Archive for the ‘Electricity’ Category

Seoul Seeks EU Investment in Kaesong

Friday, January 26th, 2007

Korea Times
Lee Jin-woo
1/26/2007

Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung Friday told European businessmen active in South Korea that the government would try its best to guarantee stability and predictability at an inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong, North Korea.

“Construction of the Kaesong industrial complex has fallen behind schedule but will proceed as planned,’’ Lee said at a luncheon meeting held by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in Korea (EUCCK) at a Seoul hotel.

The speech was given in English. Lee, who gained his master’s degree from the University of Manitoba in Canada and his doctorate from the University of Trinity College in Toronto in 1988, enjoys delivering speeches in English.

The minister said a power grid with the capacity of transmitting 100,000 kilowatts of electricity will be established at the Kaesong site in the first half of this year. Seoul has discussed the construction of a communication center with Pyongyang to expand the communication network there.

“The South Korean government will foster the best environment to make the Kaesong an attractive investment site,’’ he said. “We’re looking forward to seeing many European enterprises join the upcoming expansion of the complex.’’

Lee said the flow of exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas has continued and even expanded despite the North’s nuclear test on Oct. 9 last year.

“You may wondering why South Korea is focusing on economic cooperation with the North while putting aside many better investment chances,’’ Lee said. “That’s because we believe economic cooperation is a short cut to ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula.’’

EUCCK plans to carry out its second visit to the site in March. The chamber’s trip in 2005 was the first visit by foreign enterprises.

“Seeing is believing,’’ Lee said. “If you go and see the factories there, you’ll fully understand what I’ve told you today. I promise to assist your visit to the utmost to ensure that you have a memorable and rewarding experience.’’

On Wednesday, Lee, who took office on Dec. 11, made his first visit to the site.

About 11,200 North Korean men and women are working together with 800 South Koreans at the joint inter-Korean industrial complex. The total production in the complex last December alone was worth more than $10 million.

The complex plans to house 300 companies, which would hire as many as 70,000 workers, when power and water supply grids are completed in the first half of this year.

Currently, the EU accounts for more than half of foreign investment in South Korea and is the nation’s second-largest export market after China. It has provided humanitarian assistance worth about $430 million to North Korea since 1995.

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North Koreans cut off and freezing to death

Sunday, January 21st, 2007

Daily Telegraph
Sergey Soukhorukov
1/21/2007

The men who finally made it into the remote highland village of Koogang were greeted by an eerie silence and a gruesome sight.

Lying among the simple wooden huts and burnt remnants of wooden furniture, they found the bodies of 46 North Korean villagers, including women and children, all of whom had frozen to death. Cut off from the outside world by one of the harshest winters in many years, the villagers had suffered a macabre fate that has exposed both the desperate poverty and callous misrule blighting the Stalinist state.

More than 300 people are thought to have perished from cold so far this winter in North Korea’s mountainous north, victims of temperatures as low as -30C and of an arrogant ruling clique.

“Nobody got out of the trap alive,” said an official at the Chinese embassy in the capital, Pyongyang, who confirmed the events of Koogang. “After heavy snowfalls, there was a severe frost. The inhabitants were doomed.”

In a country notorious for its secretiveness, the regime of President Kim Jong-il has made no mention of the deaths. As the rest of the population struggle to stay warm, 50,000 members of his ruling elite continue to live in splendid isolation in a compound in central Pyongyang – enjoying the benefits of hot water, central heating and satellite television.

Elsewhere in the city, though, the scene could have been lifted from the pages of a Charles Dickens novel. The air is thick with the smell of coal dust, as families light fires on the floors of their apartments to keep out the bitter, cold winds that blow south from Siberia.

Outside Pyongyang, the situation is yet more desperate. A six-mile drive from the city, poor farmers trudge through the snow with bundles of brushwood on their backs.

A massive process of deforestation, begun in the 1990s by Kim Jong-il’s father and predecessor, Kim il Sung, has resulted in huge swathes of forest being chopped down to clear land for farming. The disastrous policy led to large-scale soil erosion, believed by many to have been a leading cause of mass famine of the 1990s, when up to three million people starved to death.

It has made the bitter winter, when the temperature in the capital routinely falls to -13C, even more dangerous as the rural poor struggle to gather enough firewood to sustain them.

The inhabitants of Koogang, around 200 miles north-east of the capital, set fire to tables and chairs, even tearing down the wood from their own homes in a desperate attempt to keep warm.

The World Food Programme estimates that North Korea will be 900,000 tons short of the amount of food needed to feed its 23 million population this year. Aid efforts have been complicated by sanctions, imposed after Kim Jong-il’s regime carried out a nuclear test in October last year. Last week, the country held negotiations with US diplomats aimed at re-starting six-party peace talks, which also include China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

Christopher Hill, America’s chief envoy at the talks in Berlin, signalled progress, saying that the US looked forward “to establishing a normal relationship with North Korea”.

But while there may be signs of a thaw in the country’s frosty relationship with the West, in Pyongyang there is no respite from the sub-zero temperatures.

The electricity supply is notoriously unreliable and as evening falls the city streets are plunged into darkness.

The only constant source of light is the giant illuminated copper statue of Kim il Sung on a hill top overlooking the city – cold comfort for those living through the bleak North Korean mid-winter.

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No New Year food rations distributed in N.K. except Pyongyang: civic group

Wednesday, January 17th, 2007

Yonhap
1/17/2007

North Korea has failed to deliver on its promise to distribute food rations across the communist country on the occasion of the New Year, a civic aid group said Wednesday.

“Except for Pyongyang, no special New Year food rations were issued,” Good Friends, a Seoul-based civic relief organization, said in its latest monthly newsletter.

The group said that North Korean authorities had planned to provide food rations equal to the daily household consumption of rice across the country, but three days worth of rice and 500 grams of bean oil were distributed only for residents in Pyongyang.

“Mid-level officials living in Pyongyang received food rations to last a half month and electricity was provided for the city during the New Year,” it said.

North Korea has suffered from a chronic food shortage since the mid 1990s due to a series of natural disasters aggravated by an overall economic downturn. However, the North had always managed to prioritize food distribution to ensure the inhabitants of the capital Pyongyang do not go without it, experts say.

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Sanctions Don’t Dent N. Korea-China Trade

Wednesday, October 25th, 2006

From the New York Times:
Jim Yardley
10/25/2006

[edited]Sanhe, China–Truckers carrying goods into North Korea across the sludge-colored Tumen River say inspections are unchanged on the Chinese side. Customs agents rarely open boxes here or at two other border crossings in this mountainous region, truckers and private transport companies say.

Nor are any fences visible, like the barrier under construction near China’s busiest border crossing at the city of Dandong. There were early reports that inspectors in Dandong were at least opening trucks for a look, but so far statistics and anecdotal reports in the Chinese news media indicate that, essentially, everything remains the same.

What is visible here, though, is the growing and, in some ways, surprisingly complicated trade relationship between China and North Korea. China remains North Korea’s most important aid donor and oil supplier, but, conversely, China is now importing growing amounts of coal and electricity from North Korea. Chinese entrepreneurs, meanwhile, are starting to buy shares in North Korean mining operations and, in one case, trying to gain access to the Sea of Japan by leasing a North Korean port as a potential shipping hub.

The upswing in Chinese economic activity — which is already raising questions about whether the intent is more strategic than commercial — is one of the reasons that China has sent mixed signals about how aggressive it will be in inspecting border trade to meet the United Nations sanctions. For now, at least, some truckers in this region say the only change in border inspections has come on the North Korean side, where customs agents are checking loads more carefully for items deemed contraband by Kim Jong-il’s government.

“We used to sit with North Koreans that we know and have a chat,” said Jiang Zhuchun, a trucker waiting to cross into North Korea on Tuesday afternoon. “But after the nuclear test, we are only allowed to sit alone in our trucks.”

The United States has praised China for approving the sanctions against North Korea, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used her visit to Beijing last week to emphasize the common desire to restart diplomatic talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. China’s leaders are said to be deeply angered over the nuclear test and have signaled they may take a harder line against their longtime ally. Last week, some banks in Dandong froze certain accounts and financial transactions with North Korea.

But the question of inspections along the 866-mile border between China and North Korea is a different matter. The sanctions authorized countries to inspect cargo entering and leaving North Korea and barred the sale or transfer of material that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Yet the sanctions are still less than two weeks old, and some details have still not been worked out. For example, the sanctions ban luxury goods without defining them.

The United States wants tightened border inspections by China as a tool for squeezing the North Korean economy and ensuring that North Korea cannot buy or sell nuclear materials. China is worried that destabilizing North Korea could begin an exodus of refugees and has resisted changing inspections. This week, with rumors swirling about a possible border crackdown, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, said China intended to comply fully with the sanctions, but also said inspections along the border would remain “normal.”

The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region, the name of the sprawling district that includes the Sanhe border checkpoint, is not the primary trade route between China and North Korea; Dandong, with its more direct route to Pyongyang, the North’s capital, is by far the busiest. But the Yanbian area is wedged into a geopolitical hotspot where China, North Korea and Russia all come together.

In interviews and visits to three crossings from Yanbian into North Korea, truckers, transportation company agents, investors and others confirmed without exception that trade is continuing across the border much as it always has. Customs agents examine bills of lading but usually open shipments only when they are tipped in advance to someone trying to smuggle goods like beer or liquor without paying customs duties, several people said.

“No matter who you talk to, they will tell you there is not much difference,” said Jin Lanzhu, whose trading company is one of the largest in the region.

On Wednesday morning inside the Chinese customs yard in the border city of Tumen, small groups of North Koreans, each wearing their mandatory pins with images of either North Korean leader Kim Jong-il or his father, Kim Il-sung, waited to cross the bridge. They had nylon sacks stuffed with shoes and clothes, television sets, a refrigerator. Some carried bags of rice.

“How many bags do you have?” asked a female Chinese customs agent in a blue uniform. She looked them over and walked away without opening any. She did forbid the North Koreans to take several boxes of fruit because of a problem with worms. Then, the men began loading the sacks onto a flatbed truck operated by the customs office to carry smaller loads to the North Korean side. Two North Korean women complained to a local taxi driver that they had to pay 400 yuan, or about $50, for the service.

“They don’t really check over here,” one North Korean woman said of Chinese customs. “They do on the North Korean side.”

A similar scene unfolded later in the day at a smaller crossing in the dingy town of Kaishan, where the customs port is so small that trucks take a dirt road to a crumbling checkpoint. On Wednesday, a young soldier watched laborers load about 150 used televisions and boxes of medicine into a North Korean truck that had crossed the river to collect the shipment.

“I’m here for security,” the soldier said.

Trade between China and North Korea has grown rapidly in recent years — as has North Korea’s trade deficit with China, in part, because China no longer appears to be selling oil at a subsidized rate. China now accounts for almost 40 percent of North Korea’s total foreign trade; bilateral trade has more than doubled to $1.1 billion in 2005 from $490 million in 1995. In Yanbian alone, trade with North Korea jumped 82 percent in 2004 and another 20 percent in 2005, according to a local newspaper account.

Divining what the increased traffic says about the state of North Korea’s economy is a subject of debate. New research and interviews in the Yanbian region suggest that North Korea, a country that regularly suffers blackouts, is now exporting growing amounts of coal, minerals and even electricity to China, which is hungry for energy and raw materials. In exchange, North Korea is no longer importing as much raw material and machinery as it had in the past.

Instead, North Korea is importing food, clothes, daily sundries, outdated televisions and appliances and, of course, oil. The trend could suggest that North Korea’s recent experiments with private markets may be expanding, some analysts said.

A recent study by the Nautilus Institute, a San Francisco-based research group, used customs statistics to describe the trend, but also concluded that it might indicate that North Korea’s nonmilitary manufacturing industries were in sharp decline. One Chinese investor in a North Korean coal mine agreed. “They seemed to have stopped the factories,” said the investor, who asked not to be identified. He said doing business with North Korea was very risky and cautioned that numerous Chinese businessmen had lost money. “There are zero guarantees and protections.”

Even so, Chinese entrepreneurs and companies, both private and state-owned, are starting to buy interests in North Korean mines to export raw materials. The amount of investment is not clearly defined, but different Chinese proposals call for building truck routes between inland trade centers in northeast China to the North Korean coast, according to Chinese media accounts.

A Chinese property developer, Fan Yingsheng, told the Chinese news media that despite the nuclear test, he was still pursuing plans to develop the North Korean port of Rajin into a shipping center for goods from China. He said he would soon fly to Pyongyang to sign a final agreement.

The flurry of Chinese activity has not gone unnoticed by South Korea and others in the region, analysts say. Like China, South Korea has resisted harsh economic sanctions and refused to shut down its own trade deals with North Korea in part because of concerns about a swift collapse of the North Korean government. But South Korea is also positioning itself, to some degree against China, to be the dominant player in the future of North Korea.

China, meanwhile, has said the activity is not strategic positioning but natural economic outgrowth for a booming, entrepreneurial economy in need of resources. Li Dunqiu, a North Korea specialist with a research institute under China’s State Council, or cabinet, recently wrote that “laws of the market economy” were the driving force in Chinese investment in North Korea.

Along the border, it is easy to see how the daily traffic from China is a lifeline for North Korea. One woman from Yanbian said her family had recently come across to buy rice and other essentials. But Mr. Jin, the owner of the trading company, said charity was not at the essence of China’s trade with North Korea.

“The business interest is the most important thing,” he said. “Helping them comes after that.” Then, pausing to reflect on the potential and perils of trading with North Korea, he added: “North Korea is just like China in the past. It is a blank sheet of paper. You can draw wherever you want to. The question is whether the paper is going to be there at all times for you to draw on.”

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North Korean energy trade with China

Tuesday, August 1st, 2006

Nautilus Institute
Nathaniel Aden
August 2006

Paper here: Nautilus-Aden.pdf
web link here

Abstract:  China is North Korea’s largest international trading partner. Since 1995, energy and fuels have dominated bilateral trade between allies.  North Korea is a net importer of Chinese crude oil and oil products; however, it became a net exporter of electricity and coal to China in 2003.  Whereas North Korean coal and electricity exports are sold at sub-market “friendship prices,” Chinese coal and oil products have been sold to North Korea at premium prices.  Over the past ten years, North Korea’s imports have become increasingly energy-intensive, while exports have become more labor-intensive.  Chinese customs data suggest that Beijing is taking a pragmatic, market-oriented approach to trade with its reclusive neighbor, while the increasingly asymmetrical energy embodiment of bilateral trade may reflect dilapidation of North Korea’s non-military industries.

Bullet Points:
1.  In 2005, bilateral trade with the PRC accounted for 39% of North Korean international trade by value.

2. North Korean trade data are compiled by partner-country Customs Bureaus, the United Nations, and the Internaitonal Monetary fund (IMF).  China and South Korea provide the best “mirror” statistics.  Customs data do not include aid shipments, official development assistance, direct government transfers, foreign direct investment, services, remittances, barter trade, smuggling, illicit trade, trade in military equipment.

3.  The DPRK has spent an increasing amount of money on diminishing quantities of energy imports, particularly Chinese crude.  The decline of energy import volumes in the face of increasing overall imports and trade may reflect demand sensitivity to increased international market prices and/or North Korea’s lack of hard currency with which to purchase imported energy and fuels.

4. The DPRK has significant, ongoing refining capabilities.

5. Between 1985 and 2002, the DPRK domestic coal production has declined from 37.5 million tons to 21.9 million tons.  Nonetheless, North Korea increased its export quantity to 2% of total domestic production since 2002. 

6.  Starting in May 2005, North Korea has been an uninterrupted monthly electricity exporter.  Hydropower may account for much of the DPRKs surplus electric power.

7.  Energy prices reflect the pragmatic, market-oriented character of China’s economic relationship with North Korea.  North Korea may be providing China coal at subsidized prices, below those of China’s other trading partners.

8.  North Korea coal export prices show an awareness of market prices starting in 2002.

9.  The DPRK has consistently paid premium prices for Chinese oil product exports over the last ten years.

10. Aside from politically-determined prices, several conditions could explain this: 1.  Real factors (transport costs, demand, goegraphy) 2. Pyongyang’s insulation from market realities 3.  No DPRK leverage.

11. In 2005, North Korea imported $2omillion worht of trucks, $2 million worth of cars, $1 million of tractors.  The transport sector has not grown significantly since 1995.

12.  Shift of DPRK trade towards energy-intensive imports and labor-intensive exports suggests deterioration of non-military industry.

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ROK suspends electricity transmission capacity expansion to Kaesong

Monday, July 24th, 2006

Say that title five times fast.  From Yonhap:

KEPCO postpones construction of transmission tower in N. Korea indefinitely

Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO), South Korea’s state-run electricity monopoly, has postponed its plan to construct a transmission tower in an inter-Korean industrial park in North Korea indefinitely amid rising tension on the peninsula in the aftermath of the North’s missile launches, the chief of the company said Monday.

“Since the inter-Korean relationship hit a deadlock due to a string of negative factors, such as North Korea’s missile firing, we have decided to put off a groundbreaking ceremony that had been slated for Friday to mark the construction of the transmission tower in the Kaesong industrial complex,” KEPCO’s Chairman & CEO Han Joon-ho said in a meeting with reporters in Seoul.

KEPCO had planned to build a transmission tower capable of sending 100,000 kilowatts of electricity from the South to the industrial park, located just across the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas.

The company currently transmits 15,000 kilowatts of electricity via 23 telegraph polls for more than 13 South Korean companies operating there.

The South Korean-built complex is a product of a historic inter-Korean summit in 2000 which set off a series of cross-border projects. About a dozen South Korean garment and other labor-intensive plants are currently in operation in the complex.

KEPCO’s announcement comes amid escalating tension between the two countries, triggered by the North’s missile launches on July 5.

Last week, North Korea withdrew all of its government officials from a joint dialogue office in Kaesong, cutting off the last direct channel for communication with Seoul.

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Russia to trade DPRK electricity for natural resources

Tuesday, July 4th, 2006

In the old days, the DPRK nurtured its independence by alternating its allegiance between China and Russia, playing the big boys off each other.  Today, China clearly holds more influence in the DPRK in terms of trade and direct political influence.  In fact, China and the DPRK are involved in several hydro-power projects on the Yalu river.  Perhaps energy subsidies are a way for Russia to regain a foothold in the DPRK and protect its direct link to Pyongyang and potential land links to Seoul. 

On an economic note, this kind of behavior is typically called “dumping” in the west and it is not allowed under WTO rules.  But both parties are clearly better off if the deal goes through.  This should tell us something about our Anti-dumping trade rules in the west as well. 

But this is all just silly speculation on my part.  Here is the article from the Joong Ang:

July 04, 2006
KHABAROVSK, Russia ― Russia has been in discussions with North Korea to supply it with surplus electricity, Russian officials at a state-owned electric power company recently told the JoongAng Ilbo. In return, North Korea would provide Russia with natural resources.

“We have been discussing exporting surplus electricity from the far eastern district of the country to North Korea,” Victor Minakov, president of Vostokenergo, the far eastern branch of the United Energy System of Russia, said in an interview last week in Khabarovsk.

“The fastest and most efficient way to resolve North Korea’s electricity problem is to supply electricity from Russia,” Mr. Minakov said.

According to Mr. Minakov, negotiations have been delayed because Russia initially asked North Korea to pay cash for the electricity, and then asked it to cover the expenses for building power transmission lines, neither of which the North could afford.

However, the negotiations resumed after Pyongyang offered to pay for the electricity with natural mineral resources. “Representatives from the Russian energy company will visit Pyongyang at the end of this month for further discussions on detailed matters,” Mr. Minakov said.

The far eastern area of Russia, reportedly has around 300,000 kilowatts of surplus electricity, and the government plans to further improve productivity there by building more power plants. Russia and North Korea has been negotiating on the supply of electricity since 2001.

Russia plans to build a 370-kilometer (229-mile) power transmission line between Vladivostok, Russia, and Chongjin, North Korea, to supply 300,000 to 500,000 kilowatts of electricity. Building power transmission lines and converters would take three years, and cost at least $200 million.

“It costs much less to supply electricity from Russia to North Korea than from South Korea to the North or through the programs of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,” Pavel Korovko, vice president of Vostokenergo, said on June 27 at a seminar in Khabarovsk.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization was dissolved recently after failing to build light water reactors in North Korea under the terms of a 1994 agreement between North Korea and the United States.

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All about DPRK energy…

Wednesday, February 1st, 2006

A report issued by the Department of Energy: dprkenergy.pdf

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Interview with a Citizen of Chongjin City

Wednesday, December 28th, 2005

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
12/28/2005

The DailyNK has reported North Korean news vividly with the help of the voices inside North Korea during the year 2005.

North Korea expressed farming as ‘the major front line for the construction of socialist economy’ in the joint new year editorial at the beginning of this year. In fact, it has made every effort to relieve its famine by mobilizing a number of people to farming for the entire year. In October, it also announced to its people that it would resume its ration system that had long been stopped.

The DailyNK met a citizen of Chongjin City of North Hamkyeong Province to fully grasp the recent situation of North Korea as a whole at this moment of seeing the old year out and the new year in. The interview is presented in the format of 10 questions and answers. The reader is expected to feel the reality of North Korea in mid-December, 2005 by reading the interview.

1.  How does the ration system work?
Workers in Giupso (State Owned Enterprise) receive a ration twice a month, the total ration being 700g a month. The government designated that the price of unglutinous rice is 46 won, while that of corn is 28 won. Those housewives who can work but stay home can buy 300g for 620 won. Children and the elderly, who are not able to work, can buy cereals at the government designated prices.

In short, the government has adopted a double price system. However, those who are rationed receive rice mixed with miscellaneous cereals whereas those who pay 620 won get unmixed rice.

Factories and Giupsos are assigned the farmland of No.112, and they have to produce cereals the quantity of which is equal to two month’s ration. In October, people were fully rationed, but since November, they have not been able to be fully rationed. People without the farmland of No.112 partly received their rations.

Additional question: What is the farmland of No.112?

It is a part of a cooperative farmland which is difficult to cultivate. Every factory and Giupso is assigned one. If a Giupso is influential, it is usually assigned a fertile land. It is so named because the policy was established on either November 2nd, last year or January 12th this year. I don’t remember the date.

2. How do people obtain their food if they are not fully rationed?
They get cereals in black markets. Transferring cereals in large scale is strictly prohibited, but people are selling them to acquaintances or under the cover of a bribe. Trading a large quantity of cereals is stealthily accomplished in a private home. Restaurants are also forbidden to sell processed cereals.

The price of rice has not risen. It ranges from 800 to 820 won ($0.4-0.41). The price of corn is 300 won ($0.15) while that of potatoes is 150 won ($0.075). Because people in Chongjin City do not enjoy eating corn, it is cheap here.

3. How are farmers rationed, and how much is the government’s purchasing price of cereals?
The farmland of No.112 is divided by fertility. The worst class is the 12th. 1,500 won ($0.75) is collected from 9,917.4 square meters of 12th class farmland as a tax. It can be payed with corn. 1kg of corn is bought for 24 won($0.012).

I heard a squad leader of a cooperative farm located near Chongjin say, “Every person on my farm was supposed to receive the prize of some 17,000 won ($8.5) because the government sent the prize to the farm for good farming, but the farm has not given the prize out to the people, saying that it would be a better idea for the money to be used to buy trucks and farm equipment, and thus people are full of complaints. The farm distributes ordinary rations to the workers.

4. What are people’s reactions to the resumption of the ration system like?
Most people are pessimistic about it. They grumble, “We do not understand why the government does not sell cereals indiscriminately. It has just made things complicated.” On the other hand, those who do not have a means of making a living hope for the ration system.

5. Do you have something to talk about regarding companies and work place lives?
In former years, there were people belonging to the circle called ‘the rest’ in companies. These people could do their own business by giving some part of their profits to their Giupso. However, all people are required to come to the Giupso to work these days. If there are some surplus workers, they are fired.

Since it was said that every Giupso should ration its workers, those who are not able to do their own businesses, especially women, have made every effort to be employed by a Giupso.

Rich people are not interested in companies, but the poor are full of complaints because ‘the rest’ circle was eliminated. The poor are getting much more interested in job opportunities.

6. As far as I know, the rate of factory operation is 20% or so. Has there been any changes recently?
No, there is almost no change in the rate. Earning foreign money is active, but I’ve never heard that those factories that had stopped before resumed its operation, or that they changed their business category to be operative.

7. Can you come up with a concrete example that shows that the status of partisans is getting lower?
Factories and Giupsos are reluctant to employ partisans because it is difficult to lay them off. If one says he is a partisan during a job interview, he will probably be turned down. Non-partisans are definitely preferred.

8. Is the control over people getting tighter?
The control in matters of food is getting tight. Because controlling restaurants and processed cereals has been getting tighter, more and more stalls are being emptied in markets, and the price of stalls is decreasing. A stall 50cm wide and 1.5m long for selling apparel can be bought for 120,000 won ($60).

Food for a family of 4 members costs 120-130 thousand won ($60-65) a month. The family also has to spend money for housing and clothing.

Additional question: I heard that even though many people are moving from one place to another, and a number of people dare to complain, punishments are getting weaker and weaker. Can you give me some examples regarding that?

The security agents say that they no longer arrest blasphemers. They even say that they will enforce laws on the basis of scientific evidences. (Blasphemers refer to those who blaspheme the system of the Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il regime.)

Punishments for defectors, radio listeners, and other such crimes are considerably moderated.

A neighbor in his 70’s was arrested due to his acquaintance’ betrayal. He revealed that he had been listening to the radio, but he was just called names during the investigation and criticized publicly in front of a crowd of people. That was the punishment. Even though blaspheming is said to be forgiven, you cannot call Kim Jong Il’s name. Maybe it would be okay for you to say South Korea is rich.

Additional question: Recently, it has been reported that Kim Jong Il ordered that torturing be checked and human rights be respected. Have you ever heard from security agents such a story or instructions?

No, I’ve never heard that.

Additional questions: Because punishments are getting moderated, what kind of countermeasures do North Korea take to protect the regime?

The National Security Agency is said to employ and use many informants. It lets people watch each other. According to one of my acquaintances, those who have an experience of escaping from the North are especially encouraged to watch each other.

9. How is the electric power supply like?
Electric power is supplied for 3 to 4 hours a day from 11 p.m. to 3 a.m. Middle class people usually have both a black and white TV set and a color TV set. They use only batteries for the black and white TV. Electric power supply is poor for winter. It starts getting better in the spring and is best in summer.

10. Recently, North Koreans are said to widely use horse-drawn or cow-drawn carriages. Is that true?
They are widely used for carrying cargo. They are seen even in urban cities. Recently, individuals or Giupsos are trading cows. The price of a cow in black markets range from 400 to 700 thousand won ($200-350). Recently, the price for using such a carriage is determined in relation to the distance instead of the weight it should carry. 3 to 4km costs 2,000 won ($1), while anything more than 5km costs 3,000 won ($1.5). The weight of the cargo usually does not exceed 700kg.

If one uses a truck, he must pay for the fuel in addition to the fee. 1kg of diesel costs 2,000 won ($1).

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The Nautilus Institute primer on the DPRK

Tuesday, November 26th, 2002

Here is the main page

The Nautilus Institute has created the DPRK Briefing Book to enrich debate and rectify the deficiencies in public knowledge. Our goal is that the DPRK Briefing Book becomes your reference of choice on the security dilemmas posed by North Korea and its relations with the United States. The DPRK Briefing Book is part of the Nautilus Institute’s “US-DPRK Next Steps: Avoiding Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear War in Korea” project.

The completed DPRK Briefing Book will cover approximately two-dozen “Policy Areas,” each containing issue briefs, critical analyses from diverse perspectives, and key reference materials, some of which are available as PDFs. (To view the PDFs, you will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader). We will post additional Policy Areas over the coming months. If you would like to be notified as they are completed, please sign up for NAPSnet, if you haven’t already.

The Nautilus Institute seeks a diversity of views and opinions on controversial topics in order to identify common ground. Views expressed in the Briefing Book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. The information contained in these pages may be downloaded, reproduced and redistributed as long as it has not been altered and is properly attributed. Permission to use Nautilus Institute materials for publications may be attained by contacting us.

Here are sections of interest:

About DPRK, Agriculture, China, Economy, Energy, Transition

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