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North Korea enacted its first “corporate law”

Thursday, January 12th, 2012

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-1-12

The adoption of Act No. 1194 by the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK was recently confirmed. “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Corporate Law” or the “Corporate Law” was reported to have passed more than a year ago in November 11, 2010.

The “Corporate Law” is evaluated as an important indication of the direction of the economic policy of North Korea since Kim Jong-un was appointed as the next successor at the Third Party Conference held on September 28, 2010.

The law consists of five chapters: 1) Basic Principles of the Corporation; 2) Organization of the Corporation; 3) Management Organization of the Corporation; 4) Business Management Activities of the Corporation; and 5) Projects of the Corporation.

The first article of this act “The Mission of the Corporate Law” states that the law was enacted to, “contribute to the development of the people’s economy and to secure the management system of the socialist corporations by establishing the system and order for the organization and management activities.”

The second article, “The Definition of Corporation” defines a corporation as an “economic unit that operates as an organization that directly handles the labor, facilities, equipment, materials, and finances for the production or volunteer activities.”

Article 9, “The Legal Rights and the Legal Protection Principles,” indicates that the “legal rights and interests of the corporations are protected by the government.” Article 10, however, specifically states that this particular law does not apply to the special trade zones and the foreign investment companies.

Article 18, “The Organization of the Corporation,” has a clause that states “the managing organization has the jurisdiction to close down corporations for unreasonable or lack of prospects that does not meet the standards and the demands of the national policy and reality.”

Article 21 depicts a manager as a “person representing the corporation and responsible for the entire business.” The manager, chief engineer, and assistant manager’s specific responsibilities were also explicated. The hierarchy was clearly indicated where the assistant manager was to report to the chief engineer and the manager while the chief engineer has to report to the manager.

Article 29 affirms that a business is to be managed based on established business and corporate strategies in which every year a draft of the people’s economy plan must be submitted to the appropriate authorities. The written economic plan must be followed on a daily, monthly, quarterly, and by index basis (Article 30).

Articles 31 to 37 include specifics on the improvements of production technology while Articles 38 to 43 include regulations to enhance the management system.

In particular, Article 42 stipulates that the corporation must promote sales based on supply plans and contracts. Those sales that do not follow the plan and the contract cannot be sold.”

Article 44 states, “The appropriate amount of labor is scientifically determined and managed based on the socialist distribution principles and a precise socialist wage system must be implemented.”

In other words, socialist principles will be applied to both the sales of merchandise and wage system. While the corporation will receive autonomy in many areas, clear regulations are provided for sales in addition to evaluation and incentive system for labor.

In recent years, North Korea has continuously passed economic laws for economic construction and enhancing the lives of the North Korean people. Such laws include the following: The Agricultural Law passed on November 3, 2009; Real Estate Management Law on November 11, 2009; the Country of Origin for Export Law on November 25, 2009; and Comprehensive Equipment Import Law on November 11, 2009.

Posted in Corporate Law, DPRK Policies, Supreme Peoples Assembly | Comments Closed

Kim Jong-un’s succession secured with key job placements

Wednesday, January 11th, 2012

According to the Daily NK:

Since Kim Jong Eun arrived in public life, North Korea has been handing out preferential promotions to the children of high cadres in the Party and military to secure the loyalty of the elite to Kim Jong Eun by creating a shared sense of destiny.

According to a well-informed source in Seoul, the children of former senior cadres continue to emerge into top leadership positions while the children of current cadres arrive at the core of Party affairs.

Many of the most recently appointed Party secretaries and departmental vice directors are the sons and son-in-laws of former or current high officials.

For example, International Secretary Kim Young Il and Tae Jong Su, the General Affairs Secretary in the Department of Administration, are sons-in-law to former State Inspection Committee Chairman Jeon Moon Seob and former Deputy Prime Minister Jeong Il Ryong respectively. Also, Oh Il Jung, who was made Vice Director of the Chosun Workers’ Party at just 50 or so years of age, is the son of former Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Vice Director Oh Jin Woo.

Elsewhere, Choi Yong Hae, the son of former Vice Director of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Choi Hyun, as well as being a Party secretary has also been made a military general and elevated to the Party Central Military Commission.

In the cabinet, Baek Yong Chun, who presides over Chosun Central Bank, is the son of former Foreign Minister Baek Nam Sun, and Trade Minister Lee Yong Nam is the nephew of People’s Safety Agency Vice Director Lee Myung Soo. Both have advanced to the Party Central Committee under the watchful eye of Kim Jong Eun. The brother of Kim Ok, Kim Jong Il’s fourth and final partner, has also been elevated on the younger Kim’s watch.

There are many more examples, the source said, going on, “The reason behind these high-speed promotions is that their parents or father-in-laws are in high positions,” before noting one more good example, “Lee Yong Ho’s father Lee Myung Jae was a close confidante of Kim Jong Il, having served as Vice Director of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation and Guidance Departments, and in Kim’s secretarial office.”

◆ Current high speed promotions for relatives a dangerous game

However, while the close relationship between family history and promotion will serve these young leaders well, it could turn into a double-edged sword.

The source pointed out, “The special treatment these children get is not because their performance or skills are better than anyone else but because their high official parents have or had special relationships with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In recent years, this tendency to ‘pass down’ has expanded due to Kim Jong Eun’s succession using it as a way to ensure loyalty by tying them together as a ‘group sharing a common destiny’.”

However, he commented, “Forming these special privilege groups will increase the complaints from the people and of course from other officials, and in the end weaken the cohesiveness of the entire system.”

The Korea Times also reports some similar information:

North Korea has handed out decent jobs to children of former and current North Korean elite in what could be an attempt to help ensure the dynastic power succession goes smoothly, a source familiar with the isolated country said Tuesday.

Jang Yong-chol, a nephew of Jang Song-thaek, became North Korea’s ambassador to Malaysia in 2010 before fully serving out his term as Pyongyang’s top envoy to Nepal, the source said.

Jang Song-thaek, a four-star general and brother-in-law of late leader Kim Jong-il, has long been considered a key official in helping Kim’s son, Kim Jong-un, consolidate power.

Kim Jong-un has recently become the supreme commander of the country’s 1.1 million-strong military as part of his moves to strengthen his power base following his father’s sudden death last month.

Top North Korean officials repeatedly swore their loyalty to the young leader, calling him “the brilliant commander” and “another peerless patriot.”

Children of Workers’ Party secretary Kim Yong-il and Vice Premier Kang Sok-ju, a veteran negotiator and key foreign policy advisor to the late leader, have been dispatched to North Korea’s overseas diplomatic missions, the source said.

Meanwhile, Ri Son-il, son of Ri Yong-ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, and Cha Dong-sup, son-in-law of the People’s Armed Forces Minister Kim Yong-chun, are engaged in works to either earn foreign currency or attract foreign investment, the source said.

The nepotism appears to be the North’s attempt to secure the loyalty of the elite to make sure the third-generation power transition goes smoothly, the source said.

The late leader also assumed power in 1994 when his father, the North’s founding leader Kim Il-sung, died of heart failure at the age of 82. (Yonhap)

Read the full stories here:
Nepotism Running Riot in Kim’s NK
Daily NK
Kim Yong-hun
2012-1-11

Children of NK officials receive job favors
Korea Times
2012-1-11

Posted in Cabinet, Kim Jong Un, Labor conditions/wages, Political economy, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Ri Chol out as JVIC chief

Tuesday, January 10th, 2012

According to Choson Exchange:

[The] Choson Ilbo has just reported that Ri Chol has left his post as head of the Joint Venture and Investment Committee (JVIC).

As we argued last fall, the name of the game for Pyongyang’s elites is securing trade and investment deals. Two main investment organs exist, the JVIC and the Daepung Investment Group. We have in the past heard rumors of other similar international investment organizations being under consideration, also. From these overarching groups, down to smaller State Owned Enterprises, there is considerable competition to show that one’s organization can deliver.

Ri Chol was a close ally of Kim Jong Il’s and the organization he came to be associated with, JVIC, rose to prominence after he helped put together the Orascom deal and was given stewardship. He was even with Kim on his last official visit, to a joint venture supermarket in Pyongyang.

He also spent most of the 1980’s and 1990’s in Switzerland in various diplomatic capacities, not the least of which was acting as a minder to Kim Jong Il’s children as they studied at private school.

What might his departure portend?

A few possibilities come to mind.

– Has the JVIC fallen out of favor with the new leadership? If this is the case, Ri might be tasked with building a new organization, perhaps with a similar focus. It would seem redundant to add another, rather than reform this one, but redundancy is hardly unheard of in planned economies.

– Has Ri himself fallen out of favor? Is he being put out to pasture? Again, it is impossible to know, but it seems that such a long term friend of the Kims, who has a personal relationship with Kim Jong Un from his school days would be a key ally at this time, especially since his deals are driving economic growth in North Korea. (Though who knows? Perhaps Kim the Younger has never liked him.)

– If not an issue with Ri personally, the move could be a part of a factional reshuffling. Bartering and dealmaking for control of the commanding heights of the economy is no doubt underway as the new government consolidates its power. It might have been deemed necessary to grant control of the JVIC to another group of Pyongyang movers and shakers – of which Ri Chol is not a part.

– Also very possible is that the very top leadership is planning to give Ri some new responsibility elsewhere. JVIC may have been judged to be running smoothly enough that Ri’s skills would be more effectively used another important organization.

This of course is highly speculative. All we really know is that Ri Chol, with a track record of securing investment, has left the JVIC. Whatever the case may be, he is worth watching in the coming months, as Pyongyang is compelled to keep investments from China and elsewhere coming.

You can read a longer bio on NK Leadership Watch.

Posted in Choson Exchange, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Joint Venture Investment Committee (JVIC), Joint Ventures | Comments Closed

KPA Journal Vol. 2, No. 6

Friday, November 25th, 2011

Joseph Bermudez, now a Senior Analyst with DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center and author of The Armed Forces of North Korea, has posted the latest issue of KPA Journal. You can download the PDF here.

Topics include: M-1979/1989 170mm SPGs (Part 1) and and article on the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly by Michael Madden.

Posted in Military, Supreme Peoples Assembly | Comments Closed

DPRK mineral exports to China increase

Sunday, November 6th, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2014-1-21): See more recent data here and here.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-11-6): According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s mineral exports to China have tripled this year compared to a year ago, a study showed Sunday.

A joint study of Chinese data by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul-based IBK Economic Research Institute showed that China imported 8.42 million tons of minerals from North Korea from January to September this year, worth US$852 million.

Over the first nine months of last year, China brought in 3.04 million tons of minerals from the North for $245 million.

Most of the minerals were anthracite coals, the data showed. This year, of 8.42 million tons, 8.19 tons were anthracites.

China is the sole major ally and the biggest economic benefactor for North Korea, a reclusive regime under international economic sanctions following its nuclear and long-range missile tests.

Cho Bong-hyun, an analyst at the IBK institute, said North Korea may be trying to earn much-needed hard currency as it aims to become a powerful and prosperous country by 2012.

“Last year, North Korea ordered its institutions to meet their goals in foreign currency income by this year,” Cho said. “Since exporting minerals is a military business, we can see that the military is trying to meet its target. In addition, the steep mineral export growth was attributable to the lifting of the cap on the amount of mineral exports, as ordered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.”

China appears to be trying to stockpile mineral resources at affordable prices, Cho added. North Korean anthracites were traded at an average of $101 per ton, whereas the international standard for quality anthracites is $200 per ton.

“Given that North Korean coals are of very good quality, trade with China must have been made at a fairly low price,” Cho said.

Meanwhile, sources said North Korean authorities last month entirely halted its coal exports, as the impoverished country fears a shortage of energy resources during the upcoming winter.

From January to September this year, China exported 732,000 tons of minerals to North Korea, most of them crude oil.

Here is the IBK web page. If anyone can find a copy of this report and send it to me to post, I would appreciate it.

Additional information:
1. The economics lessons: A. The more isolated the DPRK’s economy from the global trade and financial system, the greater monopsony power Chinese firms can exert on their North Korean trading partners. B. The rents earned in the current DPRK-China trade regime are visible and have organized constituencies. Unfortunately the much greater gains that could be reaped if the North Korean economy was more open, integrated, and dynamic remain unseen and their potential beneficiaries remain unknown and unorganized.

2. The Nautilus Institute published a very interesting paper by Nathaniel Aden on China DPRK trade back in June. See it here.

3. Here is the most recent US Geological Survey report on the DPRK’s mineral sector.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Korea’s mineral exports to China tripled from last year: study
Yonhap
2011-11-6

Posted in Copper, Gold, Graphite, Iron Ore, Mining Industry Department, Mining/Minerals, Rare Earths, Sand | Comments Closed

Plans for SEZ between China and the DPRK to Come Out at Year’s End

Thursday, October 13th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-10-5

Dai Yulin, secretary of the Dandong Committee of the Communist Party of China, said in his interview with the China Daily on September 28 that concrete plans for the joint development projects between China and North Korea in the Hwanggumpyong and Rajin-Sonbong regions will be announced at the end of the year.

This past June, Dai stated both countries agreement to jointly develop Hwanggumpyong and Rajin-Sonbong as an economic development zone and reported smooth progress in its plans.

According to Secretary Dai, “The joint management committee between China and North Korea has already been formed to promote the Hamggumpyong development project. Both countries are getting up steam to advance the project.”

In addition Dai explained, “China has secured 10 square kilometers of national land to be used to support the joint development of Hamggumpyong.” He also added, “A think tank comprised of 72 experts was also established to advise and buttress the project.”

When DPRK Cabinet Premier Choe Yong Rim visited China last month, Dai commented, “Choe’s visit to China is underlined with North Korea’s strong interest in economic reform. All the high level officials in the economic sectors accompanied him on the trip.”

While visiting China for five days, Choe met with Premier Wen Jiabao and expressed strong motivation for strengthening trade and cooperation with China, especially to improve its infrastructure. He stated, “For those Chinese companies investing in North Korea, we will provide special accommodations to encourage more investments.” In response, Wen Jiabao commented, “China will do all it can to support North Korea, so that they may seek development method most appropriate for them.”

After the meeting between the two top officials, the two nations came to an agreement to cooperate in trade, investment, and infrastructure, resources and agriculture development.

Prior to meeting with Wen, Choe visited Lanxing Chemical Industrial Machine Co. After he paid his courtesy visit to President Hu Jintao of China in Beijing, he continued to make economic related visits to Baoshan Steel Group, Bailian Xijiao Goods Purchasing Center, and industrial facilities in Jiangsu Province.

After North Korea designated Hwanggumpyong Island as a free trade zone, China has signed a 50 year-lease agreement to develop the island. Despite being a “joint development” in name, in actuality, China has the exclusive development rights based on Chinese capital.

However, North Korea is requesting for revision of the name to “co-development between China and the DPRK,” a request that China is expressing some uneasiness over. The initial agreement was to “lease Hwanggumpyong Islands to China,” which gave exclusive and autonomous development and management rights to China in the zone.

China has articulated on many occasions the Hwanggumpyong project must be strictly based on market principles and expressed apprehension that Chinese businesses may be unwilling to invest in the area if North Korea continues to pursue to change it as a joint development.

Posted in Cabinet, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

Economic performance and legitimacy in the DPRK

Sunday, August 28th, 2011

Geoffrey See and Andray Abrahamian (both representatives of Choson Exchange) wrote an article in the Harvard International Review which asserts that economic successes are becoming more important to the political narratives that reinforce the DPRK leadership’s claims to legitimacy. Below is an excerpt from their article:

North Korea’s most important domestic policy statement comes each New Year, when the major newspapers publish a joint editorial. The editorial often signals where government priorities will be in the coming year. In 2010 the newspapers spoke of “Bring[ing] about a decisive change in the people’s lives by accelerating once again light industry and agriculture.” Similar themes were echoed in 2011. This is opposed to the joint editorials of the past few years, which have focused on the more traditional themes of military strength, revolution, and socialism.

Another public sign of a shift towards focusing on economic issues is the type of official visits and inspections carried out by Kim Jong Il. Following in the footsteps of his father, Kim uses these visits to signal emphasis or encouragement of specific industries, activities, and policies. According to a report by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, the first six months of 2011 have seen Kim exceptionally busy, participating in 63 official activities. Unlike previous years, however, the number of military visitations has dropped off: only 14 visits were military related, the lowest number ever recorded. By contrast, 28 visits were economic related.

In terms of policy, North Korea has been haltingly experimenting with Special Economic Zones (SEZ) since the mid-nineties, but has recently built a bit more momentum in this area. Rason, an SEZ in the far northeast, is finally seeing some basic infrastructure upgrades that were long talked about but always delayed. Government investment bodies have started to promote the idea that Rason will be the “next Singapore,” an ambitious marketing claim to anyone who has been to Rason. With both Russia and China leasing port space, it seems more likely to be transformed into a regional transportation hub. Meanwhile, along the Chinese border in the northwest, the Hwanggumpyong SEZ recently held a groundbreaking ceremony, attended by high-ranking North Korean officials and Wang Qishan, China’s commerce minister.

Senior politicians in North Korea are increasingly judged by their ability to bring in foreign direct investments. These efforts appear to be competitive rather than coordinated. North Korean leaders associated with the National Defense Commission, the highest level policy body, have been meeting with visiting foreign investors. In 2009, the Daepung International Investment Group was re-purposed along the lines of a holding company model as a vehicle for attracting foreign direct investment l with “27 joint ventures planned and to be managed by the Group.” Daepung Group is backed by specific high-level individuals. Jon Il-Chun, reportedly the Director of Office 39, a murky international trade and finance organ, is definitely involved with the Daepung Group. Media reports also indicate that Kim Yang Gon, Director of an organization tasked with managing contacts with South Korea, the United Front Department of the Workers’ Party, is also behind the group.

In July of the same year, the Joint Venture & Investment Commission (JVIC) was established. Instead of a holding company model, JVIC is a government institution modeled as a “one-stop shop” for investors – that is, JVIC is meant to “seek out investments and assist investors in setting up operations in North Korea.” While multiple institutions claiming to hold such authority have always existed in North Korea, many of these institutions have been merged into JVIC and long-time investors have been directed to liaise with JVIC as their primary government contact. JVIC’s nominal and public head is Ri Chol, a high-ranking North Korean government official.

In August of 2010, we received credible reports that foreign investors were approached to help set up a group similar to Daepung that would be backed by another member of the National Defense Commission. Given this proposed initiative’s similarities to Daepung, the prior establishment of JVIC, and that all three groups do not appear to communicate with each other, we surmise that these various groups have a competitive relationship with the support of different patrons. Investment officials with whom our teammates have met confirm that the relationship between the agencies is “very competitive.” If this is the case, it is a signal that influential groups in Pyongyang sense that future power bases will require the ability to attract and deploy capital.

The full article is worth reading here:
Harvard International Review
Geoffrey K. See and Andray Abrahamian
August 23, 2011

Posted in Bureau 39, Domestic publication, Economic reform, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Joint Venture Investment Committee (JVIC), Kim's New Year Address (Joint editorials), Korea Taepung International Investment Group (Daepung Investment Group), National Defense Commission, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

Premier Choe Yong-rim is making unprecedented but vigorous economic inspections

Wednesday, July 20th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-7-13

Kim Jong Il’s field guidance visitations decreased significantly in recent weeks. In place of the North Korean leader, Premier Choe Yong-rim is known to be making solo economic inspection visitations.

According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, Premier Choe has made a total of 17 on-site inspections from February. Starting with Huichon Power Plant, four trips in March, two in April, six in May, and lastly, four visits in June were recorded. A high-level official to make on-site inspections unaccompanied by its leader is an unprecedented case. This suggests major change for North Korea in which the chief of Cabinet is now directly heading the economy.

Although these inspections were short day trips, sites visited concentrated mainly on factories, power plants, cooperative farms, and construction sites. While making inspection rounds, Choe’s main duty is to deliver the orders of Kim Jong Il, but he was also witnessed actively suggesting measures to resolve problems that were raised at the sites.

Premier Choe’s economic inspections correspond with the DPRK’s plan of building a strong and prosperous nation by 2012 and an effort to propagate the spirit of self-sufficiency and encourage Juche or self-reliance of the economy throughout the country.

The last report of Kim Jong Il’s official field guidance was on June 3, at the Kosan Fruit Farm located in the Kosan City of Gangwon Province. For more than a month, Kim Jong Il allegedly has not provided any onsite inspections.

There are numerous speculations on the cause of the reduced inspections but many are linking it to Premier Choe.

Many news outlets in North Korea have begun to report on Premier Choe’s economic inspection visits in isolation from Kim Jong Il and related news are on the rise. The details include visits to Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex, Nanam Coal Machine Mining Complex, and Chongjin Steel Mill from June 23 to 25 and Chollima Steel Complex on June 29.

On July 2, KCNA covered the news about Choe’s visits to Bukchang Thermalelectric Power Plant. There he presided over meetings discussing the issues of securing raw and building materials to improve facility and technological management as well as specific plans to increase energy production.

Choe’s frequent visits are interpreted to demonstrate the rise in power of the Cabinet compared to its relatively weak position of the past, compared to the Workers’ Party of Korea and National Defence Commission.

Others construe the developments as an effort to weaken any internal dissatisfaction or negative sentiments towards the regime by emphasizing the premier’s active involvement with the economic development to achieve the national goal of becoming powerful socialist state by 2012.

The decline in field inspections by Kim has raised suspicion about the health of North Korean leader. Some suggest that Kim is taking time off to recuperate from the tight schedule of his recent China visit in late May.

Recently, Japanese Kyodo News reported that Kim Jong Il cancelled plans to visit Russia on June 29 for health reasons.

Some speculate Kim is behind the scenes contemplating the changing foreign policies, deterioration of North-South relations, and food shortages.

I am not sure where the Ministry of Unification is getting their numbers. I just did a tabulation of Kim Jong-il’s and Choe Yong-rim’s economic guidance trips and public appearances from February 2011 — July 13 and get very different results than they are announcing: 36 visits for Kim Jong-il and 47 for Mr. Choe. All the data, including links to the KCNA sources are here in an Excel Spreadsheet.

Also worth mentioning is that between June 3 and July 13 (contrary to the report) Kim Jong-il made 11 or 12 public appearances–four of which were guidance trips. See them here in an Excel Spreadsheet with links to the KCNA source.

Posted in Cabinet, Fiscal & monetary policy, National Defense Commission, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

The Rason Economic and Trade Zone to Adopt the Singapore Model

Thursday, June 30th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-6-25

Since the June 8 and 9 groundbreaking ceremonies for joint development projects between North Korea and China were held, attention has been directed toward North Korea’s international economic activities. The Japan-based newspaper, Chosun Shinbo, featured an interview article regarding these collective projects, including the areas of Hwanggumpyong and Wiwha Islands and the Rason Economic and Trade Zone.

According to North Korea’s Committee of Investment and Joint Venture, Rason Economic and Trade Zone is, “an important national undertaking following the teachings of Kim Il Sung. . . . Rason will soon become the entrepot port like Singapore, enhancing the lives of North Korean people.”

In addition, it was mentioned that the development of economic zones in Hwanggumpyong and Wiwha Islands will solidify the already strong DPRK-China friendship and expand the boundaries of international economic relations.

According to North Korea’s Committee of Investment and Joint Venture, politically, “Stable political atmosphere allow investors to engage freely in investment activities and necessary legal measures were taken creating favorable legal conditions for foreign investments. This includes the establishment of Joint Venture Law (of 1984) and other related laws.” Economically, “All the necessary substructures supporting the business operation are set. Workers will all be provided free 11-year education and tax rates are the lowest in the region and for those investors investing in sectors that the DPRK is promoting, will be provided with preferential treatment.”

North Korea is encouraging foreign investments especially in the industrial, agricultural, transportation, construction, financial, and tourism sectors. In particular, adopting state-of-the-art production technology is considered most important. This is to increase the area’s competitiveness in the international market through the production of items that have high export value. However, investment restrictions are placed preventing exports on natural resources like ore and coal.

The Committee also stressed the accomplishments of economic cooperation with China and Egypt and revealed plans of passing a double tax avoidance agreement with China, who is the largest foreign investment for North Korea.

The Egyptian company Orascom Telecom has invested in telecommunications, construction, and financial sectors in North Korea. The president of Orascom is said to have met with Kim Jong Il early this year, announcing his plans of expanding investment in the country.

In addition, the Committee reiterated building an independent national economy does not exclude international economic relations. It explained, “We are trying to resolve our shortcomings through international economic activities while maximizing our domestic technology and resources. This is the principle of socialist economic construction.

The Committee of Investment and Joint Venture was established last July, which is a central state organization under the Cabinet overseeing joint ventures and investments. It is in charge of guiding, supervising and administering the inducement of investments from abroad. It is a government body on the level of the Ministry of Trade, which it has close affiliations with. The Ministry is a central organization controlling general trade activities while the Committee is mostly responsible for attracting foreign investment, joint investment, and ventures.

Posted in China, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), International trade, Joint Venture Investment Committee (JVIC), Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Singapore, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

No. 91 Office

Wednesday, June 1st, 2011

Pictured above (Google Maps): No. 91 Office

According to the Daily NK:

No. 91 Office, as it is known, is allegedly run under the auspices of the General Bureau of Reconnaissance.

A defector with substantial experience of conditions there offered information on the situation as far back as 2006 at the NKnet-organized “2011 North Korean Cyber Terror Seminar.”

The defector was unable to attend the seminar in person due to fears for his safety, but via pre-produced materials he explained how No. 91 Office is located in a set of two two-storey buildings in the Dangsang-dong of Mankyungdae-district, and how he entered the buildings on a number of occasions thanks to his relations with traders and cadres affiliated to it.

Additionally, satellite images were used to show the location of the office, just 300m from Ansan Bridge across the Botong River.

The defector also detailed the staff of No. 91 Office; the head, in 2006 a PhD-holding colonel in his 40s, a Party secretary ranked lieutenant-colonel, a similarly-ranked National Security Agency agent and around 80 staff, all in their 20s and 30s.

The 80 staff, all excellent minds selected from Kim Il Sung University, Chosun Computer University, Kim Chaek University of Technology and other elite schools, often spoke of ‘business trips’ to Shenyang and Dandong in China, the source explained.

The No. 91 Office-affiliated trade arm had five workers at the time, and is known as the ‘May 18th Trading Company, he added. Through it, the No. 91 Office allegedly obtains the equipment to do its work and provides hackers and other staff with daily necessities.

The unit has a 35-seater bus and two cars with number plates starting with ‘33’ or ‘34’, officially denoting vehicles belonging to the Mining Industry Department of the Cabinet.

Here and here are previous post on the Reconnaissance Bureau.

Here is a post on similar cyber warfare units in the DPRK: Mirim College and Moranbong University

Read the full story here:
No. 91 ‘Hackers HQ’ Revealed
Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
2011-6-1

Posted in Cabinet, Computing/IT, Military, Mining Industry Department | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch