Archive for the ‘Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong)’ Category

Oil Is Shipped to North Korea Under Nuclear Shutdown Pact

Friday, July 13th, 2007

NY Times
CHOE SANG-HUN
7/13/2007

A South Korean ship loaded with 6,200 tons of heavy fuel oil left for North Korea on Thursday under an agreement intended to end the North’s nuclear program.

The United Nations’ chief nuclear inspector said the North was expected to begin shutting down its main nuclear facilities early next week, after four and a half years of operation, during which time enough plutonium was thought to have been produced to make several atomic bombs.

The ship is expected to arrive at Sonbong, a port in northeastern North Korea, on Saturday, the same day a team of inspectors from the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled to arrive in the North to monitor and verify the shutdown.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the atomic agency, told reporters in Seoul that shutting down five nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, 62 miles north of Pyongyang, the capital, would not be difficult and should be completed “within maybe a month or so.” His agency and North Korea have already agreed on the procedures.

The shutdown would be significant because it would halt the North’s only declared program for producing fuel that can be used in nuclear weapons. The five facilities to be frozen in Yongbyon, including the country’s sole operating nuclear reactor and a radiochemical laboratory, can yield more than 13 pounds of plutonium a year, enough for one atomic bomb, according to experts.

But the steps to be taken after the initial freeze of the nuclear program remain “very much open questions,” Dr. ElBaradei said. Those include whether North Korea will provide the agency with a complete inventory of its nuclear materials, and when it might return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

“It’s going to be a very long process,” he said. “It’s going to be a complicated process. How smoothly the rest of the operation will go very much depends on how progress will be made in six-party talks.”

Chief envoys to the six-nation nuclear talks will meet in Beijing next Wednesday and Thursday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said. The envoys, gathering for the first talks since March, were expected to discuss moves beyond the reactor shutdown.

North Korea agreed to shut down its Yongbyon facilities in a February agreement with the United States, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan. The deal called for shipping 50,000 tons of fuel oil to North Korea, and South Korea volunteered.

It plans to complete shipping the oil by early August, starting with the installment on Thursday.

North Korea indicated last week that it would undertake the long-delayed shutdown after the first shipment arrived.

When United Nations inspectors return to Yongbyon, they will face the same problems they had faced there before they were expelled in late 2002. They will put in seals, install cameras and leave monitors to ensure that the facilities remain shut. But they will not be allowed to collect samples or access North Korean data, much less travel around the country, to determine how much nuclear material North Korea has produced in Yongbyon or elsewhere.

The five-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon began operating in the mid-1980s. When suspicions about North Korea’s nuclear activities emerged in the early 1990s, a key dispute was how much plutonium had been produced at Yongbyon until then — 90 grams, about 3 ounces, as North Korea reported to the I.A.E.A., or up to 10 kilograms, about 22 pounds, as the agency suspected.

The dispute has never been resolved, although North Korea agreed to suspend operations at Yongbyon in an agreement with the United States in 1994. The accord collapsed in late 2002, when North Korea expelled the United Nations inspectors and restarted the Yongbyon operation.

North Korea has since claimed to have taken spent fuel unloaded from the reactor and reprocessed it into plutonium. Last October, it conducted its first nuclear test.

“It remains an unanswered question: how much plutonium has North Korea so far produced?” said Lee Un-chul, a nuclear scientist at Seoul National University. “North Korea won’t easily give up its operational data.”

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Emperor Hotel Casino Re-opens

Thursday, June 14th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Yong Jin
6/14/2007

[NKeconWatch: Lots of pictures in original article]

The Emperor Hotel and Casino in Rajin-Sunbong has re-opened. It had earlier been a source of Chinese authority concern over remote gambling as the casino attempted to attract foreign tourists.

The North Korean regime designated Rajin and Sunbong as a special free economics and trade zone in December, 1991 and encouraged foreign businesses to locate there. Hong Kong’s Emperor Group opened a five star hotel with 100 guest rooms and a casino in July, 2000.

However, Cai Haowen, a superintendent at the Transportation Ministry in Yanbian-Zhou, embezzled approximately $425,000 of public funds and threw away all the money for gambling in the Emperor Hotel Casino, causing the Chinese government to close the hotel’s casino on January 11st, 2004.

Chinese bloggers who have visited the hotel released photos through a Chinese portal site, sina.com.

Bao Yong visited the Emperor in April and noted that the hotel is 50 km from Huichun, China, and the only tourists were Chinese. North Koreans were not permitted and there was no evidence of Russians. There were just Chinese cars with license plates from Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and, predominantly, Yanbian in the parking lot.

He said that “the strict hotel and casino management seemed more like agents or gangsters than managers, who were everywhere, creepily scrutinizing gamblers’ movement and attitudes.” They prevented him from taking photos inside the casino.

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Russia and China seek use of port in North

Wednesday, May 16th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Lee Yang-soo and Brian Lee
5/16/2007

With an eye on future transportation infrastructure, both Russia and China are courting North Korea to get in on the development of Najin port, in the far north of the country near the Russian border.

A Foreign Ministry official said yesterday that Russian Railways President Vladimir Yakunin is scheduled to visit North Korea to discuss launching a project aimed at improving and repairing a railroad from Najin to Khasan, just across the border into Russia.

Yakunin told former Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, who visited Russia last month, that President Vladimir Putin had great interest in the project and Russia was hoping for the active participation of South Korean companies, the official said. The railway official visited Seoul in July last year to discuss the project with South Korean companies. The issue was also discussed in March at a bilateral meeting with Russia on economic cooperation.

A government official said that Russia wants to use Najin port as a logistics hub, but is also intending to develop the port into a base for future development of oil and natural gas in Siberia. The ultimate goal would be to connect the trans-Siberian railway with an inter-Korean railway system.

Beijing also has its eye on the North Korean port, which it envisions as part of its grand design to build a transport network that stretches from the Indian Ocean to the North Pacific.

“Najin Port is near the Jilin area and China’s own ports in the area have already reached their full capacity,” a government official said yesterday.

Beijing has recently notified Pyongyang that it is willing to spend $1 billion to develop port facilities, build railroads connecting the port to China and improve existing infrastructure such as highways, the official said.

In a report published earlier this year, Cho Myung-chul, a researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, predicted that China would use investments in the North’s ports and railroads to extend its own infrastructure for export and import purposes. China has made similar investments in Burma and Bangladesh, among others.

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The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe

Thursday, May 3rd, 2007

American Enterprise Institute Book forum
4/17/2007

A couple of weeks ago, I had the opportunity to attend a book forum at the American Enterprise Institute on Nicholas Eberstadt’s new book, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe.  It was very informative to hear three different perspectives on the direction of North Korea’s economic reform.

Panelists included:

Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University
Deok-Ryong Yoon, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

In summary, Mr. Eberstadt and Mr. Lankov are pessimistic about the North Korean leadership’s desire to enact reforms–knowing that information leakages will undermine their political authority.  As Mr. Lankov pointed out, the North Korean nomenklatura are all children and grandchildren of the founders of the country who are highly vested in the current system.  They have no way out politically, and as such, cannot reform.

They argue that the economic reforms enacted in 2002 were primarily efforts to reassert control over the de facto institutions that had emerged in the collapse of the state-run Public Distribition System, not primarily intended to revive the economy.  Lankov does admit, however, that North Korea is more open and market-oriented than it has ever been, and  Mr. Yoon was by far the most optomistic on the prospects of North Korean reform.

Personally, I think it makes sense to think about North Korean politics as one would in any other country–as composed of political factions that each seek their own goals.  Although the range of policy options is limited by current political realities, there are North Koreans who are interested in reform and opening up–even if only to earn more money.  In this light, even if the new market institutions recognized in the 2002 reforms were acknowledged only grudgingly, they were still acknowledged, and their legal-social-economic positions in society are now de jure, not just de facto.  The North Korean leadership might be opposed to wholesale reform, but that is economically and strategically different than a controlled opening up on an ad hoc basis–which is what I believe we are currently seeing. Anyway, dont take my word for it, check out the full commentary posted below the fold:

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The Political Economy of Sanctions Against North Korea

Sunday, March 4th, 2007

Ruediger Frank
Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No.3, 2006 pp. 536

PDF Here: DPRK sanctions.pdf

Abstract:
This article explores sanctions as a policy tool to coerce North Korea’s behavior, such as by discontinuing its nuclear weapons program. It discusses the characteristics of sanctions as well as the practical experience with these restrictions on North Korea. It becomes clear that the concrete goals of coercion through sanctions and the relative power of the sending country to a large extent determine the outcome. Nevertheless, the general limitations of sanctions also apply, including the detrimental effects of unilateral and prolonged restrictions. It appears that the imposition of sanctions against the DPRK is unlikely to succeed. As an alternative way of changing the operating environment for North Korea, assistance deserves consideration. Despite many weaknesses, this instrument is relatively low in cost and risk, and can be applied continuously and flexibly.

Highlights below the fold:
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Russia and China Vie for Najin Port

Friday, February 2nd, 2007

Choson Ilbo
2/2/2007
 
Russia is trying to strengthen ties with North Korea, citing a “China threat” in Korea and the Far East. The Gudok, the daily newspaper of Russian Railways, said in an article Tuesday, “If China takes control of Najin port in North Korea, Russia may suffer huge losses in the project to link the TKR (Trans-Korea Railway) and the TSR (Trans-Siberian Railway).”

Gudok is published by Vladimir Yakunin, the president and CEO of Russian Railways and one of the closest allies of Russian president Vladimir Putin. Sources say the report can be viewed as Russia’s official position as it tries to expand its influence with Pyongyang.

“China has completed feasibility studies for Najin port and is now doing repairs and upgrades to wharfs and container unloading facilities,” the article said. It said that because the port lies at the start of the Najin-Hasan Railway and does not freeze throughout a year, Russia must take hold of it.

“China has already requested that the UNDP, or UN Development Program, give the Chinese the right of free passage in the UNDP-initiated Tumen river development project. What China aims to achieve is to establish its own port in North Korea as a foothold to advance into the Pacific Ocean,” the article said. The newspaper urged the Russian government to respond aggressively.

Sources with the Korean government said Thursday, “The Russian government suggested late last year that it would pursue a railway modernization plan on a 54km stretch of the Najin-Hasan line with its own money, without support from South Korea, if we expand container transportation on the route between Busan and Najin.”

Currently only North Korean trains are in service on that stretch of railway. Russia has been working on the line since July, converting its narrow gauge to the standard that supports container transportation.

North Korea, which has sent around 10,000 construction workers and loggers to the Far East region, is welcoming closer cooperation with Russia. When president Putin announced last Saturday that Russian would spend 100 billion rubles (W3.7 trillion) to hold the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vladivostok in Russia, North Korean consulate-general Shim Kuk-ryeong in Nachodka said, “North Korea is ready to join major construction projects as soon as Vladivostok’s infrastructure development project starts.”

Russia’s efforts to expand its influence with North Korea can be seen as falling within the context of Putin’s recent emphasis on the Far East. Late last year, Putin said, “Russia’s security is now being threatened with the illegal migration of Chinese into the Far East.”

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DPRK scores last place in economic freedom (again)

Tuesday, January 16th, 2007

Heritage 2007 Index of Economic Freedom

North Korea’s economy is 3% free, according to our 2007 assessment, which makes it the world’s least free economy, or 157th out of 157 countries. North Korea is ranked 30th out of 30 countries in the Asia–Pacific region, and its overall score is the lowest in the world.

North Korea does not score well in a single area of economic freedom, although it does score 10 percent in investment freedom and property rights. The opening of the Kaesong industrial venture in cooperation with South Korea has been a start in foreign investment.

Business freedom, investment freedom, trade freedom, financial freedom, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom are nonexistent. All aspects of business operations are totally controlled and dominated by the government. Normal foreign trade is almost zero. No courts are independent of political interference, and private property (particularly land) is strictly regulated by the state. Corruption is virtually immeasurable and, in the case of North Korea, hard to distinguish from necessity. Much of North Korea’s economy cannot be measured, and world bodies like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are not permitted to gather information. Our policy is to give countries low marks for specific freedoms when it is country policy to restrict measurement of those freedoms.

Background:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has maintained its Communist system since its founding in 1948. A serious economic decline began in the early 1990s with the end of economic support from the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, including China. Floods and droughts all but destroyed the agricultural infrastructure and led to severe famine and dislocation of the population during the 1990s. South Korean and Chinese investments in the economy have alleviated dire conditions. The government continues to rely on counterfeiting foreign currency and sales of missiles for money. That and the nuclear ambitions and isolationism of Kim Jong Il reinforce North Korea’s status as the hermit kingdom.

Business Freedom – 0.0%
The state regulates the economy heavily through central planning. The economic reforms implemented in 2002 allegedly brought some changes at the enterprise and industrial level, but government regulations make the creation of any entrepreneurial activities virtually impossible. The overall freedom to start, operate, and close a business is extremely restricted by the national regulatory environment.

Trade Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls all imports and exports, and formal trade is minimal. Data on North Korean trade are limited and compiled from trading partners’ statistics. Most North Korean trade is de facto aid, mainly from North Korea’s two main trading partners, China and South Korea. Non-tariff barriers are significant. Inter-Korean trade remains constrained in scope by North Korea’s difficulties with implementing needed reform. Given the lack of necessary tariff data, a score of zero is assigned.

Fiscal Freedom – 0.0%
No data on income or corporate tax rates are available. Given the absence of published official macroeconomic data, such figures as are available with respect to North Korea’s government expenditures are highly suspect and outdated.

Freedom from Government – 0.0%
The government owns all property and sets production levels for most products, and state-owned industries account for nearly all GDP. The state directs all significant economic activity. The government implemented limited economic reforms, such as changes in foreign investment codes and restructuring in industry and management, in 2002.

Monetary Freedom – 0.0%
In July 2002, North Korea introduced price and wage reforms that consisted of reducing government subsidies and telling producers to charge prices that more closely reflect costs. However, without matching supply-side measures to boost output, the result of these measures has been rampant inflation for many staple goods. With the ongoing crisis in agriculture, the government has banned sales of grain at markets and returned to a rationing system. Given the lack of necessary inflation data, a score of zero is assigned.

Investment Freedom – 10.0%
North Korea does not welcome foreign investment. One attempt to open the economy to foreigners was its first special economic zone, located at Rajin-Sonbong in the northeast. However, Rajin-Sonbong is remote and still lacks basic infrastructure. Wage rates in the special zone are unrealistically high, as the state controls the labor supply and insists on taking its share. More recent special zones at Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong are more enticing. Aside from these few economic zones where investment is approved on a case-by-case basis, foreign investment is prohibited.

Financial Freedom – 0.0%
North Korea is a Communist command economy and lacks a private financial sector. The central bank also serves as a commercial bank with a network of local branches. The government provides most funding for industries and takes a percentage from enterprises. There is an increasing preference for foreign currency. Foreign aid agencies have set up microcredit schemes to lend to farmers and small businesses. A rumored overhaul of the financial system to permit firms to borrow from banks has not materialized. Because of debts dating back to the 1970s, most foreign banks will not consider entering North Korea. A South Korean bank has opened a branch in the Kaesong zone. The state holds a monopoly on insurance, and there are no equity markets.

Property Rights – 10.0%
Property rights are not guaranteed in North Korea. Almost all property belongs to the state, and the judiciary is not independent.

Freedom from Corruption – 10.0%
North Korea’s informal market is immense, especially in agricultural goods, as a result of famines and oppressive government policies. There is also an active informal market in currency and in trade with China.

Labor Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls and determines all wages. Since the 2002 economic reforms, factory managers have had more autonomy to set wages and offer incentives, but the labor market still operates under highly restrictive employment regulations that seriously hinder employment and productivity growth.

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Entrepreneur tries to breathe life into the North

Tuesday, January 9th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
Lee Jung-min
1/9/2007

One of North Korea’s capitalist experiments may be awakening from hibernation. “The North’s National Economic Cooperation Federation and Tumen River Development Limited Company of South Korea have reached an agreement to build a heavy and chemical industry complex in Rajin-Sonbong district,” Oh Myoung-hwan, the president of the South Korean company, said yesterday. “We also agreed to carry out jointly a Mount Paektu tour project.” A letter of intent will be signed in Vladivostok, Russia, today, Mr. Oh said.

Mr. Oh, whose company is headquartered in Vladivostok, said Russian natural resources would be processed by North Korean workers in plants built with South Korean capital and technology. He added that he has informed the Unification Ministry in Seoul of his plans.

The National Economic Cooperation Federation is a North Korean foreign economic agency. Mr. Oh said Ryo So-hyon, the federation’s Vladivostok office head, will sign the letter of intent for the North Koreans.

A government official in Seoul speculated that North Korea is looking for new projects because its nuclear test in October triggered a drop in the number of South Korean tourists visiting Mount Kumgang and U.S. criticism of the Kaesong Industrial Complex has grown.

Mr. Oh said that when the new complex is running, train tours to Mount Paektu would be the next step. Tourists would travel by ship from Sokcho on South Korea’s east coast to Hoiryong and Musan, two harbors in the Rajin-Sonbong area of North Korea’s far northeast.

North Korea established the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone in 1991 on the western side of the Tumen River to attract foreign investment. It has been a near-total failure in attracting foreign investment. Mr. Oh said work on the new project would begin in 2-3 months.

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UNDP Tumen River Program

Saturday, December 9th, 2006

Official Web Page:

Northeast Asia can be considered the last major economic frontier on the Asian continent.  The region has enormous economic potential, but this potential can only be realised through dynamic cooperation and sharing of resources.

Recognising Northeast Asia’s considerable potential and geopolitical significance, UNDP in 1991 agreed to support the initiative of the countries in the region to establish an institutional mechanism for regional dialogue and further cooperation.   For the past twelve years, the Tumen River Area Development Programme has facilitated economic cooperation among the five member countries: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Mongolia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Russian Federation.  The member countries are equally represented in the Consultative Commission for the Development of the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, which meets annually at Vice Ministerial level.

The main objectives of the Tumen Programme are to:

  • attain greater growth and sustainable development for the peoples and countries in Northeast Asia, and the Tumen Region in particular;
  • identify common interests and opportunities for cooperation and sustainable development;
  • increase mutual benefit and mutual understanding;
  • strengthen economic, environmental and technical cooperation; and
    work to ensure that the Tumen Region is attractive for international investment, trade and business.

The first phase of the Tumen Programme involved extensive planning and background studies.  An interim phase focused on investment promotion and development initiatives designed to build momentum for the region as a growth triangle.  The second phase built on the institutional framework for regional cooperation created by the multilateral agreements concluded in 1995.  The third – and current – phase continues to address factors fundamental to regional economic cooperation and is designed to ensure the sustainability of this regional cooperation framework.

Why the Focus on the Tumen Region?
The Tumen Region has great potential as a major entrepot for international trade because of the strategic location of the Tumen transport corridor, the strong complementarities of the Tumen River Area, vast natural and human resources, and the area’s accessibility to the resources and markets of Northeast Asia.

Northeast China and Mongolia are landlocked and therefore have a strong interest in access to ports in DPRK and the Russian Far East.  Overseas shippers also have a stake in the Tumen transport corridor, for it offers a much shorter route to affluent and new markets, and facilitates transit trade to a number of destinations.

The local governments in the Tumen Region have been steadfast supporters of the Tumen Programme since its inception.  It appears that central governments in Northeast Asia are now re-emphasising the value of the Tumen Region, particularly its strategic transport corridor.  Northeast Asian governments are rapidly improving the Tumen Region’s infrastructure network and transport services.  They are also working to create legal and institutional mechanisms conducive to cross-border trade and transport.  The Tumen Programme is actively facilitating the creation of an enabling environment through “soft” infrastructure and human capacity building.

Why is Regional Cooperation so Important?
Regional cooperation is a vital part of the development process and a building block for effective participation in world trade and capital markets.  For the Tumen Region, which partly consists of small and remote areas of large countries, economic cooperation is an effective way to avoid marginalisation.  Cross-border cooperation also helps resolve environmental issues and facilitates the adoption of international environmental standards.  Most importantly, enhanced economic cooperation in Northeast Asia helps improve political relations and stability, in turn vital elements for investment and economic growth.

It is worth recalling how remote and closed the Tumen Region was just a dozen years ago, to appreciate the full significance of its role as a frontier for economic cooperation in Northeast Asia.  Much has been achieved during the Tumen Programme’s existence, particularly in terms of opening borders and increasing interaction in a region that was, until recently, tense and largely closed.  A new trade and transport corridor has been created, which will – in time – evolve into an economic corridor with a significant impact on poverty reduction and improved living standards in the region.

The Future of the Tumen Programme
The prevailing political and economic climate in the region has altered dramatically since the start of the Tumen Programme in 1991.  The Soviet Union has dissolved, China and ROK have established diplomatic relations and a major trading partnership, and there has been a degree of rapprochement between DPRK and ROK.  The transition to stronger economic systems in the countries that relied on the Soviet Comecon trading system has reinforced the logic of economic cooperation in the Tumen Region.  The increased participation of DPRK, Mongolia and the Russian Far East, combined with the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, will help the Northeast Asian economy grow.

Dynamic cooperation has found increasing expression in Northeast Asia, and relations in the region continue to improve, helped by stronger economic links.  Despite major improvements in the geopolitical circumstances of the region, however, much remains to be done.  The Tumen Programme is the only initiative that brings the member countries together on a sub-regional basis, and its existing institutional structure and multilateral agreements should be utilised to maximum effect to help Northeast Asia achieve peace and prosperity.

 

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North Korea Sending Workers for Oil

Friday, November 3rd, 2006

From the Donga
11/3/2006

It is being reported that North Korea has increased its oil imports from Primorsky, Russia every year and made its payment by sending labor abroad due to its payment incapability.

According to the government of Primorsky yesterday, North Korean oil imports increased from 62,000 dollars in 2001 to 4.4 million dollars last year. Considering that the export price for Russian Urals oil has increased 35% during the past four years, North Korean oil supplies imported from Primorsky have been more than a 42-fold increase.

“Primorsky, which does not have oil resources, exports oil to North Korea through the federal government and in compensation we get labor instead of money due to North Korean incapability of making its payment,” said Primorsky experts on North Korea.

Dong-A Ilbo special team confirmed in an interview with the government of Primorsky that North Korea has been increasing its labor exports from 3,320 workers at the end of last year to 5,000 workers until late of this year. The current number of abroad sending workers is the greatest ever since Statistics Committee of Primorsky analyzed statistics of North Korean labors in 1993.

The government of Primorsky allowed only some North Korean labor force imports. Recently, however, it is reported that they have increased the scale according to the increasing demand from local companies in Russia.

A government official of Primorsky stated over a phone call with reporters on October 30, “We have limited the number of labor permits since foreign workers are taking away employment from Russian workers.” The official did not specifically mention the reason of the recent growing North Korean labor forces because “the person in charge is away at the moment.”

However, Professor Larisha Jabrobskaja at the Far Eastern Research Center in Vladivostok, who has studied North Korean labor problems for 15 years, explained the reason as, “North Korea, suffering from a chronic trade deficit since the 1990s, is sending labor abroad in an attempt to make its payment.”

He added, “Considering the current trade structure of Primorsky, which its oil import to North Korea accounts 70% of the total exports, it seems Primorsky is swapping oil for North Korean labor.”

“North Korea is planning to expand its oil import through attracting Russian energy corporations in the Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone and the Primorsky’s project to expand its oil and coal export is taking shape these days,” according to the government of Primorsky.

Most of the workers who were forced to enter into Russia in the 1990s worked as woodcutters, but nowadays they work in various fields including construction, agricultural and marine industry.

Local Russians in Primorsky said, “North Korean workers usually get disadvantaged when they look for jobs after the entry and also when they exchange money through North Korean executives, even by offering bribes.”

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