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North Korea’s Middle Class…“Money is Power”

Sunday, March 18th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
3/18/2007

In socialism, the laborer and the peasant dominate the nation and society. However, since the late `60’s, the role of the laborer and peasant has decreased with the bureaucracy taking power, to the extent that a country can no longer remain in traditional socialism.

Currently, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il with a minority of the central class surround this core power. In North Korea, the laborers and peasants are rather subject to extortion.

Amidst a North Korean market economy, a middle class is being established. The middle class comprises of people who have assets that the average citizen cannot afford and own medium-sized businesses or engage in wholesale trade.

Undoubtedly, this group of people are dominating the middle class as well as playing a vital role in the lifeline of North Korean citizens and market, a fact that could not have been fathomable in North Korea’s past.

Until the 80’s, North Korea’s economy was a planned economy. Supply and demand of goods was distributed according to the national plan. However, in the late-80’s, small holes began to emerge in the socialist planned economic system and with a lack of daily necessities, people began to rely on the black market.

Arising from the major cities, goods were secretively traded in the black market and eventually the majority of North Koreans acquired their needed goods through this system. This system operated evading the control and regulation of North Korean authorities, but when caught, a person was condemned to severe punishment and the goods confiscated.

However, the mass food crisis of the mid-90’s completely collapsed the remnants of a socialist planned economy that had subsided unto the time. What had happened was the end of the national food distribution system.

In particular, the collapse of the food distribution meant the death sentence. Tens and hundreds of thousands of North Koreans began to die of starvation and as a means to live, people became active in the market and trade began to emerge in different regions of North Korea.

Mass starvation which created expert tradesmen

The immobilization of a socialist planned economy activated Jangmadang (North Korea’s integrated markets) which then led to the formation of a new class within North Korea’s own expert tradesmen. North Korean authorities who had no other countermeasures had little choice but to comply as the lives of the citizens were now left to the hands of trade.

In the mid-90’s, North Korean authorities approved personal trade to occur between North Korea and China and then permitted markets to exist along the border districts. Simply put, the mass food crisis created a new class which actually gave North Koreans an opportunity to trade.

At first, people would sell goods that they already had such as household appliances, television, recorder and bicycle. Furthermore, any type of stock accessible, particularly clothing, candy and other foods coming from China such as rice, flour and corn were also traded.

As people gained more experience and came to know the basics of marketing, tradesmen became more specialized. People who sold rice, only sold rice, whereas people who traded fabric only sold fabric.

North Koreans began to realize that specializing in a particular field was the way to make money and the people who were unable to assimilate to this culture broke away penniless.

Accordingly, the market gradually became a center for specialized tradesmen to provide goods and daily necessities. The goods sold by these tradesmen eventually became the mark for the middle class merchant. During this time, stabilized distributors began to dominate the market and more individualized entrepreneurs surfaced.

People skilled at cooking, baked decorative and delicious bread in their homes and then sell them at the markets. In addition, candy distributors have made a mark at the markets with candy making having become an advanced skill. People who once made candy in their homes now brag that they have been able to produce a small-scale sugar factory. In particular, clothes making and candy making has become enterprises leading to great money.

Today, 50% of candy, home-made clothing and 30% of uniforms, sold at North Korean markets are products made from home. Through goods such as these, Chinese merchants, tradesmen and the middle class are earning money through North Korea’s markets supplying the customers, the majority of the lower class.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Private property, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Restaurants | Comments Closed

Rice Price Stable around 1,000 Won

Wednesday, January 31st, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
1/31/2007

The Daily NK had conducted commodity price research in northern and southern North Korea from the end of last year to this January. According to the research result, rice price, despite some regional difference, averaged around 1000 NK won per kilogram. The price of North Korea’s most fundamental grain differed based on local rice production and whether it was inland or border area.

In Sinuiju, a city bordered with Chinese Manchuria, residents enjoyed relatively low price of rice due to the city’s proximity to China and breadbasket of the country, Pyongan Province. Sinuiju’s rice price was as follows: North Korean rice 850 won per kg, South Korean one 870 per kg, and Chinese imports 800/kg. Other than rice, every item showed little increase in price except for pork meat (2500 won per kg).

Basic Prices – January 4, 2007
Rice (1kg):
Sinuiju – 830 (produced in NK), 800(produced in China)
Kangdong – 750(produced in NK), 850 (produced in South Korea)
Kangdong hosts a military hosptial and military camp. Consequently, it maintains an excess supply of rice, making rice cheaper in Kangdong than in Sinuiju.

Corn (1kg): Sinuiju – 340 (NK), 300 (China)

Pork (1kg): 2400~2500

An egg: 250

A chicken (2kg): 7000

Soy bean oil (1kg): 3300

Salt (1kg): 230

Wheat flour (1kg) 900

Diesel oil (1kg)/Gasoline (1kg) 2200 / 2700

Exchange rate (a dollar) 3,270 / 1Yuan = 425won

In northernmost North Korea, Chongjin had had relatively high rice price. The port city close to Russia had been quarantined since outbreak of scarlet fever. In Chongjin, both North and South Korean rice cost around 1000 won/kg, and Chinese 900 won/kg.

The reason for stability of rice price around 1000 won/kg in North Korea is, in spite of what is happening outside the country, steady supply of the grain to meet next year’s demand. And moreover, stocking up or price regulations, which usually occur when shortage in rice production is expected, had not happened yet.

Given current rice circulation in private market, this spring would not be as bad as outsiders worry. Informers say that they could smuggle rice out of China whenever necessary.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s won had been weakened consistently. In second half of last year, market exchange rate was 2950 won per dollar; it is now 3270 won/ US dollar. Won per Chinese yuan has risen from 375 won/ 1yuan to 425 won/ yuan during the same time period.

In general raise in exchange rate forces commodities price to increase; however in North Korea, prices heavily depend on change in supply rate since the country is suffering ongoing shortage of it. For example, last year when the army started selling its gasoline stockpile, oil price fell from 3000 won/ kg to 2500-2600 won/kg in one month.

northern provinces prices for December 2006

NK rice-1000
SK rice-1000
Chinese rice-900

Corn-340

Wheat flour-800

Pork (1kg)-2500

An egg-300

Cabbage-350
radish-200
Potato-250

Soy bean oil-3200
sugar-2200
seasoning-5000

Pepper paste-1500

Gasoline-3200

Socks-1000
There are much cheaper kind of socks, around 200won.

Sports shoes (produced in China)-4000
There are lots of different goods according to the qualities.

Headache specific- 10

Ballpointpen-300
pencil-100
The NK products cost 10 or 20 won

A note book-1000
There are price differences depending on the sizes of notebooks.

Land tax (per 4 sq. yds)-46

Exchange rate (a dollar)-3200

1 Yuan-148

Posted in Agriculture, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Analysis of North Korea’s ‘Market Economy’ 2

Friday, January 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/26/2007

The “first-runners” are first-tier wholesalers who connect Chinese manufacturers and North Korean market owners in large cities such as Sinuiju, Hyesan, Hamheung or Chongjin. The goods transported by the first-runners to metropolitan markets in NK are met by second-runners in smaller cities.

South Pyongan province’s Pyongsong, Sunchon and Nampo are the hub for those second-runners, who move imported commodities to further deep into countryside of North and South Pyongan provinces and Hwanghae province.

Moon, a 38-year old shopkeeper in a market in Sunchon, South Pyongan, said “As soon as we hear the news that first-runners brought goods, we go to them with money right away. Since they run a huge amount of money, ordinary buyers can’t even meet them.”

Moon said that for second-runners including herself it took about half million NK wons (180 US dollars) to buy goods for one time. She buys merchandise from first-runners and sells it back to local storeowners.

For second-runners, it is crucial to procure enough high-quality goods with low price. If one buys bad products, he or she loses money. Same rule applies to first-runners.

Second-runners also hand over raw materials to manufacturers. The diminutive North Korean industry relies partly on them.

Chinese sugar and flour turn to bread and candy, and imported clothing materials are manufactured in home factories. Most of the manufacturers who buy raw materials from second-runners are individual handicraftsmen.

Lee, a clothing producer in Hamheung, sells her homemade clothes in market. Lee has had good relationship a number of second-runners, who trade Chinese fabric, so she can even buy stuff on credit.

Throughout the March of Tribulation in late 90s, North Korean people had depended on home industry for their basic necessities. And now it is estimated that significant amount of industrial products in North Korean markets are home-produced.

Those with little capital or without a stand in local market go to the most remote regions in high mountains or countryside and sell their handicrafts via train. Although it is not North Korean business slang, such activity can be classified as “third-running.”

The so-called “third-runners” trade their home-manufactured goods with country people’s corn, bean or rice, since it is rare to own a lot of cash in rural area.

In sum, once persecuted North Korean private markets are now reflecting every aspect of capitalist economy.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Agriculture, Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Finance, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Analysis of North Korea’s “Market Economy” I.

Thursday, January 25th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
1/25/2007

Since 2002’s 7.1. economic reform measures, North Korea’s markets have become most vital part of peoples life. North Korean market system operates from ‘general market’ with huge process chain to small local ‘yard market’ in the remote countryside. And, in between, there are always some brokers.

An importer buys goods from China and transports them through cargo trains or trucks to large cities in North Korea, such as Hamheung, Chongjin, Pyongsung or Nampo. Wholesale traders take those products and resell to local businesspeople. In North Korean jargon, such process is called “running.”

Usually imported goods from China or North Korean domestic ones take three steps of circulation; one or two laps of ‘run’ is added in case of mountain area.

Wholesale is mostly carried out by cars. Since oil and vehicles are not enough, sometimes wholesalers rent cars by themselves.

A forty one-year old trader working in Dandong, China, Kim, said that he purchases goods from Chinese factories firsthand. If the amount of import is huge, Kim uses freight. If not, a few trucks are fine for him. At maximum, Kim bought 60 tons of texture from China at once and resold it to North Korean wholesaler in one month.

In Hyesan, Yangkang province, 38-year old Choi, a broker of mainly Chinese cloths and shoes, sells his stuff to nearby Chongjin. Choi told the Daily NK “There are two types of so-called running; first run and second run. “Running” requires a lot of capital like money for vehicles. So the person must be patient and cautious when buying and selling something.”

According to the interview with Kim, using vehicle in wholesale business takes from 3.5 million NK wons (roughly 1,000 US dollars) to 35 million wons. The money includes not only car rental but also “transportation permit” application fee. Transportation permit is required when vehicle and personnel move inter-province, and costs relatively large amount of cash.

Kim keeps about twenty percent of total sales as his profit. The other 80% is comprised of original price of goods, car tax, gasoline and multifarious types of ‘extra expenses,’ or bribe.

The “first run” business is apportioned to a few with privilege in North Korea. Those who can earn cooperation from Security Agency and police are able to do the first run. Without bribery, it is impossible to obtain various permits that are essential for any businessperson.

In addition, to trade with overseas Chinese merchants, one must possess enough wealth and credit. Credit enables North Korean businessmen to buy goods in China with comparatively low price. Those first runners are, in most cases, wealthy North Koreans with ten thousand US dollars cash on their hand at any moment.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Automobiles, Black markets, China, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Price liberalization, Private property, Railways, Transportation | Comments Closed

DPRK scores last place in economic freedom (again)

Tuesday, January 16th, 2007

Heritage 2007 Index of Economic Freedom

North Korea’s economy is 3% free, according to our 2007 assessment, which makes it the world’s least free economy, or 157th out of 157 countries. North Korea is ranked 30th out of 30 countries in the Asia–Pacific region, and its overall score is the lowest in the world.

North Korea does not score well in a single area of economic freedom, although it does score 10 percent in investment freedom and property rights. The opening of the Kaesong industrial venture in cooperation with South Korea has been a start in foreign investment.

Business freedom, investment freedom, trade freedom, financial freedom, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom are nonexistent. All aspects of business operations are totally controlled and dominated by the government. Normal foreign trade is almost zero. No courts are independent of political interference, and private property (particularly land) is strictly regulated by the state. Corruption is virtually immeasurable and, in the case of North Korea, hard to distinguish from necessity. Much of North Korea’s economy cannot be measured, and world bodies like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are not permitted to gather information. Our policy is to give countries low marks for specific freedoms when it is country policy to restrict measurement of those freedoms.

Background:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has maintained its Communist system since its founding in 1948. A serious economic decline began in the early 1990s with the end of economic support from the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries, including China. Floods and droughts all but destroyed the agricultural infrastructure and led to severe famine and dislocation of the population during the 1990s. South Korean and Chinese investments in the economy have alleviated dire conditions. The government continues to rely on counterfeiting foreign currency and sales of missiles for money. That and the nuclear ambitions and isolationism of Kim Jong Il reinforce North Korea’s status as the hermit kingdom.

Business Freedom – 0.0%
The state regulates the economy heavily through central planning. The economic reforms implemented in 2002 allegedly brought some changes at the enterprise and industrial level, but government regulations make the creation of any entrepreneurial activities virtually impossible. The overall freedom to start, operate, and close a business is extremely restricted by the national regulatory environment.

Trade Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls all imports and exports, and formal trade is minimal. Data on North Korean trade are limited and compiled from trading partners’ statistics. Most North Korean trade is de facto aid, mainly from North Korea’s two main trading partners, China and South Korea. Non-tariff barriers are significant. Inter-Korean trade remains constrained in scope by North Korea’s difficulties with implementing needed reform. Given the lack of necessary tariff data, a score of zero is assigned.

Fiscal Freedom – 0.0%
No data on income or corporate tax rates are available. Given the absence of published official macroeconomic data, such figures as are available with respect to North Korea’s government expenditures are highly suspect and outdated.

Freedom from Government – 0.0%
The government owns all property and sets production levels for most products, and state-owned industries account for nearly all GDP. The state directs all significant economic activity. The government implemented limited economic reforms, such as changes in foreign investment codes and restructuring in industry and management, in 2002.

Monetary Freedom – 0.0%
In July 2002, North Korea introduced price and wage reforms that consisted of reducing government subsidies and telling producers to charge prices that more closely reflect costs. However, without matching supply-side measures to boost output, the result of these measures has been rampant inflation for many staple goods. With the ongoing crisis in agriculture, the government has banned sales of grain at markets and returned to a rationing system. Given the lack of necessary inflation data, a score of zero is assigned.

Investment Freedom – 10.0%
North Korea does not welcome foreign investment. One attempt to open the economy to foreigners was its first special economic zone, located at Rajin-Sonbong in the northeast. However, Rajin-Sonbong is remote and still lacks basic infrastructure. Wage rates in the special zone are unrealistically high, as the state controls the labor supply and insists on taking its share. More recent special zones at Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong are more enticing. Aside from these few economic zones where investment is approved on a case-by-case basis, foreign investment is prohibited.

Financial Freedom – 0.0%
North Korea is a Communist command economy and lacks a private financial sector. The central bank also serves as a commercial bank with a network of local branches. The government provides most funding for industries and takes a percentage from enterprises. There is an increasing preference for foreign currency. Foreign aid agencies have set up microcredit schemes to lend to farmers and small businesses. A rumored overhaul of the financial system to permit firms to borrow from banks has not materialized. Because of debts dating back to the 1970s, most foreign banks will not consider entering North Korea. A South Korean bank has opened a branch in the Kaesong zone. The state holds a monopoly on insurance, and there are no equity markets.

Property Rights – 10.0%
Property rights are not guaranteed in North Korea. Almost all property belongs to the state, and the judiciary is not independent.

Freedom from Corruption – 10.0%
North Korea’s informal market is immense, especially in agricultural goods, as a result of famines and oppressive government policies. There is also an active informal market in currency and in trade with China.

Labor Freedom – 0.0%
The government controls and determines all wages. Since the 2002 economic reforms, factory managers have had more autonomy to set wages and offer incentives, but the labor market still operates under highly restrictive employment regulations that seriously hinder employment and productivity growth.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Arms shipment, Banking, Central Bank, Counterfeiting, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Illicit activities, Insurance, International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Price liberalization, Private property, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong) | Comments Closed

Filling North Korea’s bare shelves

Wednesday, January 10th, 2007

Asia Times
Ting-I Tsai
1/10/2007

North Korea’s nuclear test has been a hot topic among analysts around the world. But inside the isolated Stalinist state, getting a hold of a pair of running shoes, a bicycle or a television set is still what most excites ordinary citizens.

And Chinese businesses continue to cash in on these material desires by selling goods manufactured at home or in North Korea at prices higher than their quality justifies, sparking much criticism.

When Pyongyang publicized its intention to initiate economic reforms in July 2002, most people had doubts about how far the policy would be taken. Four years later, the regime is still struggling to implement its reforms, but it has at least partly satisfied some of the daily demands of citizens by allowing more Chinese products to be manufactured in North Korea and more Chinese goods to be imported.

Shoes, bicycles, TV sets, beverages and clothes made in China or by Chinese companies in North Korea are helping to satisfy demand, but some disreputable Chinese companies are ruining their country’s reputation by dumping factory seconds and damaged goods on the market.

Over decades of isolation, North Koreans have been suffering not just from food shortages, but from a scarcity of basic consumer goods. In past years, Pyongyang has reportedly asked the South Korean government to donate thousands of tons of soap and clothes, as well as material for the production of 60 million pairs of shoes. In a visit to Pyongyang in November, products such as Colgate toothbrushes, toothpaste and a Japanese facial cleaner were carefully displayed in glass cases bearing price tags equivalent to US$2.60-$5.90, well beyond the financial reach of all but a few North Koreans.

After years of studying China’s experiences, Pyongyang is now gearing up to solicit foreign investment and advanced technologies to modernize its decades-old manufacturing base.

Supply and demand
“Because the supply can’t satisfy the demand, prices of most of the Chinese products simply soar in the North Korean market,” said Su Xiangzhong, chairman of a Tianjin company that founded a beverage-manufacturing joint venture, Lungjin, with a North Korean.

Trade between the two countries increased by 35.4% in 2004, followed by a 35.2% increase in 2005. By the end of October 2006, bilateral trade had reached $1.38 billion, a 4% increase over 2005.

Beijing-based Winner International Industries Ltd was one of the Chinese companies that foresaw North Korea’s consumption potential in 2000. By then, the company had co-founded a joint-venture running-shoe and clothing-manufacturing presence in North Korea. With advanced machinery from Taiwan, its shoe-manufacturing division is now capable of producing 8 million pairs of running shoes, according to an official from the company, who declined to identify himself. The clothing-manufacturing division, he said, has been a supplier to South Korean and Japanese companies. However, he added that orders from the two countries had recently decreased for unknown reasons.

Leather shoes for soldiers are of high quality, but they are not available to the average person. In Pyongyang shops catering exclusively to foreigners, a pair of leather shoes could cost as much as $326. The North Korean government is still soliciting foreign investment and purchasing shoemaking equipment via Chinese companies.

To get around in a country with underdeveloped public transportation, getting a pair of shoes is not enough. Taking advantage of that situation, Tianjin’s Digital Co started making bicycles in Pyongyang in October 2005, after the North Koreans agreed to let the Chinese take a 51% controlling share in the joint venture, virtually a monopoly, for 20 years.

It is estimated that the nation’s demand for bicycles is about 7 million, according to the Chinese media. The company now manufactures some 40 models and 60,000 bicycles annually, with the most popular model costing $26. In coming years, it plans to produce 300,000 bicycles annually and construct another three bicycle plants.

Aside from daily necessities, there are few entertainment options for North Koreans, which means there is a high demand for TV sets. Nanjing Panda, a TV maker, appeared to be the only Chinese company to foresee the emergence of the North Korean market when it invested $1.3 million there in 2002. After four years of operation, its 17-inch black-and-white and 21-inch color TV sets are reportedly the hottest items available in Pyongyang. With Panda products beginning to dominate the local market, it is becoming increasingly difficult for others to import TV sets into North Korea, according to Chinese business people.

The Panda joint venture is now digging up another potential gold mine by manufacturing personal computers (PCs) in North Korea.

In 2003, Chinese non-financial investments in North Korea amounted to just $1.12 million. That total, however, soared to $14.13 million in 2004, and reportedly reached $53.69 million in 2005. According to the Chinese media, there are now about 200 Chinese investment projects operating in North Korea. A Pyongyang-based foreign businessman described the Chinese investors as “by far the largest group by country doing business there, in all kinds of fields – plus they are from one of the few countries with the protection and representation of a big embassy”.

In March 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed an investment-protection agreement with his North Korean counterpart, and the two nations inked five bilateral economic-cooperation agreements between 2002 and 2005.

During North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s visit to China last January, Wen introduced new economic-cooperation guidelines.

Despite these positive moves, controversy over the role of Chinese businesses has emerged. A Pyongyang-based Western businessman suggested that quite a few disreputable companies “go there with the intention of getting rid of old or damaged goods they can’t sell in China, and rip off North Koreans, who have no way to get their money back”.

“Also, a lot of fake goods come from China,” he added.

Still, more and more Chinese business people are rushing to Pyongyang. Su Xiangzhong, chairman of a Tianjin-based company, noted that his firm is creating a new beverage brand, like China’s Wahaha, in Pyongyang. North Koreans are also very interested in cooperating with Chinese enterprises in manufacturing and mining.

Chinese-made clothes for women and children, low-end and generic-brand household products and sundries, color TVs and PCs are popular products in North Korea.

Li Jingke, a Dandong-based Chinese businessman who runs the China-DPR Korea Small Investor Association, suggested that natural-resource exploitation and manufacturing are the best industries for foreigners to invest in, adding that more investment-friendly policies would likely be introduced in April. By then, he said, Chinese business people might need to become more concerned about unprofessional conduct.

“When North Korea introduces more liberalized policies, competent companies from everywhere will enter the market, which would likely eliminate the existence of those Chinese businessmen who don’t have modern commercial ideas in mind,” Li said.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Black markets, China, China-DPR Korea Small Investor Association, Civil society, Computing/IT, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Price liberalization, Television, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Mass Protest Incident in Hoiryeong

Thursday, November 9th, 2006

From the Daily NK
11/9/2006

On Tuesday, a number of residents in Hoiryeong, North Hamkyong Province mass-protested in front of the Nammun (a south gate) market for “compensation of market refurbishment payment” and against the merger of Hoiryeong markets, according to a North Korean source.

The inside source told the Daily NK through a telephone interview that evening ,“From this morning, more than a hundred shopkeepers, their families and the residents of Nammun district rushed to the market management office to request compensation of market refurbishment fees and repeal of Nammun market closure.”

The informant said that the mass protested against the local government because they were stirred by the authority’s decision. It is extremely exceptional that such a mass protest occurs in North Korean society.

They formed lines to present their opinions and in the meantime, some traders shouted phrases such as “Refund the refurbishment payments!” The primitive type of protest in North Korea, in which any kind of private mass activities are forbidden, means much more than western societies’ demonstrations. “No one particularly led the incident,” the informer testified, “but outraged merchants poured into the management office as a group.”
Security officers forcefully dispersed the protestors and crowd.

He added that Hoiryeong local security officers, fearing a spreading of the protest, forcefully dispersed the protesters and crowd. And it was not clarified whether any of the protestors got arrested.

Nammun market is two kilometers southeast of Hoiryeong city, and a frequent place for shopping of food and other basic supplies by local residents.

The incident occurred when the market management officials started to remove the market.

The officials had been collecting three thousand NK won per trader as “refurbishment fees” since late October.

That morning, however, the market management office ordered all the markets in Hoiryeong to be combined with newly constructed Hoiryeong Market, which is located former Hoiryeong Southern middle school, unilaterally, and started to remove the shops in the Nammun market.

Shopkeepers of Nammun market, having been unaware of such a decision, could not accept the order, the informant told the Daily NK. And none of them was guaranteed with a spot at the new Hoiryeong Market; even if one was, there would be a lot of time and money to be spent before actually having a shop at the new market.

Those shopkeepers of the Nammun Market, waiting for the opening hour, saw the removal of their stands, and sought the management officials. When they found any official unavailable, an angry outburst came.
There was a violent clash among angry residents.

The stand-owners and their families went to the office and asked accountable senior officials for compensation, which they did not receive. One protestor reportedly shouted, “It is ridiculous to walk five kilometers (to the new Hoiryeong Market) to buy a piece of Tofu!”

It was informed that amid the protest there was a violent clash among angry residents. When a man watching the demonstration said it was meaningless to protest, shopkeepers assaulted him for collaborating with the officials.

As soon as an act of violence happened, tens of security officers came to the site and dispersed the protestors and bystanders. Meanwhile, traders vehemently resisted and abused the security guards.

The newly built Hoiryeong Market is constructed at the site of closed Hoiryeong Southern middle school with about 700 sale stands, which are one meter long and a half meter wide. A down payment of 200,000 NK won (US$690) and daily rental fee of 10 to 30 won are required for a stand. Black market exchange rate is over 3000 won per US dollar while official one is 140 per a dollar.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Perilous Journeys:

Thursday, October 26th, 2006

The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond
International Crisis Group
10/26/2006
PDF Here: Perilous Journeys.pdf

Executive Summary

Scores of thousands of North Koreans have been risking their lives to escape their country’s hardships in search of a better life, contributing to a humanitarian challenge that is playing out almost invisibly as the world focuses on North Korea’s nuclear program. Only a little over 9,000 have made it to safety, mostly in South Korea but also in Japan, Europe and the U.S. Many more live in hiding from crackdowns and forcible repatriations by China and neighbouring countries, vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. If repatriated to the North, they face harsh punishment, possibly execution. China and South Korea have held back, even during the Security Council debate over post-test sanctions, from applying as much pressure as they might to persuade Pyongyang to reverse its dangerous nuclear policy, in part because they fear that the steady stream of North Koreans flowing into China and beyond would become a torrent if the North’s economy were to collapse under the weight of tough measures. While there is marginally more hope Beijing will change its ways than Pyongyang, concerned governments can and must do far more to improve the situation of the border crossers.

Even without a strong response to the 9 October 2006 nuclear test that targets the North’s economy, the internal situation could soon get much worse. The perfect storm may be brewing for a return to famine in the North. Last year, Pyongyang reintroduced the same public distribution system for food that collapsed in the 1990s and rejected international humanitarian assistance, demanding instead unmonitored development help. Funding for remaining aid programs is difficult to secure, and summer floods have damaged crops and infrastructure.

Hunger and the lack of economic opportunity, rather than political oppression, are the most important factors in shaping a North Korean’s decision to leave “the worker’s paradise”. A lack of information, the fear of being caught by Chinese or North Korean security agents and financial limitations are more significant barriers than any actual wall or tight security at the border. China compensates for the virtual absence of border guards with a relentless search for North Koreans in hiding. In

October 2006, Chinese authorities began to build a fence along the frontier and conduct neighbourhood sweeps to find and arrest the border crossers. Despite these formidable obstacles, the willingness among North Koreans to risk their lives to escape is growing stronger, and arrivals in the South are likely to hit a record this year. The most important pull factor shaping the decision to leave is the presence of family members in China and, increasingly, South Korea. The nearly 9,000 defectors in the South are able to send cash and information to help their loved ones escape. To a lesser but significant extent, information is beginning to spread in the North through smuggled South Korean videos, American and South Korean radio broadcasts, and word of mouth – all exposing North Koreans to new ideas and aspirations.

Most North Koreans do not arrive in China with the intention of seeking official asylum, but because Beijing is making it ever more difficult for them to stay, a growing number are forced to travel thousands of kilometres and undertake dangerous border crossings in search of refuge in Mongolia or South East Asia. The mass arrests of 175 asylum seekers in Bangkok in August 2006 and a further 86 on 24 October provide vivid examples of host country hospitality being stretched to the limits.

The vast majority of North Koreans who have made it to safety resettle in South Korea. In most instances, this is a choice motivated by language, culture and the promise of being reunited with family members. In a growing number of cases, the overly burdensome procedures for being granted asylum anywhere else is the deciding factor. With the exception of Germany, the governments that have pressed most vigorously for improving North Korean human rights, namely the U.S., the European Union member states and Japan, have taken in only a handful of asylum seekers.

A loose network of makeshift shelters focused on humanitarian aid has evolved into a politically-charged but fragile underground railroad on which some North Koreans can buy safe passage to Seoul in a matter of days, while others suffer years of violence and exploitation. If they are to minimise the exploitation of the most vulnerable and enhance the much-needed aid this network delivers, concerned governments must commit to a sustainable solution.

None of the policies proposed in this report would create unmanageable burdens for any government. Unless North Korea’s economy collapses completely, the numbers of its citizens crossing international borders will continue to be restricted by many factors, not least Pyongyang’s tight controls on internal movement and the financial cost of securing an escape route. However, it is time to back up strong words and resolutions about the plight of North Koreans with actions, both because humanity demands it and because if the international community cannot quickly get a handle on this situation, it will find it harder to forge an operational consensus on the nuclear issue.

Posted in Agriculture, Black markets, Economic reform, Emigration, International Aid, Labor conditions/wages, Political economy, Price liberalization, UN World Food Program | Comments Closed

Back to the 90s, “Grass Porridge”

Tuesday, September 26th, 2006

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
9/26/2006

September, once again prices of rice rising in Jangmadang, North Korea.

At Sunam markets in Chungjin, North Hamkyung province:

1Kg rice=1,400 won ($0.46) . This is the highest prices have reached.
1kg of corn is a high 450 won.

The districts within North Hamkyung province such as Onsung, Hoiryeong and Musan are no different.

1kg rice at Onsung and Hoiryeong averages 1,200won ($0.40) and has risen to 1,300won at Musan. On average corn is costing 380~400won per kilo.

Although autumn harvest has begun throughout all of North Korea, the cost of food at Jangmadang continues to rise and the common North Korean experiences greater difficulties as a result of food shortage. Defectors have informed that poverty has become so severe in North Hamkyung province that the nightmares of mass starvation in the mid-90’s is once again tormenting a laborer’s dinner table with the reappearance of ‘grass porridge.’

On 23rd September, defector Choi Soon Nyu (pseudonym, 58, Chungjin, North Hamkyung province) came to China passing through Hoiryeong. She said “At Sunam markets in Chungjin, the price of rice has risen to 1,400won per kilo and corn has even reached 400won per kilo. Poor laborers have resorted to putting pig’s fodder into corn porridge to suffice a meal and the number of people eating grass porridge is growing.”

A tourist Jang Ha Cheol (pseudonym, Dancheon, North Hamkyung province) who entered China on 14th September through China’s Tuman customs said “In the districts of North Hamkyung rice surpassed 1,000won per kilo in July. Since the end of August, rice at Jangmadang in Dancheon and Chungjin averaged 1,300won per kilo.”

The current cost of rice nearing 1,400won per kilo at Chungjin Jangmadang is a record breaking figure. Mr. Han, an activist who has been working for 5 years at an NGO which supports defectors in China said “On the basis of information gathered through consultations with defectors for the past 3 years, it can be said that the current cost of rice at Chungjin is the highest ever in history.”

Mr. Han explained “Even during the ‘Special period’ last October where North Korean authorities strictly controlled selling food at Jangmadang, trade amongst the people did not exceed 1,000won per kilo of rice. Normally when autumn harvest begins in late September, food wholesalers and foreign marketers at Jangmadang release their units of rice kept in storage and so the cost of rice generally tends to have a depreciating effect.”

“Living costs” simultaneously escalate

North Koreans discuss amongst themselves that soon a ‘2,000won ($0.66) rice period’ will come, further raising feelings of anxiety.

Park Sung Cheol (pseudonym, 41, Gilju, North Hamkyung province) who defected to China on 17th September said “There is not a single person who is worried that they will be unable to afford rice as the costs continue to rise. In any case the staple diet for the people is corn. However, if the cost of rice rises then the cost of corn will rise accordingly and general living costs will rise also. As a result, escalating rice prices is not only a basic issue of food costs but a coupling indication that living standards will only get tighter.”

In actual, the general cost of living in North Korea is simultaneously on the rise. Pork in North Hamkyung province which averaged 2,300~2,800won per kilo in the recent spring is now nearing 4,000won (1.33). It appears that within half a year, the cost has risen no less than 60%. Corn oil and spices are averaging similar standards.

In regards to the recent ‘Skyrocketing rice prices at Jangmadang’ in North Korea, NGO’s and defectors in China are conjecturing “This year, as a result of negative farming produce and tightening of regulations by North Korean authorities after the missile launch, it seems that insecurity is lurking within North Korea and hence strategically, food that was kept in storage by food wholesalers, foreign markets and the military is not being sold at Jangmadang.”

Above all, talks coming from within North Korea suggest that compared to last year, this year food output will be regulated on a large scale.

North Korean citizens are forecasting a negative harvest as in the provinces of Pyongnam and Hwanghae, rice harvest failed due to the flood last summer and even in North Hamkyung province where corn farming is prevalent, drought has continuously soiled the area since spring. As a result, it is estimated that the harvest output this year will not even surmount 40% compared to the previous year.

In addition, since the missile launch on July 5th, North Korean authorities have been indicating that “All military families should independently prepare for 90 days of wartime rationing.” “Workers in official departments and transportation business should independently prepare for 30 days of wartime rationing.” As a result, concerns are rising within North Korea as these orders resemble the measures of policy control during the period of nuclear threat in ’93.

For these reasons defectors and NGO’s analyze that the ‘Big Hand’ at Jangmadang maneuvered by food wholesalers, foreign markets and the military are safekeeping rice in storage and watching the price of rice surge even though the harvest season has arrived.

A missionary Jung working in China said “According to testimonies of recent defectors, excluding North Korean companies collaborating with foreign movements based in China, merely 20% of locations are distributing rations despite making quotas. It is estimated that more than 70% of workers are being neglected and not receiving any rations.”

He further remarked “As long as half the nation’s distribution and companies and are in possession of a months necessary rations, only 5% of laborers will ever receive it.”

Posted in Agriculture, Arduous March, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Sunam market | Comments Closed

Dollarization of NK Economy

Monday, September 25th, 2006

Korea Times:
Andrei Lankov
9/25/2006

For a Stalinist country, North Korea was unique in its permissive approach to hard currency transactions. Most Communist states followed the Soviet example and strictly forbade all private trading in currency. There were foreign currency shops in the Soviet Union, but only the lucky holders of foreign passports could go there.

Until the late 1980s, all Soviet citizens returning from overseas were required to submit their currency to the state-run banks within 72 hours of crossing the border. In exchange, they were given special coupons that could be used as money in special shops stuffed with quality goods. They couldn’t be used in “real” currency shops, which targeted foreigners and where the merchandise was even better. By keeping more than just a few one-dollar bills at home, a Soviet citizen committed a crime.

Professional foreign currency speculators existed, but their business was extremely risky.

According to Soviet law, they could face the death penalty for their activities, and some of them were actually shot in otherwise liberal 1960s. Thus, everybody who wanted to buy or sell currency had to be very careful.

But this was not the case in North Korea. From the late 1970s currency shops operated freely in Pyongyang and other major cities, open to any North Korean who had dollars or yen.

No questions were asked by the guards. Unlike their Soviet counterparts, the shops sold not only durables, but also daily necessities and food stuffs. Currency exchange outside the banks was illegal, but it was considered a relatively minor crime.

This approach, unusually permissive for a very repressive and restrictive regime, reflected one North Korean peculiarity.

The presence of some 95,000 ethnic Koreans who were lured into moving to the North from Japan during the 1990s. The government discovered that these people could attract remittances from Japan, so a network of the state-run currency shops emerged to suck the yen into the state’s coffers.

Prices in the shops were roughly twice the international average, with the difference going to the state.

But in the early 1990s another type of dollar-based economy emerged. From 1990 the value of the North Korean won was in steady decline. The public distribution system was falling apart, and many people turned to foreign currency as the major means of protecting their savings from both inflation and the ever present danger of a confiscatory money reform. Thus, in the early 1990s a dollar-based economy emerged.

The exchange rate began to climb. The official rate was 2.2 won per dollar. Like most other Communist states, North Korea grossly overvalued its currency to squeeze more money from foreign visitors. But nobody was trading the won at such grotesquely high rate. By the time the great famine struck the country in the late 1990s, the actual exchange rate was approximately 220 won, a hundred times the official average.

Market traders and emerging entrepreneurs of all kinds ceased to use the North Korean won for any large-scale transactions.

The dollar also became the major medium of saving. Due to the lack of data and peculiarities of the Communist economy, it is difficult to give precise figures, but the annual inflation rate over the last few years has exceeded 100 percent.

The major turning point was reached in 2002, when the government introduced economic reforms. Actually, they were formally known as “special measures.”

The word “reform” had to be avoided in the official parlance since it hinted that something in the North Korean perfect society needed adjustment, and that could not possibly be true.

The new official rate of exchange was 165 won per dollar.

This was already well below the true market rate but still constituted an overnight 7,500 percent depreciation of the national currency. This is probably not a world record, but it’s still an impressive figure.

Simultaneously, the government raised prices in state shops and won-denominated salaries. This was done in an uneven fashion. Some groups gained far more than others, with the military security personnel and academic staff being the most prominent winners.

This meant the release of huge amount of cash, which flooded the economy and sped up inflation. In 2005 the exchange rate soon approached the level of 2200 won to 2300 won per dollar.

It has been discussed whether such hyper-inflation was provoked deliberately, as a result of some calculations, or came about through planners’ mistakes. I am inclined to believe the second option.

North Korean officials are exceptionally naive when it comes to the basics of the market economy. I would not be surprised if we eventually learn that in 2002 they hoped that the prices would stand still once they had been increased to market levels.

All this is often described as the dollarization of North Korean economy. However, in late 2002 the North Koreans declared that they would switch to euros as the major currency unit in their dealings with the outside world. Since then, all North Korean shops exhibit prices in euros, not dollars.

However, this act did not change actual habits much. Transactions are still usually based on the good old greenback.

Those groups who had access to the currency tended to fare much better than others. Some of those groups were once underprivileged, and the great nationwide disaster of the 1990s actually improved their social standing.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Banking, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

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