjoyed some special rights, being privileged and discriminated against at the same time. When the old system of state control and distribution collapsed, Japanese-Koreans began to invest their money into a multitude of trade adventures. It did not hurt that many of them still had the first-hand experience of living in a capitalist society.

Another group were people with relatives in China. The economic growth of China meant that the relatives could also help their poor relatives in North Korea. In most cases, this was not in the form of money transfers, but assistance in business and trade. The local ethnic Chinese were in an even better position to exploit the new opportunities. For decades, they have constituted the only group of the country’s inhabitants who could travel overseas as private citizens more or less at their will. Even in earlier times, the ethnic Chinese used this unique position to earn extra money by small-scale and part-time smuggling. In the 1990s, they switched to large operations. There is an irony in the sudden economic advance of these groups. For decades, their overseas connections have made them suspect and led to systematic discrimination against them. In the 1990s, however, the same connections became the source of their prosperity.

Until recently, the government did not try to lead, but simply followed the events. The much-trumpeted reforms of 2002 by and large were hardly anything more than the admission of the situation that had been existing for a few years by then. The official abolition (or near-abolition) of the public distribution system did not count for much, since this system ceased to operate outside Pyongyang around 1995.

But the North Korean economy has indeed come a long way from its Stalinist ways. Now the government has neither money nor support nor the political will to revive the Stalinist-style central economy. There is no way back, only forward. Stalinism is dead. Welcome to capitalism, comrades!

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Posted in 1990s Famine, Arduous March, Banking, Black markets, Chongryun, Civil society, Economic reform, Finance, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International Aid, Japan, Juche, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Private property, Transportation | Comments Closed

Foreign investors brave North Korea

Tuesday, April 13th, 2004

BBC
Lucy Jones
4/13/2004

“Got any nuclear weapons for sale?” is the response Briton Roger Barrett usually gets when he tells people at Beijing cocktail parties that he invests in North Korea.
The country’s admission to a nuclear weapons programme and its listing on George W Bush’s “axis of evil” means most people are staying well away.

But Mr Barrett, 49, a former troop commander in the British army who has 10 years experience of doing business in North Korea, recently opened a branch of his consultancy firm, Korea Business Consultants, in Pyongyang.

A self-confessed “business adventurer”, he says there is growing interest in the country after Chairman Kim Jong-il introduced economic reforms in 2002.

It’s like China in the eighties… The market reforms are very evident. It’s an exciting time to join the market.

Robert Barrett, Korea Business Consultants 
He is also the enthusiastic publisher of what must be North Korea’s only business publication – the DPRK Business News Bulletin – which features some of the 250 companies he advises.

“It’s like China in the eighties… The market reforms are very evident. It’s an exciting time to join the market,” he says.

Mr Barrett is not alone.

Even in the middle of a nuclear crisis there are foreign investors in the country, and their numbers are increasing.

They say North Korea is a mineral rich country that needs everything and insist they have to get there first.

They also believe the 2002 economic reform is for real and that the country is gradually moving towards becoming a market economy.

Poverty

The little data there is on the country’s economy is hardly encouraging, though.

There has been a devastating famine and the UN says malnutrition is still widespread.

There are chronic heating and water shortages, and most North Koreans are paid less than £5 a month.

The country also has an appalling human rights record.

A BBC documentary on the country’s gulags this year contained allegations that chemical experiments are being carried out on political prisoners.

Meanwhile, the US says it is “highly likely” that North Korea is involved in state-sponsored trafficking of heroin.

In the political arena, the second round of six-nation talks aimed at resolving the nuclear crisis ended in Beijing in February without agreement, which means US and Japanese sanctions will remain in place.
‘Communism’ tourism

But the foreign entrepreneurs in North Korea are not put off.

Some are helped by UN employees who have worked in Pyongyang (among the few people to have had contact with the regime there) and many have a track record in China.

Pack a torch, conduct business meetings on the street to avoid big brother listening in and have plenty of “Asian patience” for the endless red-tape, they advise.

An Austrian company is reportedly buying pianos from the North Koreans, a French television station uses North Korean artists to produce cartoons, while a Singapore-based firm is developing forestry and tourism.

The Singaporeans intend to offer “adventure” stays on their North Korean forestry plantations.

Meanwhile, Western tourist agencies are gearing up to offer the last chance to see communism in action, and Fila and Heineken have reportedly entered into sponsorship deals with the North Korean regime.

North Korean labour

A German, Jan Holtermann owner of the computer firm KCC Europe, is putting North Korea online.

He hopes that by being there first he will be able to eventually tap into North Korean computer talent.

The country’s small number of internet users currently dial-up to Chinese providers, a costly process at about £1 a minute.

Mr Holtermann’s customers, who he hopes will number 2,000 by the end of the year, will have unlimited access for £400 a month.

As only a few North Koreans are permitted to have telephones, and as the internet service is costly, Mr Holtermann expects his customers to be government ministries, news agencies and aid organisations.

He has invested £530,000 in the venture, intending to get first pick when North Korean software programmers come onto the market.

“They are very talented,” he says.

“It’s this capacity we want to sell in Europe.”

The parcel delivery company DHL has operated in Pyongyang since 1997, when it was invited there by the government, and now has North Korean light manufacturing, textile and beverage companies on its books.

It sees itself as contributing to the country’s “slow but increasingly visible” economic reform programme.

British consultants

Former bank employee Mr Barrett is convinced North Korea is opening up much quicker than people think.

There are opportunities in banking, minerals, agriculture and telecommunications, he insists.

“There is the odd story of something going wrong,” he says.

“But when you walk around you notice construction going on.

“The people are feeling a change.”

High level contacts

But how to do business with one of the most isolationist regimes on earth?

Contacts are essential, say businessmen.

Though even knowing a North Korean minister is not enough, says Gerald Khor of Singapore-based forestry company Maxgro Holdings.

“You have to go above the ministers to the cabinet. You don’t have to know a member but you need to know people who can influence them,” he says.

“It is very important to get the favour of the dear leader (Kim Jong-il). Because when he says something, it gets done.”

Through a former UN employee, Maxgro got Kim Jong-il’s attention and has invested $2m in forestry, agreeing the state gets 30% of the profits.

“Kim Jong-il is an environmentalist,” Mr Khor says.

“We are confident we’ll get a return.

“We have dwindling supplies and this is high quality wood.”

To locate the forests elsewhere would cost much more, he adds.

Forced to change

Economic reforms introduced by the government in 2002 are seen as the first move away from central planning since the country adopted communism in 1945.

The government has been forced to change in order to survive, especially now it can no longer barter with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, experts say.

“There is no real option not to carry out these reforms,” says UK-based Keith Bennett, who has taken trade missions to Pyongyang.

“But people don’t know where they will lead.

Chinese leaders have impressed on Kim Jong-il that there can be economic reform without fundamental political change.”

Way up on North Korea’s border with Russia and China is the Tumen economic zone, which was established in 1991 with UN help to lure investors.

The project has only had limited success and may indicate the type of problems those investing elsewhere in North Korea may face.

The North Korean section of the zone, Rajin-Songbong, hosts foreign-run hotels, telecommunications and restaurants, but that is about all.

“The North Koreans have sometimes been very co-operative and sometimes not, maybe because of policy change,” says Tsogtsaikhan Gombo, from the UN’s development agency.

“They were also disappointed when they didn’t see the investment.”

Vibrant Chinese economic zones nearby have put up fierce competition.

But even opening the door just slightly to let in capitalism has greatly improved the lives of the 150,000 people living in the zone, says Mr Gombo.

And many foreigners insist that small investments elsewhere in the country may have similar results.

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Posted in 1990s Famine, 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Animation, Arduous March, Banking, Cell phones, Communications, Drug smuggling, Energy, Finance, Foreign direct investment, Forestry, Illicit activities, Internet, Korea Business Consultants, Korea Computer Center (KCC), Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Telephones, Tourism | Comments Closed

Call for Kaesong investors

Wednesday, October 1st, 2003

From the BBC:

North Korea has unveiled the terms under which foreign investors will be lured to a ground-breaking industrial zone near the tense border with South Korea.

Two South Korean companies – Korean Land and an arm of the Hyundai conglomerate – are developing an international business park in Kaesong, part of a package of cautious economic reforms in the Stalinist country.

So far, more than 1,000 South Korean firms have enquired about setting up shop in Kaesong, where labour costs will be a tiny fraction of those south of the border.

The North Korean Government now promises investors favourable tax rates, but there are still considerable concerns over whether it will allow businesses much economic freedom.

Most of the companies so far interested in Kaesong are in light manufacturing, particularly textiles.

Depending on their line of business, these firms will be taxed at up to 14%, less than half the rate levied in the South.

Pyongyang is, however, especially keen to lure hi-tech firms, which will be subject to a tax rate of just 10%.

Investors will have to pay a number of other smaller levies, and must adhere to a minimum monthly wage of $50.

Such incentives have sparked a flurry of interest in the South, but many companies remain wary.

They will be forced to hire workers through a North Korean state agency whose powers and attitude remain unclear.

And there is still little confidence in the fundamental stability of North Korea, which has turned to economic reform in recent years, but which remains virulently opposed to most forms of foreign influence.

The Kaesong development does, however, seem to be a relatively permanent arrangement.

It forms part of a large-scale construction project in the region, which is just 50 kilometres northwest of Seoul.

Elsewhere the focus is on tourism, especially scenic Mount Kumgang on the country’s east coast, which Hyundai has been trying to develop for five years, with mixed success.

There is also a Unification Park, which will be the venue for reunions of families split by the country’s division.

Most significant are major road and rail developments which mark the first time the two rival countries have re-established transport links since the end of the Korean war in 1953.

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Posted in Foreign direct investment, International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, South Korea | Comments Closed

Reforms Turn Disastrous for North Koreans

Monday, January 27th, 2003

Washington Post
John Pomfret
1/27/2003, Page AOl

Nuclear Crisis May Have Roots in Economic Failure

Six months after North Korea announced unprecedented wage and price increases to jump-start its miserable economy, runaway inflation is emptying millions of pocketbooks and bottlenecks in production are causing widespread shortages, according to Chinese and North and South Korean sources.

The black market price of rice, the staple of the Korean diet, has jumped more than 50 percent over the past three months in most parts of the country while tripling in others, according to North Koreans, Chinese businessmen and Western aid agency workers. Some factories in poorer parts of the country, such as the heavily industrialized east coast, have stopped paying workers the higher salaries that were a cornerstone of the reforms, recent North Korean arrivals to China said. Others have taken to paying workers with coupons that can be exchanged for goods, they said, but there are no goods in the stores to buy.

“Theft new economic policy has failed,” said Oh Seung Yul, an economist at the government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. “The hopes that were raised in July are today pretty much dashed.”

The apparent failure of North Korea’s attempt to promote economic activity and improve living standards constitutes an important backdrop for its recent threats to resume a nuclear weapons program, according to the sources.

On one hand, Oh and others said, North Korea’s isolated government needed a scapegoat. On the other, according to Chinese sources close to the secretive government of Kim Jong Ii, Pyongyang has determined that it risks economic collapse without security guarantees and access to international lending institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to which the United States holds the keys. So Kim manufactured a crisis to win concessions, they said.

“Now the economic situation is more precarious than before the reforms. They can’t do this halfway,” said Cui Yingjiu, a Chinese Korean economist and adviser to the North Korean government. “They risk social chaos and economic collapse.”

The crisis has been exacerbated by a drop in the humanitarian aid that had kept North Korea on life support since 1995. Because of a shortage of donations, the World Food Program has cut back the number of North Koreans it is assisting this year from 6.4 million to 3.5 million of the country’s estimated 22.6 million inhabitants. In September, the elderly and primary school-age children on the west coast were cut off. In October, kindergarten-age children, pregnant women and nursing mothers there lost out. In November, nurseries were scratched from the list.

“It’s a tough call deciding who has to be deprived,’ said Gerald Bourke, an official with the World Food Program in Beijing. Bourke said the recent “very rapid inflation” of rice prices is “putting food way beyond the pale for a lot of people.”

The World Food Program has 25,000 tons of food in North Korea and pledges of 75,000 additional tons, he said. It needs 511,000 tons this year.

North Koreans traveling over the border to Yanji, about 700 miles northeast of Beijing, said an initial wave of hope triggered by the changes announced in July is gone in almost all parts of the country except the capital, Pyongyang.

Lee Xiangyu, a North Korean refugee in China, was arrested by Chinese border police and returned to North Korea last summer, when the changes began. After a short stint in jail, the 19-year-old returned to her home town, Musan, along the border with China. By October, she said, the lumberyard where her father worked had stopped paying him and other workers the huge raises they had received as part of the effort to promote some aspects of a free-market economy.

But prices continued to rise. “There was no money in my house, and now the prices are so high,” she said. Lee sneaked back into China in December. “It’s not like it was in 1997 when people were starving to death,” she said, speaking of the famine that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. “But it’s worse in a way. Because everybody had hope for a little while and now they are desperate again.”

North Korea’s announcement of economic reforms was front-page news, in part because the measures fit into a series of other moves that led some observers to conclude Kim was ready to lead his country out of isolation. The steps included expression of regret following a clash between North and South Korean naval forces in June, the suggestion that North Korea would hand over Japanese Red Army members wanted in Japan for hijacking a Japanese airliner in 1970, an informal meeting in July between North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun and Secretary of State Cohn L. Powell, transportation links between North and South Korea, a summit between Kim and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and talk of establishing as many as five special zones for foreign investment.

The economic changes included raising prices and wages, devaluing the North Korean won against the dollar and cutting state subsidies for failing businesses. Wages were increased between 900 percent and 1,500 percent. Prices, which are in theory set by the state, went up as well. Rice went up 4,000 percent, corn 3,700, pork 700, diesel fliel 3,700, electricity 5,900, apartment rent 2,400 and subway tickets 900.

The government announced that factories with bloated workforces could effectively lay off unnecessary workers so they could concentrate on making things again — a step North Korean industry had not taken since economic troubles began in 1995.

The main motivation for increasing the price of rice was to prompt farmers to plant more food. But Cui, who attended a conference on North Korea’s economic changes last fall in Pyongyang, said farmers were not happy.

“Grain prices went up, but so did prices for inputs like fertilizers and seeds,” he said. ‘So all gains were canceled out.”

Another issue, Cui said, is electricity. North Korea has good hydropower resources, but as farmers become interested in planting more crops, they will want to use water in reservoirs for irrigation, not for power generation. “There are a whole series of these conundrums and Catch 22s,” Cui said.

He said North Korean factories have yet to begin producing goods people want to buy. That is why trucks rolling into China from the Dandong border crossing, 350 miles southwest of Yanji, now carry clothes, television sets, shampoo and other consumer goods.

The changes befliddled Western and Chinese economists from the beginning. Chinese experts noted that when China undertook its first major economic reform in 1979, it increased the price of grain by only 25 percent. Second, they said, when China began this process, 80 percent of its population lived in rural areas, so there was a huge pooi of potential beneficiaries from the liberalized agricultural policies. But North Korea is highly industrialized: Two-thirds of its people live in cities.

Marcus Noland, at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, speculated that the changes were either a desperate attempt to jump-start a half-dead economy or a backhanded attack against North Korea’s nascent private economy. Increasing prices would reduce the value of currency held outside the state system, breaking the back of private entrepreneurs.

But then again, he said in a recent paper, “the possibility that economic decisions are being made by people who do not grasp the implications of their actions should not be dismissed toohastily.”

Correspondents Doug Struck and Peter £ Goodman in Seoul contributed to this report

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Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Black markets, Economic reform, Foreign aid statistics, International Aid, Labor conditions/wages, Price liberalization, Statistics, UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

Why reform now?

Monday, October 14th, 2002

West-Bound Train Leaving the Station: Pyongyang on the Reform Track
Marcus Noland
October 14-15, 2002

Marketization

The North Korean economic reforms that began in July 2002 have four components: marketization, inflation, special economic zones, and aid-seeking. Marketization, in turn, has several features. The government appears to be attempting to adopt a dual-price strategy similar to what the Chinese have implemented in the industrial sphere. In essence the Chinese instructed their state-owned enterprises to continue to fulfill the plan, but once planned production obligations were fulfilled, the enterprises were free to hire factors and produce products for sale on the open market. In other words, the plan was essentially frozen in time, and marginal growth occurred according to market dictates.

The government has announced a scrapping/downsizing/attenuation of the system of distributing goods and services through rationing (including the public distribution system (PDS) for food), meaning that at the household or retail level, the allocation of goods will increasingly occur through markets and on market terms. (Two exceptions are health care and education that will continue to be supplied gratis by the state.)

One can question the extent to which this is a real policy change and how much this is simply a ratification of system—fraying that had already occurred—there is considerable evidence that most food, for example, was already being distributed through markets, not the PDS. In this respect, the North Korean move could be interpreted as an admission that the genie is out of the bottle.

On the production side, enterprises have been instructed that they are responsible for covering their own costs—that is, no more state subsidies. Modest changes in the organization of production have been introduced in agriculture and there are rumors that more dramatic changes in the agricultural sector are on their way. Yet it is unclear to what extent managers outside of agriculture have been given the power to hire, fire, and promote workers, or to what extent remuneration will be determined by the market. Moreover there has been no mention of the military’s privileged position within the economy and domestic propaganda continues to speak of a “military-first” political path.

The state has administratively raised wage levels, with certain favored groups such as military personnel, party officials, scientists, and coal miners receiving supernormal increases. (For example, while it has been reported that military personnel and miners have received wage increases on the order of 1,500 percent, the increases for office workers and less essential employees are less, and the estimated income increase for agricultural workers may be on the order of 900 percent.) This alteration of real wages across occupational groups could be interpreted as an attempt to enhance the role of material incentives in labor allocation.

The state continues to maintain an administered price structure, though by fiat, the state prices are being brought in line with prices observed in the farmers’ markets. This is problematic (as it has proven in other transitional economies): the state has told the enterprises that they must cover costs, yet it continues to administer prices, and in the absence of any formal bankruptcy or other “exit” mechanism, there is no prescribed method for enterprises that cannot cover costs to cease operations, nor, in the absence of a social safety net, how workers from closed enterprises would survive. What is likely to occur is the maintenance of operations by these enterprises supported by implicit subsidies, either through national or local government budgets or through recourse to a reconstructed banking system. Indeed, the North Koreans have sent officials to China to study the Chinese banking system, which although may well have virtues, is also the primary mechanism through which money-losing state-owned firms are kept alive.

Inflation

The likelihood is increased by the second component of the economic policy change, the creation of enormous inflation. At the same time the government announced the marketization initiatives, it also announced tremendous administered increases in wages and prices (Table 1). To get a grasp on the magnitude of these price changes, consider this: when China raised the price of grains at the start of its reforms in November 1979, the increase was on the order of 25 percent. In comparison, North Korea has raised the prices of corn and rice by nearly 4,000 percent. In the absence of huge supply responses, the result will be an enormous jump in the price level and possibly even hyperinflation.

Moreover, when China began its reforms in 1979, more than 70 percent of the population was in the agricultural sector. (The same held true for Vietnam when it began reforming the following decade.) In contrast, North Korea has perhaps half that share employed in agriculture. This has two profound implications: first, the population share, which is directly benefiting from the increase in producer prices for agricultural goods, is roughly half as big as in China and Vietnam. This means that reform in North Korea is less likely to be what economists call Pareto-improving (in other words a change in which no one is made worse off) than the cases of China or Vietnam. Instead, reform in North Korea is more likely to create losers and with them the possibility of unrest. Second, the relatively smaller size of the agricultural sector suggests that the positive supply response will not be as great in the North Korean case as compared to China or Vietnam either. Again, this increases the likelihood of reform creating losers and unrest.

In the short run, the initial jump in the price level is usually accompanied by an increase in economic activity, as households and enterprises mistake increases in the overall price level for changes in relative prices. This is likely to be particularly acute in North Korea, where many households and enterprises can be expected to be relatively naïve about market economics, and where significant alterations in the structure of relative prices will be coincident with the rapid increase in the price level. So in the short run, there may be an increase in economic activity.

In the longer run however, once households and enterprises begin to distinguish more clearly between changes in relative and absolute prices, it will become apparent that some parts of the population have experienced real increases in income and wealth, while others have experienced real deteriorations. The North Koreans have not announced any mechanism for periodically adjusting prices, so in all likelihood, disequilibria, possibly severe, will develop over time. Access to foreign currency may act as insurance against inflation, and in fact, the black market value of the North Korean won has dropped approximately 50 percent since the reforms were announced.

Those with access to foreign exchange such as senior party officials will be relatively insulated from this phenomenon. Agricultural workers may benefit from “automatic” pay increases as the price of grain rises, but salaried workers without access to foreign exchange will fall behind. In other words, the process of marketization and inflation will contribute to the exacerbation of existing social differences in North Korea. Given how stressed a society North Korea has become, the implications for “losers” could be quite severe. It would not be at all surprising to observe a significant increase in mortality rates.

Make no mistake about it: North Korea has moved from the realm of elite, to the realm of mass politics. Unlike the diplomatic initiatives of the past several years, these developments will affect the entire population, not just a few elites. And while there is a consensus that marketization is a necessary component of economic revitalization, the inflationary part of the package would appear to be both unnecessary and destructive. (If one wanted to increase the relative wages of coal miners by 40 percent, one could simply give them a 40 percent raise–one does not need to increase the overall price level by a factor of 10, and the nominal wages of coal miners a factor of 14 to effect the same real wage increase.)

So why do it? There are at least three possible explanations. The first, as alluded to above, is the most benign: by creating inflation, the government hopes to provide a short-run kick-start to the economy, the long-run implications be damned. (From the standpoint of North Korean policymakers, Keynes’ aphorism, “in the long run we are all dead” may apply with a rather short time horizon.) Given the extremely low levels of capacity utilization in the North Korean economy, this argument has a certain surface plausibility. Yet the problems of the North Korean economy run far, far deeper than underutilized resources. In large part the economy is geared to produce goods (televisions and radios without tuners, to cite one example, or Scud missiles, to give another) for which there is only limited demand. Unless there is a significant reorientation in the composition of output, it is unlikely that inflation alone will generate a sizeable supply response. Even agriculture is problematic in this regard: North Korean agriculture is highly dependent on industrial inputs (chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals, for example) and agriculture could be disrupted if the farmers find themselves getting squeezed on the input side.

A second possibility is that the inflation policy is intentional, and is a product of Kim Jong-il’s reputed antipathy toward private economic activity beyond state control. One effect of inflation is to reduce the value of existing won holdings. (For example, if the price level increases by a factor of 10, the real value of existing won holdings is literally decimated.) Historically, state-administered inflations and their cousins, currency reforms, have been used by socialist governments to wipe out currency “overhangs” (excess monetary stock claims on goods in circulation), more specifically to target black marketers and others engaged in economic activity outside state strictures, who hold large stocks of the domestic currency. (In a currency reform, residents are literally required to turn in their existing holdings—subject to a ceiling, of course—for newly issued notes.) In July it was announced that the blue won (Korean People’s Won) foreign exchange certificates would be replaced by the normal brown won, though it is unclear if these are convertible into foreign currency. In the case of North Korea, the episode that is now unfolding will be the fourth such one in the country’s five-decade history.

The hypothesis has the strength of linking what appears to be a gratuitous economic policy to politics-Kim Jong-il not only rewards favored constituencies by providing them with real income increases and by going the inflation/currency reform route, but he also punishes his enemies. This line of reasoning is not purely speculative: it has been reported that one of the motivations behind unifying prices in the PDS and farmers’ markets has been to reduce the need of consumers to visit farmers’ markets, and to “assist in the prevention of “illegal sales activities” which took place when the price in the farmers’ market was much higher than the state price” (CanKor, 9 August 2002). A number of unconfirmed reports indicate that the government has placed a price ceiling on staple goods in the farmers’ markets as an anti-inflationary device. The increase in the procurement price for grain has reportedly been motivated, at least in part, to counter the supply response of the farmers, who were diverting acreage away from grain to tobacco, and using grain to produce liquor for sale.

The problem with this explanation is that having gone through this experience several times in the past, North Korean traders are not gullible: they quickly get out of won in favor of dollars, yen, and yuan. Indeed, even North Koreans working on cooperative farms reportedly prefer trinkets as a store of value to the local currency. As a consequence, this blow aimed at traders, may fall more squarely on the North Korean masses, especially those in regions and occupations in which opportunities to obtain foreign currencies are limited.

As an economist I am trained to assume rationality, and it is only with reluctance that I propose arguments that presume ignorance. But my personal experience in China suggests one more possible explanation for the North Korean policy. Demand and supply are not quantities or points—they are schedules indicating quantities as a function of prices. Market-determined prices are thus a signal of scarcity value reflecting underlying demand and supply. Conversations with Chinese officials in the early to mid-1980s, during the first stage of the marketizing reforms, however, revealed that fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of markets was widespread, especially among older officials who had spent many years in a planned economy.

The North Koreans have indicated that they are trying to unify (or at least reduce the differences between) state prices and those observed in the farmers’ markets. In a press report, one unnamed official laid out the logic of the price reform: the administered price of rice would be raised to the farmers’ market price, but since no one could afford rice at the market price, everyone’s nominal wages would be increased commensurately. What this official did not seem to grasp was that the amount of won in circulation was instantly increased by a factor of 10 due to the wage increase, unless there was an immediate supply-response, then the government had effectively caused a 900 percent jump in the price level.

Again, political considerations increase the plausibility of this argument. By all reports, the economic policy changes being undertaken in North Korea are being devised by a small number of senior officials. Moreover, North Korea has a political system in which the political space of discussion and dissent is highly constricted, and the penalties for being on the wrong side of a political dispute can be quite severe. So while the logic of too many won chasing too few goods would seem elementary to those of us raised in market economies, under the circumstances that exist in North Korea, the possibility that economic decisions are being made by people who do not grasp the implications of their actions (or are afraid to voice their reservations and instead engage in preference falsification if they do) should not be dismissed too hastily.

Special Economic Zones

The third component of the North Korean economic policy change is the formation of special economic zones of various sorts. The first such zone was established in the Rajin-Sonbong region in the extreme northeast of the country in the mid-1980s. It has proved to be a failure for a variety of reasons including its geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, onerous rules, and interference in enterprise management by party officials. The one major investment has been the establishment of a combination hotel/casino/bank. Given the obvious scope for illicit activity associated with such a horizontally integrated endeavor, the result has been less Hong Kong than Macau North.

The 1998 agreement between North Korea and Hyundai that established the Mt. Kumgang tourist venture also provided for the establishment of an industrial park to be managed and operated by Hyundai. While the tourism project was obviously the centerpiece of the agreement, from the standpoint of revitalizing the North Korean economy, the establishment of the industrial park, which would permit South Korean small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to invest in the North with Hyundai’s implicit protection, was actually more important. In the long run, South Korean SMEs will be a natural source of investment and transfer of appropriate technology to the North. However, in the absence of physical or legal infrastructure, they are unlikely to invest. The Hyundai-sponsored park would in effect address both issues. (The chaebols, because of their size and political connections, would not be so reliant on formal rules—they could always go to the South Korean government if they encountered trouble in the North.) The subsequent signing of four economic cooperation agreements between the North and South on issues such as taxation and foreign exchange transactions could be regarded as providing the legal infrastructure for economic activity by the politically noninfluential SMEs.

The North Korean government and the South Korean firm then negotiated for 18 months over the location of the zone, with the North Koreans wanting it in Sinuiju, a city of some symbolic political importance in the northwest of the country on the Chinese border, and Hyundai wanting to locate the park in the Haeju district, more easily accessible to South Korea. In the end, it was agreed that the park would be located in Kaesong-a decision that was hailed at the time as reflecting an increased emphasis on economic rationality in North Korea.

The industrial park at Kaesong has not fulfilled its promise, however: Hyundai’s dissolution forced the South Korean parastatal KOLAND to take over the project, and the North Koreans inexplicably failed to open the necessary transportation links to South Korea on their side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Hence the September 2002 initiation of activity on the northern side of the DMZ could be an important step in the take-off of the Kaesong industrial park.

In September 2002 the North Korean government announced the establishment of a special administrative region (SAR) at Sinuiju. In certain respects the location of the new zone was not surprising: the North Koreans had been talking about doing something in the Sinuiju area since 1998. Yet in other respects the announcement was extraordinary. The North Koreans announced that the zone would exist completely outside North Korea’s usual legal structures; that it would have its own flag and issue its own passports; and that land could be leased for fifty years.

To top it off, the North Koreans announced that the SAR would be run by Yang Bin, a somewhat shady Chinese—born entrepreneur with Dutch citizenship who was under investigation for tax evasion in China, and had reportedly fled to North Korea-though he does not speak Korean—during two previous investigations. (Among his various business interests, Yang operates a Dutch-style village in Shenyang complete with a windmill and imitations of Amsterdam buildings. Kim Jong-il, who knows a thing or two about fantasylands, has visited it himself.) At the time of Yang’s appointment, trading in shares of his firm, Euro-Asia Agriculture Holdings, had been suspended on the Hong Kong stock exchange after crashing on the suspicion of fraud. When asked about Yang’s appointment, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson declined to endorse it. To paraphrase Senator Lloyd Bentsen’s memorable line from the 1988 US Vice Presidential debate, “Mr. Yang, you are no Tung Chee Hwa.” Indeed, Mr. Yang was subsequently arrested by Chinese authorities. Whether the zone will survive his arrest remains to be seen.

Assuming that these are mere growing pains, the question arises as to how important the Sinuiju SAR may prove to be. It should promote economic integration between North Korea and China, though one should keep in mind that China is a big place and that the most economically dynamic parts are in the southern coastal areas far from North Korea. But the North Korean economy is so far down that even integration with a comparative backwater like Dandong could be a boost.

More important is whether the SAR will generate any spillovers. In conventional terms this will depend on whether any lessons from the Sinuiju SAR experiment are generalized to the rest of the economy. (One ray of hope in recent events is the removal of the less than 50 percent foreign ownership ceiling in joint ventures.) More subtly the SAR might have a positive impact if internally it is regarded as giving Kim Jong-il’s unimpeachable imprimatur to the reform process. Bureaucrats and factory managers who have been reluctant to get ahead of the leadership may take this as a sign that change is safe. Conversely, by taking the SAR completely outside of the normal North Korean governing structures, Kim Jong-il can in effect end-run the party and the bureaucracy, and manage the zone directly out of his office.

Uncle Junichiro…

Meanwhile, as exciting as the establishment of the Sinuiju SAR might have been, its long-run significance is probably less than that of an event that had occurred the previous week—a meeting in Pyongyang between Kim Jong-il and Koizumi Junichiro, a manifestation of the fourth component of the economic plan, passing the hat.

At the first-ever meeting between the heads of government of Japan and North Korea, Kim stunned the world by baldly admitting that North Korean agents had kidnapped 12 Japanese citizens and that most of the abductees were dead. Each of the leaders then expressed regrets for their countries’ respective historical sins and agreed to pursue diplomatic normalization. It is expected that normalization will be accompanied by a large financial transfer from Japan to North Korea in the form of grants, subsidized loans, and trade credits. Japanese officials have not denied formulas reported in the press that would put the total value of a multiyear package at approximately $10 billion, despite the shaky state of Japanese public finances. Taking inflation, changes in the value of the yen, differences in population size, and other factors into account, this sum would be in the ballpark of the transfer that Japan made to South Korea in 1965 when the two countries normalized relations. Given the puny size of the North Korean economy, this is a gigantic sum. The critical issue for North Korea is whether these talks will proceed rapidly enough to generate aid inflows before the dislocations of marketization begin to bite. Given the Japanese public’s revulsion at the disclosure of the probable murders of some of the abductees, the process of normalization may be more protracted than either the North Korean or Japanese governments expected.

In connection with this process, there are rumors that the North Koreans intend to establish yet another special economic zone on the east coast, to be oriented toward Japan. Discounting the failed zone at Rajin-Sonbong, this would give the North Koreans three special economic enclaves, one oriented toward South Korea, one toward China, and one toward Japan, diversifying their portfolios so to speak. Again, given the centrality of politics to North Korean thinking, they may well envision playing the three off against each other. In the long run, however, it is integration with South Korea that will be critical to the development of the North Korean economy.

Uncle Sam

The Koizumi visit amounted to a kick in the pants to the Bush Administration. It brought to a head the disagreement between the hawks and the moderates in Washington. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly was sent to Pyongyang with greater alacrity than he otherwise would have had. With its two allies in Northeast Asia moving forward with engagement, the “Axis of Evil” characterization will become increasingly difficult to sustain, and the United States will find its options more constrained.

For example, North Korea’s membership on the list of state sponsors of terrorism prevents the United States from supporting the DPRK for membership in international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, or Asian Development Bank. The North Koreans have fulfilled most of the terms set out by the Clinton Administration to secure their removal from the list. A major sticking point has been third-party claims by Japan associated with the Japanese Red Army hijackers and the abductees. If the hijackers are returned to Japan and the North Korean and Japanese governments resolve the abductee issue as now seems likely in the near future, a major obstacle to North Korea getting off the list of state sponsors of terror will have been removed. While it is quite possible that the Bush Administration will insist on keeping them on the list and barring their entry into the international financial institutions, this position will be increasingly hard to sustain in the face of South Korean and Japanese objections.

At the same time, the transfer from Japan to North Korea is the single biggest financial claim that North Korea maintains on the international system and dwarfs anything it could hope to get from the multilateral development banks. Unlike the sorts of carrots that the United States might offer, it also contains an element of irreversibility, and no matter how well conditioned the loans, money is at least partly fungible, raising the understandable worry in Washington that the Japanese settlement could be used for military modernization. The apparent lack of consultation between the United States and Japan in the run-up to the meeting has added to Washington’s concerns.

Conclusions

In the end, to understand the meaning of what has occurred in the last several months, one has to make some kind of assessment of the motivations behind North Korea’s policy changes. One argument put forward by some North Korea-watchers is that Kim Jong-il has long understood that the North Korean system is irretrievably broken, but that it has taken a long time for him to consolidate power and implement these far-reaching changes. This is hard to believe. Kim Jong-il was reputedly running the country on a day-to-day basis for ten years before his father’s death eight years ago. This means he has in effect been running the country for 18 years and was the uncontested supreme leader for the last eight. In a political system as hierarchical as North Korea’s, it is difficult to accept that it has taken him this long to consolidate his position.

Indeed, the opposite interpretation would seem more plausible, namely, that Kim Jong-il has reluctantly concluded that the old methods are inadequate to revive the economy and out of political necessity is embracing marketization, inflation, and the former colonial master in a desperate bid to revitalize a moribund system. If this interpretation is correct, then we should expect hesitancy in the implementation of reforms, and a strong reliance on the international social safety net supplied by the rest of the world. In certain respects the plans put forward thus far appear to be ill-conceived, but a combination of marginal increases in economic activity and international aid inflows may put enough goods on the shelves to keep the population pacified, at least in the short run. Ten billion dollars can buy a lot of transistor radios.

However, the initiatives undertaken in the last several months are qualitatively different from the diplomatic initiatives that the North Koreans undertook over the last several years. Marketization and inflation alter economic, political, and social relations on the ground, and raise far higher stakes internally. While the upside potential may be great, failure could mean the end of the regime. The train has left the station, but where it is headed and if it will derail are open questions—even for the conductor.

Table 1: Price Increases
     
Rice   4,000%
Corn   3,700%
Pork   700%
     
Diesel fuel   3,700%
Electricity   5,900%
     
Apartment rent   2,400%
Subway ticket   900%

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Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Fiscal & monetary policy, Japan, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), USA | Comments Closed

Great summary of recent events: trade, economic reform

Monday, October 14th, 2002

From the Institute for International Economics:

West-Bound Train Leaving the Station: Pyongyang on the Reform Track

Marcus Noland
Institute for International Economics

Paper prepared for the Council on US-Korea Security Studies
Seoul, Korea
October 14-15, 2002

Marketization

The North Korean economic reforms that began in July 2002 have four components: marketization, inflation, special economic zones, and aid-seeking. Marketization, in turn, has several features.1 The government appears to be attempting to adopt a dual-price strategy similar to what the Chinese have implemented in the industrial sphere. In essence the Chinese instructed their state-owned enterprises to continue to fulfill the plan, but once planned production obligations were fulfilled, the enterprises were free to hire factors and produce products for sale on the open market. In other words, the plan was essentially frozen in time, and marginal growth occurred according to market dictates.

The government has announced a scrapping/downsizing/attenuation of the system of distributing goods and services through rationing (including the public distribution system (PDS) for food), meaning that at the household or retail level, the allocation of goods will increasingly occur through markets and on market terms. (Two exceptions are health care and education that will continue to be supplied gratis by the state.)

One can question the extent to which this is a real policy change and how much this is simply a ratification of system—fraying that had already occurred—there is considerable evidence that most food, for example, was already being distributed through markets, not the PDS. In this respect, the North Korean move could be interpreted as an admission that the genie is out of the bottle.

On the production side, enterprises have been instructed that they are responsible for covering their own costs—that is, no more state subsidies. Modest changes in the organization of production have been introduced in agriculture and there are rumors that more dramatic changes in the agricultural sector are on their way. Yet it is unclear to what extent managers outside of agriculture have been given the power to hire, fire, and promote workers, or to what extent remuneration will be determined by the market. Moreover there has been no mention of the military’s privileged position within the economy and domestic propaganda continues to speak of a “military-first” political path.

The state has administratively raised wage levels, with certain favored groups such as military personnel, party officials, scientists, and coal miners receiving supernormal increases. (For example, while it has been reported that military personnel and miners have received wage increases on the order of 1,500 percent, the increases for office workers and less essential employees are less, and the estimated income increase for agricultural workers may be on the order of 900 percent.) This alteration of real wages across occupational groups could be interpreted as an attempt to enhance the role of material incentives in labor allocation.

The state continues to maintain an administered price structure, though by fiat, the state prices are being brought in line with prices observed in the farmers’ markets. This is problematic (as it has proven in other transitional economies): the state has told the enterprises that they must cover costs, yet it continues to administer prices, and in the absence of any formal bankruptcy or other “exit” mechanism, there is no prescribed method for enterprises that cannot cover costs to cease operations, nor, in the absence of a social safety net, how workers from closed enterprises would survive. What is likely to occur is the maintenance of operations by these enterprises supported by implicit subsidies, either through national or local government budgets or through recourse to a reconstructed banking system. Indeed, the North Koreans have sent officials to China to study the Chinese banking system, which although may well have virtues, is also the primary mechanism through which money-losing state-owned firms are kept alive.

Inflation

The likelihood is increased by the second component of the economic policy change, the creation of enormous inflation. At the same time the government announced the marketization initiatives, it also announced tremendous administered increases in wages and prices (Table 1). To get a grasp on the magnitude of these price changes, consider this: when China raised the price of grains at the start of its reforms in November 1979, the increase was on the order of 25 percent. In comparison, North Korea has raised the prices of corn and rice by nearly 4,000 percent. In the absence of huge supply responses, the result will be an enormous jump in the price level and possibly even hyperinflation.

Moreover, when China began its reforms in 1979, more than 70 percent of the population was in the agricultural sector. (The same held true for Vietnam when it began reforming the following decade.) In contrast, North Korea has perhaps half that share employed in agriculture. This has two profound implications: first, the population share, which is directly benefiting from the increase in producer prices for agricultural goods, is roughly half as big as in China and Vietnam. This means that reform in North Korea is less likely to be what economists call Pareto-improving (in other words a change in which no one is made worse off) than the cases of China or Vietnam. Instead, reform in North Korea is more likely to create losers and with them the possibility of unrest. Second, the relatively smaller size of the agricultural sector suggests that the positive supply response will not be as great in the North Korean case as compared to China or Vietnam either. Again, this increases the likelihood of reform creating losers and unrest.

In the short run, the initial jump in the price level is usually accompanied by an increase in economic activity, as households and enterprises mistake increases in the overall price level for changes in relative prices. This is likely to be particularly acute in North Korea, where many households and enterprises can be expected to be relatively naïve about market economics, and where significant alterations in the structure of relative prices will be coincident with the rapid increase in the price level. So in the short run, there may be an increase in economic activity.

In the longer run however, once households and enterprises begin to distinguish more clearly between changes in relative and absolute prices, it will become apparent that some parts of the population have experienced real increases in income and wealth, while others have experienced real deteriorations. The North Koreans have not announced any mechanism for periodically adjusting prices, so in all likelihood, disequilibria, possibly severe, will develop over time. Access to foreign currency may act as insurance against inflation, and in fact, the black market value of the North Korean won has dropped approximately 50 percent since the reforms were announced.

Those with access to foreign exchange such as senior party officials will be relatively insulated from this phenomenon. Agricultural workers may benefit from “automatic” pay increases as the price of grain rises, but salaried workers without access to foreign exchange will fall behind. In other words, the process of marketization and inflation will contribute to the exacerbation of existing social differences in North Korea. Given how stressed a society North Korea has become, the implications for “losers” could be quite severe. It would not be at all surprising to observe a significant increase in mortality rates.

Make no mistake about it: North Korea has moved from the realm of elite, to the realm of mass politics. Unlike the diplomatic initiatives of the past several years, these developments will affect the entire population, not just a few elites. And while there is a consensus that marketization is a necessary component of economic revitalization, the inflationary part of the package would appear to be both unnecessary and destructive. (If one wanted to increase the relative wages of coal miners by 40 percent, one could simply give them a 40 percent raise–one does not need to increase the overall price level by a factor of 10, and the nominal wages of coal miners a factor of 14 to effect the same real wage increase.)

So why do it? There are at least three possible explanations. The first, as alluded to above, is the most benign: by creating inflation, the government hopes to provide a short-run kick-start to the economy, the long-run implications be damned. (From the standpoint of North Korean policymakers, Keynes’ aphorism, “in the long run we are all dead” may apply with a rather short time horizon.) Given the extremely low levels of capacity utilization in the North Korean economy, this argument has a certain surface plausibility. Yet the problems of the North Korean economy run far, far deeper than underutilized resources. In large part the economy is geared to produce goods (televisions and radios without tuners, to cite one example, or Scud missiles, to give another) for which there is only limited demand. Unless there is a significant reorientation in the composition of output, it is unlikely that inflation alone will generate a sizeable supply response. Even agriculture is problematic in this regard: North Korean agriculture is highly dependent on industrial inputs (chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals, for example) and agriculture could be disrupted if the farmers find themselves getting squeezed on the input side.

A second possibility is that the inflation policy is intentional, and is a product of Kim Jong-il’s reputed antipathy toward private economic activity beyond state control. One effect of inflation is to reduce the value of existing won holdings. (For example, if the price level increases by a factor of 10, the real value of existing won holdings is literally decimated.) Historically, state-administered inflations and their cousins, currency reforms, have been used by socialist governments to wipe out currency “overhangs” (excess monetary stock claims on goods in circulation), more specifically to target black marketers and others engaged in economic activity outside state strictures, who hold large stocks of the domestic currency. (In a currency reform, residents are literally required to turn in their existing holdings—subject to a ceiling, of course—for newly issued notes.) In July it was announced that the blue won (Korean People’s Won) foreign exchange certificates would be replaced by the normal brown won, though it is unclear if these are convertible into foreign currency. In the case of North Korea, the episode that is now unfolding will be the fourth such one in the country’s five-decade history.

The hypothesis has the strength of linking what appears to be a gratuitous economic policy to politics-Kim Jong-il not only rewards favored constituencies by providing them with real income increases and by going the inflation/currency reform route, but he also punishes his enemies. This line of reasoning is not purely speculative: it has been reported that one of the motivations behind unifying prices in the PDS and farmers’ markets has been to reduce the need of consumers to visit farmers’ markets, and to “assist in the prevention of “illegal sales activities” which took place when the price in the farmers’ market was much higher than the state price” (CanKor, 9 August 2002). A number of unconfirmed reports indicate that the government has placed a price ceiling on staple goods in the farmers’ markets as an anti-inflationary device. The increase in the procurement price for grain has reportedly been motivated, at least in part, to counter the supply response of the farmers, who were diverting acreage away from grain to tobacco, and using grain to produce liquor for sale.

The problem with this explanation is that having gone through this experience several times in the past, North Korean traders are not gullible: they quickly get out of won in favor of dollars, yen, and yuan. Indeed, even North Koreans working on cooperative farms reportedly prefer trinkets as a store of value to the local currency. As a consequence, this blow aimed at traders, may fall more squarely on the North Korean masses, especially those in regions and occupations in which opportunities to obtain foreign currencies are limited.

As an economist I am trained to assume rationality, and it is only with reluctance that I propose arguments that presume ignorance. But my personal experience in China suggests one more possible explanation for the North Korean policy. Demand and supply are not quantities or points—they are schedules indicating quantities as a function of prices. Market-determined prices are thus a signal of scarcity value reflecting underlying demand and supply. Conversations with Chinese officials in the early to mid-1980s, during the first stage of the marketizing reforms, however, revealed that fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of markets was widespread, especially among older officials who had spent many years in a planned economy.

The North Koreans have indicated that they are trying to unify (or at least reduce the differences between) state prices and those observed in the farmers’ markets. In a press report, one unnamed official laid out the logic of the price reform: the administered price of rice would be raised to the farmers’ market price, but since no one could afford rice at the market price, everyone’s nominal wages would be increased commensurately. What this official did not seem to grasp was that the amount of won in circulation was instantly increased by a factor of 10 due to the wage increase, unless there was an immediate supply-response, then the government had effectively caused a 900 percent jump in the price level.

Again, political considerations increase the plausibility of this argument. By all reports, the economic policy changes being undertaken in North Korea are being devised by a small number of senior officials. Moreover, North Korea has a political system in which the political space of discussion and dissent is highly constricted, and the penalties for being on the wrong side of a political dispute can be quite severe. So while the logic of too many won chasing too few goods would seem elementary to those of us raised in market economies, under the circumstances that exist in North Korea, the possibility that economic decisions are being made by people who do not grasp the implications of their actions (or are afraid to voice their reservations and instead engage in preference falsification if they do) should not be dismissed too hastily.

Special Economic Zones

The third component of the North Korean economic policy change is the formation of special economic zones of various sorts. The first such zone was established in the Rajin-Sonbong region in the extreme northeast of the country in the mid-1980s. It has proved to be a failure for a variety of reasons including its geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, onerous rules, and interference in enterprise management by party officials. The one major investment has been the establishment of a combination hotel/casino/bank. Given the obvious scope for illicit activity associated with such a horizontally integrated endeavor, the result has been less Hong Kong than Macau North.

The 1998 agreement between North Korea and Hyundai that established the Mt. Kumgang tourist venture also provided for the establishment of an industrial park to be managed and operated by Hyundai. While the tourism project was obviously the centerpiece of the agreement, from the standpoint of revitalizing the North Korean economy, the establishment of the industrial park, which would permit South Korean small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to invest in the North with Hyundai’s implicit protection, was actually more important. In the long run, South Korean SMEs will be a natural source of investment and transfer of appropriate technology to the North. However, in the absence of physical or legal infrastructure, they are unlikely to invest. The Hyundai-sponsored park would in effect address both issues. (The chaebols, because of their size and political connections, would not be so reliant on formal rules—they could always go to the South Korean government if they encountered trouble in the North.) The subsequent signing of four economic cooperation agreements between the North and South on issues such as taxation and foreign exchange transactions could be regarded as providing the legal infrastructure for economic activity by the politically noninfluential SMEs.

The North Korean government and the South Korean firm then negotiated for 18 months over the location of the zone, with the North Koreans wanting it in Sinuiju, a city of some symbolic political importance in the northwest of the country on the Chinese border, and Hyundai wanting to locate the park in the Haeju district, more easily accessible to South Korea. In the end, it was agreed that the park would be located in Kaesong-a decision that was hailed at the time as reflecting an increased emphasis on economic rationality in North Korea.

The industrial park at Kaesong has not fulfilled its promise, however: Hyundai’s dissolution forced the South Korean parastatal KOLAND to take over the project, and the North Koreans inexplicably failed to open the necessary transportation links to South Korea on their side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Hence the September 2002 initiation of activity on the northern side of the DMZ could be an important step in the take-off of the Kaesong industrial park.

In September 2002 the North Korean government announced the establishment of a special administrative region (SAR) at Sinuiju. In certain respects the location of the new zone was not surprising: the North Koreans had been talking about doing something in the Sinuiju area since 1998. Yet in other respects the announcement was extraordinary. The North Koreans announced that the zone would exist completely outside North Korea’s usual legal structures; that it would have its own flag and issue its own passports; and that land could be leased for fifty years.

To top it off, the North Koreans announced that the SAR would be run by Yang Bin, a somewhat shady Chinese—born entrepreneur with Dutch citizenship who was under investigation for tax evasion in China, and had reportedly fled to North Korea-though he does not speak Korean—during two previous investigations. (Among his various business interests, Yang operates a Dutch-style village in Shenyang complete with a windmill and imitations of Amsterdam buildings. Kim Jong-il, who knows a thing or two about fantasylands, has visited it himself.) At the time of Yang’s appointment, trading in shares of his firm, Euro-Asia Agriculture Holdings, had been suspended on the Hong Kong stock exchange after crashing on the suspicion of fraud. When asked about Yang’s appointment, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson declined to endorse it. To paraphrase Senator Lloyd Bentsen’s memorable line from the 1988 US Vice Presidential debate, “Mr. Yang, you are no Tung Chee Hwa.” Indeed, Mr. Yang was subsequently arrested by Chinese authorities. Whether the zone will survive his arrest remains to be seen.

Assuming that these are mere growing pains, the question arises as to how important the Sinuiju SAR may prove to be. It should promote economic integration between North Korea and China, though one should keep in mind that China is a big place and that the most economically dynamic parts are in the southern coastal areas far from North Korea. But the North Korean economy is so far down that even integration with a comparative backwater like Dandong could be a boost.

More important is whether the SAR will generate any spillovers. In conventional terms this will depend on whether any lessons from the Sinuiju SAR experiment are generalized to the rest of the economy. (One ray of hope in recent events is the removal of the less than 50 percent foreign ownership ceiling in joint ventures.) More subtly the SAR might have a positive impact if internally it is regarded as giving Kim Jong-il’s unimpeachable imprimatur to the reform process. Bureaucrats and factory managers who have been reluctant to get ahead of the leadership may take this as a sign that change is safe. Conversely, by taking the SAR completely outside of the normal North Korean governing structures, Kim Jong-il can in effect end-run the party and the bureaucracy, and manage the zone directly out of his office.

Uncle Junichiro…

Meanwhile, as exciting as the establishment of the Sinuiju SAR might have been, its long-run significance is probably less than that of an event that had occurred the previous week—a meeting in Pyongyang between Kim Jong-il and Koizumi Junichiro, a manifestation of the fourth component of the economic plan, passing the hat.

At the first-ever meeting between the heads of government of Japan and North Korea, Kim stunned the world by baldly admitting that North Korean agents had kidnapped 12 Japanese citizens and that most of the abductees were dead. Each of the leaders then expressed regrets for their countries’ respective historical sins and agreed to pursue diplomatic normalization. It is expected that normalization will be accompanied by a large financial transfer from Japan to North Korea in the form of grants, subsidized loans, and trade credits. Japanese officials have not denied formulas reported in the press that would put the total value of a multiyear package at approximately $10 billion, despite the shaky state of Japanese public finances. Taking inflation, changes in the value of the yen, differences in population size, and other factors into account, this sum would be in the ballpark of the transfer that Japan made to South Korea in 1965 when the two countries normalized relations. Given the puny size of the North Korean economy, this is a gigantic sum. The critical issue for North Korea is whether these talks will proceed rapidly enough to generate aid inflows before the dislocations of marketization begin to bite. Given the Japanese public’s revulsion at the disclosure of the probable murders of some of the abductees, the process of normalization may be more protracted than either the North Korean or Japanese governments expected.

In connection with this process, there are rumors that the North Koreans intend to establish yet another special economic zone on the east coast, to be oriented toward Japan. Discounting the failed zone at Rajin-Sonbong, this would give the North Koreans three special economic enclaves, one oriented toward South Korea, one toward China, and one toward Japan, diversifying their portfolios so to speak. Again, given the centrality of politics to North Korean thinking, they may well envision playing the three off against each other. In the long run, however, it is integration with South Korea that will be critical to the development of the North Korean economy.

…and Uncle Sam

The Koizumi visit amounted to a kick in the pants to the Bush Administration. It brought to a head the disagreement between the hawks and the moderates in Washington. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly was sent to Pyongyang with greater alacrity than he otherwise would have had. With its two allies in Northeast Asia moving forward with engagement, the “Axis of Evil” characterization will become increasingly difficult to sustain, and the United States will find its options more constrained.

For example, North Korea’s membership on the list of state sponsors of terrorism prevents the United States from supporting the DPRK for membership in international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, or Asian Development Bank. The North Koreans have fulfilled most of the terms set out by the Clinton Administration to secure their removal from the list. A major sticking point has been third-party claims by Japan associated with the Japanese Red Army hijackers and the abductees. If the hijackers are returned to Japan and the North Korean and Japanese governments resolve the abductee issue as now seems likely in the near future, a major obstacle to North Korea getting off the list of state sponsors of terror will have been removed. While it is quite possible that the Bush Administration will insist on keeping them on the list and barring their entry into the international financial institutions, this position will be increasingly hard to sustain in the face of South Korean and Japanese objections.

At the same time, the transfer from Japan to North Korea is the single biggest financial claim that North Korea maintains on the international system and dwarfs anything it could hope to get from the multilateral development banks. Unlike the sorts of carrots that the United States might offer, it also contains an element of irreversibility, and no matter how well conditioned the loans, money is at least partly fungible, raising the understandable worry in Washington that the Japanese settlement could be used for military modernization. The apparent lack of consultation between the United States and Japan in the run-up to the meeting has added to Washington’s concerns.

 

Conclusions

In the end, to understand the meaning of what has occurred in the last several months, one has to make some kind of assessment of the motivations behind North Korea’s policy changes. One argument put forward by some North Korea-watchers is that Kim Jong-il has long understood that the North Korean system is irretrievably broken, but that it has taken a long time for him to consolidate power and implement these far-reaching changes. This is hard to believe. Kim Jong-il was reputedly running the country on a day-to-day basis for ten years before his father’s death eight years ago. This means he has in effect been running the country for 18 years and was the uncontested supreme leader for the last eight. In a political system as hierarchical as North Korea’s, it is difficult to accept that it has taken him this long to consolidate his position.

Indeed, the opposite interpretation would seem more plausible, namely, that Kim Jong-il has reluctantly concluded that the old methods are inadequate to revive the economy and out of political necessity is embracing marketization, inflation, and the former colonial master in a desperate bid to revitalize a moribund system. If this interpretation is correct, then we should expect hesitancy in the implementation of reforms, and a strong reliance on the international social safety net supplied by the rest of the world. In certain respects the plans put forward thus far appear to be ill-conceived, but a combination of marginal increases in economic activity and international aid inflows may put enough goods on the shelves to keep the population pacified, at least in the short run. Ten billion dollars can buy a lot of transistor radios.

However, the initiatives undertaken in the last several months are qualitatively different from the diplomatic initiatives that the North Koreans undertook over the last several years. Marketization and inflation alter economic, political, and social relations on the ground, and raise far higher stakes internally. While the upside potential may be great, failure could mean the end of the regime. The train has left the station, but where it is headed and if it will derail are open questions—even for the conductor.

 

Table 1: Price Increases

Product   Reported Price Increase (percent)

Rice   4,000
Corn   3,700
Pork   700

Diesel fuel   3,700
Electricity   5,900

Apartment rent   2,400
Subway ticket   900

Sources: Press reports, private correspondence.

 

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Posted in Agriculture, Banking, Economic reform, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Japan, Labor conditions/wages, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Price liberalization, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, USA | Comments Closed

Light from the North?

Sunday, August 11th, 2002

Time
Donald MacIntyre
8/11/2002

Richard Savage kneels in the rich brown earth of a field on the outskirts of Pyongyang and reverentially spreads out the broad, green leaf of a young paulownia tree. The saplings have been in the ground for only a month but already they are a meter high; the first harvest could take place in just five years. Eyes shaded by his black cowboy hat, the Singaporean native gazes down the rows of juvenile trees, each worth thousands of dollars at maturity, with a satisfied grin. The experimental lumber crop has survived the harsh North Korean winter and is flourishing in the loamy soil. “The paulownia loves this,” he says. Glancing at another leafy plant, a new hybrid, he confides, “We’re going to let the Dear Leader name it.”

Hermit state, international pariah, charter member of the “axis of evil”?North Korea is hardly an obvious place for long-term investments like tree farms. The decrepit Stalinist economy depends on international handouts to prevent widespread starvation. The Dear Leader, strongman Kim Jong Il, runs the country like a medieval fief. But Savage is confident that his $23 million, 20,000 hectare Paulownia plantation south of Pyongyang will pay off. His Singapore-based company, Maxgro Holdings, is investing $5 million in North Korea this year, and he even has plans to build a resort there, complete with a 70-room hotel, horseback riding, trout fishing and all-terrain vehicles. “This is a mega-growth area,” he says. “If you don’t move now, you will have missed the boat.”

Whether Savage has boarded the Titanic remains to be seen, but there are increasing signs that North Korea at last may be opening its barbed-wire gates, economically and diplomatically. Last month, the authoritarian leadership increased food prices, set artificially low by the government, by as much as 50 fold, while increasing miners’ and scientists’ salaries by almost as much. Many observers say the reforms, including the elimination of some manufacturing subsidies, signal that Kim is edging toward a market economy instead of perpetuating a system in which North Koreans rely on virtually free handouts from the government.

Just as intriguing is the sudden burst of sunshine out of Pyongyang diplomats, the normally reclusive North Koreans are now clamoring to talk to Seoul, Tokyo and Washington all at once. Senior North Korean government officials are scheduled to travel to Seoul this week for ministerial-level talks, the first such tete-a-tete in nine months. Says Yim Sung Joon, a senior advisor to South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung: “This is a very important moment for the two Koreas.”

On the agenda: everything from reunions of separated families to rebuilding a railway across the heavily mined dmz dividing North and South. In a surprise move, Pyongyang has already agreed to send athletes to the Pusan Asian Games next month, the first time North Koreans will take part in an international sporting event in the South. Japanese officials head to Pyongyang next week for talks that will include the awkward issue of Japanese nationals allegedly abducted in the 1970s and ’80s, Japan wants them back before the two countries can normalize relations. Meanwhile, North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun met with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell for a 15-minute chat on the sidelines of the asean meeting in Brunei two weeks ago, the highest level encounter between the two sides since George W. Bush became President.

Is this the same country whose navy six weeks ago shelled South Korean patrol boats off the west coast of the peninsula, killing five sailors? It is, say observers, who speculate that the naval battle may have been an accidental clash rather than a deliberate provocation. The country’s recent reforms and overtures are, in fact, in keeping with an agenda dating back to the late 1980s, when the Soviet Union unraveled and left its client state, North Korea, without a dependable source of oil and food. The conventional wisdom has been that Kim is too scared of losing control to risk reform. But a devastating famine in the mid-’90s made it clear the country could not go it alone–that it must, to some degree, join the international economic community.

Frequent business visitors to Pyongyang say the North Koreans have been overhauling their investment laws and welcoming international trade delegations in the hope of attracting foreign capital. Government connections are still essential, but there are fewer layers of bureaucracy than in China, say experts on North Korean business practices. Once a joint venture is signed, getting things done is no tougher than in other developing countries. “I find it very refreshing to be here,” says Savage. “The guys are very straight.”

But North Korea’s agricultural output has fallen dramatically and its infrastructure is crumbling. Most of its factories have shut down and its electric power system is in shambles. The country has one of the worst credit ratings in the world and its currency, the won, is not convertible. Building the basic services that might make North Korea alluring to more foreign investors will take billions of dollars in loans from international lenders like the World Bank.

Lending cannot take place without assent from the U.S., and Washington won’t approve until North Korea allows inspections of all its nuclear weapons facilities. The country froze its nuclear program under a 1994 agreement with the U.S., in return receiving oil imports and a commitment–backed by South Korea and Japan–to build two light-water nuclear power plants in North Korea. Ground has been broken for construction of one in the port city of Kumho. But under the agreement, North Korea must allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to assess whether Pyongyang is living up to its promise to come clean on all of its nuclear programs, a process that could take several years. The U.S. and its partners want to begin soon. So far, Kim has refused to allow inspections to resume, and the standoff goes on. Says a Western diplomat: “The North Koreans are going to have to be viewed as extremely clean.”

Nevertheless, a few brave pioneers have set up shop in North Korea in anticipation of better times. Swiss data-processing company Datactivity.com has run a joint-venture data-entry center in Pyongyang since 1997. Some South Korean companies have launched joint ventures in areas like animation and computer software. And Chinese traders do a booming business back and forth across the China-North Korea border. Robert Suter, who heads the Seoul office of Swiss power generation company ABB Ltd., says his firm is staking out a position in North Korea, “It is the same as it was in China years ago. You had to be there and you had to build trust.”

The question on many minds is whether Kim Jong Il, who has a history of trading friendly relations and empty promises for monetary assistance, is merely giving the world another head fake. His market reforms, according to skeptics, are designed not to liberalize the economy but to control the informal black markets that burgeoned during the famine, when the government could not feed everybody.

If North Korea is indeed serious about reform, it will begin by rebuilding its decimated manufacturing sector. The country needs to export goods if it is to earn hard currency to pay for the food and fertilizer it cannot produce itself. Cutting off subsidies to deadbeat factories is just a first step, and there is no evidence the government has a blueprint for moving further. “They aren’t scrapping the socialist system,” says Koh Hyun Wook, an expert on North Korea at Kyungnam University near Pusan. “These are makeshift moves to overcome the current economic crisis.”

Savage, the tree farmer, believes otherwise. He will be in North Korea with his Israeli irrigation engineers this week, setting up greenhouses and touching base with his North Korean partners. But he acknowledges his venture will require patience. The country “may be a bit backward,” he concedes, “but so what? If you are prepared to help, it will take off like a bloody bullet.” Or a paulownia tree.

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Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Banking, Black markets, Computing/IT, Datactivity.com, Economic reform, Energy, Finance, Forestry, Labor conditions/wages, Maxgro holdings, Nuclear, Sports, Switzerland | Comments Closed

N Korean loggers flee Russian ‘slave’ camps

Sunday, March 13th, 1994

The Independent
Terry McCarthy Helen Womack
3/13/1994

SEVERAL hundred North Koreans have escaped from gulag- style logging camps in Siberia. The mass break-out turns a spotlight on the shadowy camps where, Russian journalists say, North Koreans are kept as ‘virtual slaves’ to cut timber in a shameful deal that is profitable to Moscow and Pyongyang.

As many as 150 of the loggers are trying to defect to South Korea, according to government
 sources in Seoul. North Korea angrily denies the reports, describing them as ‘rumour, unfounded propaganda and sheer fabrication’. But one of the escapees, contacted this week in the Russian Far East city of Vladivostok, said economic hardship at home and bad living conditions in the camps were driving many of the loggers to think seriously of defecting.

Park Dong Bok, who comes from the northern part of North Korea, close to the Chinese border, had been working for two years in one of the Siberian timber camps close to the city of Khabarovsk. Although on Russian territory, the 16 camps are run entirely by North Koreans, watched over by Pyongyang’s notorious security police who confiscate passports so workers cannot travel, even within Russia. Russian officials are not allowed inside the camps, despite reports of serious abuses, but they tolerate this because the North Koreans are an exceedingly cheap labour force. A portion of the timber is given to Russia and the rest goes to North Korea.

Mr Park is 36, and like all the lumberjacks in Siberia – estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000 – he has a wife and family back in North Korea. The loggers’ families act as virtual hostages to discourage defection attempts.

Though the workers initially volunteer to come to Russia, conditions are reminiscent of Stalin’s forced labour camps of the 1950s. Life is unpleasant, particularly in the winter when there is no heating – though food rations were better than at home, said Mr Park: the loggers received rice every day, meat twice a month – usually pork imported from China – and grew their own vegetables. In North Korea most people receive meat only on a few feast days, and rice is often replaced with low-quality cornmeal.

But discipline in the camps was harsh, he said. There were frequent beatings by camp guards, and two types of prison: a log house for minor infractions and solitary confinement cells for ‘ideological crimes’, such as criticising the government of Kim Il Sung. The loggers dreaded these prisons: sleep was impossible, rations were reduced, beatings were commonplace and not all prisoners got out alive. The work day began at 5am, and continued until 8pm in the summer, 5pm in the shorter winter days. Rest days were rare. Each logger received one new set of clothes per year, and most worked for three years before returning home. They earned an average of dollars 25 a month (paid in North Korean won), and those able to cut 50 per cent more than their target could earn a maximum of dollars 40 a month.

To supplement their income, some of the loggers secretly distilled alcohol in the forest and sold it to Russians who came to the perimeter fences at night. Russian prostitutes also arrived at night.

Mr Park was driven to defect by news from home. Because his father had retired, his family’s food ration had been reduced, and to supplement their diet his mother started dealing on the black market. She was discovered, and the family was deported to a poor mountain area as punishment. His wife divorced him and took her two children with her.

With nothing to hold him back, Mr Park decided to escape and seek asylum in South Korea. Other North Koreans he worked with escaped because of hardship at home, and the news about the outside world that they received from illicit contacts with Russians. Since South Korea opened a consulate in Vladivostok last year, the North Koreans have made this city their first destination: it is several hundred miles from the logging camps, compared with the 5,000-mile journey to the next South Korean diplomatic post in Moscow.

Mr Park, who speaks a little Russian, is hiding in Vladivostok until his asylum request is processed. He is afraid North Korean agents will track him down. The South Korean government is still debating whether to accept the asylum requests. Normally Seoul receives only a handful every year, from North Korean diplomats in Africa or Asia.

Officials are concerned that, if all the loggers are accepted, many more may flee the camps, upsetting relations with Moscow and the tentative peace talks with Pyongyang.

Russian journalists first brought the plight of the North Koreans to light in 1991. The existence of the camps, which first started operating in the 1950s, has been kept secret, and few Russians know about them.

North Korea’s official news agency betrayed the government’s embarrassment, saying reports of defecting loggers were ‘a malicious abuse and slander’ and ‘an unpardonable insult to the Korean working class, who are masters of the country’.

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Posted in Forestry, Labor conditions/wages, Lumber, Russia | Comments Closed

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