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China reportedly incentivized Kim Jong-un to visit

Friday, March 30th, 2018

UPDATE 1 (2018-4-4): The Donga Ilbo reports that China is marginally easing up on sanctions following the unofficial meeting that took place with the two country’s respective leaders. According to the article:

Some Chinese enterprises in Dandong, a city in northeastern Liaoning province bordering North Korea, stopped sending back North Korean workers to their home country, South Korea’s intelligence sources said on Monday.

…
It is reported that the Chinese authorities, however, have not taken any action regarding employing North Korean workers. Rather, a source quoted Chinese government officials as saying “refrain from any action that could upset North Korean people for the time being.”

South Korean government said it is identifying intelligence that the average daily traffic volume between Dandong and North Korea surged to 50 trucks, from 20 to 30 trucks earlier this year. The traffic in this region is one of the key indicators that show bilateral trade flows. More than 100 trucks a day would come and go before the international community strengthened sanctions against the North.

According to data released by China’s customs agency, North Korean exports to China amounted to 1.72 billion dollars, a 33 percent down from 2016. However, Beijing is likely to give some breathing space to its ally as Chinese President Xi expressed his willingness to expand mutual exchanges in a meeting with Kim.

ORIGINAL POST (2018-3-30): I am still of the opinion that “maximum pressure” has not been the primary cause of North Korea’s newfound desire to hold talks with the US and South Korea. However, this article in the FT argues that China has enforced trade restrictions on North Korea in excess of the UNSC resolution requirements, and perhaps this policy played a role in bringing Kim Jong-un to Beijing.

According to the Financial Times:

Official Chinese statistics show that the monthly average of refined petroleum exports to North Korea in January and February was 175.2 tons, just 1.3 per cent of the monthly average of 13,552.6 tons shipped in the first half of 2017.

The level of reduction went far beyond the 89 per cent cut in petroleum product exports stipulated by the UN sanctions.

Chinese coal exports to North Korea were also cut to zero in the three months to the end of February, after running at a monthly average of 8,627 tons in the first half of 2017. Exports of steel ran at a monthly average of 257 tons in the first two months of this year, down from a monthly average of 15,110 tons in the first half of 2017.

Shipments of motor vehicles also dried up, with just one unit being exported in the month of February, official Chinese statistics show. Concerns over the accuracy of China’s statistics are common, but analysts said that such consistent and bold drops in export volumes are unlikely to have been the result of official massaging.

Bonnie Glaser points out a rumor that these stringent trade caps will be lifted to the point that China is still in compliance with UNSC resolutions.

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Posted in China, International trade, Statistics, Trade Statistics, UN Security Council | Comments Closed

N. Korea’s high-tech goods imports rise sharply in recent years despite sanctions

Thursday, March 29th, 2018

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s imports of smartphones, notebook computers and other high-tech products have risen sharply in recent years despite international sanctions following the country’s nuclear and missile tests, a report said Thursday.

High-tech goods accounted for 12.1 percent of the North’s total imports of manufactured products in 2016 from 6 percent in 2007, according to a report written by Kim Yang-hee, an official of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. The report is carried in the March 2018 edition of the Korea Development Institute’s North Korea Economic Review.

The report was written based on statistics released by the North Korean government.

The high-tech goods include smartphones, PCs, automobiles, and aviation and space technology products.

The proportion of telecommunication and electronics goods also rose to 10.2 percent in 2016 from 3.9 percent in 2007.

The report noted North Korea failed to ship coal to China since October last year when the United Nations sanctions on North Korea toughened.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s high-tech goods imports rise sharply in recent years despite sanctions: report
Yonhap
2018-3-29

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Posted in International trade, Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Singapore revokes work permits for North Koreans

Tuesday, March 27th, 2018

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

In a report to the UN Security Council on its implementation of resolution 2397, Singapore says it has revoked all work permits for North Korean citizens in the country. Straits Times:

The resolution mandated that member states repatriate all North Korean workers in their jurisdictions no later than December 2019, or two years from the adoption of the resolution.

In its implementation report dated March 19, the Singapore government said: “Singapore has revoked the work passes of all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea earning income in Singapore and will not grant new work passes to nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

“There are therefore no nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with work passes in Singapore.”

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.

To raise awareness of the resolution, relevant authorities in Singapore have “proactively engaged business owners and relevant entities to remind them of existing and new restrictions” imposed on North Korea, according to the report.

Financial institutions in Singapore have also been alerted to the risk of North Korea “using nominees, front companies and Singaporean companies” to circumvent the UN Security Council’s resolutions, said the report.

In November last year, Singapore suspended all commercial trade with North Korea, a provision also mentioned in the implementation report last week.

“Singapore has imposed a prohibition on the import, export, re-export, transit and trans-shipment of all goods for the purposes of trade with any person in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” said the report.

Article source:
Singapore revokes all North Korean work permits
Straits Times
2018-03-27

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Weekend reading recommendation: North Korea’s Shackled Economy, 2018

Friday, March 23rd, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) has published a report by William Brown, and I urge all those with an interest in the North Korean economy to read it. It is a pragmatic take on the North Korean economy in 2018, noting both the progress and the limits of the changes in its economic system over the past few years. Brown is pessimistic (or perhaps just realistic) about North Korean economic resilience in the face of sanctions, but also notes the great potential for economic development that exists in North Korea’s human capital and skilled labor. Brown’s analysis of the country’s currency situation, one of the most opaque topics in already opaque field, is particularly interesting. Below is an excerpt from the executive summary:

The North Korean economy remains weak and vulnerable, but its structure is changing as it confronts major internally- and externally-generated pressures. Ironically, as UN sanctions have tightened in recent years, the economy has become more decentralized and productive, as weakening state controls have allowed the spread of market activities, providing incentives for individuals and families to work in their own self-interest. Central planning is weakening as money replaces the once ubiquitous ration coupon, and self-reliance on both a national and localized level is increasing as foreign trade and foreign aid dwindle. However, the state-run economy has not withered away, and Pyongyang dictates perhaps half of all economic transactions, a far larger share than does the central government in any other country. The state and its enterprises and the huge farmers’ collectives still own most capital and property, and through their extensive regulations and police powers extract large rents from individuals and families.

The full report can be found here.

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Posted in China, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Political economy, South Korea | Comments Closed

“Maximum pressure” and the North Korean economy: what do market prices say?

Friday, March 9th, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

With the news today about a summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump tentatively planned for the end of May, there has been much debate about the role of the US policy of “maximum pressure” through economic sanctions.

The efficacy of the policy is difficult to evaluate, particularly since it often takes many months or even years for the full effect of sanctions to play out. Whether the policy has been effective or not depends on, well, how you judge success or failure. There is little doubt that North Korea’s exports have taken a significant hit not primarily from the sanctions themselves, but from China’s enforcement of them. This is the single biggest difference between how sanctions have hit the North Korean economy during the past year, versus previous years. It seems fairly indisputable that sectors of the economy have suffered, with export industries taking the biggest hit.

But what has been the impact on the economy as a whole? It’s difficult to say, but we have two important indicators: prices of rice and foreign currency on North Korean markets. The data on these two indicators is far from perfect, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw firm conclusions from it. (For an explanation of this data, and the rationale for using rice prices in lieu of the formal goods basket used to measure inflation in other countries, see this article, for example). Nevertheless, neither of the two indicators suggest a situation out of the ordinary on North Korean markets during the period that “maximum pressure” has been applied.

First, a look at rice prices. If sanctions were truly devastating the North Korean economy, there is a whole host of reasons why one should expect rice prices to increase.

One of them is expectations of worse times to come as importing inputs for agriculture as well as food becomes increasingly difficult. Another is that if importing food products in general* becomes more difficult, perhaps because Chinese traders anticipate that their North Korean counterparts won’t be able to pay, consumers would be expected to switch more of their consumption to domestically sourced goods, increasing demand and thus prices. In general, anxiety about worsening times often leads to inflation.

This does not seem to have happened. In fact, rice prices have been remarkably stable over the past year (if the graph looks strange, click for full image):

There may well be other forces at work, too. Increased smuggling of cheaper Chinese rice, for example, may well have contributed to the price stability. But this is in itself a sign of the resiliency of the North Korean economy; when some supply decreases, there are ways of compensating through other means.

Exchange rates are another important metric. If the inflow of foreign currency (in this case US dollars) decreases, its price – the exchange rate – should go up. Expectations matter here, too: if the market expects that foreign currency supply will dry up in the future, it tends to act in the present and make purchases today to hedge for tomorrow. As with rice prices, exchange rates have been remarkably stable over the past year (again, click for better image):

In sum, we have little or no hard evidence that the North Korean economy, on the whole, has suffered significantly and harshly from sanctions thus far. That may itself not be an argument against sanctions, since again, it may take much longer than just a year for their full impact to play out. But it does call into question the claims that “maximum pressure” is the chief reason for Kim Jong-un’s outreach to Donald Trump.

*This likely holds true regardless of the level of self-sufficiency in North Korea’s agricultural production.

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North Korean markets insulated from sanctions, but not forever

Wednesday, March 7th, 2018

Posted by Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Analysis at Daily NK:

In 2017 alone, the United Nations Security Council passed four major sanctions resolutions against North Korea: Resolutions 2356, 2371, 2375, and 2397. Under the measures, the North’s crude oil imports were restricted, and coal and mineral exports were banned. Additionally, the North was prohibited from sending its laborers to work abroad – one of the key ways in which the regime earns foreign currency.
“One cannot say that, on a macro level, sanctions against North Korea have been ineffective,” said Lee Seok Ki, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET). “Since around August or September of 2017, the North’s exports have dropped significantly, and we have seen a major impact from sanctions on their industrial output. The country’s anthracite (coal) exports are down 66% compared to the previous year, which is a devastating hit to their mining sector, and the trend is expected to continue.”
Lee added that while most indicators point to declining imports, it remains difficult to conclude that sanctions have had the same effect on the North Korean manufacturing sector. Despite this, Lee noted that “sanctions are having an effect on the trade sector and we will continue to see both quantitative and qualitative effects in the long term.”
Other experts support the opinion that sanctions are working against the North’s overall trade. “North Korea’s exports to China are down 37%, which has led to a further 1.8% drop in growth for the North’s economy over the last year,” said Kim Byung Yeon, a professor at the Department of Economics at Seoul National University.
“If the North is unable to get sanctions lifted, the growth rate for their economy could drop to as low as minus 5% in the next year,” Kim added, explaining that the effects on economic growth will be significant due to the structure of the North’s economy and the relatively high proportion that exports contribute to it.
Kim said that citizens working in the trade sector have been most affected by sanctions, though he points to the government as taking the most damage. “Most trade has been conducted by state-owned and party- or military-run companies, meaning that the elite class and government officials take a big hit from sanctions,” Kim said. “Kim Jong Un relies heavily on trade as a source of income (for his regime), which means that the person most impacted by sanctions is none other than Kim Jong Un.”
But while sanctions appear to be having a significant effect on the North’s trade and industry, experts are noting that the local markets in the country have not been affected as heavily.
“When you look at the price of rice or the exchange rate over time, it’s hard to see any major effect of sanctions (on local markets),” KIET researcher Lee said.
Daily NK’s own research has come to the same conclusion, finding that the price of rice in North Korea’s markets has remained steady at around 4,000 to 5,000 KPW per kg since the beginning of the recent surge in international sanctions.
“People have been relying on themselves, actively participating in the markets and smuggling since the end of the Arduous March (great famine of the 1990s), which means that sanctions do not yet seem to be having an effect on the markets,” said a source in North Hamgyong Province, pointing to the steady availability of consumer goods as evidence.
“Kim Jong Un has instituted improvements in the quality of domestic-made goods, leading to these products in many cases pushing out Chinese versions from the markets,” said Lee Geun Young, Professor at the Yanbian University Department of Political and Public Administration. “There are now fewer items being brought in from China, so these products are having less influence on market prices.”
However, experts also believe that the damage inflicted by sanctions will inevitably reach the markets. “It’s not easy to precisely predict when the effect of sanctions will reach the markets,” Professor Kim said. “But one thing is clear: because many items rely on some form of importation, the long-term effects of a continuing decline in trade will inevitably lead to a reduction in the volume of available goods and a decrease in consumer purchasing power.”
Article source:
North Korean markets insulated from sanctions, though not forever
Jang Seul Gi
Daily NK
2018-03-07
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Posted in Agriculture, China, Economic reform, International trade, Political economy, South Korea | Comments Closed

International sanctions to reported to hit DPRK economy harder

Wednesday, February 28th, 2018

According to Yonhap:

A series of international sanctions will likely plunge the North Korean economy into a deeper slump this year and sharply worsen the living conditions of its citizens, a report said Wednesday.

The United States, the United Nations and other nations imposed tough economic sanctions on the reclusive country in retaliation for its nuclear and missile tests last year.

Lee Suk, a senior researcher at the state-run Korea Development Institute (KDI) and one of the report’s authors, said the international sanctions clearly dented North Korea’s trade last year, stalling or contracting its industrial activity and agricultural output.

“The impact of the sanctions doesn’t appear to have spilled over into the market yet, but there is a possibility that North Korea may suffer further setbacks in production, trade and consumption, sharply aggravating the welfare of economic actors.”

Kim Young-hoon of the Korea Rural Economic Institute estimated North Korea’s grain output for 2017 at 4.71 million tons, down 2 percent from the previous year.

“Pyongyang’s farm production didn’t increase last year, despite a series of agricultural reform measures since 2012,” Kim said. “It is difficult to paint a positive picture of North Korea’s food supply and demand this year.”

Lee Jong-kyu, a KDI researcher, said North Korea’s coal exports to China, its chief ally and economic benefactor, tumbled 78.5 percent on-year in 2017, with their dollar value sinking 66 percent.

The plunge contributed nearly 80 percent to the decrease in the value of North Korean trade with China last year, Lee said, predicting tougher international sanctions will give Pyongyang less leeway in its policy options this year.

Lee Suk-ki, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade, estimated that North Korea’s mining, agricultural and construction sectors stalled or contracted in 2017, compared with the previous year.

The sectors’ slack or weaker activity probably resulted from a severe drought, a decline in trade stemming from international economic sanctions and a correction following the previous year’s push to ramp up production, the economist said.

This article is derived from the  February 2018 issue of the monthly KDI Review of the North Korean Economy. See page 45 of this PDF (in Korean).

Read the full Yonhap story here
Int’l sanctions to hit N.K economy harder: report
Yonhap
2018-2-28

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US prepares maritime interdiction to stop North Korean sanctions evasion

Friday, February 23rd, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

As the Winter Olympics with all its inter-Korean contacts wind down, the US is preparing to place Coast Guard forces to stop and search vessels in Asia-Pacific waters, to prevent North Korean sanctions circumvention. Reuters:

Washington has been talking to regional partners, including Japan, South Korea, Australia and Singapore, about coordinating a stepped-up crackdown that would go further than ever before in an attempt to squeeze Pyongyang’s use of seagoing trade to feed its nuclear missile program, several officials told Reuters.

While suspect ships have been intercepted before, the emerging strategy would expand the scope of such operations but stop short of imposing a naval blockade on North Korea. Pyongyang has warned it would consider a blockade an act of war.

The strategy calls for closer tracking and possible seizure of ships suspected of carrying banned weapons components and other prohibited cargo to or from North Korea, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Depending on the scale of the campaign, the United States could consider beefing up the naval and air power of its Pacific Command, they said.

The U.S.-led initiative, which has not been previously reported, shows Washington’s increasing urgency to force North Korea into negotiations over the abandonment of its weapons programs, the officials said.

North Korea may be only a few months away from completing development of a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, despite existing international sanctions that, at times, have been sidestepped by smuggling and ship-to-ship transfers at sea of banned goods, according to officials.

“There is no doubt we all have to do more, short of direct military action, to show (North Korean leader) Kim Jong Un we mean business,” said a senior administration official.

The White House declined official comment.

The effort could target vessels on the high seas or in the territorial waters of countries that choose to cooperate. It was unclear, however, to what extent the campaign might extend beyond Asia.

Washington on Friday slapped sanctions on dozens more companies and vessels linked to North Korean shipping trade and urged the United Nations to blacklist a list of entities, a move it said was aimed at shutting down North Korea’s illicit maritime smuggling activities to obtain oil and sell coal.

Tighter sanctions plus a more assertive approach at sea could dial up tensions at a time when fragile diplomacy between North and South Korea has gained momentum. It would also stretch U.S. military resources needed elsewhere, possibly incur massive new costs and fuel misgivings among some countries in the region.

The initiative, which is being developed, would be fraught with challenges that could risk triggering North Korean retaliation and dividing the international community.

China and Russia, which have blocked U.S. efforts at the United Nations to win approval for use of force in North Korea interdiction operations, are likely to oppose new actions if they see the United States as overstepping. A Chinese official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said such steps should only be taken under United Nations auspices.

China’s Foreign Ministry, in a statement to Reuters, said they did not know anything about the plan, but that in principle China believes U.N. resolutions on North Korea should be fully and thoroughly implemented.

“At the same time, we hope relevant countries act in accordance with Security Council resolutions and international law,” it added, without elaborating.

Full article:
Exclusive: U.S. prepares high-seas crackdown on North Korea sanctions evaders – source
Phil Stewart, David Brunnstrom
Reuters
2018-02-23

I won’t go into the strategic and political implications, but when it comes to sanctions circumvention, a plan like this, thoroughly executed, would likely raise the costs of North Korean sanctions circumvention. Even with what sanctioned trade still goes on, there’s likely a substantial premium charged by traders that deal with North Korea because of the risks involved. As those risks go up, so should the premium. No measures can make circumvention fully impossible, but it can get a whole lot more expensive.

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Are DPRK hard-currency reserves expected to dry up by October?

Wednesday, February 21st, 2018

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s hard currency reserves are expected to dry up around October if international sanctions on the communist nation hold, the chairman of the parliamentary intelligence committee said Wednesday.

Rep. Kang Seok-ho of the main opposition Liberty Korea Party said during a party meeting that the North’s recent peace overtures toward the South, including its invitation to President Moon Jae-in to visit Pyongyang, are aimed at overcoming such economic hardship.

“I received an analysis that, if international sanctions against the North continue like this, all of North Korea’s foreign currency earnings and overseas assets will be frozen, and its dollar (reserves) will dry up around October,” the lawmaker said.

Kang didn’t say where the analysis came from, including whether it’s from the National Intelligence Service.

He said it is an assessment he drew after discussions with intelligence authorities, concluding that as a result of international sanctions North Korea held out an olive branch, including its invitation to Moon to visit the North for what would be a third inter-Korean summit.

“At a time like this, our government should further strengthen cooperation with the international community on sanctions against the North,” Kang said.

He also said the government should send a special envoy to the North and work actively to help resume talks between the U.S. and the North.

A similar prediction was made in the Joong-Ang Ilbo a couple of weeks ago:

In 2017, the North’s exports to China — the only remaining market it officially trades with — plunged by 37 percent on-year. This year, they could plummet more than 90 percent if China fully complies with the sanctions.

…

Despite a sharp fall in exports, imports remained unchanged, suggesting a thinning of foreign exchange reserves.

…

Pyongyang is estimated to have about $3 billion in foreign exchange reserves. The unregistered sum could be higher when including foreign currency hoarded away by the elite. The coffers will fall further this year. By the second half, North Korea could be short on foreign exchange.

The Joong-Ang Ilbo article offers additional data and is well worth reading.

$3 billion seems low to me, but I can’t prove it. The black market value of the won has not moved much (since 2012!), and I have to suspect that the currency traders in the DPRK have a better idea of the country’s foreign exchange reserves than I do.

I suppose we will see in the later half of this year? It is interesting to think about think about the implications of North Korea running out of foreign exchange…

Read more here:
N. Korea’s hard currency reserves expected to dry up by October: lawmaker
Yonhap
2018-2-21

The effect of sanctions
Joong-Ang Ilbo
Kim Byung-yeon
2018-1-22

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Posted in Fiscal & monetary policy, International trade | Comments Closed

UNICEF warns of child malnutrition in North Korea following sanctions

Tuesday, January 30th, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Few or no policies come without unintended consequences. For aid institutions such as UNICEF, sanctions have led to goods being more difficult to bring to North Korea, since both banks and transportation companies are reluctant to have anything to do with the country:

Under United Nations Security Council resolutions, humanitarian supplies or operations are exempt from sanctions, Omar Abdi, UNICEF deputy executive director, said.

“But what happens is that of course the banks, the companies that provide goods or ship goods are very careful. They don’t want to take any risk of later on being associated (with) breaking the sanctions,” Abdi told a news briefing.

“That is what makes it more difficult for us to bring things. So it takes a little bit longer, especially in getting money into the country. But also in shipping goods to DPRK. There are not many shipping lines that operate in that area,” he said, referring to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Sanctions on fuel have been tightened, making it more scarce and expensive, Abdi added.

Reuters, citing three Western European intelligence sources, reported exclusively last week that North Korea shipped coal to Russia last year which was then delivered to South Korea and Japan in a likely violation of U.N. sanctions.

“We are projecting that at some point during the year 60,000 children will become severely malnourished. This is the malnutrition that potentially can lead to death. It’s protein and calorie malnutrition,” said Manuel Fontaine, director of UNICEF emergency programs worldwide.

“So the trend is worrying, it’s not getting any better.”

In all, 200,000 North Korean children suffer from acute malnutrition, including 60,000 with the most severe form that can be lethal, according to UNICEF.

UNICEF had projected 60,000 children would suffer severe acute malnutrition last year, and reached 39,000 of them with therapeutic feeding, spokesman Christophe Boulierac said.

“Diarrhoea related to poor sanitation and hygiene and acute malnutrition remains a leading cause of death among young children,” it said in Tuesday’s appeal to donors that gave no toll.

UNICEF is seeking $16.5 million this year to provide nutrition, health and water to North Koreans but faces “operational challenges” due to the tense political context and “unintended consequences” of sanctions, it said.

It cited “disruptions to banking channels, delays in clearing relief items at entry ports, difficulty securing suppliers and a 160 percent increase in fuel prices”.

“It’s a very close, and tightly monitored intervention which is purely humanitarian in its essence,” Fontaine said.

Full article:
60,000 North Korean children may starve, sanctions slow aid: UNICEF
Stephanie Nebehay
Reuters
2018-01-30

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Posted in International Aid, International trade | Comments Closed

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