Archive for the ‘Price liberalization’ Category

Purchase Popular Jangmadang Goods at State-Operated Stores

Tuesday, July 3rd, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
7/3/2007

A North Korean insider source relayed on the 2nd that citizens’ complaints have been rising because the North Korean government recently gave guidelines to sell a portion of products which have been selling with popularity at the jangmadang (markets) only at state-operated stores.

This source, who resides in North Pyongan, revealed in a phone conversation with DailyNK, “Recently, plastic floors have been popular, so “plastic sales” is earning a lot of money. However, government authorities have mandated that the commerce office directly oversee plastic floors and that they be sold at state-operated stores.”

The insider relayed, “Families above middle-class have been showing a lot of interest in acquiring furniture. Besides floors, drawers on which TV can be placed and cabinets displaying wines and others are very popular.”

Previously, floors made of paper covered the floors of houses, but since North Korean civilians’ standard of living started rising recently, Chinese-made plastic floors decorated in flowers is drawing popularity.

He said, “Rumor has been leaking that pork (1,700 North Korean won per kg), the price for which has declined recently, is also directly managed by the commerce office, along with plastic floors.” “Besides this, the complaints of merchants have been rising since rumor starting circulating that the list of items to be overseen by the office will increase.”

He added, “Would they want to do any business given that individual sales are discouraged and turned over to national control when sales go even remotely well? There are grievances due to the fact that earning a livelihood through jangmadang sales is not even allowed, on top of the lack of provisions.”

Further, he said, “Regulations regarding people engaging in “Chapan-Jangsa (sales by trucks)” using privately-owned buses or trucks exceeding eight tons have begun. If one is caught, the vehicles become registered as national property and the vehicle owner receives a salary from the country instead.”

“Chapan Jangsa” refers to carrying out wholesale while ferrying the load on trucks. The “plastic floor” and “Chapan Jangsa,” along with what is popularly known as “ice (drug) sales” are counted are the top three business that brings in the most amount of money.

“The complaints of people are high, but the scope of regulation is wide-ranging, so there are people who think that the inspections will stop after several times.”

Even guideline to prevent wearing of wedding dresses

He also said, “Since October 2006, there were even guidelines to prevent wearing of wedding dresses at weddings. Not only wedding dresses, but wearing white gloves were also prohibited.”

In North Korea, wearing wedding dresses at weddings became a trend seven to eight years ago. Nowadays, many civilians are known to wear them. Even if they do not wear wedding dresses, North Korea’s general wedding culture is donning flowers on the chest part of dresses and on the head and putting on white gloves.

Additionally, the insider relayed, “The size of the flower of the groomsmen and the bridesmaids should not be bigger than the groom’s and the bride’s. The flower of the groom and the bride is fixed at 7cm and the flower of the groomsmen and bridesmaids fixed at 5cm. In the case with those who go against the orders and get their pictures taken after marriage, the photo volunteer in charge’s volunteer card (employment permit) can be revoked.”

Share

Plastic Surgery Popular, Breast Augmentations a Trend

Tuesday, June 12th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
6/12/2007

Recently, it has been reported that businesses in charge of facial plastic surgery and skin maintenance are becoming more popular among the wealthy class.

Through a survey DailyNK conducted on actual living conditions in the Northeast region of North Korea, it was discovered that massage rooms, steam baths, beauty-related enterprises (plastic surgery and skincare maintenance) are the main thriving businesses.

Beauty-related businesses such as these prevail in relatively large-sized cities, such as Chongjin in North Hamkyung, Hamheung in South Hamkyung, and Wonsan in Kangwon. This trend seems to follow the up and coming wealthy class who have risen through doing business in North Korea.

Skin maintenance and plastic surgery which has caused a stir among the women in Shinuiju and Pyongyang have spread to inland countrysides within the last several years.

Double eye-lid surgery, eyebrow tattoos, and others can be simply performed by a plastic surgeon doctor or beauty operation specialists, so it has been widely popular among young women.

The cost of plastic surgery, in the case of double eye-lid surgery, was 500 North Korean won per one-eye in 2004, but the asking price has been 1,500 won since 2006. The North Korean exchange rate was recently 2,980 won per dollar.

In addition to double eye-lid surgery, breast augmentation has been spreading to a portion of upper-class women. The popularity of the breast enlargement surgeries demonstrates an encouragement of beauty among North Korean upper-class women.

◆ “Massages” a rage, centered on large-scale cities = Chinese-style health massages cost around 10,000 (US$3.4) North Korean won per hour and for an additional 2~30,000 won, on-the-spot sex with a female masseuse is possible.

This survey, based on the latter half of May, took place by focusing on the price of commodities in five cities, such as Kim Chaek and Chongjin City in North Hamkyung, Danchun and Hamheung in South Hamkyung, and Wonsan Kangwon.

The results of the survey showed that the region with the highest standard of living in the Northeast region is Wonsan City of Kangwon. The reason why Wonsan has a relatively high standard of living is that it has been a central place of trade with Japan.

If North Korea and China’s trade can be represented by Shinuiju, then Wonsan has played that role with trade with Japan. However, it has recently been severely targeted by the suspension in North Korea and Japan’s trade.

Wonsan’s upper-class restaurants are known to show aggressive service by shouting “Welcome” when guests come in, by decorating the interior of restaurants, and by adopting a Chinese-style waiter and waitress system.

In addition, Japanese secondhand goods have been highly traded in Wonsan. Electronic rice cookers, sewing machine, fans, TVs and other Japanese thrift goods are commonly traded and have more reasonable prices than the other regions.

Newly released 2-3 person electronic rice cookers are around 13~150,000 won, fans around 7~80,000 won, used gas stoves around 15~200,000 (approx. US$50.34~67.10), used TVs around 20~250,000 won, and flat-screen TVs over 350,000 (approx. US$117.50) won.

The supply of electricity is not an issue, so it is provided 24 hours long and electricity is better-supplied than in Hamheung.

Further, the “105 factory (furniture production factory)” in Wonsan produces furniture which is delivered to the Central Party and the quality, compared with the cost, is supposed to be the best in North Korea.

Industrial goods in Chungjin are relatively economical, but Chinese-made color TVs and flat-screen newly-released TVs are sold for 20~250,000 and 350,000 won, respectively. Used bicycles imported from Japan is sold for 10~150,000 won.

In Chongjin, the number of taxis have risen lately, but because of the expensive cost, not too many people take advantage of it. Going 4km costs around 5,000 won. Taxis that are operating are either Chinese used taxis or imported cars which are past the expiration date.

◆ The price of rice narrowly rises = In Hamheung, the cost of taxis is supposed to be slightly higher than Chongjin. There are not too many people who ride taxis, so the rate is doubled beyond the center of cities and in remote places.

The cost of penicillin has risen significantly in Chongjin, with the spread of the measles, the scarlet fever, and other infectious diseases since last winter. Chinese penicillin is hard to acquire due to its reputation for having poor quality and North Korean penicillin is sold at Jangmadang (market) for 500 won per one.

The cities considered to have low standards of living are Kim Chaek of North Hamkyung and Danchun in South Hamkyung. The size of the jangmadang (market) is smaller than in other regions and there is a limit in the variety of goods. Steam baths or massage places do not even exist. The price of medical goods are also supposed to be exorbitant.

The specialty of Kim Chaek City is its low cost of nails. The Sungjin Steel Works Complex in Kim Chaek produces nail by melting steel and sells them, which is sold for 2,200 won~2,500 won per kg in Hoiryeong, at 1,200 won in Kim Chaek. However, not only is the weight heavy and is difficult to package, but the usage by civilians is not very high, so the incidence of sale to other provinces is low.

In Danchun, the price of fruit is very expensive, so it is not sold by the kilogram unit, but is sold individually. One medium-size apple is sold for up to 800 won.

On one hand, the price of rice in North Korea’s northeast region showed a narrow upward tendency in the latter half of May at the end of the spring shortage season. Corn, the staple of low-income civilians, did not show a huge change.

Share

In reclusive North, signs of economic liberalization

Wednesday, May 30th, 2007

Hankyoreh
Authored by Ryu Yi-geun and translated by Daniel Rakove

PYONYANG: “Next time, please come back and purchase something,” implored Mr. Hong to the customers leaving his store empty-handed.

“You’re saying you earn more if you sell more?”

“You bet.”

But this reporter was still suspicious. Four days later, I carefully asked our handler for confirmation.

“Of course it’s true,” he assured me. “Even in the same eight-hour workday, he who produces more results gets paid more.”

The concept of receiving compensation in proportion to the amount of sales is one that is now long familiar to North Koreans. Yet what is surprising is the gusto with which North Korean store staff will go to in encouraging South Korean tourists to buy their products, a phenomenon indicative of how great the materialistic impulse has become in the reclusive communist nation.

Constructed in Pyongyang’s central district in 1995, the 47-story Yanggak Hotel seems to float above the Daedong River like an island. Mr. Hong works at a store there on the second floor. There is even a spot next door to exchange money. Though the set prices are written on each product – in Euros – the South Korean customers managed to save a bit through bargaining. The owner was at first insistent that all products be only sold for the listed price, but he finally gave way after a long give and take with the customers. He decided it worthwhile to sell his products slightly cheaper, if only to make a profit. Though most transactions are conducted at the listed price, there were instances at the hotel store and other establishments of selling to tourists at a discounted rate after haggling over the price.

Elements of capitalism are slowly making their way into North Korean life – wrapped in the euphemism of “utility.” After returning from his trip to North Korea from May 14-18, on which he led 130 economic delegates, Min Byeong-seok, Director of the Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture proclaimed, “I could unmistakably feel here and there that North Korea is changing.”

It is of course difficult to confirm the presence of change in North Korea. This is in part because the changes are occurring at a low level. After all, there is always a difference in what we look for compared to what we are shown. This is what makes it difficult for someone to declare unreservedly, “North Korea is this,” or “North Korea is that.” There are also parts of North Korea that are difficult to understand due to the biases originating from the political system and values of the observer. Hankyoreh21 managed to get a spot in the group of Pyongyang-bound economic delegates, and recorded below is a compilation of the various things we witnessed.

“My life has gotten so much better since last year.” These words did not seem to be mere propaganda. Whether spoken by our North Korean guide or the various Pyongyang citizens with whom we came in contact, their words were by and large the same. One citizen told us, “My wages increased from 3,000 to 6,000 North Korean won,” and consumer prices “went up about 10-20 percent.” In other words, wages have increased much faster than has the rate of inflation. Yet that man cannot be taken to be the representative Pyongyang laborer, nor does he have the credibility of an economist.

Indeed, it is hard to grasp the level of inflation in North Korea: all one can do is take an educated guess. Lee Do-hyang of the Institute for National Security Strategy said, “These things are evidence that the financial situation is improving and the economy is enduring,” adding, “It seems that the quality of life for common people is taking a turn for the better.” Yet in North Korea, where it is said some US$30 a month is necessary to get by, a 3,000 North Korean won raise is not exactly a windfall: 6,000 North Korean won is about equivalent to $2, and on the black market, $1 sells for 3,000 North Korean won. Thus, the rationing and side jobs that bring in an additional $15-20 a month are an essential source of income.

Pyongyang’s major marketplaces have grown livelier. Stretching between 2,000 and 3,000 pyeong (1 pyeong is 3.3 sq. meters), one large-scale market has taken up a spot next to Kimchaek Industrial School on a once-empty spot along Otangangan Street. In the shape of a high school gym, the market’s two-story building is covered in a blue roof and the exterior is clean. Visible from the Yanggak Hotel, the market was bustling at 6 p.m. on May 16. The Bonghak Market next to the Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory was also busy once the sun set. At least one marketplace has taken shape in each of Pyongyang’s 18 districts. Each one is a symbol of capitalism’s penetration of the socialist, planned economy. The activities in each market are said to be hardly distinguishable from the capitalism found in other countries.

One citizen said, “The people go to the markets more, where the prices are a little bit cheaper than at the nationally operated stores. Even if one doesn’t buy anything, it is fun to look around, what with the variety of goods for sale and the haggling going on.” Most citizens are said to buy their daily necessities at such markets, having become an essential part of daily North Korean life.

Street food vendors started appearing quite a while ago, but their numbers are ever-increasing. The fairly tidy vendors can be seen here and there throughout Pyongyang, selling a variety of goods, including soft drinks, ice cream, bread, rice cakes, and so on. Each product runs between 100-300 North Korean won.

The local People’s Committee gives licenses for the operation of such stands to various companies or the descendants of revolutionaries. A portion of sales is taken by the state and the remainder of the profit goes to the managing company or individual.

Though the residents of Nampo, a port city 40 minutes by bus from Pyongyang, do not seem to be better off than their Pyongyang counterparts, the city is quite lively. On the journey from the major ship repair factory by the port, through the city center, and to the freeway entrance leading to Pyongyang, 50-60 separate street food vendors were spotted. The products they were selling as well as their method of sale were quite diverse. Some vendors – most likely new ones – simply laid out their goods on the ground for sale, showing even to the outsider that North Korea’s markets have hit a growth surge.

Five years have passed since the July 1, 2002 economic measures were instituted by the North Korean government, raising wages as well as the currency’s value. In addition, the price of rice and other necessities was increased, and a system of incentives and limited independent capital was expanded. Yet very few North Korean people have even heard of “the 7/1 measures.” Only after talking for a significant length of time will they mention the notion of “utility” that has been pursued over the last few years.

At the end of Unification Road in the Nagnang district of southern Pyongyang, the Phoenix Clothing Factory is producing clothing on commission. The 1,000-pyeong factory is unceasingly filled with the whirr of sewing machines. U Beom-su, 53, introduced himself to the South Korean observers as the company’s “chief executive,” explaining, “The workers work eight hours a day, but when the fixed day for shipment draws near, we have no choice but to put them on overtime.” The payment system for workers is multi-tiered, with five levels, the salary increasing with rank. Every month, one laborer is chosen from each team of workers as being the most outstanding, and is given bonus compensation. The ‘chief executive’ explained that further incentive payments were rewarded based upon the factory’s production levels on the whole.

It is unclear as to how widespread this model of business is, but director of the Korea Institute for National Unification Lee Bong-jo said that “the seeds of competition are visible.” However, the workers at the Yuwon Shoe Factory and the Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory were flustered when asked about their salaries or the labor system and evaded giving an answer.

The will for liberalization was evident here and there. At the 10th annual Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair on May 14, 200 companies from 12 countries participated, either to view the product lines or to display their own. The majority were Chinese companies, including its largest electronics firm, Haier, while there were several sections of the exhibition primarily interested in retailing to the foreign visitors themselves, the determination by North Korea to get its products out to foreign markets was apparent.

Many members from the South Korean team of economic representatives also participated. In particular, representatives from Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd, the world’s second largest shipbuilder, as well as the Korea Port Engineering Company, visited the Yeongnam Ship Repair Factory and the Nampo Port to explore the possibility of making investments in those places. In a gesture of consideration, the Northern handlers prepared a separate automobile for the potential investors to explore the grounds, and held a separate consultation session for them beyond the general one for the economic delegates. On multiple occasions, various North Korean officials expressed an interest in attracting South Korean capital. The self-confidence they showed hinted at a sense that they had to some extent resolved the immediate issues of day-to-day subsistence. It may sound strange, but the consensus of those who had also made the trip last year was that the electricity situation had improved. In other words, basic economic conditions seemed to be on the upswing. Perhaps the self-confidence North Koreans showed in displaying their possession of a nuclear weapon has now flowed into the economic sector, thus explaining their will for some liberalization.

Yet simply because there is a will for opening up does not mean liberalization will come easily. One Daewoo source explained, “[We told the North Koreans that] there must be assurances before we invest. They have to provide the same conditions that China does.” At this point, there is probably not a single person who could make such assurances on behalf of the North Koreans. The country is still unprepared to take advantage of the money available to it from the South through the economic cooperation program. The six-party talks also must also make some progress on the nuclear issue. Furthermore, if North Korean – U.S. relations do not improve, then free trade between North and South will remain uncertain indefinitely.

In the case that external matters are settled and the will for liberalization strengthens, then the vitalization of the North Korean economy could quickly pick up with the improvement of infrastructure, such as the electricity grid and logistics, which are pointed to as the largest stumbling blocks. The reporters who arrived first on May 12 witnessed, for instance, how the automatic doors and the elevator on the first floor of the Yanggak Hotel took 30 minutes to warm up. While the houses themselves gave off light after the sun set, the streets between them were completely dark. The mere 20-30 percent rate of operation at factories as estimated by experts is partially accountable to a lack of raw materials, but most of all to the deficiency of electricity.

The rigidity of the economic system only adds to North Korea’s list of woes. Though the director of Pyongyang Cosmetics has requested raw materials and modern machinery, he does not have the full authority to manage the company. Another company has imported the raw materials from China, and he confessed that he knew little of the specifics on the subject. The director of the Daeanchinseon Glass Factory made a similarly vague request for “raw materials.”

The problems go deeper. For one, there was no sign on the part of the North Korean factory managers to think of the visiting economic representatives as business counterparts in the world of capital and industry. For example, even photography by the group of South Korean trade representatives was forbidden within the factory grounds. Another chronic problem is the ease by which North Koreans that are not economic officials or specialists break promises. Furthermore, as often appears in planned economies, there is a single-minded focus on “production” without consideration of whether the product being made is for domestic use or for export. This sort of difficulty was evident at the cosmetics and shoe factories, as well.

Lee Bong-jo, director of the Korea Institute for National Unification, offered some advice to the South: “Knowledge of North Korea must precede any investments there.”

It seems that amongst difficulty, Pyongyang may be carefully seeking change. Though it remains stuck in the dilemma of pursuing liberalization while maintaining regime stability, it is increasingly sending strong signs to the outside world of a will for liberalization. As South Korean Former Minister of Unification Jeong Sye-hyeon said, “It is difficult for North Korea to go backwards.”

Share

North Korean Won dropping in value

Monday, May 21st, 2007

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
5/21/2007

Recently, the cost of living for North Koreans has become increasingly burdensome, as the value of the North Korean won (KPW) has steadily fallen. This phenomenon has been observed since the introduction of the July 1st measures in 2002, but the toll on poorer citizens is growing as money is concentrated in the hands of the elite.

A decent jumper jacket from China sells for 30,000 to 50,000 won, a kilogram of meat for 3,000 won, and a bottle of cooking oil for 2,700 won. North Koreans tell of taking 100,000 won to the market and, having only made a few purchases, leaving with an empty wallet.

Every month, a family of four requires 50 kilograms of rice (50,000 KPW or 1,000 won per kg) and 20 kg of corn (7,000 KPW or roughly 350 won per kg). On top of this, the expense of buying supplementary food items such as cooking oil, red pepper flakes, vinegar, garlic, and scallions is almost equivalent to the price of rice.

One North Korean woman (hereafter referred to as Ms. Kim) who sells noodles at the Hweryung Nammun market estimates her living expenses at 60,000 won per month. Ms. Kim, a housewife responsible for a family of three, earns about 2,000 to 3,000 won a day selling noodles. This amounts to roughly 60,000 won a month, which only covers food expenses. She cannot even dream of buying rice, let alone saving up to raise seed money for a business, as her income goes toward supplementary items like corn (23,000 KPW for 70 kg), cooking oil (2,700 KPW), and beans (950 KPW for 1 kg).

Ms. Kim’s husband, who works at the Hweryung machine factory, receives a monthly salary of 4,000 won. This money is only enough to buy four kilograms of rice. Ms. Kim started selling noodles ten years ago, when it became clear that relying on her husband’s income would end in starvation for her family. She said that she has not put meat on the table for her child in a long time, as it is difficult to afford even one kilogram a month. With the exception of merchants who trade with overseas Chinese, workers who earn foreign currency, and those with relatives in China, the majority of Hweryung’s residents live day to day.

With the recent order from the Ministry of Public Security to “cease selling, as rations will be provided starting in April,” local markets have come under stricter regulation. This regulation has had the effect of raising the price of goods manufactured in China. Before the restriction, transactions took place at stalls and impromptu shops, but now buyers must hunt down merchants, which has led to a rise in prices.

On a related note, the dollar’s weak performance in the international market has been reflected in the North Korean black market. The exchange rate remains pegged at one dollar to eight Chinese yuan, but the rate of the North Korean won to the dollar and to the yuan changes daily. North Korea does not have a fixed exchange rate, because individuals who offer money exchange services occasionally receive information on currency rates from China. Due to the dollar’s recent weakness, the rate of the North Korean won to the dollar as well as to the yuan has been falling for several months.

Share

The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe

Thursday, May 3rd, 2007

American Enterprise Institute Book forum
4/17/2007

A couple of weeks ago, I had the opportunity to attend a book forum at the American Enterprise Institute on Nicholas Eberstadt’s new book, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe.  It was very informative to hear three different perspectives on the direction of North Korea’s economic reform.

Panelists included:

Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University
Deok-Ryong Yoon, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

In summary, Mr. Eberstadt and Mr. Lankov are pessimistic about the North Korean leadership’s desire to enact reforms–knowing that information leakages will undermine their political authority.  As Mr. Lankov pointed out, the North Korean nomenklatura are all children and grandchildren of the founders of the country who are highly vested in the current system.  They have no way out politically, and as such, cannot reform.

They argue that the economic reforms enacted in 2002 were primarily efforts to reassert control over the de facto institutions that had emerged in the collapse of the state-run Public Distribition System, not primarily intended to revive the economy.  Lankov does admit, however, that North Korea is more open and market-oriented than it has ever been, and  Mr. Yoon was by far the most optomistic on the prospects of North Korean reform.

Personally, I think it makes sense to think about North Korean politics as one would in any other country–as composed of political factions that each seek their own goals.  Although the range of policy options is limited by current political realities, there are North Koreans who are interested in reform and opening up–even if only to earn more money.  In this light, even if the new market institutions recognized in the 2002 reforms were acknowledged only grudgingly, they were still acknowledged, and their legal-social-economic positions in society are now de jure, not just de facto.  The North Korean leadership might be opposed to wholesale reform, but that is economically and strategically different than a controlled opening up on an ad hoc basis–which is what I believe we are currently seeing. Anyway, dont take my word for it, check out the full commentary posted below the fold:

(more…)

Share

Hoiryeong Market Price of Rice Wanes from 1000 to 800 North Korean Won

Tuesday, April 10th, 2007

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
4/10/2007

riceprices.jpgAt the end of March, the price of North Korean rice in Hoiryeong City’s jangmadang (market) fell to 820 won per 1kg, around 200 won lower than early January of this year. At a 100 won less value, the price of rice is in a falling state.

The result of Daily NK’s survey of three cities – Shineju, Hoiryeong, Kwaksan – in North Korea’s southern and northern regions at the end of March revealed that the declining price of rice will remain a reality through all regions of North Korea. In Shineju, North Korean rice costs 800 won per kg, 850 won for South-Korean rice, and 700 won for Chinese rice. The price of rice in Shineju is not much different than in January.

The price of corn, which is the staple among North Korea’s low-income, fluctuated narrowly from 340 won at the beginning of the year to 370 won at the end of March. Compared to the decline in the price of rice, the price of corn remaining at the current level can be said to reflect the demand for corn which has been transferred from the demand for rice on a small-scale.

As a whole, the stability of North Korea jangmadang’s price of rice indicates that food supply for North Korean citizens is relatively stable, compared to before. Since the North Korean authorities have not fulfilled the nationwide rations, a large majority of the citizens are purchasing their food at the jang.

In spite of North Korea entering the spring shortage season where the difficulty of obtaining food becomes more severe, the stability of the current price of rice is significant contrary evidence from the position upheld by world’s food organizations or domestic aid organizations of “100,000 tons of food deficit” in North Korea.

The value of the North Korean currency has been in a recession since March. In the Northern region, the currency declined from 3200 won per dollar early this year to 3050 won by the end of March. The Chinese yuan has also declined from 418 won to 360 won. North Korea’s inflation is falling back daily.

The price of North Korean pork at 2500 won per kg does not differ much from early this year. The price of flour, which is rare in North Korea, is 1000 won per kg; it always exceeds the price of rice. The price of North Korean sea foods is still astronomical. The bidding price for one frozen Pollack is 4000 won. That is enough to buy 5kg of rice.

A local source who conducted the price investigation of markets inside North Korea said, “The results of this investigation revealed that the price difference among the North Korean regions is very significant” and “besides medicinal or daily products, the price level in Hamkyungdo is higher than the price level in Pyongando.”

 

Share

Rice bought, sought at markets in N. Korea: source

Tuesday, April 10th, 2007

Yonhap
4/10/2007

North Korean authorities have scaled back their country’s food rationing system and allowed rice to be bought and sold at open markets in major cities, sources here said Tuesday.

In July 2002, the communist country reduced food rationing and introduced an economic reform program under which wages were raised and farmers’ markets were expanded so that people could buy food. But the policy has zigzagged on the purchase and sale of cereals and rice. 

“Since last year, rumors have spread about the sale at state-run stores as the food rationing system did not function well. Currently, not only corn but also rice is being traded at the markets,” a government source said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The source added that North Korean authorities permitted the sale of imported rice at state-run stores. “The authorities hope to clamp down on high rice prices at black markets by diversifying the sources of rice distribution,” the source said. On the North’s black market, the product costs about 20 times more than rice at state-run stores. 

Share

Foreign Policy Memo

Tuesday, April 3rd, 2007

Urgent: How to Topple Kim Jong Il
Foreign Policy Magazine
March/April 2007, P.70-74
Andrei Lankov

From: Andrei Lankov
To: Condoleezza Rice
RE: Bringing Freedom to North Korea

When North Korea tested a nuclear weapon late last year, one thing became clear: The United States’ strategy for dealing with North Korea is failing. Your current policy is based on the assumption that pressuring the small and isolated state will force itto change course. That has not happened—and perhaps never will.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Il and his senior leaders understand that political or economic reforms will probably lead to the collapse of their regime. They face a challenge that their peers in China and Vietnam never did—a prosperous and free “other half” of the same nation. North Korea’s rulers believe that if they introduce reforms, their people will do what the East Germans did more than 15 years ago. So, from the perspective of North Korea’s elite, there are compelling reasons to resist all outside pressure. if anything, foreign pressure (particularly from Americans) fits very well into what Pyongyang wants to propagate— the image of a brave nation standing up to a hostile world dominated by the United States.

Yet, sadly, the burden of encouraging change in North Korea remains the United States’ alone. China and Russia, though not happy about a nuclear North Korea, are primarily concerned with reducing U.S. influence in East Asia. China is sending considerable aid to Pyongyang. You already know that South Korea, supposedly a U.S. ally, is even less willing to join your efforts. Seoul’s major worry is not a North Korean nuclear arsenal but the possibility of sudden regime collapse. A democratic revolution in the North, followed by a German-style unification, would deal a heavy blow to the South Korean economy. That’s why Seoul works to ensure that the regime in Pyongyang remains stable, while it enjoys newfound affluence and North Koreans quietly suffer.

Do not allow this status quo to persist. Lead the fight for change in North Korea. Here are some ideas to make it happen:

Realize a Quiet Revolution Is Already Under Way: For decades, the Hermit Kingdom was as close to an Orwellian nightmare as the world has ever come. But that’s simply not the case anymore. A dramatic transformation has taken place in North Korea in recent years that is chronically underestimated, particularly in Washington. This transformation has made Kim Jong Ii increasingly vulnerable to internal pressures. Yes, North Korea is still a brutal dictatorship. But compared to the 1970s or 1980s, its government has far less control over the daily lives of its people.

With the state-run economy in shambles, the government no longer has the resources to reward “correct” behavior or pay the hordes of lackeys who enforce the will of the Stalinist regime. Corruption runs rampant, and officials are always on the lookout for a bribe. Old regulations still remain on the books, but they are seldom enforced. North Koreans nowadays can travel outside their county of residence without getting permission from the authorities. Private markets, once prohibited, are flourishing. People can easily skip an indoctrination session or two, and minor ideological deviations often go unpunished. It’s a far cry from a free society, but these changes do constitute a considerable relaxation from the old days.

Deliver Information Inside: North Korea has maintained a self-imposed information blockade that is without parallel. Owning radios with free tuning is still technically illegal— a prohibition without precedent anywhere. This news blackout is supposed to keep North Koreans believing that their country is an earthly paradise. But, today, it is crumbling.

North Korea’s 880-mile border with China is notoriously porous. Smuggling and human trafficking across this remote landscape is rampant. Today, 50,000 to 100,000 North Koreans reside illegally inside China, working for a couple of dollars a day (a fortune, by North Korean standards). In the past 10 years, the number of North Koreans who have been to China and then returned home may be as large as 500,000. These people bring with them news about the outside world. They also bring back short-wave radios, which, though illegal, are easy to conceal. It is also becoming common to modify state-produced radios that have fixed tuning to the state’s propaganda channels. With a little rejiggering, North Koreans can listen to foreign news broadcasts.

But there are few broadcasts that North Koreans can hope to intercept. It was once assumed that South Korea would do the best job broadcasting news to its northern neighbor. And that was true until the late 1990s, when, as part of its “sunshine policy,” South Korea deliberately made these broadcasts “non-provocative.” There are only three other stations that target North Korea. But their airtime is short, largely due to a shortage of funds. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America each broadcast for roughly four hours per day, and Free North Korea (FNK), a small, South Korea-based station staffed by North Korean defectors, broadcasts for just one hour per day.

Being a former Soviet citizen, I know that shortwave radios could be the most important tool for loosening Pyongyang’s grip. That was the case in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, some 25 percent of Russia’s adult population listened to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week because they were one of the only reliable sources of news about the world and, more importantly, our own society A dramatic increase in funding for broadcasts by Voice Of America is necessary.  It is also important to support the defectors’ groups that do similar broadcasting themselves. These groups are regularly silenced by South Korean authorities, and they have to do everything on a shoestring. A journalist at the FNK gets paid the equivalent of a janitor’s salary in Seoul.  Even a small amount of money- less than U.S. military forces in Seoul spend on coffee-could expand their airtime greatly. With an annual budget of just $1 million, a refugee-staffed station could be on air for four hours a day, 365 days a year.

Leverage the Refugee Community in the South: There are some 10,000 North Korean defectors living in the South, and their numbers are growing fast. Unlike in earlier times, these defectors stay in touch with their families back home using smugglers’ networks and mobile phones. However, the defectors are not a prominent lobby in South Korea. In communist-dominated Eastern Europe, large and vibrant exile communities played a major role in promoting changes back home and, after the collapse of communism, helped ensure the transformation to democracy and a market economy. That is why the United States must help increase the influence of this community by making sure that a cadre of educated and gifted defectors emerges from their ranks.

Today, younger North Korean defectors are being admitted to South Korean colleges through simplified examinations (they have no chance of passing the standard tests), but a bachelor’s degree means little in modern South Korea. Defectors cannot afford the tuition for a postgraduate degree, which is the only path to a professional career. Thus, postgraduate scholarships and internship programs will be critical to their success. Without outside help, it is unlikely that a vocal and influential group of defectors will emerge. Seoul won’t fund these programs, so it will be up to foreign governments and non-governmental organizations to do so. Fortunately, these kinds of initiatives are cheap, easy to enact, and perfectly compatible with the views of almost every U.S. politician, from right to left.

Fund, Plan, and Carry out Cultural Exchanges: The Cold War was won not by mindless pressure alone, but by a combination of pressure and engagement. The same will be true with North Korea The United States must support, both officially and unofficially, all policies that promote North Korea’s Contacts with the outside world. These policies are likely to be relatively expensive, compared to the measures above, but cheap in comparison to a military showdown with a nuclear power.

It makes sense for the U.S. government to bring North Korean students to study overseas (paid for with U.S. tax dollars), to bring their dancers or singers to perform in the West, and to invite their officials to take “study tours.” Without question, North Korean officials are wary of these kinds of exchanges with the United States. However, they will be less unwilling to allow exchanges with countries seen as neutral, such as Australia and New Zealand. In the past, Pyongyang would never have allowed such exchanges to happen. But nowadays, because most of these programs will benefit elite, well- connected North Korean families, the temptation will be too great to resist. in-other words, a official in Pyongyang might understand perfectly well that sending his son to study market economics at the Australian National University is bad for the communist system, but as long as his son will benefit, he will probably support the project.

Convince Fellow Republicans That Subtle Measures Can Work: Some Republicans, particularly in the U.S. Congress, might object to any cultural exchanges that will benefit already-privileged North Koreans. And, for many, funding Voice of America isn’t as attractive as pounding a fist in Kim’s face. But these criticisms are probably shortsighted. As a student of Soviet history, you know that mild exposure to the world outside the Soviet Union had a great impact on many Soviet party officials. And information almost always filters downstream. A similar effect can be expected in North Korea. During the Cold War, official exchange programs nurtured three trends that eventually brought down the Soviet system: disappointment among the masses, discontent among the intellectuals, and a longing for reforms among bureaucrats. Money invested in subtle measures is not another way to feed the North Korean elite indirectly; it is an investment in the gradual disintegration of a dangerous and brutal regime.

North Korea has changed, and its changes should be boldly exploited. The communist countries of the 20th century were not conquered. Their collapse came from within, as their citizens finally realized the failures of the system that had been foisted on them. The simple steps outlined here will help many North Koreans arrive at the same conclusion. It may be the only realistic way to solve the North Korean problem, while also paving the way for the eventual transformation of the country into a free society. This fight will take time, but there is no reason to wait any longer.

Share

19 Dollars a Month Means Three Corn Meals a Day

Monday, April 2nd, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
4/2/2007

“100,000 won (approx. US$32.2) doesn’t cut it.” This is a sigh-ridden comment of a North Korean citizen, who states that even if he has 100,000 won, it is not much to spend.

The recent currency depreciation of the North Korean won has been exacerbating the North Korean citizens’ burdens of their costs of living.

Such a situation has been ongoing since the July 1st Economic Measure in 2002, but with the concentration of money in the privileged class, the grim realities of life of vulnerable persons have been becoming more difficult.

Hoiryeong citizen Park Hyun Sik (pseudonym), in a phone conversation with Daily NK on the 30th, stated that “a decent Chinese jumper costs 30,000 ~50,000 (approx. US$ 9.7~16) won for one, 3,000 won for 1kg of meat, and 2,700 won per a bottle of oil. After eagerly awaiting a month, I go to the market with 100,000 won (approx. US$ 32.2), but end up with nothing even though I did not buy much.”

Mr. Park, who conducts the wholesale business of relaying goods received from overseas Chinese emigrants to the provinces, receives a monthly income of 300,000 won. This puts him in a good class in North Korea. Mr. Park’s family, which consists of his wife and son, plans to secure food with this money.

Evidently, a family of four needs 50kg (50,000 won) of rice, which costs 1,000 won per kg, and 20 kg (7,000 won) of corn, which costs 350 won per kg, to survive. Additionally, the cost of buying a bottle of bean oil at 2,700 won as well as pepper powder, vinegar, garlic, onions and other vegetables is almost equal in value to the cost of buying rice.

On top of this, the family says they eat pork meat about once a month, which costs 3,000 won per kg. The rest of the money goes to the three family members’ clothing and cigarettes and drinks for Mr. Park, all of which cost about 300,000 won. Even then, Mr. Park tends to be on the well-fed side.

Working Citizens Cannot Eat Meat Even Once A Month

Kim Jung Ok (Alias), who sustains her living through a noodle business in the Hyeryung South Gate jang (market), has a monthly living expense of approximately 60,000 won. Ms. Kim is a housewife, who has taken on the responsibility of her three-member family.

Even if she sells noodles all day, she only makes 2,000~3,000 won. She merely earns around 60,000 won per month, all of which goes to food. Making a profit from her business is a mere dream, she expresses. She cannot even think about rice; after buying 70 kg of corn (23,000 won), bean oil, beans (950 won per kg) and other vegetables, she has nothing left.

The monthly income of her husband, who works at a machine shop in Hoiryeong, is 4,000 won. That is enough to buy 4kg of rice. Fearing starvation if she solely depended on her husband, she opened her noodle shop 10 years ago. “Even if we are both working like this, it is barely enough for corn meals. It is difficult to buy a kg of meat in a month. It has been a long time since I fed meat to my child,” she confessed.

Currently, with the exception of storekeepers who trade with Chinese emigrants, foreign currency traders, and those who have relatives in China, a majority of residents in Hoiryeong live daily as Mr. Park.

Recently, the Ministry of People’s Safety Agency issued the order that “Rations will be distributed in April. So, stop engaging in illegal trade.” Due to this decree, the control of the jangmadang (market) has been tightened. Discontent among residents who sell Chinese industrial products has climaxed, “How can we live if they feign ignorance while not providing the rations?”

The regulation of jangmadang (market) by ministry officials has only raised the price of Chinese industrial products. Before that, there would be joint bargains, but now, purchasers are visiting the merchants and so the costs of products are going up.

On one hand, the influence of the dollar’s recent bearish turn in the international market is fully reflected in the North Korean black market. The exchange rate of 800 won to a dollar between the Chinese Yuan and the dollar remains unchanging, but the North Korean currency following suit to the dollar and the Yuan changes day to day. Ultimately, North Korea is not “a region with a fixed exchange rate” due to the fact that exchange merchants occasionally apply the exchange information received from China.

Due to the dollar’s slump, the ratio of the North Korean won to the dollar and to the Yuan has been on the decline for several months. Mr. Park said, “In January, the North Korean currency went up to 42,000 won per 100 won RMB, but has drastically gone down to 36,500 won per 100 won.”

Share

North Korea Lacking a Million Ton of Food…Inflated Figures?

Wednesday, March 28th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
3/28/2007

The World Food Programme (WFP) revealed that North Korea had for the first time admitted that they were lacking a million ton of food.

Recently, Tony Banbury, WFP Asia Director spent 3 days on location with officials from the North Korean Agriculture Ministry and Foreign Ministry where the food situation was discussed.

On the 26th, Banbury told Reuters, “This is a very significant development that they themselves are confirming they have a gap of 1mn tones.”

Director Banbury informed that the WFP and other sources had provided for North Korea’s food variance which equated to about 20% of the nations needs, however that these sources had already been wasted.

Disputably, these figures made by Mr. Banbury do not correspond to the figures on North Korea’s crop yields. Some even criticize that it was inappropriate of the WFP to directly quote comments made by North Korean officials.

According to a source by the DailyNK, the cost of rice has remained at 800~900 won(US$0.25~0.29). Especially with the forthcoming cyclic hardships of spring harvest, these figures suggest that market costs are actually stabilizing.

Since the breakdown of the distribution system, many North Koreans have resorted to purchasing rice at the markets. In North Korea, the cost of rice is a good representation of market conditions, and considering that rice prices are showing constancy is evidence that there have not been drastic setbacks as a result of the rice distributions.

In comparison to last year where flooding made the food crisis chronic in various districts throughout North Korea, the situation hasn’t really deteriorated. Rather, the continuous inflow of food and hence trade from China has helped maintain market prices, North Korea-China tradesmen say.

Earlier this year, the Rural Development Administration in South Korea estimated North Korea’s food production to be 4.3mn tons. Evidence from a defector who once worked at North Korea’s food distribution ministry and past analysis on crop production suggests that North Korea would not have incurred a food crisis in the case it had produced more than 4mn tons of output.

Simply put, 4.3mn tons of production is at the least enough to maintain the lives of North Korean citizens. Undoubtedly, in a society like North Korea, this figure could initiate a food crisis and starvation in the lower class. However, inflating the shortage of food may only cause exhaustion of essential aid.

In addition, some argue that international organizations are actually provoking this vicious cycle in North Korea by decreasing the real amount of food produce.

Recently, North Korean analyst Marcus Noland published a report, ‘Famine in North Korea’ where he argued that about 50% of international food aid was being consumed by the military and, or the elite class.

In the report, he said, “The North Korean government consistently sought to frustrate transparent, effective humanitarian relief” and that, “Diversion is almost certainly occurring on a large scale, enough food to feed between 3 to 10 percent or more of the North Korean populace. Some of this aid is almost surely consumed by politically connected groups, including the military.”

Share