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US sanctions Syrian bank for DPRK connection

Sunday, August 14th, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2011-8-17): The recently sanctioned bank denies it has ties to Iran and the DPRK. According to Lebanon’s Daily Star:

The Lebanese subsidiary of a Syrian bank sanctioned by the United States denied on Wednesday “unfounded political allegations” that it dealt with North Korea and Iran.

“Since the establishment of our institution, we have never had any operation with either a North Korean or an Iranian entity even before the existing sanctions,” the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank said.

“As a result, we deny all accusation of being involved in any illegal activity with any suspected country,” a statement added.

The United States Treasury has charged that the state-owned Commercial Bank of Syria allegedly supported Syria and North Korea’s efforts to spread weapons of mass destruction.

Washington last week imposed sanctions on the bank, the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank and telecoms company Syriatel over President Bashar al-Assad’s increasingly brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests.

The move freezes the US assets of the businesses targeted and prohibits US entities from engaging in any business dealings with the two banks.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-8-14): The US has sanctioned a Syrian Bank for its involvement in DPRK proliferation activities. According to Yonhap:

The Treasury Department said the Commercial Bank of Syria has provided financial services to North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank and Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, both of which were blacklisted for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Syrian bank’s Lebanon-based subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, and Syriatel, the largest mobile phone operator in Syria, were also sanctioned under Wednesday’s measure.

“By exposing Syria’s largest commercial bank as an agent for designated Syrian and North Korean proliferators, and by targeting Syria’s largest mobile phone operator for being controlled by one of the regime’s most corrupt insiders, we are taking aim at the financial infrastructure that is helping provide support to (President Bashar) Asad and his regime’s illicit activities,” Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen said in a press release.

The Commercial Bank of Syria also holds an account for Tanchon Commercial Bank, the primary financial agent for the Korea Mining Development Corp., North Korea’s premier arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons, according to the department.

The U.S. is stepping up efforts to isolate the Assad regime amid its brutal crackdown on anti-government protesters.

NTI has additional information here.

Other DPRK-Syria stories below:
1. Syria and the DPRK collaborated on the construction of Syria’s nuclear facility which was destroyed in 2007 by an Israeli air strike.

2. According to Joshua Pollock, over the last decade the DPRK and Syria have cooperated on missile development.

3. The UNSC was investigating a shipment of North Korean chemical safety suits to Syria.

4. Syria’s Tishreen War Museum was designed and built by North Koreans!

Posted in Arms shipment, Banking, Finance, Illicit activities, Syria, Tanchon Commercial Bank, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Garland fights extradition to US

Monday, July 18th, 2011

It has been a couple of years since we heard from Sean Garland, but the Irish Times reports that the alleged purveyor of alleged North Korean “supernotes” is fighting his exztradition to the US at Ireland’s high court. According to the story:

A veteran republican handed over almost $250,000 in Russian hotels in an international plot to spread the notes across Europe, a court heard.

Authorities in the US have accused Sean Garland of being the ringleader of a massive forgery racket that distributed the top grade counterfeit $100 bills.

The former IRA leader is fighting his extradition to the US at the High Court in Dublin, which heard Garland met a co-conspirator twice in Moscow with the fake cash.

Garland, 77, also the ex-president of the Workers’ Party of Ireland, denies the allegations.

In an affidavit to the court, Brenda Johnson, assistant US attorney, said: “This case involved a long-standing and large-scale supernotes distribution network (the Garland organisation) based in the Republic of Ireland and headed by Sean Garland, a senior officer in the Irish Workers’ Party.”

The US Secret Service (USSS) discovered the ‘supernotes’ were sourced in the Democratic Republic of North Korea, she said, and were transported around the world by North Korean officials travelling under diplomatic cover.

They also allege Garland and six co-conspirators used couriers to transport supernotes and payments to avoid detection themselves.

The international probe, which also involved the UK’s National Crime Squad (NCS) – now the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (Soca) – and the interior ministry of Russia (MVD), found the high-grade counterfeit bills were in worldwide circulation from the late 1980s until at least July 2000.

Ms Johnson alleged one of Garland’s alleged co-conspirators, Hugh Todd, later told investigators he purchased more than $250,000 of supernotes from “the Garland organisation” which were redistributed into the world economy through currency exchanges across Europe.

He maintained he first met the Irishman in the Radisson Hotel in Moscow in April 1998, where Mr Garland emptied a leather bag packed with approximately 80,000 dollars of counterfeit US notes on to a bed for $30,000 in genuine notes.

Two months later, the pair met in the Savoy Hotel in Moscow, where between $160,000 and $180,000 of counterfeit US currency was handed over, it is claimed.

Records with Scandinavian Airlines prove Mr Garland was in Russia on both occasions, she added.
An undercover NCS officer infiltrated the group in 1999 and met with members in several pubs and hotels around Birmingham, where they discussed the counterfeit notes and how their boss ’Sean’ sourced them in Russia.

Ms Johnson’s affidavit states Garland knew the Federal Reserve notes were counterfeit, that he travelled circuitous routes and met with other conspirators to discuss the supernotes operation and engage in transactions.

“Some members who were apprehended in possession of or passing notes have admitted that Garland was the source and leader of an illegal supernote distribution organisation and that (Christopher) Corcoran was his direct contact, communicator and negotiator,” she said.

“Their statements are substantiated by documentary evidence, physical and electronic surveillance and other witness accounts.”

Garland, of Beldonstown, Brownstown, Navan, Co Meath, was a former IRA leader in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He was a key figure in securing the official IRA ceasefire of May 1972.

He was initially arrested by the PSNI on foot of an extradition warrant by the US authorities in October 2005 at the Workers’ Party annual conference in Belfast. He fled to the South when released on bail.

He was later arrested outside the Workers’ Party in Dublin in January 2009 and released on strict bail conditions, which included surrendering the title deeds to his family home.

Barristers for Garland maintained the pensioner should not be extradited as the alleged offence happened in Ireland and was based on hearsay.

Michael Forde, senior counsel, argued his client had been accused of a complex, sophisticated trans-national conspiracy, but that the charge fell under Ireland’s own forgery or money-laundering laws.

“The rationale is very simple,” said Mr Forde. “If the offence was committed against Irish law, and a substantial part committed in the State, then the State should prosecute.”

His legal team also argued Garland’s fundamental rights have been infringed, that there had been a delay is making the second extradition order and that the extradition was connected with a political offence.

Mr Forde also claimed the application was hearsay based on hearsay and had not established a prima facie case.

“The question this court has to ask itself is there enough admissible evidence here to justify putting Mr Garland on trial,” he added.

The extradition hearing before Mr Justice John Edwards is listed for four days.

Read the full story here:
Ex-IRA man Garland ‘led fake dollars plot’, court told
Irish Examiner
2011-7-18

Posted in Banking, Counterfeiting, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Illicit activities | Comments Closed

ROK seeks to gain greater control of sanctioned cash flows to DPRK

Wednesday, May 25th, 2011

According to KBS:

South Korean firms doing trade with North Korea must will soon make payments only at government-designated banks.

The Unification Ministry said it will revise the law on inter-Korean cooperation and exchange to this effect. It said the measure aims to provide a greater understanding of the monetary flow of inter-Korean trade and secure transparent transactions.

The ministry has announced the qualifications a bank must meet to deal in inter-Korean trade payments and through June third, any of the 18 commercial banks in the country can apply for the designation. Two or three banks will be selected.

The revised law will also state in clearer terms the conditions and procedures relating to cross-border exchanges. It further calls for obtaining government approval when South Korean residents wish to transfer money to families in North Korea or when overseas chapters of South Korean firms seek to invest in North Korea.

The South Korean government is also seeking to gain control over remittances to families of DPRK defectors.

Read the full story here:
Designated Banks to Process S-N Trade Payments
KBS
2011-05-25

Posted in Banking, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, South Korea | Comments Closed

ROK moves to control inter-Korean remittances

Monday, May 23rd, 2011

UPDATE (2011-5-26): Defectors are not too happy with plans by the South Korean government to get control over remittances to the DPRK. According to the Korea Herald:

North Korean defectors here are strongly opposing a government plan to require them to gain approval before making remittances to relatives in the cash-strapped state.

They say that the approval process could put them and their loved ones in the North in dangerous situations and make brokers demand more money for delivering funds.

They also say that since their remittances are made through “complicated multi-layered” procedures, it would be difficult to detect those sending money without approval.

On Tuesday, the Unification Ministry put on public notice a revision bill mandating defectors to obtain approval when remitting more than a certain amount of money, with the cut-off figure yet to be set. Officials said the revision is aimed at “securing transparency in inter-Korean exchanges.”

“We have been scrimping on food, clothes and others to send some of the hard-earned money ― at most 1 million won ($917) ― to help our family, not the North Korean regime. The approval system is wrong,” a 43-year-old North Korean defector, who has taken asylum here since 1997, told The Korea Herald, declining to be named.

“Our remittances have been transparently made and we always check whether our relatives have received the money by talking directly to them by cellphone. Through the talks, albeit brief, defectors tell them the truth about Korean society and help enlighten them and bring about change there.”

He also pointed out that the planned system may not be effective.

“All these have so far taken place secretly. Who would ever like to willingly tell the authorities about their remittances at the risk of revealing their identities and those of their relatives in the North? One out of 10 may be willing,” he said.

A Unification Ministry official said that the government will carry out the approval system after taking into account opinions from the defectors and experts.

“There has been controversy over the legitimacy of their remittances, which has stemmed from the absence of government procedures over them. The system is aimed at systemizing their sending of the money to the North,” the official said.

“We will consider various opinions including those regarding the amount of money for which they should secure approval and measures to protect their family in the North.”

North Korean defectors usually send their money through ethnic Chinese people here, who ask their Chinese relatives or acquaintances inside the North or near the North Korea-China border to deliver the money. The brokers are known to take 30 percent of the total remittances.

According to a survey by a private Seoul-based group, which was released early this year, nearly half of North Korean defectors here have sent money to their families in the North.

The survey by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights found that 49.5 percent said they had sent money to their families in the North, while 46 percent said they had not and 4.5 percent said that they have no family there.

The survey was conducted on 396 North Korean defectors residing in the South, aged 15 or older, from Dec. 14-31 last year.

Seoul officials estimate that North Korean defectors’ annual remittances amount to $10 million.

Some people say the remittances could stimulate North Koreans’ longing for the affluent life south of the heavily fortified border. Others, however, are concerned that the money could get into the wrong hands in the notoriously autocratic regime.

The number of North Korean defectors living here stands at 21,294 as of April. It is expected to rise as food shortages and oppression continue in the reclusive state.

And according to Yonhap:

The Unification Ministry has announced its plans to revise a law that would require defectors to receive government approval before sending money to their families.

The ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, said the move is aimed at legalizing the money transfers and increasing their transparency.

Defectors said their families in the North usually receive some 70 percent of their remittances as brokers who arrange the deals take some 30 percent of the money as a fee.

The ministry said it would give some wiggle room for defectors by exempting them from receiving mandatory approval in case they remit a certain amount of money for their families to support them or to help them seek medical treatment.

Details have yet to be arranged. The revision process would take months as other government ministries must screen any changes before the new law’s submission to the legislature for approval.

The new revision is expected to take effect as early as the second half of next year.

The move “is not trying to regulate humanitarian money remittance,” a government official said on condition of anonymity, citing office policy.

Still, the proposed move triggered a backlash from defectors, who fear that the government regulation could complicate the process of money remittance and jeopardize their families in the North.

“I have no choice but to give money to family members in the North as they live on the money I send to them, but I cannot give any information to the government,” a defector said, asking not to be identified, citing security concerns for family members in the North.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-5-23): According to the Korea Herald:

South Koreans who wish to send money to their families in North Korea will be required to get government approval in advance under a revised law, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said Monday.

All remittances between the South and North, including investments or aid to the North from an overseas corporation set up by a South Korean citizen, will require government approval, according to the revised law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, aimed at increasing transparency of the cross-border exchanges.

So far, only payments for commercial transactions were subject to obtain government permission in advance, raising concerns that it was hard to track other kinds of cash flow into North Korea.

North Korean defectors who have settled in the South or members of families separated by the border after the 1950-53 Korean War have occasionally remitted money to their kin in the impoverished North through bank accounts in third countries such as China.

But under the new law taking effect in the second half of this year, South Koreans are obliged to get government approval before sending or passing on inheritance to their family in the North. There will be exceptions, however, for remittances of small amounts for basic living costs or medical costs of their kin in the North.

If a corporation established by a South Korean citizen in a third country plans to invest in the North, the South Korean proprietor will now have to report to the Seoul government in advance.

South Koreans planning to send goods purchased in third countries to the North will also have to attain government permission.

A South Korean Christian aid group recently sent flour, bought in China through a Chinese nongovernmental organization called Amity Foundation, to North Korea.

South Korean companies trading with entities in the North will also be required to register, under the new law.

“Between 700 and 800 companies are believed to have records of trade with the North so far, but only 580 have been confirmed so far in a survey conducted after the May 25 regulation (on inter-Korean exchanges) last year,” a ministry official said.

“The others have either stopped doing business in the North or have gone out of contact, making it hard for the government to keep track.”

The ministry plans to set up a state-funded agency to support inter-Korean nongovernmental exchanges at all times.

So far, the ministry has allocated financial aid to support inter-Korean exchange to selected non-profit organizations once or twice a year.

Previous reports indicated that the level of remittances from the ROK to the DPRK can reach USD$10m per year.

Read the full story here:
Seoul tightens rules on cash flow to North Korea
Korea Herald
Kim So-hyun
2011-5-23

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, Emigration, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy | 1 Comment »

On the DPRK’s informal credit markets…

Monday, May 16th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

Loan-sharking of both money and food is back to being widespread in North Korea these days, and sources say this is causing problems.

The activity is said to have waned for a time in the face of strict crackdowns during the currency redenomination in 2009; however, according to sources, a lot of those people who were expropriated by the currency redenomination have now started borrowing money from loan sharks in order to begin trading or get access to food, meaning it has spread widely once again.

A source from Hyesan, Yangkang Province explained on the 13th, “Those without funding for trade tend to borrow money at high interest. If they borrow money from an acquaintance, the interest rate is five percent, or they make an agreement with a loan-shark, who they don’t know well, to give ten percent.”

“Some loan-sharks get from 15 to 20 percent interest from smugglers for loans over a single night! Even though it is risky, depending on the regulations, they lend money to smugglers because they can earn large sums of money in just a few days.”

Loan sharks have been the target of crackdowns for years. In August 1997, the Ministry of Public Security (formerly the People’s Safety Ministry) released a decree stating that authorities could go so far as to execute those caught loaning food at high interest rates. Additionally, right before the currency redenomination in September of 2009, the National Security Agency cracked down on loan-sharking, releasing a decree calling on officials to “Map out measures to uproot usury.”

However, given that even agents of the People Safety Ministry use loan-sharking for the trading activities of their families, the crackdowns are doomed to fail.

According to sources from several provinces, the activity is also more common in rural areas than in cities, because in cities people have more survival mechanisms, but rural people do not have many alternative ways to get hold of money or food.

Loans are used in these agricultural areas in order to borrow grain from March to May, and are paid back double in the harvest season. In Yangkang Province, meanwhile, when people borrow one kilogram of rice or flour, they must pay it back in the form of 2.5 or 3 kg of potato starch, since the major product of the province is potatoes.

It is the kind of interest rate that was applied during the March of Tribulation, but people still apply it now.

This is a vicious circle of poverty, another defector pointed out. “Those who suffer loan-sharking each year face another worrying fall because their harvest must be paid to the loan sharks.”

The author of this Daily NK story unfortunately chooses to describe the DPRK’s “informal lenders” as “loan sharks,” making them morally equivalent to thieves and bullies, rather than describing them as lenders in a high-risk market. This sort of pejorative name-calling is common among those who don’t understand how credit markets work, particularly in a high-risk business environment such as the DPRK.

The reality is that informal and black market lenders in the DPRK are making de jure illegal loans from their own savings. This means that if the loan is officially discovered, the lender (and probably the borrower) will face criminal charges. Even if the lender is not arrested, he must pay regular protection money to keep it that way. Additionally, there is little property in the DPRK which can be credibly used as collateral in a loan, which means that even if the loan is not discovered by the authorities, if the borrower defaults or absconds with the funds there is little the lender can take possession of to recover his capital. This level of risk requires borrowers to pay much higher interest rates to coax scarce lenders into the market.

In addition to the high interest rates that black market lenders usually charge, they also earn a bad reputation for their resort to “informal” mechanisms to insure and recover these loans. Some insurance mechanisms, such as lending to family members and close acquaintances, might work well. Other mechanisms, such as making threats of harm (and following through), are not as widely respected. But these are “technological” adaptations and responses to the DPRK business environment, not purely sadistic behavior. In other words, these market practices are completely predictable given the institutional environment and not unique to the DPRK. If the DPRK court system impartially enforced contracts, and collateral could be legally secured, these sorts of technologies would be unnecessary.

I am not claiming that black market lenders are angels, or even pleasant people (in fact some of them may be powerful individuals in the party and security infrastructure), but they are financing the development of the DPRK’s unofficial economy out of nothing more than financial self-interest. Without their efforts a whole class of informal and black market entrepreneurs would be unable to access capital markets to start new businesses or finance operations. The unpleasant side of black market lending should not be placed on the market participants themselves, but on the DPRK’s policymakers who have pursued economic policies that have made this sort of behavior necessary.

Read the full Daily NK story here:
Loans Creating Circle of Poverty
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
2011-5-16

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Finance, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Insurance, Ministry of People’s Security (Criminal Police), National Defense Commission | 2 Comments »

China Exim Bank delegation visited DPRK in April

Monday, May 9th, 2011

According to the Donga Ilbo:

Members of the credit rating agency under the Export-Import Bank of China are known to have visited North Korea around the “Day of the Sun” on April 15, otherwise known as the birthday of the Stalinist country`s founder Kim Il Sung.

A source in Beijing said, “Around 10 people from the Export-Import Bank of China made a 10-day trip to North Korea ahead of the Day of the Sun. They not only visited Pyongyang but also other cities.”

The agency provides sovereign credit ratings for countries around the world. Critics say the members visited the North to seek further economic cooperation, adding their trip holds more meaning than attending the holiday event because they also visited other cities.

Another source in Beijing said, “The Chinese government is mulling financial benefits including no-interest loans to Chinese companies investing in the [North’s] city of Rason.”

Beijing seems to be preparing to invest in the Hunchun-Rason area near the Tumen River and Dandong-Sinuiju’s Hwanggeumpyong region near the Yalu River, where Pyongyang-Beijing economic cooperation is vital.

Read the full story here:
China`s Exim Bank delegation visited N. Korea last month
Donga Ilbo
2011-5-9

Posted in Banking, China, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

Remittances from North Korean defectors

Thursday, April 21st, 2011

Andrei Lankov writes in the East Asia Forum:

Until some 10 years ago, defection from North Korea implied that the person’s connections with his or her homeland would be broken for a long time, or perhaps even forever. North Korea was a huge black hole from where almost nothing could get out. But this is not the case anymore.

The number of North Korean defectors in South Korea has increased tremendously. In 2000, there were merely 1,400 North Koreans residing in the ROK. Now, a decade later, their numbers exceed 21,000.

These people are usually described as ‘defectors,’ but this name is misleading since almost none of them were driven by purely political considerations when they decided to leave North Korea. In most cases, they initially move to China, looking for food and better paying jobs. Only later do they usually find ways to move to South Korea, where, as they assume, their lives would be easier and more stable than in China.

To some extent these expectations are proven correct. By South Korean standards, North Korean refugees are not doing too well, their income being roughly half the income of the average South Korean. Nonetheless, even the 1 million won per month, plus subsidised housing and healthcare, are usually seen by refugees as affluence.

However, being Koreans they do not forget about their family members left behind in North Korea. In some cases the refugees save money to pay a professional defection specialist (simply called a broker) to relocate their family members to South Korea. A typical defection costs about 2-3 million won, but in some complex cases (for example, when the family members are old and fragile, very young or live far away from the border), it might cost considerably more.

Not everybody is willing to bring their entire family here and not every North Korean family wants to move to Seoul. Instead, defectors send money to their families back in the North. In recent years these transfers have dramatically increased in scale.

Remittances to the North are, strictly speaking, illegal according to both South and North Korean law. Nonetheless there is no way to stop this activity and, frankly, neither government is really willing to do so.

Last December the Database Centre for North Korean Human Rights conducted a survey of the economic situation of North Korean refugees in South Korea. According to the survey, 49 per cent of refugees regularly send money to their families in the North. The average amount sent by one person is estimated to be about 1 million won per year.

On balance the researchers estimated that about $10 million is sent North by defectors annually. There have been other attempts to estimate the scale of the remittances but those estimates are not much different ― most authorities agree that the annual amount is within the range of $5-$15 million. The $10 million is not a reliable amount for such a poor country as North Korea. After all, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, often described as a major cash cow for the regime, generates some $20-$35 million a year.

Of course, one cannot make a bank transfer at a Citibank branch somewhere in the North Korean wilderness, and Western Union has yet to open its offices in the North. Remittances are made in cash and handled by the same networks of brokers who also smuggle people, letters and mobile phones to and from North Korea. Usually, money is first paid to a broker or their representative in South Korea and then moved or wired to China. Then the cash is smuggled across the border from China to the North. If the recipient lives near the border, they usually get the money straight from the smuggler. For those who live further south (in Pyongyang for example) the money might be delivered by a courier.

The complexity and risk of such an arrangement implies that service fees are expensive. The transaction fee currently fluctuates at 20-30 per cent of the total, so from the $1,000 sent by a refugee from Seoul, only $700-$800 will reach her relatives. Nonetheless, the system is quite reliable and incidents when the money does not reach its intended destination are rare.

Judging by anecdotal evidence, such money seems to be used for investments by North Korean recipients, most of whom run small businesses or workshops.

Politically, these remittances are important. North Koreans nowadays suspect that South Korea is not the destitute American colony the official propaganda used to criticize. These regular remittances make a difference; they reinforce the understanding that South Korea is a very rich place indeed. In the long run the spread of this knowledge does not bode well for the people who are now in control in Pyongyang.

Read the full story here:
Remittances from North Korean defectors
East Asia Forum
2011-4-21

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Emigration, Finance, South Korea | Comments Closed

DPRK owes ROK appx $1billion

Wednesday, April 20th, 2011

According to the Choson Ilbo:

North Korea owes South Korea more than W1 trillion in terms of food and other loans, it emerged Tuesday (US$1=W1,092). The North has to start repaying the debt from June next year, but given its economic difficulties and strained inter-Korean relations it is unlikely that Seoul will see a penny.

According to the Unification Ministry, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations gave the North 2.4 million tons of rice and 200,000 tons of corn from 2000 to 2007 on condition of repayment over a period of 20 years with a 10-year grace period at a 1 percent annual interest. The loans amount to US$720.04 million, with the interest reaching $155.28 million.

The South Korean government also spent W585.2 billion from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to re-link cross-border railways and roads from 2002 to 2008. Of the total, W149.4 billion worth of materials and equipment for construction on the North Korean side are also loans to be repaid on the same conditions.

Besides, Seoul lent the North $80 million worth of raw materials for production of textile, footwear, and soap in 2007 and 2008. At the time, the North paid back 3 percent of the loan with 1,005 tons of zinc ingots worth $2.4 million, leaving a $77.6 million balance.

All told, the principal on these loans amounts to W1.02 trillion and the total debt including interest to over W1.2 trillion.

The first repayment of $5.83 million for the food loans provided between October 2000 and March 2001 is due on June 7 next year.

A ministry official said, “The amount has already been included in next year’s revenue plan, on the assumption that it will be paid back. If the North fails to pay, it will be deemed outstanding balance.”

Aside from the food and economic loans, the South also lent the North W1.37 trillion through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization from 1998 to 2006 for the construction of a light-water nuclear reactor. The money was raised by issuing government bonds. The total amount of all loans adds up to W2.25 trillion, if the accrued interest of W877.2 billion is counted.

But since the KEDO project was scrapped in 2006, there is no way for the South to get the money back. It seems likely that the total amount will be handled as “irredeemable government bonds” that have to be made up for with tax money.

Read the full story here:
Pyongyang Owes Seoul Huge Amounts of Money
Choson Ilbo
2011-4-20

Posted in Banking, Debt, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, International trade, Railways, South Korea, Statistics, Trade Statistics, Transportation | Comments Closed

Exchange rate data

Wednesday, April 6th, 2011

The The UN World Food Prgram’s Rapid Food Security Assessment Mission (RFSA) offered some exchange rate data that I thought was worth pointing out:

Currently the official exchange rate is about USD1=KPW100 yet the market rate is closer to USD1=KPW3000. In other words, the redenomination of the national currency that occurred in November 2009 is all but neutralized. The effects of this policy on ordinary citizens appear to be mixed where people with over KPW 100,000 lost their savings. The purpose of such a policy was to control inflation by reducing money supply and to curb the growth in private enterprise. Worker salaries remained the same, but prices were reduced significantly.

The PDS prices were revised downwards in the wake of the currency revaluation making it even more affordable, at least in principle. For example, PDS prices of rice declined from KPW 44 to KPW 24 per kg and maize declined from KPW 24 to KPW 14. At these low prices the issue is the lack of commodities in the market, rather than consumers lacking money to purchase them.

An average worker makes around KPW 3,000 to KPW 4,000 per month. This translates into a dollar per month which only works in DPRK because everything is heavily subsidized and ordinary citizens do not rely on direct purchases of imported commodities. If PDS were to run out of cereals at the end April, people would not have the means to purchase cereals on the black market, where prices are KPW2000 per kilogram of rice and about KPW 1000 for maize. It is highly doubtful that the barter system which is the backbone of this informal economy will be able to withstand a shock of this magnitude over more than a couple of weeks. A humanitarian crisis is the likely outcome of such a series of events.

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

India and the DPRK: aid and financial safeguards

Sunday, March 27th, 2011

India is providing the DPRK with USD$1m in assiatance via the UN World Food Program. According to the WFP web page:

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) today welcomed a generous donation of US$1 million from the Government of India for its operation to reach the most vulnerable children and their mothers in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

In an event organised at the Government of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, Honourable Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. E. Ahmed handed over an official pledge letter to WFP India representative Mihoko Tamamura.

“We are delighted to accept this donation from the government on behalf of the people of India,” said Ms. Tamamura. “As the people of DPRK are coming to the end of one of the bitterest winters in living memory – this act of generosity is extremely timely.”

The donation from India is to be used to buy pulses, rich in protein, which is a key missing ingredient in the daily DPRK diet.

Meanwhile the Reserve Bank of India (India’s Central Bank) has issued a warning to Indian banks regarding North Korean funds. According to the Business Standard:

Fearing possible money laundering and terror-financing risks from Iran and North Korea, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has asked banks and other financial entities to be cautious in dealings with entities and funds from these countries.

The RBI warning follows a fresh global caution notice issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Iran and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The FATF is an inter-governmental body responsible for making policies at national and international levels to combat money laundering and terror-financing.

The RBI said the FATF has issued a fresh public statement on February 25, 2011, “calling its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/FT) risks emanating from Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).”

“All banks and all-India financial institutions are accordingly advised to take into account risks arising from the deficiencies in AML/CFT regime of these countries, while entering into business relationships and transactions with persons (including financial institutions) from or in these countries/jurisdictions,” the RBI said in a March 24 circular.

A similar circular could be issued soon by the market regulator Sebi to warn market entities against their dealings with funds and entities related to these two countries.

An FATF public statement in this regard is always followed up by various regulators in India and other member countries asking the entities regulated by them to exercise extra caution in dealings with countries where anti-money laundering and terror-financing regulations have deficiencies.

The RBI and Sebi had last issued such a warning in January about Iran, pursuant to a directive from the FATF.

India became a member of the FATF last year. Following the nation’s accession into the global body, it is required to follow the global standards prescribed by the FATF to check money laundering and terror-financing activities.

As per the FATF warning, all financial institutions have been advised to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with Iran and North Korea, as well as their companies and financial institutions.

The FATF has urged member countries to take into account the risk of money laundering and terror-financing when considering requests by Iranian and North Korean financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries.

Iran and North Korea have been subjected to various sanctions by the US and some European countries to thwart the flow of funds allegedly used to finance their nuclear weapon ambitions and sponsor terror-related activities.

You can read the full story here:
RBI warns banks against dealings with Iran, N Korea funds
Business Standard
3/27/2011

Posted in Banking, Finance, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), India, International Aid, UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

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