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DPRK citizens sue for inheritance in ROK (Part 2)

Monday, August 1st, 2011

Another North Korean is suing for an inheritance claim in South Korean courts. According to the Joong Ang Ilbo:

A North Korean man is seeking to inherit part of the assets left behind by his father who died in the South, government and court officials here said yesterday, just weeks after a similar case ended in assets being split among family members across the two Koreas.

The man in his 50s is currently preparing to file a lawsuit with the help of an agent in China and a lawyer in South Korea, the officials said on condition of anonymity. The man’s late father reportedly left behind an inheritance worth millions of dollars.

The alleged case comes on the heels of a similar inheritance dispute that ended earlier this month after a Seoul court mediated the split of assets worth 10 billion won ($9.35 million) between South and North Korean family members of a North Korean man who died here in 1987. It was the first time North Koreans were awarded assets left by a relative in the South.

The lawyer in charge of the new case visited South Korean ministries last month to discuss the possibility of transferring assets out of the country, according to a government official.

The large amount of assets involved in the recent inheritance lawsuits has raised suspicions of the North Korean regime’s involvement, the official added.

“Judging from the recent cases, it seems like the North Koreans are filing lawsuits with detailed knowledge of their parents’ inheritance. Wouldn’t that be difficult without the [North Korean] government’s help?” the official said.

An earlier report indicated that a new South Korean law is supposed to go into effect in January 2012 which prevents inheritance claims from being sent to the DPRK without the permission of the Seoul government. This would mean that if this case can be resolved quickly (slim chance) the funds might find their way back to the DPRK.

After January 2012, should North Koreans continue to file these cases, we can expect that Pyongyang would put them on the table in any kind of inter-Korean negotiations. This could potentially make a few North Koreans opposed to reconciliation between the two governments since it would imply the South Koreans would release the funds to the North Korean government rather than holding them in escrow for the individuals themselves.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean man sues to get father’s inheritance
Joong Ang Ilbo
2011-8-1

Posted in Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, South Korea | 1 Comment »

Garland fights extradition to US

Monday, July 18th, 2011

It has been a couple of years since we heard from Sean Garland, but the Irish Times reports that the alleged purveyor of alleged North Korean “supernotes” is fighting his exztradition to the US at Ireland’s high court. According to the story:

A veteran republican handed over almost $250,000 in Russian hotels in an international plot to spread the notes across Europe, a court heard.

Authorities in the US have accused Sean Garland of being the ringleader of a massive forgery racket that distributed the top grade counterfeit $100 bills.

The former IRA leader is fighting his extradition to the US at the High Court in Dublin, which heard Garland met a co-conspirator twice in Moscow with the fake cash.

Garland, 77, also the ex-president of the Workers’ Party of Ireland, denies the allegations.

In an affidavit to the court, Brenda Johnson, assistant US attorney, said: “This case involved a long-standing and large-scale supernotes distribution network (the Garland organisation) based in the Republic of Ireland and headed by Sean Garland, a senior officer in the Irish Workers’ Party.”

The US Secret Service (USSS) discovered the ‘supernotes’ were sourced in the Democratic Republic of North Korea, she said, and were transported around the world by North Korean officials travelling under diplomatic cover.

They also allege Garland and six co-conspirators used couriers to transport supernotes and payments to avoid detection themselves.

The international probe, which also involved the UK’s National Crime Squad (NCS) – now the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (Soca) – and the interior ministry of Russia (MVD), found the high-grade counterfeit bills were in worldwide circulation from the late 1980s until at least July 2000.

Ms Johnson alleged one of Garland’s alleged co-conspirators, Hugh Todd, later told investigators he purchased more than $250,000 of supernotes from “the Garland organisation” which were redistributed into the world economy through currency exchanges across Europe.

He maintained he first met the Irishman in the Radisson Hotel in Moscow in April 1998, where Mr Garland emptied a leather bag packed with approximately 80,000 dollars of counterfeit US notes on to a bed for $30,000 in genuine notes.

Two months later, the pair met in the Savoy Hotel in Moscow, where between $160,000 and $180,000 of counterfeit US currency was handed over, it is claimed.

Records with Scandinavian Airlines prove Mr Garland was in Russia on both occasions, she added.
An undercover NCS officer infiltrated the group in 1999 and met with members in several pubs and hotels around Birmingham, where they discussed the counterfeit notes and how their boss ’Sean’ sourced them in Russia.

Ms Johnson’s affidavit states Garland knew the Federal Reserve notes were counterfeit, that he travelled circuitous routes and met with other conspirators to discuss the supernotes operation and engage in transactions.

“Some members who were apprehended in possession of or passing notes have admitted that Garland was the source and leader of an illegal supernote distribution organisation and that (Christopher) Corcoran was his direct contact, communicator and negotiator,” she said.

“Their statements are substantiated by documentary evidence, physical and electronic surveillance and other witness accounts.”

Garland, of Beldonstown, Brownstown, Navan, Co Meath, was a former IRA leader in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He was a key figure in securing the official IRA ceasefire of May 1972.

He was initially arrested by the PSNI on foot of an extradition warrant by the US authorities in October 2005 at the Workers’ Party annual conference in Belfast. He fled to the South when released on bail.

He was later arrested outside the Workers’ Party in Dublin in January 2009 and released on strict bail conditions, which included surrendering the title deeds to his family home.

Barristers for Garland maintained the pensioner should not be extradited as the alleged offence happened in Ireland and was based on hearsay.

Michael Forde, senior counsel, argued his client had been accused of a complex, sophisticated trans-national conspiracy, but that the charge fell under Ireland’s own forgery or money-laundering laws.

“The rationale is very simple,” said Mr Forde. “If the offence was committed against Irish law, and a substantial part committed in the State, then the State should prosecute.”

His legal team also argued Garland’s fundamental rights have been infringed, that there had been a delay is making the second extradition order and that the extradition was connected with a political offence.

Mr Forde also claimed the application was hearsay based on hearsay and had not established a prima facie case.

“The question this court has to ask itself is there enough admissible evidence here to justify putting Mr Garland on trial,” he added.

The extradition hearing before Mr Justice John Edwards is listed for four days.

Read the full story here:
Ex-IRA man Garland ‘led fake dollars plot’, court told
Irish Examiner
2011-7-18

Posted in Banking, Counterfeiting, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Illicit activities | Comments Closed

China cracking down on DPRK-made methamphetamine

Thursday, July 7th, 2011

Picture above from the Daily NK.

According to the Donga Ilbo:

China has begun cracking down on North Korea`s narcotics trade in China along with South Korean intelligence, having seized 60 million U.S. dollars worth of drugs from the North last year, according to a South Korean government source Monday.

“It’s only a fraction. The volume of drug trafficking in China will be much greater than that,” the source said.

This is the first time for China to unveil the volume of narcotics made in North Korea.

Beijing had been reluctant to raise the matter in public though it found Pyongyang`s increased drug trafficking as a threat. China diplomatically protects the North in nuclear issues but started a crackdown with South Korea apparently because it can no longer tolerate the North`s narcotics, which threatened China`s three northeastern provinces bordering the North.

The drugs seized by Beijing are said to have the best quality, going beyond the level individuals can produce. So Pyongyang is considered to be manufacturing narcotics on the national level at factories.

“China is pretty much pissed off,” a diplomatic source said, adding, “China believes that North Korea’s drug trafficking has grown more serious since last year.”

Though Beijing did not specifically mention the North when it stressed a crackdown on drugs, it implied North Korean-made narcotics.

In a previous post, we linked to a Newsweek story on the Chinese crackdown:

Twenty years ago, Yanji had only 44 registered drug addicts. Last year, the city registered almost 2,100 drug addicts, according to a 2010 Brookings Institution report, with more than 90 percent of them addicted to meth or similar synthetic drugs. Local officials acknowledge that this is very likely a gross undercount and that the actual number may be five or six times higher. “Jilin Province is not only the most important transshipment point for drugs from North Korea into China, but has itself become one of the largest markets in China for amphetamine-type stimulants,” the Brookings report said.

Chinese authorities recently conducted a provincewide crackdown, code-named Strong Wind. But for law enforcement, the drug presents a particular problem. Unlike other drugs, it’s nearly impossible to trace the origin of meth. Still, officials, residents, and experts believe that much of the methamphetamine consumed in this Chinese region is manufactured across the border in North Korea, a longtime exporter of drugs. “Clearly,” the Brookings report said, amphetamine-type stimulants “from North Korea have become a threat to China in recent years.”

In an article published last year, Cui Junyong, a professor at Yanbian University’s School of Law, posited that a large amount of the illegal drugs ingested in Yanji came from North Korea. Supporting his point, the border patrol last year arrested six North Koreans in a high-profile bust, including a dealer named “Sister Kim.” Although sources estimate that a gram of meth in North Korea costs roughly 10 times the price of a kilo of rice—about $15—it’s still much cheaper than in China.

“Selling ice is the easiest way to make money,” says Shin Dong Hyuk, who was born in a North Korean concentration camp in 1982 and escaped to South Korea in 2005. Every defector, he added, “knows about ice.”

Perhaps because of its alliance with its benighted neighbor, the Chinese government has been extremely careful about pointing its finger at North Korea; reports on drug busts in Jilin province euphemistically refer to the drugs as coming from a “border country.”

“We don’t publicize” the drugs coming from North Korea because it would touch on “the good relationship between China and North Korea,” an official, requesting anonymity, from Jilin’s anti-drug unit says. But he adds, “Of all the drugs we’ve seized this year, it’s mostly been ice, because that’s our main drug here.”

…

According to Yun and others, North Korea’s methamphetamine production is centered in Hamheung, the site of a chemical-industrial complex built by the Japanese during World War II, which has a high concentration of chemists and was reportedly one of the worst-hit cities during the famine.
…

Earlier this year, a US Department of State report to the Congress alleged that the DPRK’s state-sponsored drug production was on the wane–though “private” production and trade along the Chinese border remained a problem. According to one report:

In an annual report submitted to Congress, the US State Department said “no confirmed instances of large-scale drug trafficking” involving the North Korean state or its nationals were reported in 2010.

It said there was not enough information to confirm that the communist state was no longer involved in drug manufacture and trafficking “but if such activity persists, it is certainly on a smaller scale”.

This is the eighth consecutive year that there were no known instances of large-scale methamphetamine or heroin trafficking to either Japan or Taiwan with direct North Korean state involvement, it said in the 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

“The continued lack of public reports of drug trafficking with a direct DPRK (North Korea) connection suggests that such high-profile drug trafficking has either ceased or been sharply reduced,” the report said.

The report said, however, that trafficking of methamphetamines along the North Korea-China border continues and press reports about such activities have increased in comparison to last year.

“These reports… point to transactions between DPRK traffickers and large-scale, organised Chinese criminal groups” in locations along the border.

“Press reports of continuing seizures of methamphetamine trafficked to organised Chinese criminals from DPRK territory suggest continuing manufacture and sale of DPRK methamphetamine,” the report said.

This and continued trafficking in counterfeit cigarettes and currency suggests that “enforcement against organized criminality in the DPRK is lax”, it added.

Additional Information:
1. Back in March, Andrei Lankov wrote about this situtaion.

2. Earlier this year, the DPRK arrested some Japanese men in Rason for “trafficking and counterfeit”.

3. In June, China intercepted a meth shipment from the DPRK.

4. Marcus Noland also has posted on this topic.

Posted in Drug smuggling, Finance, Illicit activities, International trade, Manufacturing, Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Daily NK on anti-socialist activities

Thursday, June 23rd, 2011

Part 1: The Illogicality of Anti-Socialist Policy
Lee Seok Young
2011-6-22

In North Korea today, those actions which are subject to the harshest oversight and most excessive punishment are those deemed anti-socialist, an expression of the extent to which such actions are seen as a threat to the regime.

Yet these very actions have already taken deep root in people’s lifestyles, spreading rapidly as a result of chronic economic difficulties, food insecurity, endemic corruption and the inflow of information from abroad.

First of all, every North Korean and defector the Daily NK meets says much the same thing; that if people had not followed an ‘anti-socialist’ path during the mid-90s famine, they could not have survived. The power which maintains North Korean society through the hardest times is that derived from anti-socialist actions, and it is those actions which the authorities would like to put an end to.

The blocking of these so-called ‘anti-socialist trends’ nominally began with Kim Jong Il’s 1992 work, ‘Socialism Is a Science’, issued following the fall of the Eastern Bloc. A time of great fear for the regime, ‘Socialism Is a Science’ expressed a determination to block out anti-socialist phenomena.

However, a famine exploded nationwide shortly after the publication of the thesis, placing these very anti-socialist modes of behavior at the core of the lives of almost everybody in the nation.

Having completely replaced Kim Jong Il and the Chosun Workers’ Party as the alpha provider of sustenance, money is now uppermost in the minds of the people. If they can, they are moving away from the collective farms, factories and enterprises to become more active in the market.

“At a time when the state didn’t provide rations and workers were not even receiving their monthly wages, the ones who started trading early on were all best able to avoid this predicament,” said one defector, “Others followed after their example and, rather than trying to find work, went straight into the market.”

Money, then, is the fundamental toxin that now threatens to shake the very basis of the Kim regime, completely undermining the ‘let’s work the same, have the same and live well’ lifestyle that the regime has long been demanding from the people.The authorities, as part of a losing battle to halt this slide, ‘educates’ the people with the mantra, “Don’t become a slave to money,” but it makes no difference.

People are growing more and more money-oriented. What simply began as a desperate rearguard action to survive extreme poverty has become a preoccupation with accumulating wealth. The many who don’t have the capital to start a business are keen to work with those who do.

One interviewee, a woman hailing from North Hamkyung Province, told The Daily NK, “They have to keep trying, but they can’t eliminate it. How could they, when the state itself is actually encouraging its spread? Everywhere you go, they demand bribes, and people with money never get punished even when clearly guilty, because everyone is desperate to earn money.”

Given that the central authorities demand Party funds from regional bodies, and regional Party and military cadres in turn work with smugglers, and the cadres charged with inspection turn a blind eye to criminal acts in exchange for bribes, the whole system is, as the interviewee said, rotten from the top down.

One defector who left his position as a cadre in a Yangkang Province enterprise agreed, recalling, “The Party periodically collected money from our factory, but since all the machinery had long since stopped running, they made us work in the market and give 30% of the profits to the authorities. It was the state that promoted anti-socialism in consequence.”

Another defector originally from North Hamkyung Province said in a similar vein, “The National Security and People’s Safety agents stationed on provincial borders stop people without the right permit to travel, but let them pass in exchange for a few packs of cigarettes. Some even ask for your wrist watch. It’s not just the people; the whole nation is busy being anti-socialist.”

Increasing exposure to foreign materials is also influencing the situation somewhat. Such things are especially popular with students and women working in the markets, two groups which are more up-to-date than most.

South Korean and Western culture is being transmitted quickly via DVD, and materials that are brought into the state from China by traders and smugglers are also pushing forward new trends such as the ‘Korean Wave.’

To the North Korean people, who once lived in near complete isolation from the rest of the world, the introduction of foreign materials has intensified their yearnings for a new life style. The stricter the regulations become, the thirstier for something else the people become.

Part 2: Crackdowns Enhancing Anti-Socialist Cycle
Mok Yong Jae
2011-06-23

‘Anti-socialism’ in North Korea is a destabilizing force disturbing the foundations of the system. For that reason, the authorities place a great emphasis on rooting it out. Inspections are frequent and their targets varied. But the fact is that this has done little to stop the growth of such activities; in fact, quite the opposite; some believe that targeted inspections actually increase instances of smuggling, for example.

These focused inspections are handed down in the name of the ‘Party Center’ in other words Kim Jong Il. The latest inspections over anti-socialist trends in border areas have been being carried out by Kim Jong Eun’s direct instruction. First people are educated about and warned against ‘anti-socialist behavior’, then provincial Party and military cadres launch an inspection.

If a concerted inspection is to be unleashed on a given area, an inspection unit is set up, and it does the work. In the case of recent inspections targeting drugs and defection, the inspection units have even been sent from the Central Committee of the Party. The makeup of the unit can differ slightly depending on the target of the inspection, but usually includes agents from the National Security Agency (NSA), People’s Safety Ministry and Prosecutors Office. Precise search sites are usually selected at random and the searches conducted without warning, while ‘criminals’ are flushed out in part by getting citizens to report on one another.

However, the effectiveness of this system has a limit. This is primarily due to an overwhelming degree of official corruption at nearly all levels.

The Spread of Bureaucracy and the Limits of Inspections

The primary agents conducting the inspections, agents from the NSA and PSM, collude with smugglers for their own benefit. Anti-socialist activities are not a new means of survival, and the more commonplace the inspections become, the more focused the agents doing it become on their own self-interest; i.e. rent seeking rather than uncovering instances of wrongdoing.

For example, agents seek out big smugglers only in order to offer them an opportunity for their actions to be ignored, something they will do for a price. A source from Yangkang Province explained to The Daily NK, “Hoping not to lose their goods, also so as to avoid prison, in many cases smugglers try to win over agents. They talk to the official for a while, and if they think ‘this guy can be won over’ then some even gently encourage them to find a way to forego any punishment.”

Then, when the inspecting agents begin dropping heavy hints about expensive merchandise, electronics or a piano, for example, the smugglers say, “I’d be delighted to buy that for you,” and for that receive their freedom.

Thus, it is rare for money to change hands directly; goods are bought in China and handed over when the inspection period has come to a close. The smuggler also obtains a permit to import a certain amount of other goods without penalty in the future. By winning over agents in this way, assistance in future times of trouble can also be secured.

In addition, as Lee Jae Won, the former chairman of the Korean Bar Association Committee on Human Rights in North Korea and someone who has interviewed a great number of defectors as author of the 2010 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, concludes, “Anti-socialist activities are extremely common for North Korean cadres in public positions such as prosecutors and judges.” The bribing of prosecutors and judges in exchange for leniency or to escape conviction is a daily occurrence, as much as bribing the security forces and cadres.

What Anti-socialist Counteroffensive? Officials are the source of Antisocialism

Now much more so than in the past, cadres and agents are directly involved in the antisocialist activities.

A Chinese-Korean trader who often goes between Dandong and Shinuiju told The Daily NK, “There are so many drugs in North Korea that even the officers supposed to be policing it are taking drugs themselves. Some of them even asked me to take opium to China and sell it. I go back to North Korea every year to visit relatives, and I’ve seen officers there doing bingdu (methamphetamines) with my own eyes.

It is also said that the families of cadres are the main source of South Korean movies and dramas on DVD. Party cadres are, in effect, the very source of the Korean Wave that their bosses in Pyongyang ban on the premise of defending the state from the ‘ideological and cultural invasion of the South Chosun reactionaries’.

A source from Pyongan Province confirmed the story, telling The Daily NK, “These DVDs and VCDs come from the houses of cadres who travel overseas a lot. The children of cadres love watching them. The families of traders have a lot of them, too, but it’s the cadres they’re spreading from.”

Thus, while the central Party single-mindedly attacks anti-socialist behaviour, the cadres and agents who are meant to be carrying out the orders are deeply involved in the ‘anti-socialism’ themselves. The more crackdowns that occur, the more contact there is between the elite and security forces on the one hand and smugglers and traders on the other, offering more opportunities for symbiosis. It is for this reason that some claim the inspections are actually catalyzing the anti-socialism.

Meanwhile, An Chan Il of the World North Korea Study Center pointed out to The Daily NK that the whole thing is completely inevitable, saying, “These inspection teams are not receiving proper rations from the state, so of course they take bribes instead when sent out into the field. Administrative irregularities and corruption are at the very heart of these anti-socialist inspections. The only way for the families of inspecting agents to survive is for the father to be a part of this anti-socialist behavior.”

Choi Yong Hwan from the Gyeonggi Research Institute agreed, adding, “These inspections are intensifying social inequality. The fundamental cause of this is the collapse of the state rationing system due to economic difficulties. It’s a situation where even the agents are hungry, so there is a permanent pattern of them attempting to guarantee their own survival via corruption. There is a vicious cycle repeating here, whereby those who are able to ingratiate themselves with the inspecting agents and cadres survive, and those who do not or cannot get punished.”

Posted in Black markets, Civil society, Communications, Drug smuggling, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Illicit activities, International trade, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD) | 2 Comments »

ROK seeks to gain greater control of sanctioned cash flows to DPRK

Wednesday, May 25th, 2011

According to KBS:

South Korean firms doing trade with North Korea must will soon make payments only at government-designated banks.

The Unification Ministry said it will revise the law on inter-Korean cooperation and exchange to this effect. It said the measure aims to provide a greater understanding of the monetary flow of inter-Korean trade and secure transparent transactions.

The ministry has announced the qualifications a bank must meet to deal in inter-Korean trade payments and through June third, any of the 18 commercial banks in the country can apply for the designation. Two or three banks will be selected.

The revised law will also state in clearer terms the conditions and procedures relating to cross-border exchanges. It further calls for obtaining government approval when South Korean residents wish to transfer money to families in North Korea or when overseas chapters of South Korean firms seek to invest in North Korea.

The South Korean government is also seeking to gain control over remittances to families of DPRK defectors.

Read the full story here:
Designated Banks to Process S-N Trade Payments
KBS
2011-05-25

Posted in Banking, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, South Korea | Comments Closed

ROK moves to control inter-Korean remittances

Monday, May 23rd, 2011

UPDATE (2011-5-26): Defectors are not too happy with plans by the South Korean government to get control over remittances to the DPRK. According to the Korea Herald:

North Korean defectors here are strongly opposing a government plan to require them to gain approval before making remittances to relatives in the cash-strapped state.

They say that the approval process could put them and their loved ones in the North in dangerous situations and make brokers demand more money for delivering funds.

They also say that since their remittances are made through “complicated multi-layered” procedures, it would be difficult to detect those sending money without approval.

On Tuesday, the Unification Ministry put on public notice a revision bill mandating defectors to obtain approval when remitting more than a certain amount of money, with the cut-off figure yet to be set. Officials said the revision is aimed at “securing transparency in inter-Korean exchanges.”

“We have been scrimping on food, clothes and others to send some of the hard-earned money ― at most 1 million won ($917) ― to help our family, not the North Korean regime. The approval system is wrong,” a 43-year-old North Korean defector, who has taken asylum here since 1997, told The Korea Herald, declining to be named.

“Our remittances have been transparently made and we always check whether our relatives have received the money by talking directly to them by cellphone. Through the talks, albeit brief, defectors tell them the truth about Korean society and help enlighten them and bring about change there.”

He also pointed out that the planned system may not be effective.

“All these have so far taken place secretly. Who would ever like to willingly tell the authorities about their remittances at the risk of revealing their identities and those of their relatives in the North? One out of 10 may be willing,” he said.

A Unification Ministry official said that the government will carry out the approval system after taking into account opinions from the defectors and experts.

“There has been controversy over the legitimacy of their remittances, which has stemmed from the absence of government procedures over them. The system is aimed at systemizing their sending of the money to the North,” the official said.

“We will consider various opinions including those regarding the amount of money for which they should secure approval and measures to protect their family in the North.”

North Korean defectors usually send their money through ethnic Chinese people here, who ask their Chinese relatives or acquaintances inside the North or near the North Korea-China border to deliver the money. The brokers are known to take 30 percent of the total remittances.

According to a survey by a private Seoul-based group, which was released early this year, nearly half of North Korean defectors here have sent money to their families in the North.

The survey by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights found that 49.5 percent said they had sent money to their families in the North, while 46 percent said they had not and 4.5 percent said that they have no family there.

The survey was conducted on 396 North Korean defectors residing in the South, aged 15 or older, from Dec. 14-31 last year.

Seoul officials estimate that North Korean defectors’ annual remittances amount to $10 million.

Some people say the remittances could stimulate North Koreans’ longing for the affluent life south of the heavily fortified border. Others, however, are concerned that the money could get into the wrong hands in the notoriously autocratic regime.

The number of North Korean defectors living here stands at 21,294 as of April. It is expected to rise as food shortages and oppression continue in the reclusive state.

And according to Yonhap:

The Unification Ministry has announced its plans to revise a law that would require defectors to receive government approval before sending money to their families.

The ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, said the move is aimed at legalizing the money transfers and increasing their transparency.

Defectors said their families in the North usually receive some 70 percent of their remittances as brokers who arrange the deals take some 30 percent of the money as a fee.

The ministry said it would give some wiggle room for defectors by exempting them from receiving mandatory approval in case they remit a certain amount of money for their families to support them or to help them seek medical treatment.

Details have yet to be arranged. The revision process would take months as other government ministries must screen any changes before the new law’s submission to the legislature for approval.

The new revision is expected to take effect as early as the second half of next year.

The move “is not trying to regulate humanitarian money remittance,” a government official said on condition of anonymity, citing office policy.

Still, the proposed move triggered a backlash from defectors, who fear that the government regulation could complicate the process of money remittance and jeopardize their families in the North.

“I have no choice but to give money to family members in the North as they live on the money I send to them, but I cannot give any information to the government,” a defector said, asking not to be identified, citing security concerns for family members in the North.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-5-23): According to the Korea Herald:

South Koreans who wish to send money to their families in North Korea will be required to get government approval in advance under a revised law, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said Monday.

All remittances between the South and North, including investments or aid to the North from an overseas corporation set up by a South Korean citizen, will require government approval, according to the revised law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, aimed at increasing transparency of the cross-border exchanges.

So far, only payments for commercial transactions were subject to obtain government permission in advance, raising concerns that it was hard to track other kinds of cash flow into North Korea.

North Korean defectors who have settled in the South or members of families separated by the border after the 1950-53 Korean War have occasionally remitted money to their kin in the impoverished North through bank accounts in third countries such as China.

But under the new law taking effect in the second half of this year, South Koreans are obliged to get government approval before sending or passing on inheritance to their family in the North. There will be exceptions, however, for remittances of small amounts for basic living costs or medical costs of their kin in the North.

If a corporation established by a South Korean citizen in a third country plans to invest in the North, the South Korean proprietor will now have to report to the Seoul government in advance.

South Koreans planning to send goods purchased in third countries to the North will also have to attain government permission.

A South Korean Christian aid group recently sent flour, bought in China through a Chinese nongovernmental organization called Amity Foundation, to North Korea.

South Korean companies trading with entities in the North will also be required to register, under the new law.

“Between 700 and 800 companies are believed to have records of trade with the North so far, but only 580 have been confirmed so far in a survey conducted after the May 25 regulation (on inter-Korean exchanges) last year,” a ministry official said.

“The others have either stopped doing business in the North or have gone out of contact, making it hard for the government to keep track.”

The ministry plans to set up a state-funded agency to support inter-Korean nongovernmental exchanges at all times.

So far, the ministry has allocated financial aid to support inter-Korean exchange to selected non-profit organizations once or twice a year.

Previous reports indicated that the level of remittances from the ROK to the DPRK can reach USD$10m per year.

Read the full story here:
Seoul tightens rules on cash flow to North Korea
Korea Herald
Kim So-hyun
2011-5-23

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, Emigration, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy | 1 Comment »

Number of DPRK workers at Kaesong complex continues to grow

Tuesday, May 17th, 2011

According ot the Choson Ilbo:

The number of North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex has been growing even as Seoul halted all other trade with the North after deadly attacks on the Navy corvette Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island last year.

There were 46,420 North Korean workers at the industrial park at the end of February, up 11 percent from 42,415 a year ago, according to the Unification Ministry on Sunday. This represents a monthly increase of 334. The industrial park’s output rose from $256.47 million in 2009 to US$323.32 million last year.

Why the increase?

Since all other inter-Korean trade has been suspended, the Kaesong Industrial Complex is the sole window for the North to obtain a steady legal supply of hard cash. The monthly wage of workers at the complex averages at around $100, but they only see between 30 and 50 percent while the rest goes to the regime.

“The workers get their wages in North Korean won or daily necessity coupons, and the North Korean authorities take all the dollars,” said a North Korean source. That amounts to some $4.6 million every month.

If the number of workers keeps increasing at the same rate, the North is expected to earn nearly $60 million this year. With the sources of hard currency exhausted, the North finds it profitable to assign even one more workers to the complex, but that also benefits the South Korean firms there. “North Korean worker wages are far more competitive than those in China and Southeast Asia,” said a staffer with an apparel firm at the complex. “At present we employ 1,200 North Korean workers, and the more we employ, the more profit we can make.”

And Lee Im-dong, a former secretary-general of the businesses association at the complex, said, “We have asked the North Korean authorities for additional manpower of 20,000. As far as the Kaesong Industrial Complex is concerned, our interests completely coincide with those of North Korea.”

The supply of additional workers is not easy. The available labor force in Kaesong and vicinity was already exhausted several years ago, so there is even a joke that “all the healthy in Kaesong now work at the industrial park.” The authorities have turned old buildings in Kaesong into boarding houses for workers recruited from Pyongyang, Pyongan and Hamgyong provinces, said the source.

“The fact that the North is going extra mile to bring more workers to Kaesong shows how desperately it needs dollars,” opined the Unification Ministry official.

Read the full article here:
N.Korea Keeps Sending More Workers to Kaesong Complex
Choson Ilbo
2011-5-17

Posted in Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | 1 Comment »

DPRK embassy involved in India car smuggling?

Tuesday, May 17th, 2011

According to the Choson Ilbo:

North Korean Embassy officials in India are being investigated for involvement in a luxury car smuggling case worth W100 billion (US$1=W1,091).

Senior officials of the North Korean and Vietnamese embassies are suspected of smuggling luxury sedans and motorcycles, evading customs duties estimated at 5 billion rupees (approximately W120 billion) over the past years, the Indian Express reported Monday.

According to India’s Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Sumit Walia, alias Sunny (32) imported stolen or second-hand foreign cars using the embassy officials as frontmen to evade customs duties and sold them as brand-new.

In India, second-hand foreign cars are subject to tariffs of 160 percent and new cars to 109 percent. But diplomats are exempt.

Walia bought stolen cars chiefly from the U.K, and forged their registration documents to disguise them as new cars. He imported them in the name of the diplomats and allegedly sold them to businessmen, politicians, and celebrities.

Indian authorities have confiscated 41 cars. Most of them are top brand cars such as BMW, Ferrari, Lexus, and Porsche.

The DRI estimated the amount of customs duties Walia and his gang have evaded at 5 billion rupees. The agency has asked the Indian Foreign Ministry for cooperation with the investigation to find out what role the North Korean and Vietnamese embassy officials played.

The more things change, the more they stay the same. As regular readers are aware, North Korean embassies self-finance their operations through business opportunities in their host countries. Sometimes these are legitimate business ventures…sometimes not. Plenty of similar stories are archived on this web page.

Read the full story here:
N.Korean Diplomats in India Investigated for Car Smuggling
Choson Ilbo
2011-5-17

Posted in Finance, Illicit activities, India, International trade | Comments Closed

On the DPRK’s informal credit markets…

Monday, May 16th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

Loan-sharking of both money and food is back to being widespread in North Korea these days, and sources say this is causing problems.

The activity is said to have waned for a time in the face of strict crackdowns during the currency redenomination in 2009; however, according to sources, a lot of those people who were expropriated by the currency redenomination have now started borrowing money from loan sharks in order to begin trading or get access to food, meaning it has spread widely once again.

A source from Hyesan, Yangkang Province explained on the 13th, “Those without funding for trade tend to borrow money at high interest. If they borrow money from an acquaintance, the interest rate is five percent, or they make an agreement with a loan-shark, who they don’t know well, to give ten percent.”

“Some loan-sharks get from 15 to 20 percent interest from smugglers for loans over a single night! Even though it is risky, depending on the regulations, they lend money to smugglers because they can earn large sums of money in just a few days.”

Loan sharks have been the target of crackdowns for years. In August 1997, the Ministry of Public Security (formerly the People’s Safety Ministry) released a decree stating that authorities could go so far as to execute those caught loaning food at high interest rates. Additionally, right before the currency redenomination in September of 2009, the National Security Agency cracked down on loan-sharking, releasing a decree calling on officials to “Map out measures to uproot usury.”

However, given that even agents of the People Safety Ministry use loan-sharking for the trading activities of their families, the crackdowns are doomed to fail.

According to sources from several provinces, the activity is also more common in rural areas than in cities, because in cities people have more survival mechanisms, but rural people do not have many alternative ways to get hold of money or food.

Loans are used in these agricultural areas in order to borrow grain from March to May, and are paid back double in the harvest season. In Yangkang Province, meanwhile, when people borrow one kilogram of rice or flour, they must pay it back in the form of 2.5 or 3 kg of potato starch, since the major product of the province is potatoes.

It is the kind of interest rate that was applied during the March of Tribulation, but people still apply it now.

This is a vicious circle of poverty, another defector pointed out. “Those who suffer loan-sharking each year face another worrying fall because their harvest must be paid to the loan sharks.”

The author of this Daily NK story unfortunately chooses to describe the DPRK’s “informal lenders” as “loan sharks,” making them morally equivalent to thieves and bullies, rather than describing them as lenders in a high-risk market. This sort of pejorative name-calling is common among those who don’t understand how credit markets work, particularly in a high-risk business environment such as the DPRK.

The reality is that informal and black market lenders in the DPRK are making de jure illegal loans from their own savings. This means that if the loan is officially discovered, the lender (and probably the borrower) will face criminal charges. Even if the lender is not arrested, he must pay regular protection money to keep it that way. Additionally, there is little property in the DPRK which can be credibly used as collateral in a loan, which means that even if the loan is not discovered by the authorities, if the borrower defaults or absconds with the funds there is little the lender can take possession of to recover his capital. This level of risk requires borrowers to pay much higher interest rates to coax scarce lenders into the market.

In addition to the high interest rates that black market lenders usually charge, they also earn a bad reputation for their resort to “informal” mechanisms to insure and recover these loans. Some insurance mechanisms, such as lending to family members and close acquaintances, might work well. Other mechanisms, such as making threats of harm (and following through), are not as widely respected. But these are “technological” adaptations and responses to the DPRK business environment, not purely sadistic behavior. In other words, these market practices are completely predictable given the institutional environment and not unique to the DPRK. If the DPRK court system impartially enforced contracts, and collateral could be legally secured, these sorts of technologies would be unnecessary.

I am not claiming that black market lenders are angels, or even pleasant people (in fact some of them may be powerful individuals in the party and security infrastructure), but they are financing the development of the DPRK’s unofficial economy out of nothing more than financial self-interest. Without their efforts a whole class of informal and black market entrepreneurs would be unable to access capital markets to start new businesses or finance operations. The unpleasant side of black market lending should not be placed on the market participants themselves, but on the DPRK’s policymakers who have pursued economic policies that have made this sort of behavior necessary.

Read the full Daily NK story here:
Loans Creating Circle of Poverty
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
2011-5-16

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Finance, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Insurance, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), National Defense Commission | 2 Comments »

China Exim Bank delegation visited DPRK in April

Monday, May 9th, 2011

According to the Donga Ilbo:

Members of the credit rating agency under the Export-Import Bank of China are known to have visited North Korea around the “Day of the Sun” on April 15, otherwise known as the birthday of the Stalinist country`s founder Kim Il Sung.

A source in Beijing said, “Around 10 people from the Export-Import Bank of China made a 10-day trip to North Korea ahead of the Day of the Sun. They not only visited Pyongyang but also other cities.”

The agency provides sovereign credit ratings for countries around the world. Critics say the members visited the North to seek further economic cooperation, adding their trip holds more meaning than attending the holiday event because they also visited other cities.

Another source in Beijing said, “The Chinese government is mulling financial benefits including no-interest loans to Chinese companies investing in the [North’s] city of Rason.”

Beijing seems to be preparing to invest in the Hunchun-Rason area near the Tumen River and Dandong-Sinuiju’s Hwanggeumpyong region near the Yalu River, where Pyongyang-Beijing economic cooperation is vital.

Read the full story here:
China`s Exim Bank delegation visited N. Korea last month
Donga Ilbo
2011-5-9

Posted in Banking, China, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

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