Archive for the ‘Finance’ Category

Companies in Kaesong Industrial Complex receive unannounced tax notices

Thursday, October 25th, 2012

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
2012-10-25

Recently, eight companies in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) informed that they received tax collection notices, a unilateral decision made by the North Koreans.

The Ministry of Unification and KIC reported that out of the 123 companies, 8 companies were informed by the North Korean authorities to pay about 160,000 USD in total in taxes.

Two companies out of the eight notified companies already paid close to 20,000 USD to the North Korean tax authorities.

On top of taxation, 21 companies were notified to submit additional tax documents. This may be to collect additional information for future tax collection purposes.

The tax authorities are also requiring companies to submit documents related to show proof of purchase of raw materials, and submit cost analysis documents and a copy of bank statements showing the history transactions.

Last August, the Central Special Direct General Bureau (CSDGB) notified the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee of new tax bylaws, which enforces a fine up to 200 times the amount of accounting manipulation and abolish the retroactive taxation system while increasing the number of documents for submission. Furthermore, the North is threatening to restrict access to the KIC, if companies fail to pay owed taxes or do not submit requested documents.

In addition to imposing fines for tax frauds, new tax bylaws demanded by the CSDGB included enforcement of additional taxes in the name of corporate income tax, sales tax, and other taxes.

The unilateral decision by the CSDGB to amend bylaws is a violation of Kaesong Industrial District Law, which requires any revision of the laws must be negotiated between the North and the South. Another problematic issue is that tax imposed on the companies is based on North Korea’s own estimation rather than tax reports submitted by the companies of the KIC.

For the first time last year, tenant companies in the KIC recorded an average operating profit of 56 million KRW, finally operating in the black after years in deficit.

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Pyongyang targets Kaesong Zone for more revenues

Thursday, October 18th, 2012

UPDATE 2 (2012-10-18): Yonhap and the Korean Times pass along details of the tax increases in the Kaesong Zone:

North Korea has unilaterally imposed hefty taxes on South Korean firms operating in the joint Gaeseong inter-Korean industrial complex in the North while employees there are demanding the firms provide more severance pay, a Seoul government official said Thursday.

“The North imposed the taxes including corporate income and business taxes on some of the companies operating in the Gaeseong complex in accordance with a new tax enforcement regulation (enacted) and delivered by the North last August,” the official said.

The imposed taxes were unilaterally drawn based on the North’s estimation of business activities by the South Korean firms, according to the official. About 10-20 firms out of the total 123 South Korean firms operating in the complex located in the North Korean border city of Gaeseong were reportedly slapped with the heavy taxes.

The amount of taxes imposed and whether the firms paid them are not clearly known, but some of the companies are said to have paid the taxes amid increasing pressure from the North.

The North unilaterally issued the new tax regulations in August, which also allow the country to levy heavy fines if a South Korean firm is found to have accounting irregularities. The regulations allow fines as heavy as 200 times the amount involved in potential accounting fraud by South Korean firms.

As part of efforts to extract taxes, the North is reportedly threatening a ban on the movement of goods and people in and out of the complex if the taxes are not paid, other sources said.

South Korean firms there are protesting the levies, saying “they may thwart normal corporate activities,” but the North may not budge on the decision, they said.

In addition, North Korean employees at the Gaeseong complex are demanding that South Korean firms provide severance pay even if employees voluntarily quit.

Under the current labor terms in Kaesong, South Korean firms are required to offer severance pay only when North Korean employees are involuntarily laid off after at least one full year of employment.

As of end-August, a total of 52,881 North Korean workers were employed by South Korean firms operating in the Gaeseong complex. About 500 to 1,000 employees leave South Korean employers every year, citing health reasons or marriage.

Meanwhile, the South Korean firms continued to register an annual net loss from their operations in the Kaesong complex, the Unification Ministry handling inter-Korean issues said. The combined net loss of 119 firms out of the total 123 stood at 14 million won ($12,681) in 2011, decreasing from net losses of 134 million won and 272 million recorded in 2010 and 2009, respectively, according to the ministry.

Nearly 37 percent of the 119 firms surveyed by the ministry said they feel the North’s interference with their corporate activities is severe, the ministry said. Inability in hiring or firing North Korean workers is the most frequently cited complaint among the 119 firms polled, followed by difficulties in Internet connection and a shortage of North Korean labor.

Read previous posts on this topic below.

(more…)

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Promotion of Foreign Investments into Hwanggumpyong and Other Special Economic Zones

Friday, September 14th, 2012

Institute for Far Eastern Studies

North Korea is exerting efforts in pulling Chinese investments into its special economic zones (SEZs).

On September 7, the 8th Jilin, China-Northeast Asia Investment and Trade Expo was held in Changchun, China as well as the 6th high-level forum for Northeast Asian economic and trade joint venture to promote the joint investment projects of Rason and Hwanggumpyong special economic zones.

At the event, North Korean officials focused on explaining the advantages and favorable conditions for foreign investors, including the joint management committee to be operated by both countries and laws and regulations installed for investment protection.

In the past, North Korea mainly focused on Rason SEZ but this time around, the spotlight was turned to Hwanggumpyong. Chinese officials went on to explain the details of 14.4 square-kilometer Hwanggumpyong SEZ, where five major industries – textiles, modern agriculture, electronics and communications, culture and industrial and trade services – with industry, culture, and service serving as the three major functions of Hwanggumpyong.

Furthermore, the tariff, tax and other benefits will be provided to various industries. The processing trade industry will be exempt from tariffs, and those companies operating for more than ten years will be granted tax exemptions, while those companies contributing to the infrastructure construction, tourism and hotels will be given priority and other favorable conditions. Last year, North Korea only centered its attention to Rason SEZ, with no mentioning of Hwanggumpyong.

Out of the thirty companies that participated at the North Korean exhibit, were from Rason SEZ. These companies represent the successful cases of Rason, recognized for abundant seafood, processed foods, and textile production.

One company from Rason stated, “repair and expansion project for the road connecting Hunchun with Rason will be completed by the end of this year, which will stabilize power supply that can attract more foreign investment from China.” According to a North Korean businessperson, there are 216 companies currently operating in Rason and over 80 percent are joint venture through foreign capital.

Since January 2010, the city of Rason received the designation as the metropolitan city and has improved the business conditions. Foreign companies inviting their business partners from home to Rason became easier, where visas were processed efficiently, as quickly as a day.

There are plans of more briefing sessions for North Korean SEZs to be held in Beijing, later this month. It is planned to be held from September 26 to 27 with over 30 state managed companies and over 100 representatives participating to explain 50 new investment projects.

The invitation of this event reiterated, the purpose of this briefing session was to attract Chinese investment for North Korean companies, for the contribution of economic development and improvement of people’s lives in North Korea.”

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Chongjin’s “Mansudae-style” apartments

Thursday, August 23rd, 2012

Pictured above (Google Earth): Pohang District, Chongjin (in red)

UPDATE 1 (2012-8-23): The Daily NK, which has been the only organization to cover the housing construction in Chongjin (see original post below), reports on the classic problem of political allocation of resources (in this case housing) in socialist economies. According to the article:

A source from Chongjin told Daily NK yesterday, “This rumor started going around that the apartments they are building would first go to decorated soldiers, veterans and discharged military officers, and then the rest would be distributed to ordinary people. As soon as that happened, a group of 40 or more people, many of whom had already seen their former homes demolished and thought they had priority on the housing list, got really angry.”

“The crowd went repeatedly to both the local administrative office and the district people’s committee to demand that a list of those assigned homes be made public,” he added.

During the protests, the source said, “Those who found they were not on the list warned that they would not stand idly by if their new homes were stolen from them. They didn’t back down from the guys from the Ministry of People’s Safety either, not for more than 30 minutes.”

The head of the local administrative office vacated his post due to the trouble and hasn’t been seen since, something that has made the aggrieved individuals even angrier. Upper level cadres are also refusing to meet them, and lower level figures are trying to wash their hands of the whole affair, saying that the list of those assigned apartments can no longer be changed. No longer thinking that the problem can be solved at the district level, the group has sent a letter to the provincial authorities outlining their grievances.

“Their point is that the authorities said that only a small number of the apartments would go to those people (decorated soldiers, veterans and discharged military officers), while most of them were supposed to go to ordinary families,” the source explained.

The source also explained the backdrop, saying that thousands of homes in the Namgang and Pohang areas of the Pohang district of the city have been destroyed since last June, and that the displaced residents from those homes have all been living with relatives and friends while waiting for the chance to move into what they thought were to be their new dwellings.

The problem is not over yet, either. According to the source, “It also looks like some facilities like shops and restaurants that were not on the original plans for an area around the amusement park are also being built, which will reduce the volume of housing available. Who can say how people from that area who’ve lost their homes will object if they lose out.”

This article is interesting to me because it answers a couple of questions I have had for some time: “What happens to families displaced by urban construction projects?” [Answer: for the most part, they go live with family members until replacement housing is allocated] and “How is new housing allocated if not through de-facto sales?” [Answer: Ideally through an objective and enforceable list based on “need”. However, this process is often corrupted. See here, here and here].

ORIGINAL POST (2012-8-14): According to the Daily NK:

It has been confirmed that affluent local wholesale traders have been co-opted to support the construction of apartment buildings in Chongjin, North Hamkyung Province.

A Chongjin source told Daily NK yesterday, “The construction of high-rise apartment buildings in the Pohang district of the city is being done by enterprises and ‘shock troops’, but there are also local go-betweens at the forefront connecting affluent traders from the region with the construction teams so that the latter can get materials as needed.”

The source went on, “It seems that most of the province’s rich people have gathered here. You can tell that there are people with genuine power involved in the construction by how fast the buildings are going up now.”

Since last May, Chongjin has been working to follow in the footsteps of the Mansudae area of Pyongyang by constructing apartments for 10,000 households, including 2,000 in the Pohang district. The project is said to be part of North Hamkyung Province Party Secretary Oh Soo Yong’s determined effort to show loyalty to the regime of Kim Jong Eun. However, the Party and state lacks the power to follow through on the plans.

The situation is not rare. Rich people and brokers acting as go-betweens are actively involved in all types of construction projects in North Korea today. This was even the case when Pyongyang planned the building of 100,000 apartments in time for the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung earlier this year. Indeed, all North Koreans know that “without the go-betweens this country’s economy would seize up.”

Usually, the North Korean authorities get factory enterprises and units of ‘shock troops’ to do the state’s construction and set in place plans to secure the necessary cement, steel and other materials, but this part very rarely goes according to plan.

For one thing, factories need to be bribed if the construction sites want to get their materials delivered on time, so the middlemen have a close relationship with the factories. Meanwhile, the rich people who finance the construction later receive a share of the finished apartments in return.

Currently in Chongjin, a home on the 3rd or 4th floor of such an apartment costs about $5,000. A rich man investing $7,000 dollars in the construction of a building can expect to make about $3,000 in profit. Other floors cost $3,000-$4,000 at current rates. However, in Pyongyang prices are much higher, with apartments on the 3rd or 4th floor trading for as much as $10,000 dollars.

The source said, “There are nicely dressed men striding around the construction site checking on progress, and these are the rich folk.”

The publicly available satellite imagery of Chongjin is too old to show recent construction, and since I have no budget, staff, or connections to people who have the ability to get new satellite imagery, I cannot show you any recent pictures.

Despite the lack of physical evidence, however, I have good reason to believe that new residential construction is underway in Chongjin.  This is because I do have publicly-available imagery of other DPRK cities and towns which are being “upgraded” with new apartment blocks. Recently I wrote about construction in Rason. I will post imagery of additional towns and cities if I get the time.

Read the Daily NK story here:
Rich Traders Invest in Chongjin Construction
Daily NK
Choi Song Min
2012-08-10

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DPRK affected by rising rice prices, currency depreciation

Friday, August 10th, 2012

Pictured above (Daily NK): The 2012 Won / US$1 exchange rate up to 2012-7-13.

According to data provided by the Daily NK, the won/dollar exchange rate fell (the won appreciated relative to the dollar) nearly 28.4% from 5,100W/US$1 in December 2011 (a high following Kim Jong-il’s death) to approximately 3,650W/US$1 in February 2012. Since February, however, the won has showed a steady depreciation and the exchange rate has risen 48%  to 5,400W/US$1 as of July 13.

So as I sit here eating breakfast I am wondering what caused these swings in the exchange rate?

Firstly, what was behind the dramatic fall in the exchange rate (and food prices) in January and Febraury? A simple answer may be a decrease in uncertainty and risk.  Following Kim Jong-il’s death, the DPRK did not repeat the mistakes made after the passing of Kim Il-sung.  For the most part markets remained open and “regular” activities of the state were highlighted in the domestic media and reported to contacts overseas. It is also possible that Chinese intervention, particularly in the form of food assistance and trade facilitation, could have played a role.

Secondly, does this mean that the increase in the exchange rate and food prices is a result of growing uncertainty? I am not convinced. It is beyond the scope of a blog post to tease this kind of information out, but here are some other things to think about: Economic uncertainty (pending policy changes, inflationary public finance), balance of trade (fall in net exports/rise in net imports, aid), capital flows (investment, aid, remittances), weather (drought/floods), “lean times” leading up to the fall harvest.

Some of these things matter more than others but it is important to keep in mind that the North Korean won is worth about as much today as it was when Kim Jong-il died. Since the won/US$ exchange rate is highly correlated with the price of rice (a fact that can be visually confirmed on the Daily NK web page) this means that food prices are also pretty high at the moment.

UPDATE 1 (2012-8-16): The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) has also posted a few words on this topic:

Rice Prices and Exchange Rate on the Rise
2012-8-16

Since Kim Jong Un’s ascent to power, the rice prices and exchange rates are on the rise. Despite Kim Jong Un’s proclaimed priority in elevating the quality of life for the North Korean people, uncertainty are prevalent in the country as Kim Jong Un has yet to meet the expectations of the people for economic revitalization or reform.

Compared to last year, the prices of rice last September that ranged 2,400 to 2,500 KPW per 1 kg, has jumped to 4,500 KPW in December right after the death of Kim Jong Il and exchange rates that averaged 2,800 to 3,000 KPW against one USD soared to 5,000 KPW. Although the prices have stabilized since then, the prices are climbing once again, as the price of rice in February at 3,100 KPW has gone up to 3,600 KPW/kg and exchange rate of 3,700 KPW per dollar jumped to 4,800 KPW in June.

In some places, the price of rice is reported to be above the 5,000 KPW range. According to Daily NK, an internet news outlet, the prices of rice in major cities like Pyongyang, Haesan, and Sinuiju has steadily increased for the last four months.

The price of rice in Pyongyang was 2,600 KPW/kg in April but it has slowly climbed to 3,000 KPW in June 5 to 4,900 KPW in end of June and is 5,300 KPW as of July 13. In Sinuiju and Haesan, the rice prices in April were around 2,600 to 2,700 KPW but soared to 4,300 to 5,000 KPW in July 13.

Exchange rates are also unstable as exchange rate to one US dollar that averaged 3,700 KPW in March soared to 4,200 KPW in April 25, 4,400 KPW in July 14 to 5,400 KPW by July 13.

Seasonal factors are also adding to the price fluctuations. May to August is normally a difficult time for North Korea with frequent famine. Combined with extreme drought conditions in June, accelerating inflation, and people’s rising apprehension about the economy, some rice wholesalers are not withholding the sales of rice.

The rising rice prices and exchange rate is expected to continue for the time being. Flood damages and other natural disasters and the trauma from the failure of last currency revaluation in November 2009 are factors adding to the price escalation.

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Civil Cooperative Bank deposit and saving information

Monday, August 6th, 2012

Previously, I posted information on the Jaeil Credit Bank in the DPRK. Today, with the help of a much-appreciated reader, I offer some hard-currency deposit and saving information from the Pyongyang Civil Cooperative Bank (민사협조은행). The interest rates and time-to-maturity intervals are identical to the Jaeil Credit Bank, however, the marketing material for the Civil Cooperative Bank does a better job of explaining the how interest payments are calculated.

Pictured above is a marketing flyer for the bank taken in Pyongyang. Below is a translation of the flyer:

외화저금안내
Currency savings guide

보통저금 [Usual saving] 1%
정기저금(6개월) [Regular Saving (6 month)] 2.5%
정기저금(1년) [Regular Saving (1 year)] 6%
정기저금(2년) [Regular Saving (2 year)] 7%
정기저금(3년) [Regular Saving (3 year)] 7.5%
정기저금(5년) [Regular Saving (5 year)] 8%
정기저금(10년) [Regular Saving (10 year)] 9%

Civil Cooperative bank provides to its customers the best credit and financial services. It is our general policy to treat your account information as confidential and it will not be shared with the third parties.

Now a regular savings saver can withdraw their interest prior to maturity and the entire principal amount can also be withdrawn before the due date (maturity).

How to Calculate Savings interest
1. Interest of usual savings and regular savings will be calculated until the day before and if withdraw prior to maturity regular savings will also be considered as usual savings.

2. One year is 360 days and one month is calculated as 30 days.

3. If the maturity date of the regular savings passes the entire amount including the interests will be extended under the same condition.

4. If the bank changes the interest rate, the original interest rate will be applied until the date of the change and the new rate will be applied for the principal and extended.

Interest calculation and payment (if withdraw prior to maturity)
1. In case of 6 months savings 0.5% , in case of 2 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, after that 1%, in case of a 3 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, till 2 years 1% and in case of 5 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, till 2 years 1%, till 3 years 1.3% and the rest 1.5%, if 10 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, till 2 years 1%, 3 years 1.3% , 5 years 1.7% and the rest 2% of interest will be calculated and paid.

2. If customers, who already have withdraw the interest prior to maturity from the regular savings, want to withdraw the entire principal of part of it, interest will be calculated as described above with out the withdrawn interest from the principal.

Business hours: Mon-Fri 9.30 am – 5 pm

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Insurance in the DPRK

Thursday, July 12th, 2012

Jakub Rehor and Geoffrey See of Choson Exchange post interesting information on insurance in the DPRK:

According to the Choson Exchange:

In the planned, state-controlled economy of North Korea, familiar concepts (including insurance) acquire a very different meaning. In a market economy, insurance coverage indemnifies individuals or corporations for losses suffered due to natural disasters, accidents, sickness, or death. In North Korea, what is called “insurance” functions as a fundraiser for certain entities in the government.

There are two kinds of insurance products in North Korea, individual and enterprise insurance. Both are compulsory and are administered by KNIC (Korea National Insurance Corporation). Compulsory individual insurance is deducted automatically from salaries, and is used to fund the state-run healthcare system. Individuals cannot file claims under this insurance; all payments go into the healthcare system to cover its costs and to other state-directed uses. This individual insurance program was originally administered by Korea Central Bank, but parts of it were moved to KNIC where it formed a new department.

Individuals do not have the option of buying property or life insurance in DPRK. Only state-owned enterprises can use property insurance. Compulsory enterprise insurance covers property losses from all major perils (there is exclusion for war). There are no separate policies or riders for windstorm, earthquake, flooding, etc. Instead, policies specify coverage by type of property (animal insurance, machinery insurance, etc.)

Pricing is set without regard to individual risks and loss history. Rather, insurance operates on a pooled basis, with the goal of roughly matching premiums with claims and administration costs. There are no reserves and the state absorbs any losses or profits. As a result, KNIC has no incentive to care about profitability or correct pricing (and, presumably, service) for local insurance operations priced in North Korean won.

There is no independent regulatory authority in DPRK overseeing KNIC’s activities. In theory, the Central Bank and Finance Ministry should be involved, but in reality they don’t have the expertise or political backing. The only oversight of KNIC comes from the party which provides mainly political supervision.

Given the pooled nature of the compulsory policies and lack of risk-based pricing, KNIC acts mainly as an administrator, collecting premiums and disbursing payments. In this position it functions as a revenue generator for the government via two channels:

1. It fails to pay market replacement value of losses. Claims are settled at official government prices which do not reflect market reality.

2. It has been alleged that KNIC has been involved in reinsurance fraud. Media reports claim that European reinsurers write policies for KNIC which then submits false claims, or retains a portion of the claim settlement payments rather than passing it on to the insured.

The existing insurance arrangements in DPRK are clearly inadequate for the needs of foreign joint ventures operating in the Special Economic Zones. If North Korea hopes to attract foreign investment, it needs to modernize its insurance system to bring it into line with expectations of outside investors.

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Remittances to the DPRK

Wednesday, July 11th, 2012

Reuters offers a tale of how remittances from defectors in the South are making life easier for their family members who remain in the DPRK (a topic discussed here before). According to Reuters:

Next morning, she wired 15,000 yuan ($2,400) to the broker’s account at a bank in China, near the border. His wife confirmed receipt of the funds, informed her husband, and the defector’s brother got money in North Korea, a state where the average income is estimated at just $1,200 a year.

Brokers typically charge up to 30 percent fees for such transactions, but by and large, they work well.

“I heard it only took 15 minutes for my brother to get the money (after funds were wired),” said the defector, who is officially listed as dead in North Korea. “Two days later, my brother called me back saying ‘Thank you. We will spend your money wisely’.”

Some 70 percent send money home to the country they fled, says the Organization for One Korea, a South Korean support and research institute on North Korean defectors. Annual flows are estimated at $10 million a year as defectors try to help out families in a country where many are malnourished and lack access to basic healthcare.

Incoming funds from South Korea have become so significant that they have been dubbed the “Mount Halla Stream”, named after the tallest mountain in South Korea, said Kang Cheol-hwan, the author of “The Aquariums of Pyongyang,” a survivor’s account of North Korean gulags.

This has helped offset a decline in funds from ethnic Koreans living in Japan that dominated in the mid-1980s and was known as the “Mount Fuji Stream”.

“In the past, pro-Pyongyang people in Japan and some Korean Americans sent money but they grew old and strong sanctions from Japan also took a toll. So the generation providing remittances has changed and it is now the defectors in South Korea who are doing it,” said Kang.

I have also interviewed a few former North Koreans about remittances. They all report it is common and brokers charge about 30%.

Read the full story here:
Insight: A secret plea for money from a mountain in North Korea
Reuters
2012-7-11

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DPRK loggers in Russia: Economic data

Monday, June 25th, 2012

According to the Asahi Shimbun:

More than 100 North Korean defectors are now in Russia, with about 30 in Moscow, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Each day, the former logger felled larch and other trees and transported them to stations from 8 a.m. to around 10 p.m. at the No. 13 office in Tygda in the Amur Oblast.

About 700 North Koreans worked as loggers at the office, with three to four dying in accidents every year.

Loggers made about $500 (40,000 yen) a month on average and $2,000 to $3,000 in a season, according to accounts of other former workers. But more than 70 percent of their pay was siphoned off by the government.

The man remembers he received a maximum of $160 a month in certificates, but supervisors said half of the payment had been sent to his family in North Korea. He was never told how much he made.

North Korean workers dispatched around the world send home several hundreds of millions of dollars a year. The workers, along with mineral resources, are a key source of hard foreign currency for the country, which suffered a trade deficit of $630 million last year.

North Korea’s Forestry Ministry operated its Russian representative office on the outskirts of Khabarovsk, with branches in Tygda and Chegdomyn in the Khabarovsk district, its two largest logging bases.

During the peak, up to 20,000 North Koreans worked as loggers in Russia, with half of them based in Tygda and Chegdomyn, according to sources.

The defector said he volunteered to go to Russia in September 1995 “to make a living.” At that time, rations were suspended in a food crisis, and people were starving to death in rural areas.

At the No. 13 office in Tygda, eight loggers formed a group. Two workers were each responsible for cutting, selecting, transporting and loading trees onto cargo trains. With equipment in short supply, the monthly quota of 3,000 cubic meters was seldom met.

North Korea focused on logging in Russia’s Far Eastern region after it concluded a contract with the former Soviet Union in 1967. Under the agreement, North Korea would take about 35 percent of the trees felled.

North Korean workers are dispatched abroad only for three years. But the man managed to extend his stay, paying bribes to representatives at the No. 13 office, including those from the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea and the State Security Department, or the secret police.

The man won the trust of senior officials and started working outside the logging base on a part-time basis in around 2000. He would earn 2,000 rubles (4,800 yen, or $60) if he worked at a road construction site for one week.

North Korea has closed many logging bases in Russia. Tygda and Chegdomyn have only several hundred workers between them, according to sources.

But there are still 15,000 to 20,000 North Korean workers in Russia, according to South Korean human rights groups and other sources.

A little less than 5,000 work in Vladivostok, and plans are under way to have several thousand North Koreans engage in farming or construction in the Amur Oblast.

North Korea has also sent workers to other parts of the world. About 19,000 entered China on a work visa between January and March, a 40-percent increase from the same period the previous year.

Kim Tae San, a former employee of North Korea’s Light Industry Ministry, was responsible for running a joint venture shoe sewing factory in the Czech Republic for three years from 2000.

The 60-year-old said workers could save only less than 10 percent of what they made because the remainder was confiscated by the government.

Female workers at the plant each made $150 a month, but $75 to $80 was unconditionally remitted to North Korea. In addition, the factory collected $40 for lodging expenses, $1 for subscriptions for airlifted Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea’s ruling party, and $2 for flowers. On a memorial day, a basket of flowers was presented before the Kim Il Sung statue in Pyongyang on behalf of all workers overseas.

Read previous posts on loggers in Russia here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

The full story story is well worth reading here:
FAR EAST FOCUS: Pyongyang exploits N. Korean loggers in Russia
Asahi Shimbun
Yoshihiro Makino
2012-6-25

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ROK investigates firms doing business with DPRK

Thursday, June 7th, 2012

According to the Hankyoreh:

Prosecutors carried out a large-scale investigation of companies involved in inter-Korean trade over the past year. They were seeking evidence of violations of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act (IKEC Act) in their remittances to North Korea. Around 200 such companies were found to have been fined.

The fined companies argue that their penalties are attributable to differing interpretations and application of the law by the Lee Myung-bak administration. The same actions were not deemed problematic under the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (1998-2008). Those governments took a softer line on North Korea; things changed significantly when the conservative Lee Myung-bak government took office in 2008.

The Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, under chairman Jeong Yang-geun, estimated that as many as 200 companies involved in inter-Korean trade had been fined as of late May. A biggest change was the Lee government’s May 24 measures, put in place after the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan warship. The measures suspended almost all transactions with North Korea.

Companies that were already on the brink of bankruptcy were stuck with fines ranging from one million to eight million won. Companies with high transaction volumes were fined the legal limit of 10 million won (about US$8500).

They were accused of violating Article 13, Item 1 of the Exchange and Cooperation Act, citing Article 4 of a Jan. 2008 Unification Ministry notice stating that anyone sending a third-party remittance to North Korea through a Chinese bank account must receive separate permission from the Unification Minister.

The president of Company “H,” identified by the initial “K,” has been called and visited several times since late last year by police public security officers and detectives from in and around Seoul and elsewhere investigating items brought in from North Korea. In April, he was summoned to a police station in South Gyeongsang province.

K had been involved in transactions since before the Kim and Roh administrations. He said there were no problems because the items in question were subject to blanket approval by the Unification Minister and had already passed through normal procedures.

The president of Company T, identified as Lim, was investigated on the same charge between January and April of this year. He confessed being cowed by the demand to travel from Seoul to a police station in Incheon and report to the security division there. He said he wasted time and suffered hardship submitting three rounds of documentation at the police’s request. Five companies had already been investigated by that same police station, Lim said.

“The police asked for an authoritative interpretation, and the officials at the Unification Ministry couldn’t make a proper judgment about whether there had been a violation. It was as though they had no idea such a rule existed,” he added.

The president of Company C, who goes by the initial “G,” paid a visit to Korea Exchange Bank in late 2007 to send a remittance to pay for sand, and was told that a third-party remittance was not possible. G went to the Bank of Korea. There, he was told they wouldn’t be able to do a remittance either. So he put one of the employees there in touch with the Unification Ministry. After that, he was able to notify the Bank of Korea and send remittances within their limit without a problem.

Some time around March of 2011, police launched an investigation and began calling him in. He asked them just what kind of permission he was supposed to receive. There was no information in the Jan. 2008 ministry notice about the procedure or documents for remittances. He also asked what kind of law for exchange and cooperation the IKEC Act was. G was fined according to another law after lawfully sending the remittance according to the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act.

Experts and attorneys countered that the transactions in question were already approved according to Article 13, Item 4 of the IKEC Act, which empowers the Unification Minister to issue blanket approvals to “items involved in transactions with North Korea, forms of transactions, and methods of payment.” And since North Korea does not have an international financial system, nearly all the companies’ remittances took the form of third-party transactions through Chinese banks.

Experts and attorneys said the fines could only be interpreted as prosecutors taking issue with the very notion of money being sent to North Korea. The businesspeople in question had also agreed with the ministry to follow a normal procedure of reporting third-party remittances to the Bank of Korea in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act, they said.

An attorney for Corporation “T” said, “Not only is there ample room for debate about judicial authorities punishing activities deemed lawful by Article 13, Item 4 of the IKEC Act on the basis of the Unification Minister’s notice, but it also shows a disregard for what the ministry has recognized over the past years.”

Indeed, a trade company sent a question to the ministry asking whether any of the 500 firms it knew to be involved in inter-Korean economic cooperation had requested approval from the minister for third-party remittances to North Korea. None, the ministry replied.

The ministry was also found not to have taken any follow-up measures on documentation or procedures in its presiding offices after specifying in its notice that the minister’s approval was required for third-party remittances.

University of North Korean Studies professor Yang Mu-jin, a onetime secretary to the Unification Minister, said, “After the May 24 measures, now they’re killing these businessmen twice.”

But a senior ministry official said there was no problem with application of the law in the prosecutors’ investigation, although it was done without prior discussion with the ministry.

Another senior official said the notice was issued “in the interest of ensuring transparency in remittances to North Korea.”

Those on the receiving end of the fines said the measures were tantamount to using the Exchange and Cooperation Act to kill off the companies involved in exchange and cooperation.

“They’re about to keel over anyway because of the state inter-Korean relations are in,” one said. “What good is the law once all the companies are gone?”

Unification Ministry figures show a steady increase in the amount of North Korean items brought in through inter-Korean trade (including consignment processing), rising from US$258 million win 2004 to a peak of US$645 million in 2007. The level stayed above US$600 million as recently as 2008, the first year of the Lee administration.

But as relations with North Korean headed downhill, the numbers plummeted below US$500 million starting in 2009, finally bottoming out at US$4 million in 2011 after relations were severed with the May 24 measures.

Read the full story here:
When it comes to trading with North Korea, it’s no longer business as usual
HK
Kang Tae-ho
2012-6-7

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