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Jangmadang Will Prevent “Second Food Crisis” from Developing

Friday, October 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
10/26/2007

There is a prospect of the rise of “second food crisis” next year because of the flood disaster and the resulting food shortage.

A senior researcher at Korea Rural Economic Institute, Kwon Tae Jin said warningly, “Unless North Korea comes up with a special plan to secure food supply, there will come another food crisis next year, which is as severe as the one in the mid and late 1990s.”

Kwon anticipated that North Korea would need 5.2 million tons of grain for domestic consumption. Unfortunately, it is expected that North Korea would produce around 3.8 million tons of grain. This means there will be a shortage of 1.4 million tons of grain.

The statistics indicates there is a real possibility of a food crisis. North Korean authorities announced that the flood inundated about 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland, which accounts for 14 percent of the country’s farmland. It is estimated that 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland produces at least 500,000 tons of grain.

However, another prospect says that although food shortage is inevitable, it will not lead to mass starvation in North Korea as it did in the mid-1990s. Most of defectors from North Korea said, “Since the mid-2000s, things have changed. There won’t be any serious starvation.” They said that the current situation is different from that of those days under the central food distribution system. They added that the Jangmadang (markets) economy has changed a way for life among North Korea people.

◆ The amount of demand for food is overestimated

It should be double-checked whether North Korea really needs a minimum of 5.2 million tons of grain. There is criticism that the estimate of food demand which was calculated by some South Korean experts on North Korea and relief organizations is unrealistic. It is also pointed out that the estimate is calculated based on the nutrition standard of South Korea.

Defectors said that mass starvation would not have occurred if North Korea had at least a half of 5.2 million tons of grain in the mid 1990s.

Although the international standard for daily nutritional intake is between 2,000 and 2,500 kcal/day, North Korea sets the standard at 1,600 kcal/day, which amounts to 450 grams of grain.

It is easy to estimate the minimum amount of food demand needed in North Korea. Let us say every individual including children and the elderly needs 550 grams of grain per day, which is equal to the daily amount of food distributed to every adult by the state. With the population of 22 million in North Korea, the country then needs 12,100 tons of grain each day and 4.4 million tons of grain per year.

It is known that the North Korean government provides 550 grams of grain for adults and 300 grams for both children and the elderly. According to CIA’s World Fact Book 2004, the population aged between 15 and 64 in North Korea is around 15 million, which accounts for 67.8 percent of total population. This means the population of children and the elderly together reaches about 7 million. If we do the math, we come into conclusion that the amount of food needed in North Korea every year is 3,777,750 tons of grain.

Recall that North Korean people had received the aforementioned amount of food through the state food distribution until early 1990s. Of course, the country did not suffer from mass starvation back then.

The mass starvation during the mid-1990s resulted from huge decrease in food production between 1994 and 1998. In those years, North Korea produced about 2 million tons of grain, which fell far below the needed levels of food production. Hwang Jang Yop, former secretary of the Worker’s Party also testified that in the fall of 2006, while he was still in North Korea, he once heard the secretary of agriculture Seo Kwan Hee worrying about extremely low food production.

Therefore, it is correct to estimate the minimum amount of food needed in North Korea at 3,777,750 tons of grain. If the food production decreases below 3 million tons, then the food prices will skyrocket, and the possibility of mass starvation will be increased.

◆ A New way of life among North Korean people helps prevent them from falling victim to starvation.

North Koran people do not believe in the state authorities any more. The people know that they suffered from horrible starvation because they relied on the state and its food distribution system. During the crisis, many people had desperately waited for food to be distributed until they collapsed and died. Nowadays, North Korean people find a means of living by themselves at Jangmadang.

“There is no free ride” is the words on everybody’s lips in North Korea, which means that everyone must work hard in order to make a living. The lowest class became a day laborer.

The mass starvation of the mid-1990s has brought a significant change into North Korean society. Except a few, most of North Korean people do not rely on the state’s food distribution system. Instead, they have come up with a variety of survival techniques such as engaging in business, illegal trade with China or real estate transactions, receiving support from defected family members, and house sitting.

In that manner, North Korean people make money and use it to buy rice. An affiliate at the Bank of Korea who studies price trends of North Korea said, “Since the adoption of the July 1 Economic Improvement Measure, the price of rice and corn has increased the least.” If the prices go up, people would tighten their belts and decrease their spending on every item except rice. This means they are not that vulnerable to starvation as they used to.

◆ Businessmen are good at securing food.

Recently, a number of rich businessmen have emerged. Some have tens of thousands dollars, and others as many as several million dollars. Groups of Jangmadang businessmen have been organized with these rich businessmen as the leaders.

These businessmen come and go to China as they please and supply food and goods to Jangmadang in North Korea. If the rice price in North Korea is expensive than in China, they buy Chinese rice and sell it at Janmadang. In this way, they help balance supply and demand at the market.

Furthermore, Chinese residents in North Korea and Chinese businessmen also joined the North Korean businessmen as providers at the market. They too sell food produced in China at Jangmadang when food prices go up in North Korea. If possible, they even sell rice reserved for the People’s Army. There was an accusation that the state authorities supplied food aid from overseas for the People’s Army while collecting food produced in North Korea at the same time.

Of course, some businessmen could deliberately keep a hold on food supply anticipating an increase in food prices. However, that kind of unfair activity is temporary. Although it is too early to tell, the “invisible hand” of the market, however small it is, is operating in North Korea and acting as a preventive measure against starvation.

Posted in Agriculture, Arduous March, Black markets, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Political economy, Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Privileged Pyongyang Citizens No Longer Enjoy Privileges in the Market.

Monday, October 22nd, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/22/2007
(Click on image for original size)

According to DailyNK’s research on prices in North Korea conducted in late September, the prices in Pyongyang are similar to the prices in other parts of the country. The finding shows that Jangmadang (markets) economy has been going through integration and similar distribution process across North Korea.

In the past, domestic commodities were sold cheap, and foreign products were sold expensive in Pyongyang.

DailyNK has been conducting quarterly research on prices in the central such as Pyongan Province and Hamkyung Province and northern areas.

This time the research result shows that the price of rice in a Jangmadang in Pyongyang is 1,350 won/kg, which is similar to the price of rice in Sinuiju, 1,400won/kg. In North Korea, the rice price serves as a gauge for price trends.

In Pyongyang, the exchange rate is about 330 thousands won to 100 dollars, which is the same as the exchange rate in other places. The most famous imported cigarettes, Cat (Craven A) is sold at the same cost of 1,500 won in Pyongyang and other areas.

Subsidiary food is more expensive in Pyongyang. The price of cabbage is 400 won/kg, 50 won/kg higher than cabbage price in Sinuiju. The price of pork ranges from 3,500 to 4,000/kg, 500~1,000 won/kg higher than the pork price in other areas.

The prices of seafood such as brown and green seaweed, and dried Pollack are cheaper in Pyongyang. Seafood caught in Kangwon Province and neighboring areas is transported to markets in Pyongyang in refrigerator car. Since the demand is high, seafood is sold in great quantities, and the price remains low in general.

Movie ticket prices range from 200 to 400 won. Telephone service is charged five won per minute. Overall, the price range for each commodity is high, and many different kinds of goods are available in Jangmadang.

Imported items from China such as socks, sports shoes, or underwear are expensive being sold at a cost of 1,000 won in Pyongyang. That is because there are extra shipping rates and labor costs imposed on Chinese goods transported to Pyongyang. On the contrary, in Sinuiju, imported goods from China are circulated on the market right away.

Often, retail prices are higher in Pyongyang because of high levels of consumption among Pyongyang citizens. However, cigarettes or liquor produced in Pyongyang, or clothes from South Korea circulated to other areas via Pyongyang are sold cheap in Pyongyang.

However, in these days the differences in regional price levels have almost disappeared.

A defector from Pyongyang, Ahn Chul Min (a pseudonym) who came to South Korea in 2006 said, “Prior to 2002, there were individuals who hung around from place to place and made money on price differences. But nowadays, the retail prices are almost uniform across the country because people just use a telephone and find out where to get items they want at what prices.

“Since there is no big difference in retail prices, retailers are not doing well in business,” Ahn added, “Instead, individuals driving a truck and selling goods wholesale are making good money.”

Ahn said, “Not everyone who lives in Pyongyang is well-to-do. Despite of their locations whether in Pyongyang or Chongjin, all markets have goods from South Korea and China. The poor people even if they live in Pyongyang should buy cheap and low quality of products from China. In contrast, those who live in Chongjin and have money can buy goods from South Korea anytime.”

Market Prices Consistent Throughout DPRK
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-10-25-1
10/25/2007

The results of a survey conducted by Daily NK on the price of goods in Pyongyang at the end of September show that prices in the capital were similar to those in rural areas. This is an indication that markets throughout the country are integrated, and evidence that goods can be circulated from region to region.

In the past, the price of domestic goods in Pyongyang was relatively cheep, while imported goods were sold at high prices. During that time, Daily NK carried out local price surveys in central regions such as Pyongan and Hamkyung provinces, as well as in northern areas. According to this latest survey in Pyongyang, the cost of one Kg of rice, the standard measure of the cost of goods in North Korea, was 1,350 won, similar to the 1,400 won price in Sinuiju, and the 1,250 won cost in Hyeryung. An exchange rate of 3,300 won per USD is also in line with rural exchange rates, as is the 1,500 won price tag on a pack of Craven A cigarettes, the most favored imported cigarette in North Korea.

Non-essential food goods are more expensive in Pyongyang than in outlying areas, with one Kg of lettuce selling for 400 won, 50 won more than in Sinuiju. Also, pork in the capital runs between 3,500 and 4,000 won per Kg, which is 500 to 1,000 won more than it would cost elsewhere in the country.

On the other hand, seaweed, dried Pollack, and other marine products are cheaper in Pyongyang than elsewhere. Ocean harvests from Kangwon and neighboring provinces are brought to Pyongyang markets by way of refrigerated trucks. Because of high demand, a variety of goods get delivered, yet overall, prices are held fairly low.

Overall, the price range on a particular ware was very wide, indicating that there was a variety of products available in the markets. The survey found that goods such as undergarments, socks, sneakers imported from China were selling for the high cost of 1,000 won each. In Sinuiju and other northern areas, goods from China are brought directly to markets, but by the time these same goods reach Pyongyang, additional labor and transportation costs force prices up. Pyongyang residents typically have more money to spend than those in rural areas, also leading vendors to raise prices on some goods, however cigarettes and alcohol produced in Pyongyang and distributed to rural areas, as well as South Korean goods which reach DPRK markets by way of Pyongyang, are slightly less expensive in the capital.

Recently, regional price differences have nearly disappeared. Prior to 2002, some traders earned their living traveling from region to region exploiting price differences. However, now with one simple phone call, North Koreans can find out where and for what price goods are being sold, leading the majority of retail prices to be similar throughout the country.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Black markets, Economic reform, Film, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Telephones, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Market Prices Are Skyrocketing in North Korea

Friday, October 19th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/19/2007

A study reveals that market prices have skyrocketed in North Korea since the massive flood disaster in August.

According to the study conducted by DailyNK in late September this year, the rice price in the northern part of North Korea increased by 500 North Korean won on average between early July and September. In the market in Sinuiju of North Pyongan Province, the rice price rose from 980 Won/kg to 1,400 Won/kg.

The price of imported rice from China also went up to 1,250 won/kg. The rice from South Korea was sold at 1,450/kg. In Gwaksan of North Pyongan Province, the domestic rice was sold at 1,370/kg, the rice from China at 1,500/kg, the rice from South Korea at 1,300/kg.

In Hoiryeong of North Hamkyung Province, the price of domestic rice was 900 won/kg in July but rose to 1,250 won/kg. In Kilju of North Hamkyung Province, the domestic rice was sold at 1,200 won/kg. This shows that the rice price in North Hamkyung Province did not increase as highly as the price in Sinuiju of North Pyungan Province. In Hoiryeong, the price of rice has been rising steadily from 820 won/kg in March.

The rice in Hoiryeong is cheaper than in Sinuiju because demand for corn is relatively high and food distribution is partly being operated in Hoiryeong.

Between July and late September, the price of wheat also rose from 900 won to 1,200 won, and the price of noodles from 1,000 won to 1,600 won. However, the price of whole corn, the staple food for the low-income families remained stable for the same period.

It was believed that the surge in food prices resulted from the massive flood damage which stroke North Korea in early and middle August. When vast areas of land in South Pyongan and Hwanghae Province, the major granary of North Korea, were submerged during the flood, it was expected that domestic crop production would decrease.

After the food crisis in 1990s, the demand for rice increases in every fall during which rice price is low and people tend to purchase in advance one-year supply for food. In this fall, however, the price of rice greatly rose because the shortage of food was anticipated.

Meanwhile, the surge in rice price illustrates that overseas food aid was not distributed to the people of North Korean. The illicit sale of rice originally distributed to the party cadres or People’s Army has not been fully activated in the market. In addition, the rise in rice price was triggered by the fact that the number of wholesalers stocking up rice in advance increased with the news that there would be a shortage of food.

In early August, the price of rice once surged to a high of 1,950 won/kg in the market in Sinuiju. Thereupon, there was a rumor going around that the rise in rice price resulted from the state’s ban on rice sale and had nothing to do with the flood. Anyhow, the rice price has been on the decrease since then, and in September it had remained at around 1,500 won/kg.

As opposed to the rise in rice price, the price of corn, the main diet for the low-income families remained stable. This means the possibility of massive starvation in North Korea is low this year. Moreover, that the corn price remained moderate when rice price went up by 500 won reflects that the economic situation of middle class has been stabilized over the years.

Along with the rise in food prices, the prices of industrial products or others have been soaring sharply. The price of pork increased from 2,300 won/kg to 3,000 won/kg, and the price of frozen Pollack from 3,500/fish to 4,800/fish

The prices of brown seaweed or fruit juice went up to around 2,000 won each. The price of the popular imported cigarettes, Cat, rose by 200 won being sold at a cost of 1,500 won.

As winter is coming soon, the heating fuel price increased. Brown coal was sold at a cost of 1,300 won for 20 kg, gasoline at a cost of 3,000 won/liter

The exchange rate also increased from one dollar to 3,100 won to one dollar to 3,300 won.

Posted in Agriculture, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | 1 Comment »

North Korea Farming Region Destroyed, So the Cost of Rice Increases

Wednesday, October 17th, 2007

Daily NK
Han Young Jin
10/17/2007

Due to the flood damage which heavily affected the central region of North Korea last August, the next year’s price of rice has been putting an increasing burden among civilians.

Min Nam Su (pseudonym), a North Korean trader who has come to Dandong, China, said on the 15th, “In Hwanghae and South Pyongan Province this year, farming has been affected for the flood damage, so the price of rice has been showing signs of an increase. Currently in the Jangmadang (markets) in Shinuiju, 15kg of rice costs 25,000 North Korean won (KRW8,000, USD8.7).

“The farmlands in Hwanghae and South Pyongan have been completely submerged, so we were only able to look to farming in North Pyongan Province. It is obvious that they will be taken up for provisions for the People’s Army, so people who have money are already busy buying and hoarding rice.”

A majority of urban civilians are directly purchasing rice from the jangmadang, with the exception of Hwanghae and Pyongyang, after the breakdown of the provision system in North Korea. If the price of rice skyrockets, the livelihood of North Korean citizens will be directly affected.

It is possible that the rice aid from South Korea or international society, which will be distributed from the end of this month, may stabilize the price of rice.

Good Friends, beginning early this month, relayed through its newsletter, “Only when the rice aid comes in quickly will the overall price of rice decrease, no matter whose hands it falls into. It is difficult to buy a kg of rice for 1,700~1,900 won.”

Rice aid to North Korea flows in through Pyongyang, Nampo, or through Chongjin Harbor. The rice, after it goes to the People’s Army or large-city political employees, travels down a path of smuggling into the jangmadang. NGOs for North Korea estimate that the actual amount of rice allocated to civilians is around 30% of all the aided rice.

The North Korean authorities recently gave an instruction to factories and offices to guarantee six-months worth of food provisions to laborers, but the factories are reportedly in a difficult situation due to the rice shortage.

Mr. Min said, “From now on, 15kg of rice is supposed to hike up to 50,000 North Korean won (approx. USD17.4). In places like Yongcheon plain and Jungju plain, some farming has been well done, so the armies are mobilized and will do harvest. This year in particular, there will probably be a lot of thieves in farmlands.”

He said further, “The price of rice is supposed to have risen even more in Kaecheon, Suncheon, and Pyongsung in South Pyongan Province than in Shinuiju. There have been news that people are even coming from the Hwanghae region, which is a famous farming province, to North Pyongan to buy rice.”

Mr. Min said, “In early August, when the initial flood damage occurred, a kilogram of rice rose to 1,960 (approx. USD0.7) in the Shinuiju and in the second week of August, remained stable at 1,500 won (approx. USD0.52). It seems like the price of rice will continue to rise. But, the situation would change when the support is distributed to the civilians, but who expects that?”

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Good Friends, Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Unintended Separation of Young Married Couples

Monday, September 24th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
9/24/2007

Choi (25) from Hamheung, South Hamkyung Province, married with his fiancé last Spring. Wedding ceremony was accompanied by his neighbors, friends and relatives. Happy life afterwards seemed awaiting the newly wed couple.

All of sudden, serious problem emerged. As in South Korea, North Korean married man provides housing while married woman brings furniture and other basic goods. Rarely a newly wed couple lives with their parents.

However in these days, due to rising house prices, couples have hard time finding new homes. Even if they are fortunate enough to find one, sometimes police or local government officials intervene and confiscate houses for private sales of property, which is, in principle, still illegal in communist North Korea.

Confiscated houses are distributed to Army officers or discharged veterans. Choi’s house was forfeited, too. He went to the police office and protested, but police guards bluntly replied; “Then you can live with your parents.”

The Chois are now in debt to buy another house. And for a while, since there is no house to live together, the newly weds are residing in their parents’ houses separately.

Faulty construction in Yongcheon

Kim (female, 55) live with fear. Her little apartment in Yongcheon, North Pyongan Province, is so weak that it might crumble to ground someday.

She and her family lost home in 2004 Ryongchun station exploision. They had lived in tents for several months until local government finally told them a plan to build new houses for refugees. Delight soon turned to disappointment, however. The apartment was well built outside but faultily done so inside.

Rumors spread that new houses built after Ryongchun incident was so hastily constructed that vulnerable to sudden collapse. Materials were poor and construction phase was too quick. Some houses were not even equipped with proper electricity. Cracks emerged soon.

A neighbor of Kim told her that some party officials embezzled money and materials provided upon Ryongchun residents after the explosion.

For Kim who is living in anxiety, state and the Dear Leader are no more venerable.

Photo market in NK

Hwang (male, 20) from Chongjin, North Hamkyong Province, has father who is involved in Sino-Korean trade. Thanks to his rich dad, Hwang seldom goes to work and instead hangs out with friends. He owns a lot of foreign stuff, which attracts many friends.

His most precious is a Japanese digital camera. While walking down the street with the camera on his hand, every girl looks upon him with envies.

Even in Chongjin, there are an increasing number of people who bring digital cameras. Using digital camera grew fast since three to four years ago. And some people take and sell pictures of customers, 2000 NK won (less than a US dollar) per pic.

According to a friend in Hwoiryeong, it is sold five hundred won per picture taken from digital camera, taking five days.

Posted in Black markets, Civil society, Dating/Courting, Price liberalization, Real estate | Comments Closed

North Korean Citizens Are Differentiated into Six-Levels

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Kwang Baek
9/21/2007

The expansion of Jangmadang’s private economy

Several years ago, I met a defector from North Korea and is currently residing in Japan. He frequently meets people coming and going from North Korea.

The change he relayed regarding North Korea was interesting and vivid. Although hundreds of people are not dying from starvation as in the past, transformation brought about by the expansion of the private economy, such as the Jangmadang (markets).

I asked him what the most significant change in North Korea was after the mass starvation of the mid-90s.

It was the reorganization of North Korean society’s class system. According to him, there are currently six levels of classes forming in North Korea.

First is the top privileged class based on Kim Jong Il. It is the class that feeds and lives on Kim Jong Il’s administrative funds, all kinds of support coming in from South Korea, and extractions from civilians.

The second is the power class engaging in the area of foreign currency earning activity. A portion of money gained from the foreign currency earning business is offered to the Kim Jong Il regime and the rest are accumulated as their own wealth.

The third is the “moneybag” class who has earned money from exchanges with the products from Jangmadang and China. They use “violence” and “money,” like the Russian mafia, to secure the commercial rights of each region via the Jangmadang.

The fourth is the class whose sustenance depends on provisions. It can be deduced that people in the middle-class take up approximately 20~30% of the civilian population.

The fifth is the common class who depend on Jangmadang and individual patches. Approximately 60% of the total population falls into this class. They live day to day on their labor power.

The lowest class is the elderly, the handicapped, Kotjebi (begging children), city migrants, and diseased patients.

The most outstanding class is the 5th class. They are a class who has started living independently without depending on the Kim Jong Il regime and counts as 60% of the population.

South Korean administration believes that there is a need to seek a North Korean policy while considering the size and characteristics of the lower class.

That is, direct support or loans to the North Korean government should be reduced and a direct commercial transaction with North Korean citizens should be increased. Gradually, Kim Jong Il regime’s political position should be weakened and the status of self-sufficient lower-class citizens have to be elevated. This can become an important foundation for North Korean society’s move towards a market economy.

The second eye-catching element is the most venerable people in the lower class. Approximately 10% of people who fall under this class are humanitarian aid recipients of our government and international society. The latter two have steadily continued their support to them.

Despite this, according to a recent North Korean source, a significant amount of people are suffering from malnutrition among those who have been admitted to hospitals, long term reeducation camps, and concentration camps for beggar children. Why are such events occurring?

The defector said that when the rice that the South Korean government sends arrives at the North Korean harbor, North Korean authorities or organizations immediately sell them for money.

Similar testimonies have come forth from North Korean civilians. Rice which is sold at the harbor can only be bought with foreign currency. People who can purchase rice by paying foreign currency are “moneybags” for a portion of bureaucrats who have accumulated wealth. Moneybags and corrupt officials hand over this rice to the Jangmadang and collect the enormous balance.

The humanitarian aid provided by the outside, before they are even relayed to the lowest class who should be receiving support, are flowing into the hands of moneybags and corrupt bureaucrats. If such defectors’ testimonies are true, the South Korean government’s humanitarian rice support has lost its original function.

The solution regarding this is two-fold. First is directly relaying medical products and rice to North Korea’s lowest class. Through civilian and organizational efforts, a humanitarian support team jointly based on South Korean civilians and government should be formed and they should initiate humanitarian aid activity by directly going into North Korea.

Further, a large-sized South Korean humanitarian support activity inspection team should observe the activities of the North Korean Red Cross and raise the transparency of distribution. If this is difficult, there is a need to simplify the window through the support of international society whose monitoring is much ahead of our government’s monitoring of formality.

The government should urgently restore the original capacity of humanitarian support in order to avoid falling into a policy of failure geared only towards a dictatorship regime.

Posted in Black markets, Civil society, Dating/Courting, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, International trade, Price liberalization, Private property, Songbun | Comments Closed

Class Divergence on the Rise as Market Economics Spred in DPRK

Friday, September 21st, 2007

Institute for Far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-9-21-1
9/21/2007

The recent growth in the private-sector economy in DPRK markets and other areas of society has brought with it some significant social changes worth noting. According to most defectors from the North, following the massive famine suffered in the mid 1990s, the biggest change to emerge in the DPRK was the reshuffling of the social class structure. In North Korean society, there are reportedly five identifiable social classes.

The first of these classes is the ruling class, made up of those elite surrounding Kim Jong Il. This class survives off of Kim Jong Il’s government funds, aid sent from South Korea, and from exploitation of the general public.

The second class is made up of business traders with access to foreign capital. A portion of money earned through foreign currency exchange businesses is turned over to the Kim Jong Il regime, while the rest can amassed in order to lead a relatively comfortable life.

The third class is made up of organized thugs who make their money through public trading and markets. These people control regional markets and local trading by using money and violence to employ extortion tactics much like the Russian mafia

The fourth class scrapes by on government rations. This mercantile class comprises an estimated 20~30 percent of the North’s overall population.

The fifth distinct class in North Korea is made up of commoners who support their way of life through farming private plots and selling goods in markets. An overwhelming majority of the population falls into this class; more than 60 percent of the people in North Korea live hand-to-mouth each day on the fruits of their own labor.

The remainder of the population falls beneath even these classes, because they either lack labor skills or are feeble elderly, handicapped, hospitalized, homeless, or wandering from city to city.

Posted in 1990s Famine, Arduous March, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

What about Supporting North Korean Schools and Students?

Tuesday, September 18th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Kwang Baek
9/18/2007

According to the newsletter of “Good Friends” published recently, the students living in the dormitories of technical colleges have not been able to eat anything due to the shortage of food for more than 10 days.

If this were to be true, there is a sentiment of utter despair and helplessness since there is both the South Korea and the international society’s food support going into North Korea at the moment. There has been a food supply of 400,000 ton being exerted to North Korea since July, and there is continually a grand supply of food to assist the flood victims. How is it possible that in spite of all these efforts, there are still starving North Korean youth?

According to the newsletter, the situation has worsened to the point where the teachers and principles in schools and kindergartens have to go out on a limb to retain some food supply. In Wonsan, children of the school age are unable to attend school. They are spending their time at the market selling ice cream, vegetables or carrying goods to earn money for living. There have been schools in Hamkyung province reported to have stopped running due to this reason.

It is difficult to determine whether this phenomenon is spread out nationwide, or simply applicable to some students or specific region. However, in spite of the difficulty in determining the extent of these effects, considering the non-transparent state of the distribution of food provision, it is highly likely that these effects are spread out nationwide.

The newsletter states that students are not only responsible for their own stationeries and backpacks, but they are also for the necessary cleaning tools, desks and chairs, and even the chalks used by the teachers.

North Korean government enforced the students to pay for the operation of schools since the mid 1990s. The government collects fees for school operation, oil, and even the fee for designing tank constructions. It is said that students face hard times in even attending schools if they don’t pay these fees.

The children who should be spending their youth running around and being free are spending their study time in the market earning money. The level of begging has expanded to group theft on the streets. According to the villagers in Donglim, North Pyongan, 1 out of the 3 children is unable to attend school due to the lack of money. This is sufficient evidence of “School Breakdown” phenomenon.

There is a proverb that even God cannot salvage poverty. However, perhaps North Korea may be an exception to this proverb. The fault of school breakdown and poverty lies not in the civilians, but solely in Kim Jong Il. All of these phenomenons after one another are tragic ramifications of the ignorance and inhumane dictatorial leadership of Kim Jong Il. It is difficult to hide our distress and sorrow on the issue.

However, in retrospect, this phenomenon of school breakdown can also be perceived as the breakdown of North Korean free education system. What is the “free education system” that Kim Jong Il has so much bragged about? The nature of North Korean education is nothing but a systematic tool to make children as bullets and bombs to protect Kim Jong Il.

Was it not a tool to crush the creativity of young, intelligent minds to force them into becoming the slaves of the system? It wouldn’t be an exaggeration if we were to say that it was this education system that has created the North Korean society of today.

School breakdown phenomenon can also be interpreted as the destruction of idolization education revolved around Kim Jong Il glorification. The ideology inculcation system that bound all children and students in North Korea is finally coming to collapse.
The reason for the collapse is simple. Kim Jong Il regime is losing the strength to control it. We must carefully analyze this trend. While we must strive to stop the phenomenon of children starving and/or dropping out of schools, we must actively be supportive of the current situation that the North Korean government is losing its reign of its people.

We must focus our attention to the independent economic activities taken by the North Koreans, rather than them being dependent on the government sponsored rations. We must put our focus on restoring the practical right to live for the North Korean civilians and allow them to feel more connected to the international society, rather than Kim Jong Il ‘s regime.

The international community must come up with discerning measures to support the students and the parents to experience their independent economic activities and understand the vanity of the glorification-based education system of North Korea. It is time to carefully discern the possible remedies for individual schools and students, rather than continuing the sponsorship through Kim Jong Il regime and South Korean government.

Posted in Agriculture, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, Education, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Good Friends, Political economy, Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Narrowing Economic Gap Key to Reunification

Monday, September 17th, 2007

Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
9/17/2007

Former Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu said reducing economic inequality between the two Koreas is the foremost task to achieve reunification of the two Koreas.

In an exclusive interview with The Korea Times in Seoul on Sept. 6, the former point man on North Korean affairs reiterated the importance for closer cross-border economic ties, which he said would make the North open to the outside world and eventually help achieve reunification.

Park, however, said a “unilateral give-away”policy centered on huge inter-Korean business projects should be refrained from and any economic assistance for North Korea should contribute to opening up the communist neighbor, as well as proceed in tandem with progress in six-party talks over the North’s nuclear program.

He also said big-budget programs for the North, a so-called “Marshall Plan,” touted by some of President Roh Moo-hyun’s aides, is premature and not feasible.

“But a proposal for a second industrial complex on the Gaeseong model may be within the realm of feasibility,” he said. “Even though few people expect the Roh government to make any covert cash payments to the North either before or after the second inter-Korean summit, the possibility that a huge economic cooperation project may be unveiled cannot be ruled out.”

Lee Hae-chan, who served prime minister and as Roh’s political adviser, said last month that President Roh would propose several joint economic projects to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il at the Oct. 2-4 summit in Pyongyang.

He cited plans to build industrial parks in the North’s port city of Nampo and other cities, modeled after the Gaeseong industrial park, as well as invest in the North’s public infrastructure projects, including the renovation of the 170-kilometer Pyongyang-Gaeseong highway.

Launching South Korean-backed tourism projects in the North’s scenic mountains modeled on the Mount Geumgang program is also considered, said Lee, a presidential hopeful of the pro-government United New Democratic Party.

Roadmap for Korean Unification

Park referred to the German reunification process as a case in point from which South Korea should take a cue for the reunification of the peninsula.

“Since March 1970, East and West Germany had held a total of nine summit talks for about 20 years before they achieved the goal of reunification,” said Park, president of Kyungnam University.

“Through the summits spanning two decades, West Germany focused on exchanges and economic cooperation with East Germany,”he said. “In return, the West demanded of the East offsets like the opening of news media and exchanged visits by separated families. Such efforts bore fruit and paved the way for eventual reunification.”

West Germany provided East Germany with $2 billion-worth economic support annually before the reunification. Even after reunification, however, a disparity in economic strength between the sides has caused many social problems in Germany, he said.

“When the two sides were reunified, a gap in economic powers between West and East Germany was a three-to-one level. The West continued to offer $150 billion worth support to the East annually for 16 years after the reunification,” he said. “Still, Germany sees a jobless rate between 15 and 20 percent and has various social problems.”

The German reunification model should serve as an important lesson for South Korea to not try to achieve Korean reunification in a hasty manner without proper preparations, said Park, who served as unification minister between 1999 and 2001 under former President Kim Dae-jung.

“I expect inter-Korean reunification will be achieved 20 to 30 years from now under the condition that a gap in economic capabilities between the South and North is to be narrowed to a five-to-one level,” he said.

“But we should not forget we are still in theearly stage of inter-Korean cooperation. It, therefore, behooves us not to make haste, although envisioning and conducting in-depth research on various ways of attaining unification should not be discouraged,”he said. “If the two Koreas are to be reunified suddenly without preparation, the unified Korea will face severer social problems and conflicts than experienced by Germany.”

Park said the idea of establishing an inter-Korean federation or confederation on the heels of the Joint Declaration issued at the end of the historic 2000 summit is premature at the moment.

The former unification minister added setting the stage for institutionalizing the inter-Korean summit should be a small but most important goal for the upcoming Roh-Kim summit.

“In Germany’s case, the institutionalization of the summit had contributed significantly to exchanges and economic cooperation between East and West Germany, laying the groundwork for tearing down the Berlin Wall,” he said. “The same is the case with Korea. Institutionalizing the inter-Korean summit is a key step toward the reunification.”

POWs, Abduction Issues

Besides issues of the North’s nuclear program and peaceful reunification, PresidentRoh should put high priority on the issue of South Korean abductees and prisoners of war (POWs) in the planned talks with Kim Jong-il, Park said.

“I cautiously anticipated that Kim will make a bold decision on the topic in exchange for Roh’s possible offer for social overhead capital investment in North Korea,” Park said, referring to the meeting between Kim Jong-il and then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2002.

In the summit in September 2002, Kim apologized to Koizumi for the kidnapping of Japanese nationals in return for normalizing ties with Japan. After Koizumi’s second visit to Pyongyang in 2004, the North allowed five victims to return to Japan. Japan calls on the North to allow the other victims to return home.

“It is of utmost importance that Roh broach the topic in a conciliatory way, summoning all of his diplomatic skills, love for compatriots, and humanistic instincts,” Park said. “He should find a way of accentuating the benefits that would accrue to the North should it display a constructive attitude.”

“Chairman Kim may be the only person who can spring a surprise that may spawn unexpected consequences, both positive and negative,”he continued. “`Let us hope that the surprise that will emanate from the upcoming inter-Korean summit will be of a positive variety.”

The Seoul government has been reluctant to take up the kidnapping issue not to harm relations with North Korea, especially since the Kim Dae-jung administration that advocated engagement policies toward the North.

NLL Controversy

As for a controversy over a redrawing of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, Park said it is not desirable for the issue to be included in the summit agenda.

“Given its controversial nature in politicaland military terms, especially in the context of presidential elections in the South, I believe that it will be prudent to leave the NLL issue for future discussion in inter-Korean military talks,”he said. “But the North is certain to raise it, hence the South should be well prepared to defend its long-standing position on the issue.”

Park said Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo’s planned visit to Pyongyang with Roh would be a good opportunity to help ease tensions between the two militaries.

“Whether it would be an open or closed meeting, if Kim is able to have talks with the North Korean defense chief, that will be meaningful,”he said. “And if the two defense chiefs set a schedule for the second defense ministerial talks, that would be great.”

Kim will be the first South Korean defense minister to visit the North in the 54 years since the armistice was signed at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. The defense ministers from the two Koreas met in September 2000 following the first summit.

Drawn by the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, the NLL has served as the de facto maritime boundary between the two Koreas. But the North has refused to recognize the line and insisted it be nullified and redrawn.

Seoul maintains a firm stance that the NLL cannot be a matter of discussion, which it sees as a territorial concession.

The 1992 Basic Agreement stated inter-Korean inviolable borderlines and boundaries are recognized as in the armistice signedat the end of the Korean War. But the agreement added the two Koreas could discuss the matter later.

The NLL has emerged as a hot potato ahead of the summit as some government officials expressed support for discussing the matter at the summit, citing the 1992 agreement.

Presidential Chief of Staff Moon Jae-in told a National Assembly session last week if the North offers to discuss the issue, the South would accept it.

Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung said last month that he believes the NLL isnot a territorial concept open to future discussions. He also said the inter-Korean naval clash in 2002 was caused by Seoul’s refusal to negotiate the NLL.

Park expected that unless the North gives up its “military-first” policy, progress in military confidence building between the South and North would take time, and it is likely to follow the escalation of economic cooperation and the building of a peace structure on the peninsula.

Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Price liberalization, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

Trading Places

Sunday, September 16th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
9/16/2007

The late 1990s will go down in North Korean history as years of frantic trade activity. As a witty North Korean once put it: “There are two types of people in North Korea now: those who trade and those who are dead.”

I’ve met a number of former North Korean merchants, and today I would like to tell the story of one such woman. The story is typical in many respects, and I suspect that countless thousands of her peers would narrate something similar.

When the Dear Leader died in 1994 and things began to fall apart, Ms. Yoo was in her early 20s, doing semi-skilled work at one of the offices in the North Korean capital.

By autumn 1996, even in privileged Pyongyang, food rations were coming less and less frequently. Ms. Yoo’s office, like many other offices across the country, decided to shrink its workforce.

Every month all workers were given one week free, on the assumption they would somehow fend for themselves. They were not paid that week’s wages, and did not receive rations either.

Essentially, it was Ms. Yoo’s mother who was the brains and energy behind the entire enterprise. A kindergarten teacher, she was a typical Korean “ajumma” at her entrepreneurial best: charismatic, charming when necessary, clever andquick-witted.

Actually, Ms. Yoo did not know much about her mother’s contacts and plans.

Now, a decade later, she still remains ignorant. However, one thing was clear: the mother had good connections among the personnel of the hard currency shops.

How did she manage to acquire such connections? After all, the hard currency shops are staffed with privileged people, while a kindergarten teacher is not very high in the North Korean pecking order.

We know not. At any rate, these connections existed and this fact sealed the fate of Ms. Yoo. It was not what people would talk about so much, but Ms. Yoo believes that many of her colleagues started private trade in those years, when it began to flourish. She was no exception, but her situation was better since her mother would take care of business planning.

Ms. Yoo’s mother chose cigarettes as their major merchandise. The smuggled Chinese cigarettes sold extremely well, the packs were light and so could be easily moved by the girl in her early 20s, and profits were very high.

In late 1996 a pack of ten would cost 280 won in the borderland areas, but could be sold in Pyongyang for 400 won wholesale. Later, Ms. Yoo found ways to buy the cigarettes even cheaper, at 240 won a pack, purchasing the merchandise directly from the smugglers instead of the local go-betweens.

Mother sold the cigarettes to the hard currency shop. It is not clear what happened to the merchandise eventually. It seems that the shop managers simply pocketed the money they received from the sales of the cigarettes.

A single trip would garner a net profit of some 20,000 won, and she could go once a month (sometimes more frequently). Now consider that Ms.Yoo’s official salary was 80 won a month, and her father, a junior college teacher, received something like 150 won a month, so the black market money from the cigarettes ostensibly appears an outrageously large amount of money.

However, in the world of the Pyongyang black market, which began to emerge around that time, this was not seen as a fortune. Still, Ms. Yoo spent no more than 1,000 won a month on herself buying whatever was her fancy.

One of her more extravagant splurges was on a South Korean cosmetics set which cost 800 won, or roughly her official annual salary. At the time she did not quite realize where the goods were produced, since being a good, politically correct girl, she still believed that South Korea was populated by beggars living in constant terror of the sadistic Yankees!

But what about travel permits? After all, for decades no North Korean was allowed to leave the county without a permit issued by the police. Well, by the mid-1990s the travel permit system was in disarray with a single exception: entrance to Pyongyang remained strictly controlled.

However, in most cases money talked, and permits could be issued for a moderate bribe. However, Ms. Yoo and her mother discovered an even easier way. They did not bribe officials but bribed railway policemen, those who were on duty on the North Korean passenger trains.

For 500-1,000 won, plus free booze and some presents, a policeman would make sure that Ms. Yoo would reach her destination and come back with sacks of cigarettes, and he also would take care of her personal security.

Better still, the 500-1,000 won bribe was sufficient for few round-trip commercial expeditions. The trips were hard. The carriages were unbelievably crowded, with people packed everywhere, sitting on roofs and ladders. As Ms.

Yoo describes, “even on the roof one could not see a square centimeter of paint, people there were sitting that tight.” Another problem was the frequent delays, so the journey of some 400-500 kilometers would normally take 2-3 days. Still, the money was good, and Ms. Yoo enjoyed the adventure, and even now, ten years later, she seems to be proud of her ability strike deals, calculate profits and losses, and find suppliers.

However, Ms. Yoo’s business activity did not last for long. Somewhat against her will, she found herself lured (or kidnapped) to China and soon fate turned in a way which made a return home impossible.

Posted in Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Price liberalization, Private property, Tobacco, Transportation | Comments Closed

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