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KFA wraps up business delegation to DPRK…

Monday, March 10th, 2008

In the words of Alejandro himself:

[The] Korean Friendship Association concluded its first busines [sic] delegation, headed by Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos, Special Delegate and KFA President, in collaboration with the DPRK Committee for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Trade and the DPRK Chamber of Commerce. The group included companies from Australia, France, Spain and Lebanon in different sectors like ship building, foodstuff production, medicine, IT and infrastructure, etc. The visit was a big success and 75% of the investors signed letter of intentions and contracts. All of the participants agreed that DPR Korea has a huge potential and new market with many interesting opportunities with the lowest taxes and wages but with the most skilled, motivated workforce. The companies fullfiled [sic] all their plans and resolved the questions during the visit and they had meetings with their Korean counterparts as well as with the officials of Trade, Chamber of Commerce, Banking authorities and logistics.

They visited a Foodstuff factory, Heavy Machinery complex, Ostrich farm as well as the ‘Kaesong Industrial Zone’ in the border with South Korea, were they had a briefing by the Director representative of Hyundai-ASAN.

After that, the investors visited a South Korean cable-making factory and a garment manufacturing plant specialized in high quality sport brands.

From KFA we congratulate the companies that concluded agreements and established Joint Ventures in the DPRK and wish them success in their projects.

From a follow up post on the KFA forum, one of the attendees appears to be Mr. Kevin Liu, head of Asian Division of London-based Exclusive Analysis.

Posted in Chamber of Commerce (DPRK), Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Computing/IT, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Ministry of Foreign Trade, Sea shipping | Comments Closed

Russian auto plant KamAZ in DPRK

Thursday, March 6th, 2008

A couple of days ago, we had an interesting exchange in the comments that I want to make sure readers have an opportiunity to see:
———————–

Werner Koidl Says:

In that Asia Times report Dr. Petrov wrote:
“… Last year the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line in North Korea, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96″. …”

I would be interested in more details about that KAMAZ truck assembly line in North Korea ! Where ?, joint venture ?, size ?
———————–

Leonid Petrov Says:

Concerning the “Taebaeksan 96″ truck assembling plant, the KamAZ set it up last year (2007 or Juche 96) in the town of Pyeongseong. The terms of this deal with NK were really “friendly” and last year KamAZ was having no or very little profit. The production volume last year was very limited (45 or 48 trucks). However, it’s just the beginning of such cooperation.

There is one technician-representative from KamAZ who manages the assembling process. He stays in Pot’onggang HTL and commutes to Pyeongseong. Many North Korean drivers and technicians seem to be technically ignorant (i.e. not knowing how to change the engine oil, etc.), so they need a new technological culture to be introduced. Russians train them well and the North Koreans are grateful.
———————–

Gag Halfrunt Says:

Now that explains the brochure for the Taebaeksan 96 I’d noticed on the Korean Friendship Association’s exports page. I was wondering how anyone could be making money from sticking badges on KamAZes and trying to sell them on. In any case, the export potential for the Taebaeksan 96 must be close to zero, since anyone outside the DPRK who wants a KamAZ can buy one assembled by KamAZ itself.

Trying to drum up interest in the DPRK as an investment destination, the KFA say, “All business made directly with the government, state-owned companies. No middle agents.” This is amusing, because, on the Pyeonghwa car brochure on the KFA website, they’ve sneakily deleted Pyeonghwa’s own contact details and replaced them with the KFA’s email and web addresses. I think this qualifies them a “middle agent” standing between Pyeonghwa and any potential export customers…
———————–

Werner Koidl Says:

The link “brochure for the Taebaeksan 96″ given by Gag Halfrunt seems to indicate that the KamAZ Taebaeksan-96 is assembled in a joint venture with Ryongwang [Ryongbong] Trading Company of North Korea. Ryongwang Trading is also the joint venture partner of Pyeonghwa Motors (Unification Church) to assemble the “Whiparam” in Nampo. And Ryongwang Trading company is also business partner of “Kohas” company from Switzerland. And because of its connections to Ryongwang this Swiss company got in troubles with the US administration.

Posted in Automobiles, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Joint Ventures, Kamaz, Russia, Ryonbong General Corporation, Transportation | 1 Comment »

DPRK holds first extended cabinet meeting of the year

Monday, March 3rd, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-3-3-1
3/3/2008

In the latest issue (February 3rd) of the DPRK Cabinet bulletin, “Democratic Chosun”, it was reported that the first extended cabinet meeting of the year opened in the beginning of February, with Premier Kim Young-il presiding. The bulletin stated that the issue of accomplishing this year’s economic plans was discussed.

At the meeting, Vice Premier Kwak Bum-ki stressed that accomplishing this year’s economic goals was “essential for opening the doors to a breakthrough for building an economically strong nation,” and that it was the “fundamental task laid out before the Cabinet.” He went on to reveal the tasks and directives needed to revitalize all realms of socialist construction, which he stated was necessary to create a powerful and prosperous nation by 2012, the centennial anniversary of the birth of the late Kim Il Sung.

In particular, he called for the production of the “lifeline of socialist construction”, and specifically, electricity, coal, metal, and railways, which he referred to as the “four lines for the advance of the people’s economy.”

Accordingly, the goal of carrying out overwhelming repairs to power generation facilities, and at the same time constructing new power plants in order to increase electrical production capabilities by several hundred thousand kilowatts, was proposed.

The meeting also stressed the need for concentrating efforts on geological exploration and exploitation industries in order to reasonably development and use natural resources, for a change in production of goods necessary for daily life, and for a resolution to the people’s ‘eating problem’ alluded to in the recent New Year’s Joint Editorial.

The bulletin also reported that there was discussion on creating a new five-year plan for the development of science and technology, going as far as to say, ”the role of science and technology in the building of an economically powerful nation is decidedly large, and in order to answer the very real calls for development, [the issue of] strengthening international economic projects” was brought up.

Premier Kim Young-il, Vice-Premier Kwak Bum-ki, Chairman Kim Kwang-rin, of the Committee on National Planning, Park Nam-jil, of the Power Supply Industry Bureau, and Kim Yong-sam, from the Railways Bureau, were among cabinet ministers present.

Posted in 2012 Strong and Prosperous Nation (Kangsong Taeguk), Cabinet, Coal, Domestic publication, Electricity, Energy, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Political economy, Railways, Songun | Comments Closed

North Korea’s Cultural Relations Strategy

Sunday, March 2nd, 2008

The international press (and just about every blogger on the planet-including myself) has written something about the NY Philharmonic’s visit to North Korea last week. Whether one believes that this event is a significant breakthrough in cultural relations or not, what has evaded direct discussion in the media is the purpose of cultural relations in the North Korean system (and indeed its predecessor – the Soviet system).

At the end of World War II, the DPRK imported many Soviet party, state, and military organizations. One of these was the USSR All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (known as ‘VOKS’). Publicly, the mission of VOKS was to promote peace and understanding between the Soviet people and other peoples of the world. However, the actual mission of VOKS was to promote Soviet ideology, policy, and influence overseas.

VOKS began its mission in the 1920s. It undertook activities such as: Attempting to influence French intellectual circles; bringing sympathetic individuals and groups to tour the Soviet Union to see how the construction of the worker’s paradise was proceeding; bringing students from the developing world to be educated in the Soviet Union; sending Soviet scholars and technicians to undertake development projects overseas, etc. VOKS was even influential in the USA, where it supported a number of pro-Soviet civil society organizations.

VOKS also played an important role in establishing the legitimacy of Soviet hegemony in North Korea following World War II. Cultural delegations of North Koreans were taken to the Soviet Union to bear witness to the great accomplishments of the worker’s revolution. Their impressions were then distributed to the North Korean population at large, along with many other cultural goods produced by the Soviet Union.

Although VOKS’ success at swaying public opinion in the west is an unresolved question (as far as I know), the details of their activities are well known to western scholars since Soviet archive materials are readily accessible. Effective or not, the take away from this history lesson is that socialist countries have historically treated cultural relations activities, like everything else, as regime-enhancing activities. In other words, they promote the political incumbents.

The North Koreans copied VOKS wholesale from the Soviets, and this organization is still functioning in the DPRK today. It is the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (CCRFC). Although this body has been around since the founding of the DPRK, it is perhaps most known in contemporary times for supporting the Korean Friendship Association, numerous pro-Pyongyang “Friendship Societies,” and to a lesser degree, several leftist organizations such as the National Lawyers Guild. These organizations tend to toe the party line and echo Pyongyang’s perspective in international debates. At a minimum, they promote a marginal distrust of western media and historiography.

Based on the comments I have made so far, many might be led to believe that I am pessimistic on the positive impact that cultural relations broadly, and the the NY Philharmonic visit specifically, might have in changing the North Korean system. But this would be a mistake. Since the Arduous March and Kim Jong Il’s rise to power, North Korean institutions have undergone such a transformation that comparison with their Soviet predecessors might not be useful for understanding their purposes today.

Since 1997, the North Korean CCRFC has been chaired by Mun Jae Chol, a North Korean policy elite. I just finished watching the NY Phil performance-here-and Mun Jae Chol is indeed in the audience, as are several people who work for him who I have met. Mun Jae Chol took over the committee in 1997 (as best I can put together from KCNA reports–his promotion was not formally announced in the news), and since then the mission of the organization seems to have changed significantly. To start with, the cold war is over. North Korean cultural relations activities are not going to convince the world’s people that the North Korean government is the legitimate governing authority for the whole Korean peninsula. No one will ever believe that now.

Since the propaganda war is over, and resources are scarce, the CCRFC seems to be focused on generating foreign exchange revenue from tourism, cultural exchanges, and brokering foreign direct investment (all under the guise of their previous mission, however). Under established laws and customs, the staff of the CCRFC are permitted to interact with foreigners and make regular trips overseas. They are the very people who have an incentive to promote interaction with the west because they will directly benefit financially from it. True these people are not paragons of liberalism, but they all own western clothes, use digital cameras, listen to iPods, broker deals between private North Koreans and foreigners (smuggle goods), and travel to China on a regular basis. There are procedures in place to control their entrepreneurial tendencies, such as never allowing one guide to be alone with a foreigner, however, these rules can be evaded at minimal cost. They might repeat what they are told to say, but they certainly know better.

Staff of the CCRFC include influential party members and security personnel. Raising the frequency and profile of cultural relations activities with North Korea will increase the income of these individuals who can buy support directly through cash transfers, or indirectly through business deals, ultimately greasing the cogs of change in the North Korean bureaucracy towards a greater acceptance of openness. Maybe.

Comment from Dr. Petrov:
CCRFC (known in North Korea as Taewe Munhwa Ryeollak Wiwonhoe or simply TaeMun) is indeed struggling to survive in the changing economic environment. Although most of the projects they try to lure foreigners into are devoid of economic sense, they are still pretty powerful and even allowed to invite journalists to visit N.Korea. Cooperation with CCRFC is a game of unpredictability but in some cases can lead to success. See a success story here.

Posted in Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Political economy | 5 Comments »

More on the DPRK anti-corruption campaign…

Sunday, February 24th, 2008

Details are starting to emerge on North Korea’s recent anti-corruption drive.

North Korean authorities have been investigating the chief of a North Korean committee in charge of inter-Korean economic cooperation for months after seizing $20 million from his house, a report said Friday.

Quoting an unidentified Chinese source informed on North Korean affairs, the Dong-A Ilbo newspaper said Pyongyang authorities are intensifying their investigation into Jung Woon-eop and 80 other officials of the committee over where the money came from.

It is possible that this is just a good old fashoned purge.

It is also possible that this campaign is the first stage in a policy shift.

The full article can be found here:
NK Official Suspected of Embezzling Funds From Seoul
Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
02-22-2008

Posted in Foreign direct investment, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), National Economic Cooperation Federation (DPRK), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | 3 Comments »

DPRK anti-corruption drive: purge, policy change, or both?

Thursday, February 21st, 2008

A little over a week ago, the North Korean government announced an anti-corruption campaign in two agencies: the United Front Department and the National Economic Cooperation Council.

As I said then, these sorts of campaigns have nothing to do with making the bureaucracy more accountable or responsive to public demands, but are political maneuvers to prevent “rents” or funds from being channeled to uses that lie outside the leadership’s control (or some faction of the leadership). In other words, they are regime enhancing (like a purge).

Today, the Daily NK offers a scenario whereby this anti-corruption drive might be a necessary precondition for a drastic policy change:

The fact that the Guidance Department is involved in the current investigation may be a sign that Kim Jong Il is trying to rebuild the party so that he can change the focus of policy from the military to economic matters. Kim Jong Il has already created a militarily powerful country by acquiring nuclear weapons. Now he wishes to improve other areas.

Within the context of the anti-corruption campaign, today’s Daily NK does a wonderful job identifying the specific agencies involved in reorganizing the DPRK’s levers of power:

The Defense Security Command of the [Korean] People’s Army and the National Security Agency are also launching inspections, but these kinds of inspection are limited. A Defense Security Command investigation can inspect military organizations, local party organizations and individual cadres, but it cannot investigate party branches in the capital and the National Security Agency. At the same time, the National Security Agency’s investigators cannot access the party organizations in Pyongyang, the military and the Defense Security Command.

However, the Guidance Department’s inspection can examine every organization including party organizations in Pyongyang, the Defense Security Command, and the National Security Agency. [A Guidance Department investigation requires Kim Jong Il’s direct authorization. It is often said that if one is the target of such an investigation, one stands little chance of reprieve.]

There are only two known examples of a Guidance Department-led investigation in North Korean history. The first was the investigation of the National Security Agency in February, 1984. […] The second case occurred in 1997 and was known as the Shimhwajo case, resulting in the hushed-up removal of many of Kim Il Sung’s close associates. This inspection was approved by Kim Jong Il and was operated by Jang Sung Taek, Kim’s brother-in-law and the First Vice-Director of the Guidance Department. Through the investigation, thousands of high officials who followed Kim Il Sung were punished, expelled, secretly executed, or sent to prison camps.

To read about another similar change in the balance of power in the DPRK, read the rest of the story here:
Inside the North Korean Shake-up
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
2/21/2008

Posted in Inter-Korean summit, Organization and Guidance Department, Political economy | 2 Comments »

North Korea can produce instant noodles again

Tuesday, February 12th, 2008

The Chosun-Shinbo reports (via the Daily NK) “North Korea can produce instant noodles again” because construction has been completed on Pyongyang’s newest (and largest) noodle factory, the Pyongyang Wheat Flour Factory.

“Starting this year, domestically produced instant noodles will likely be supplied to people on a large scale.”(Daily NK)

…signaling that the DPRK government still seems intent on re-launcing the collapsed Public Distribution System (which has floundered many times).

[The] Pyongyang Wheat Flour Factory is located in Samheong-dong of Mankyungdae District, in Pyongyang, and mainly produces wheat flour, cookie, noodle, and yeast. North Korea built its first noodle factory, Daedong River Instant Noodle Factory, with foreign capital in August 2000 along the Daedong River in Pyongyang.(Daily NK)

Last October Yonhap, reported that Hyundai’s 44,000-strong union donated US$553,800, appx. $13 per worker, to help finance a corn noodle factory in Pyongyang. This is likely the “older” Daedong River Instant Noodle Factory. If this is the case, then Pyongyang has two noodle factories coming on line at about the same time.

The rest of the story:
Although the DPRK government is a newcomer to the noodle business, noodle production and consumption have been burgeoning in North Korea’s private economy, and there is supportive journalistic evidence that the business now suports those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder (see here, here, here, and here). Small scale noodle production requires little capital, so it is a natural fit for those who have nothing but have taken to supporting themselves.

The opening of new government-operated food processing plants is tantamount to a “re-nationalization” of a “privatized” industry in the DPRK. Past reports claim that noodle sales earned private vendors between 900 to 1,600 won. Now these vendors, who operate at the fringes of North Korea’s semi-legal private economy, will at a minimum, be forced to compete with “free” or heavily subsidized government operators.

What will be the result? On the pessimistic side, we could claim that the DPRK government is attempting to monopolize the food supply to control the population (as it has in the past). On the other hand, their ambitions might be more modest and they are only looking to establish some form of carrot they can point to as legitimization of the government’s leadership.

From an economic reform perspective, however, North Korea needs fewer government-run noodle factories and a better business environment for noodle entrepreneurs.

The full stories can be found here:
North Korea Can Produce Instant Noodles Again
Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
2/12/2008

Hyundai Motor union leaders visit N. Korea for noodle project
Yonhap
10/31/2007

Posted in Agriculture, Black markets, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Joint Ventures, Pyongyang Wheat Flour Factory | Comments Closed

North Korea launching massive anti-corruption drive

Monday, February 11th, 2008

Last Friday, Yonhap reported that Kim Jong Il has ordered an anti-corruption investigation of two key agencies, both of which manage South Korean investments in the DPRK: the United Front Department (which Lankov claims is involved in clandestine operations) and the National Economic Cooperation Council.

North Korea is in the midst of a massive anti-corruption drive which has already resulted in the arrest of one of its top officials handling business with South Korea, informed sources in Seoul said Saturday.

The campaign, ordered by leader Kim Jong-il, was prompted by widespread allegations that some top party and administration officials took bribes as they pushed business projects with South Korean industrialists, said the sources well versed in North Korean affairs.

“The probe was launched as National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il said there was a lack of supervision over the United Front Department [a key party organization that supervises inter-Korean affairs], although lots of suspicions were raised over the department’s corruption,” one source told Yonhap News Agency.

According to the sources in Seoul, the North Korean leader was enraged after getting a report that some party and government officials allegedly pocketed bribes and diverted food and other aid from South Korea to black markets.

Also under investigation is the National Economic Cooperation Council, a government body that handles business with South Korean entrepreneurs, the sources said.

The Council’s chief, Jeong Woon-eop, remains under arrest pending investigation into allegations that he took “huge amounts” of bribes, said the sources, who wanted to remain anonymous. (Yonhap excerpted)

Frequently “anti-corruption campaigns” in developing countries have nothing to do with making the bureaucracy more accountable or responsive to public demands, but rather are political maneuvers to prevent “rents” or funds from being channeled to uses that lie outside the leadership’s control (or some faction of the leadership). In other words, they are regime enhancing. The announcement of this campaign demonstrates two important principles that deserve explicit mention:

1. Not all profits earned by North Korean joint ventures are channeled to the leadership, and in fact many of them are siphoned off by middlemen who actually control the financial machinery. Once skimmed off the top, it is likely that these funds are used in illicit private commercial operations since they cannot be legally declared by the owner (unless there are domestic channels for laundering money in North Korea).

2. If funds are being siphoned off of high-profile official joint venture operations, then the leadership is not in control of its internal fiscal affairs. Indeed it is likely that, as in the Soviet Union, the people who keep the private economy running are the trusted mid- to senior-level officials who can skirt the rules and know how to actually get things done within the system.

Update 2/24/2008:

North Korean authorities have been investigating the chief of a North Korean committee in charge of inter-Korean economic cooperation for months after seizing $20 million from his house, a report said Friday.

The full article can be found here:
NK Official Suspected of Embezzling Funds From Seoul
Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki

Update 2/12/2008:

The chief of Daesung General Bureau, a division of the 39th Department which manages foreign transactions, was fired on suspicion of embezzling US$1.4 million last fall.” (Daily NK)

The full article can be found here:
North Korea launching massive anti-corruption drive
Yonhap
2/9/2008

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Daesung General Bureau, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Joint Ventures, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), National Economic Cooperation Federation (DPRK), Political economy, United Front Department | 3 Comments »

DPRK crackdown on trading offices finds corruption

Tuesday, February 5th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Bfrief No. 08-2-5-2
2/5/2008

It appears that from the end of last year through this January, North Korean Party, regional, cabinet and People’s Committee officials have been carrying out inspections of trading companies, ordering massive layoffs and closings of companies where mis-management or other abnormalities are found.

In Yonhap News, a North Korean insider in Beijing, China was quoted on the 31st as saying, “Since November of last year, North Korean authorities have carried out inspections on trading companies under the control of each organization, with layoffs at most trading firms with abnormalities, deficits, or other mismanagement.”

According to the source, over 100 trading companies are registered in Chungjin, South Hamkyung Province, but after the current housecleaning measures are enforced, only around 15 will remain in operation, with practically all problematic offices being closed down.

Another North Korean source in Shenyang, China reported, “These inspections include trading offices run by the Party, military, and other so-called ‘powerful institutions’, so across the board, there are no exceptions, and as to the growing intensity [of the inspections], they are much stronger and wider in scope than formal annual inspections that have been carried out in the past.” “The order handed down at the end of last year to greatly reduce staff in the Party, military and Cabinet happens every year, but this year massive lay-offs in the workforce at trading companies appears to related to a different kind of personnel liquidation.”

These inspections reportedly stem from an incident at the end of last July in which Oh Moon-hyuk, branch manager of the Ruengra 888 trading company in Yunsa, North Hamkyung Province, was executed after being implicated in the smuggling of timber. The trading company was responsible for the export of timber, and operates under the control of the Party’s accounting bureau. The inside contact stated that because of this incident, North Korean authorities carried out further inspections, leading in October of last year to the dismissal of one official receiving vice-minister pay, and the broadening of the inspections nationwide.

Through the inspection-broadening measures, trade officials under the North Pyungan Province trade office also received an inspection party from the central government, causing many problems for Chinese traders who could not travel in from Dandong. Through these inspections, North Korean authorities reportedly uncovered several cases of embezzlement and misappropriation of company finances while the trading companies were exporting marine products or coal, iron ore, and other mining materials.

The goal of these inspections appears to have been the restoration of public order, just as the recent measures preventing women under the age of 45 from working in markets was a reaction to diminishing public discipline. In the future, price controls, regulations on export goods, or other government regulations regarding international trade are likely to be strengthened.

Posted in Companies, Forestry, Labor conditions/wages, Lumber, Manufacturing, Political economy | 1 Comment »

NK Military Has Little Influence on Major Policy Decisions

Sunday, January 27th, 2008

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
1/27/2008

An expert on North Korea has recently disputed a widely circulated claim that North Korea’s hard line diplomacy is due to influence from the North Korean military.

Park Young Tack, an active duty officer at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) said, “The North Korean military usually influences the policy decisions that are related to military roles and functions only.” Park wrote this in his recent article published on January 15 in the 2007 winter edition of the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis entitled ‘The Increasing Standing of the North Korean Military and the Military’s Influence on Decision Making’.

Park said, “Unless Kim Jong Il asks the military for opinions, the military cannot take part in matters other than its own.”

It is widely believed at home and abroad that the North Korean military exerts huge influence on the country’s major policy decisions and therefore is responsible for driving the country to take a hard line.

U.S, envoy Christopher Hill said prior to his visit to Pyongyang last year that he would like to meet high-ranking military officials and persuade them to give up the country’s nuclear programs.

Park said, “It is mistaken to believe that the standing of the military is superior to that of the Party as was the case in the past, and that the military plays a key role in decision making regarding the country’s fate.”

“Many believe that the North Korean military is trying to get in the way of the inter-Korean dialogues. However, that is exactly how the Party wants the world to assess the current situation in North Korea. It is my judgment that the Party has been manipulating the situation so that the military appears to take on the role of the hard-liners,” Park said. Park stressed that the General Political Bureau of the People’s Army by itself cannot voice opposition to the nation’s current policy toward South Korea.

Park said that Secretary for Military Munitions Jun Byung Ho, United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon, and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk Ju have established and are operating a direct reporting system to Kim Jong Il. Secretary Jun is currently responsible for conducting the country’s nuclear tests, Director Kim for operations of the policy through the direct reporting system [to Kim Jong Il], and Minister Kang for foreign announcements.

“It seems that Kim Jong Il allows the military to exert influence on decision making to some extent as a reward for the military’s pledge to help build and defend the absolute dictatorship of Kim Jong Il,” Park said.

“The military circles take part in making policy decisions by offering specialized suggestions and by advocating the Kim Jong Il regime which adopted the ‘Military-First’ policy among the ruling elite, the leaders from the middle class and the lower class,” Park said. However, Park added that the military has limited influence over matters other than its own.

Park said that Kim Jong Il is also strengthening the military-friendly system to watch and hold in check the military, which can pose the biggest threat to his regime.

“When making decisions, Kim Jong Il calls the ruling elite individually for consultations and has them report to him directly,” Park said, adding, “In any case, Kim Jong Il is at the center of the decision making process and stands at the top of the decision making ladder.”

“Kim Jong Il is a policy developer who issues policy proposals more frequently than anyone in the country. Any policy proposed by Kim is considered a supreme order and becomes a law,” Park said. “If an individual at the lower levels of the state wants to make a policy proposal, he usually first contacts an authority in the relevant field who then tries to read Kim Jong Il’s mind on the policy to be proposed. Only after he receives convincing words from the authorities, the low-level cadre is able to submit his proposal. That way, he can escape censure that would result from making an unsuccessful policy proposal.”

Park said that those working at the lower level of the state authorities cooperate with each other even if they work in different departments. If there are any policy shortcomings, they try to solve them together and share the responsibilities. They also create a task force between departments for policy implementation.

Park said, “This kind of political operation has come into existence for the following reasons: First of all, Kim Jong Il prefers to have an inner-circle, minimize the number of personnel, and simplify office procedures. Second, people at the working level have to worry about censure waiting for them when their policy implementation efforts end in failure.”

“Kim Jong Il’s administration style shows that he relies on an informal channel of communication with the ruling elite.” Park said, “He keeps a tight reign on all power groups within the country including the military, and no power group dares to challenge Kim’s authority. Even if united, these groups can hardly exercise any significant influence over decision making.”

Posted in Korean People's Army, KPA General Political Bureau, Military, Political economy, Songun, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

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