Archive for the ‘South Korea’ Category

Inter-Korean trade up 36% in 2012

Thursday, March 22nd, 2012

According to Yonhap:

Despite rising cross-border tension, the trade between South and North Korea surged 36 percent from a year ago to US$320 million in the first two months of this year, government data showed on March 16.

The data provided by the Korea Customs Service indicated that the trade via the inter-Korean industrial complex has not been affected by tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

South Korea slapped sanctions on the North in May 2010 in retaliation for the deadly sinking of a South Korean warship earlier that year, though it keeps intact the complex in the North’s western border city of Kaesong.

The complex, a key outcome of the inter-Korean summit in 2000, marries South Korean capital and technology with cheap labor from the North. It is now home to more than 120 South Korean small and medium-sized companies.

Tensions have flared anew in recent weeks as the two Koreas traded militaristic rhetoric against each other over Seoul’s defamation of the dignity of North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un and his late father, former leader Kim Jong-il.

Read the full story here:
Inter-Korean Trade Surges 36 Percent This Year
North Korea Newsletter No. 202 (March 22, 2012)
Yonhap

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DPRK rejects ROK food aid

Sunday, March 11th, 2012

Following the US – DPRK nuclear / food deal announced at the end of February, the DPRK has decided to reject humanitarian assistance from private South Korean organizations. According to Yonhap:

North Korea has apparently decided not to accept humanitarian aid by South Korea’s private relief agencies that comes with monitoring, aid officials here said Monday.

North Korea has said it will only accept “pure” humanitarian aid from South Korea, in an apparent rejection of aid with strings attached, an aide official said of his recent contact with his North Korean counterpart.

Another South Korean private aid official also made a similar comment. The two spoke on condition of anonymity, citing policy.

The North’s move came as North Korean and U.S. officials held talks in Beijing last week to work out details of 240,000 tons of U.S. food aid reached in their recent nuclear deal.

South Korea has called for monitoring of its food aid to the North to ensure that the aid reaches its intended beneficiaries in the isolated country.

In November, North Korea allowed a South Korean official to travel to the North for a rare monitoring of flour aid by a South Korean private organization.

Last year, South Korean civic groups donated nearly 3,000 tons of flour to North Korea and some of the civic groups sent monitors to the North to try to ensure the transparency of the distribution of their food aid.

Despite the North’s alleged rejection of aid with strings attached, a private aid official said his group plans to send food aid to the North this year.

“We plan to conduct monitoring in an appropriate manner through consultations with North Korea,” the official said. He asked not to be identified, citing policy.

The North has relied on international handouts since the late 1990s when it suffered a massive famine that was estimated to have killed 2 million people.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea said to reject S. Korean food aid with strings attached
Yonhap
2012-3-12

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Seoul to ease some Kaesong investment regulations

Thursday, February 16th, 2012

According to the Donga Ilbo:

The South Korean government will allow companies operating in the Kaesong industrial complex in North Korea to bring new facilities or build plants there. Against this background, regulations banning new investment in the complex under a sanction against North Korea, which made May 24 last year, will be massively eased.

Park Soo-jin, vice spokeswoman of the Unification Ministry in Seoul, said Wednesday, “We will ease sanctions on North Korea imposed May 24 last year to support the operations of plants operating (in the Kaesong complex), including allowing the entry of necessary facilities and construction of warehouses.” “We will also actively examine working-level talks with Pyongyang to resolve the issue of supply of North Korean workers. We are willing to negotiate with the North on building dormitories and tackling passage, customs and telecommunications matters and personal safety.” The ministry is also mulling putting artificial grass on a soccer field within the complex to improve living conditions of South Korean staff.

The latest decision is a follow-up measure after members of the special parliamentary committee for inter-Korean relations development and the National Assembly`s Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee visited the Kaesong complex Friday and urged the resolution of difficulties facing companies operating there. Having offered Tuesday working-level talks to Pyongyang for family reunions, Seoul apparently hopes to expand amicable relations through this deregulation.

The Unification Ministry said last year`s sanctions will remain in force since expansion of large-scale investments will still be banned, including new corporate advances into the complex and plant construction. The latest measure, however, is still a big step forward because until now, Seoul had approved just facility entry into the complex for repair purposes, while going forward, additional facilities could be allowed for production activities. Plant construction was initially allowed for seven companies, which had been suspended due to last year’s sanctions.

Certain projects are already in place, including the construction of fire stations and emergency medical facilities, as well as repair of roads for commuting by North Korean workers. The South Korean ban on visiting North Korea excluding the Kaesong complex and Mount Kumgang area, which was effected last year, was also eased following approval of trips to North Korea for social and cultural exchanges, including the recovery of Kaesong Manwol pavilion.

Read the full story here:
Seoul to partially lift restrictions on biz complex in N. Korea
Donga Ilbo
2012-2-16

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On DPRK remittances

Wednesday, February 15th, 2012

Chico Harlan writes in the Washington Post:

Recent North Korean defectors in South Korea sometimes joke that their transition to capitalist life begins with two key steps. First, they buy a smart phone. Then, they get a lesson about phone banking.

With those two things, defectors can then transfer money back to North Korea, where many still have family or friends. The money doesn’t go directly to the North; rather, it’s channeled through a series of brokers, routed through China, and trimmed by handling fees and commissions.

But as underground systems go, this one is quite functional. Some 50 percent of North Korean defectors have transferred money back home. Those who try once almost always do it again.

Just a decade ago, almost no money flowed back to the North in the form of remittances. But the number of defectors here has skyrocketed, and the amount of cash they send back home has surged as well.

Some 23,000 defectors now live in South Korea, with the number jumping more then 2,500 every year. (Just 12 years ago, a total of 1,400 North Koreans lived in the South.)

The defectors don’t make much money — about $1,000 per month on average — but that doesn’t stop them from sharing it generously, shipping it back to a country where $1,000 can feed a family for a year.

According to a January 2011 survey from the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, some 56 percent of defectors who send money give more than $900 (1.01 million won) annually. Another 12.5 percent give more than $4,500 (5.01 million won) annually.

North Korea scholar Andrei Lankov, in this April 2011 essay, estimated that the total money given each years totals $10 million–an enormous influx of cash into the extremely impoverished North.

One recent defector, Ju Kyeong-bae, described during a recent interview at his apartment in Seoul how he transfers money to his friends in the North, who live in a village some 25 miles from the Chinese border.

First, one of his friends — let’s call him Mr. Jeong — calls Ju from North Korea, using a Chinese cell phone that gets a signal from towers just beyond the border.

Mr. Jeong provides a telephone number for a broker in China. Ju calls the broker.

The broker then gives Ju the name of a bank in South Korea, along with a particular account number.

Ju determines the amount of money he wants to send, punches a few buttons on his iPhone, and transfers the money, which then pinballs from the South Korean bank to a Chinese bank, using two brokers.

The Chinese bank account belongs to a businessman (let’s call him Mr. Kim) who does frequent work in North Korea — and who holds lots of private wealth stashed away in the North. When Ju’s money lands in Mr. Kim’s account, Kim just lets it sit there. He never withdraws it and takes it across the border. Rather, he distributes money he already has stashed in North Korea to Mr. Jeong, who in turn gets it to the person Ju’s payment is intended for.

Mr. Jeong then places another call to Ju — a confirmation.

“Some of the middle men, I never even know their names,” Ju said. “It’s all based on trust. If you don’t trust the system, you’re better off not even sending money.”

According to the 2011 survey of defectors, the commission on transfers is generally between 21 and 30 percent. It’s almost never higher than 50 percent. Some 90 percent of defectors say they receive a phone call from their friend or family member confirming that they received the payment.

One of every two defectors thinks his or her money transfers will spark admiration toward the South. About one in every 10 thinks the money will raise resistance against North Korean society.

South Korea technically bans the transfers, but an official at Seoul’s Ministry of Unification, which handles North Korea policy, says that the government has little incentive to stop the remittances.

“They fall into a gray area,” said the official, requesting anonymity because he was unauthorized to speak about the policy on record. “We always say no money should be sent to North Korea in case it is diverted for military purposes. But in this case, we’re not talking about huge amounts. And it’s for humanitarian purposes. So long as that’s the case, we won’t pursue it.”

Additional posts on remittances:

1. ROK moves to control inter-Korean remittances (2011-5-26)

2. ROK seeks to gain greater control of sanctioned cash flows to DPRK (2011-05-25)

3. Remittances from North Korean defectors (2011-4-21)

4. Defectors remit US$10m a year to DPRK (2011-2-23)

Read the full story here:
North Korean defectors learn quickly how to send money back home
Washington Post
Chico Harlan
2012-2-15

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Daewoo Shipbuilding [not] to invest in DPRK SEZ

Friday, February 10th, 2012

Pictured Above (Google Earth): The Hwanggumphyong and Wiwha Island SEZ on the Yalu/Amnok River which separates the DPRK and PRC.

On Friday, the Donga Ilbo reported that Daewoo Shipbuilding was going to invest in the DPRK’s Hwanggumphyong SEZ (see the original post below).  Today the report appears to be incorrect. According to the Wall Street Journal:

Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. on Monday shot down news reports that it had agreed to build a shipyard in North Korea.

“We don’t have any plans to do that,” a spokesman said.

According to some South Korean news accounts over the weekend, the company, which is the world’s second-largest builder of ships and whose controlling stake is owned by the South Korean government, had agreed to help a Chinese company develop an island off North Korea’s northwest coast, near the Chinese city of Dandong.

The DSME spokesman said the company held discussions with the Chinese company but isn’t close to an agreement.

The news accounts said DSME would build a shipyard that would be devoted to repair work. One report said the idea would be presented to DSME’s directors and announced in April.

The company spokesman said it’s unclear how the accounts originated.

See the original report bleow:

(more…)

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North Korean workers in Kaesong exceeds 50,000

Thursday, February 9th, 2012

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-2-8

As of January 2012, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) employs over 50,000 North Korean workers.

South Korea’s Ministry of Unification (MOU) reported that North Korea sent 449 additional workers to the complex last month, bringing the total number of North Korean employees at the KIC to 50,315.

The majority of the workers are women, comprising 72 percent of the total employees. A total of 81.8 percent are high school graduates, while 9.5 percent are college graduates and 8.7 percent are graduates from specialized/professional schools.

The KIC has had a low worker turnover rate. Some of the workers are licensed doctors and nurses, signifying the popularity of employment at the complex.

However, the MOU added that, “in order to meet the demands of the South Korean corporations in the KIC, 20,000 more workers are needed.”

Currently the average monthly wage of the workers is 110 USD, which is paid directly to the North Korean authorities in US dollars by the South Korean companies.

Out of the total wage, 45 percent is deducted and collected by the North Korean government as social security (15 percent) and social cultural policy funds (30 percent). The North Korean workers receive 55 percent of the total wage, which is paid either in coupons or North Korean currency.

Since the KIC’s opening in 2004, the total amount paid to the KIC workers reached 193.58 million USD as of November 2011.

Despite the deadlocked relations between the two Koreas, the number of employees, along with production and number of businesses, has steadily increased.

The number of employees in 2007 was 23,529. Thus the number has increased to over 50,000 in just four years, and the yearly production output has risen from 180 million to 400 million USD.

Cumulative production also increased from 310 million USD in March 2008 to 1.19 billion USD as of last year. During this time, 55 additional South Korean companies joined the KIC.

Yearly export output jumped from 870,000 USD in 2005 to 36.87 million USD in 2011. However, this is a drop from the previous year’s export of 39.67 million USD. Cumulative export as of November 2011 was 190 million USD.

In the assessment of the MOU, “the decrease in export reflects buyer’s anxiety from instability in inter-Korean relations and North Korean military provocations and many of the manufactured goods were sold domestically in South Korea.”

In addition, the issue of KIC-made products to be granted a “made in Korea” label is still under debate. According to an undisclosed MOU source, “This July will mark the one year anniversary of the ROK-EU FTA and the Committee on Outward Processing Zones (OPZ) is scheduled to meet to discuss the matter of KIC’s recognition as OPZ. But it will not be an easy game to win.”

UPDATE:  The Hankyoreh also wrote about the Kaesong Zone’s growth.

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Kaesong production up 14% in 2011 – employment to increase

Monday, January 23rd, 2012

According to Yonhap:

The joint South-North Korean industrial complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong saw its production expand 14.4 percent in 2011 from a year earlier, Seoul’s unification ministry said Monday.

The total production at the Kaesong Industrial Complex reached US$369.9 million during the January-November period last year, up from $323.3 million worth of production for all of 2010, according to the Ministry of Unification.

The output during the last month of 2011 has not been tallied yet, the ministry said, adding the on-year growth rate may be far greater.

Production for the first 11 months of 2011 marks a 25.7-percent growth from the same period in the previous year, the ministry also noted.

Monthly production hit $31.1 million in January last year and hovered near the $30-million mark every month last year, except in February, according to the ministry.

The ministry attributed last year’s output growth to an increasing number of workers at Kaesong.

North Korean laborers working at the complex reached a peak of 48,708 as of November last year, the ministry said. The comparable figure at the end of 2010 was 46,284, it said.

Yonhap also reports the following:

The provision of new laborers is seen as a signal of the new North Korean leadership attempting to maintain the joint industrial complex, the symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation, despite the North’s repeated denunciations of the Lee Myung-bak administration for allowing only a former South Korean first lady and a businesswoman to visit Pyongyang to mourn Kim’s death.

“North Korea will provide about 400 more laborers to the Kaesong Industrial Complex on the 26th (of January) immediately after the Lunar Yew Year’s holiday,” a source at the Kaesong complex said.

A Unification Ministry official also said that he “heard that North Korea will soon increase the laborers at the Kaesong Industrial Park.”

The North had planned to increase the number of North Korean laborers late last month but suspended the plan due to the sudden death of Kim on Dec. 19.

Hundreds of South Korean factories in the industrial park employ 48,708 North Koreans as of the end of November last year, up 2,400 from a year earlier.

Read the full stories here:
Production at joint industrial Kaesong park expands 14.4 pct in 2011
Yonhap
2012-1-23

N. Korea to provide 400 new laborers to S. Korean firms in Kaesong: sources
Yonhap
2012-1-24

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Korea Peace Foundation to donate flour to the DPRK

Friday, January 20th, 2012

Pictured above (Yonhap): Food aid to be delivered to the DPRK (2012-1-27)

According to Yonhap:

Representatives of a South Korean charity group plan to visit North Korea next week to deliver 180 tons of flour aid to North Korea to help ease its chronic food shortages, officials said Friday.

The planned shipment by the Seoul-based Korea Peace Foundation marks the first flour assistance to the communist country following the death last month of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

The UNDP also made public that it will place a priority on the DPRK this year:

Radio Free Asia says the United Nations Development Programme will place a priority on improving food security in North Korea by reducing crop losses after harvests.

The U.S. based broadcaster said the UNDP plans to save more crops and improve seed production by revamping North Korea’s crop storage facilities and farm equipment such as threshers and grinders.

Around 15 percent of crops harvested in Pyeongyang are said to be damaged every year, while only 13 percent of the 150-thousand tons of seed produced meet international standards.

Food security is achieved by securing a certain amount of food, taking into account potential population increases, natural disasters and war.

Additional Notes:
1. I believe the “Korea Peace Foundation” is also the “Korean Conference of Religion and Peace (KCRP)

2. Read about South Korea’s aid to the DPRK in 2011 here.

3. CNN also covered the story about South Korean food aid.

Read the full Yonhap article here:
S. Korean group to send first flour aid to N. Korea after Kim’s death
Yonhap
2012-1-20

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North Korean trade and aid statistics update

Tuesday, January 17th, 2012

According to Business Week:

North Korea’s trade expanded more than 20 percent in 2010 to $6.1 billion on growing business with China even as the economy shrank for a second year, South Korea’s national statistics office said.

Trade volume increased 22.3 percent in 2010 after a 10.5 percent decline in 2009, Statistics Korea said in its annual report today in Seoul. Commerce with China accounted for 57 percent, or $3.5 billion, of North Korea’s foreign trade, up from 53 percent in the previous year. The totalitarian state doesn’t report economic statistics.

North Korea’s gross domestic product contracted 0.5 percent to 30 trillion won ($26.1 billion) in 2010, compared with South Korea’s 1,173 trillion won, the Bank of Korea said in November. Per capita income was 1.24 million won compared with South Korea’s 24 million won.

Kim Jong Un took over as leader of North Korea in December after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. The regime has relied on economic handouts since the mid-1990s and an estimated 2 million people have died from famine, according to South Korea’s central bank. The United Nations and the U.S. increased sanctions on the country aimed at curtailing its nuclear weapons program after 2010 attacks that killed 50 South Koreans.

Chinese aid to the stricken country will probably increase as the government in Beijing seeks to avoid a flood of refugees from crossing the 880-mile (1,416 kilometer) border it shares with North Korea, analyst Dong Yong Sueng said. While food shortages have contributed to rising defections, North Korea has shown no willingness to ease sanctions by abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

Economic Dependence

“North Korea’s economic dependence on China will inevitably increase for the time being unless there’s some resolution to the nuclear situation,” said Dong, a senior fellow at the Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul. “China wants a stable North Korean regime and succession to avoid a potential influx of refugees.”

North Korea had a shortfall of as much as 700,000 metric tons of food last year, which could affect a quarter of the population, according to the United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization. China provides almost 90 percent of energy imports and 45 percent of the country’s food, according to a 2009 report from the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations.

China is preparing to consent to a North Korean request to provide 1 million tons of food in time for the April 5 anniversary of the birth of the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung, Japan’s Fuji Television said on its website. The report didn’t say where it obtained the information.

Providing Assistance

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin today told reporters in Beijing that while he wasn’t aware of the report, “we have always been providing assistance to the DPRK within our capacity which we think will be conducive to the stability and development of the country.” DPRK is an acronym of North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Kim’s military had over one million soldiers in active duty and 7.7 million reserve troops as of November 2010, today’s report said, citing South Korean Defense Ministry figures. The North operates under a military-first policy and has remained on combat alert since the Korean War ended in 1953 with a truce and not a peace treaty.

North Korea’s population rose to 24.2 million in 2010 from 24.1 million in 2009, about half of South Korea. Inter-Korean trade rose 13.9 percent from a year earlier to $1.9 billion last year, Statistics Korea said.

South Korea plans to set up a fund to raise as much as 55 trillion won to pay for eventual reunification with North Korea, Unification Minister Yu Woo Ik said in an interview with Bloomberg last October.

Read Sangwon Yoon’s full article in Business Week here.

The data in this article was pulled from a recent publication by Statistics Korea (Korean, English). You can read a press release of the publication here (in Korean). You can read the press release in English here (via Google Translate). It is not very good, so if a reader would care to take the time to translate this article, I would appreciate it. You can also download the press release as a .hwp file at the bottom of the article (download a .hwp reader here).

Statistics Korea did set up a North Korea Statistics page which you can see here. Unfortunately, it is only in Korean! I have, however, added it as a link on my North Korean Economic Statistics page.

UPDATE 1: The Daily NK also covered this story with the following report:

The income gap between North and South Korea is becoming ever wider, according to statistics released yesterday by Statistics Korea showing that South Korea’s per capita Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010 was $27,592, 19.3 times that of North Korea at $1,074. Last year the gap was 18.4 times.

In the (legal) foreign trade sector, the two Koreas also lived very differently. South Korea’s 2012 trading volume was $891.6 billion, 212.3 times North Korea’s $4.2 billion. North Korea’s exports were worth just $15 billion, its imports $27 billion.

As expected, North Korea’s trade reliance on China was highly significant (56.9%), partly because as strained inter-Korean relations started to bite, so inter-Korean trade declined as well: from 33.0% in 2009 to 31.4% in 2010.

Meanwhile, 61.0% of adults in South Korea are economically active, a number which rises to 70.2% in North Korea. Conversely, there are 3,134,000 college students in South Korea, but only 510,000 in North Korea.

In the energy industry sector in 2010, South Korea imported 872,415,000 barrels of crude oil, 226.4 times more than North Korea’s 3,854,000. The electricity generating capacity of South Korea is 10.9 times more than that of North Korea, too, though the generated amount was actually around 20 times bigger, the statistics allege.

Automobile production was no better; in South Korea (4,272,000), 1,068 times more than North Korea (4,000). Steel production in South Korea was 46.1 times that of North Korea, cement was 7.6 times more, and fertilizer 6.1 times.

UPDATE 2: The Hankyoreh adds some critiques of the data:

“With inter-Korean relations so tense, it is no longer possible for us to do the kind of North Korean grain production estimates that were possible under the previous administration,” a government official explained on Tuesday.

2010 production figures for rice, corn, barley, beans, and other major grains were left blank in a Statistics Korea report on major statistical indicators in North Korea. The numbers were included in statistical data released in 2008, 2009, and other years.

A Statistics Korea official said, “We made several requests to the organization in charge, but they didn’t provide materials, so we couldn’t print them.” The Rural Development Administration is responsible for investigating North Korean grain production. Early every year, it has estimated and released North Korean grain production figures for the previous year. Since 2011, however, it has failed to release figures.

A government official explained, “Since inter-Korean relations were decent during the previous administration, it was possible to go to the North and get samples to use as a basis for estimates.”

“With inter-Korean exchange all but completely halted under the current administration, the basis for releasing estimates has disappeared,” the official added.

Some observers said the decision was motivated by concerns that South Korean public support for food aid to North Korea could grow if low figures are presented. The argument is that there is no reason the kind of grain production estimates that were possible in 2008 and 2009, while the Lee administration was in office, would not be so for 2010 alone. Observers are also expressing bafflement at the fact that only agricultural products were omitted from estimates at a time when even the number of cars is being estimated in the area of industrial products.

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University, said, “Recently, food aid negotiations have been taking place between North Korea and the US, and I suspect the government may have decided not to announce [the estimates] because it was too concerned about public sentiment in South Korea.”

The North Korea figures released Tuesday also showed South Korea‘s per capita gross national income of $20,759 to be 19.3 times North Korea’s $174 for 2010.

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Lankov on the DPRK’s political calculations

Sunday, January 15th, 2012

Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

This year, President Lee Myung-bak’s New Year address paid much attention to North Korea issues. The South Korean President warned the North against fresh provocations but the general tone of his speech was conciliatory.

Lee said that now is the time to put aside past problems and start to rebuild relations anew. Tellingly, he did not repeat that Seoul expects Pyongyang to apologize for the two military incidents of 2010 ― the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island.

Are there chances that Pyongyang will react to this charm offensive and rush to resume talks with Seoul? Don’t hold your breath ― such chances are very remote. Pyongyang decision makers understand perfectly well that an immediate detente is not in their long-term interests.

Pyongyang’s foreign policy goals are surprisingly easy to describe: They are regime security and obtaining unconditional aid (the former is an absolute priority with the latter a rather distant but still significant second). In other words, North Korea’s foreign policy makers want to squeeze as much aid as possible from the outside world but only so long as this aid comes without too many conditions which might have impact on regime security.

Since 2008, the North Korean state has found itself in a rather unpleasant situation: U.S. aid stopped almost completely while the amount coming from South Korea has dramatically decreased. In this new situation, North Korea has been left with just one aid provider ― that is, China. This is not a situation that Pyongyang’s elite is happy about.

Since the 1960s, North Korean diplomats have worked hard to ensure that their country would always have at last two overseas sponsors. It was preferable if the two sponsors had uneasy, if not hostile, relations, so that their rivalry could be used to ensure that only limited concessions would be given in exchange for aid.

For the early 1960s until the late 1980s, China and the Soviet Union were the sponsors. From the early 1990s, the Chinese continued and the Soviet Union was replaced by South Korea and the United States.

In order to decrease their dangerously high dependence on China, North Korean diplomats now want South Korea to resume large-scale aid ― in other words, to re-implement a version of the “Sunshine Policy,” the North Korean-directed policy of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun when they were president in 1998-2007.

North Korean leaders are careful observers of the ever-changing South Korean political scene. They have to be, since milking the South has long since become their major source of revenue. They hope that the coming parliamentary and presidential elections will be won by the Korean nationalist left.

This is understandable, since left-leaning politicians in South Korea have always been more willing to provide the North with aid, without asking too many awkward questions. In recent years, it seems that the left has lost part of its earlier enthusiasm for such a policy, but one should still reasonably expect that a left-leaning (or as it would proudly style itself, “progressive”) administration will indeed be more receptive to Pyongyang’s demands.

So what should North Korea do to increase the chances of the South Korean left-leaning parties? Pretty much the only thing they can do is to “not” help the right, and this is exactly the reason why the recent conciliatory remarks by President Lee are likely to fall on deaf ears.

While the North Korea issue is marginal in South Korean politics, the left-leaning opposition can blame the Lee administration for its real (or alleged) mishandling of the North and the resulting instability on the Korean Peninsula (admittedly, this type of electoral rhetoric has a kernel of truth to it). Therefore, if the North agrees to play according to Lee’s rules, it will help the South Korean “conservatives” in presenting themselves as people who, at the end of the day, know how to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Of course North Korea would be rewarded if it were to talk right now. But from Pyongyang’s point of view it makes a great deal of sense to wait another year, in anticipation of the electoral success of the South Korean left. If the left is not successful in the end, then they can still easily make a deal with the next right-leaning administration. It is telling that in recent months the presidential contenders of the right have also indicated that they would be softer in their approach towards the North.

Therefore we should not expect a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough anytime soon. Fortunately though, we also do not have to be that afraid of fresh North Korean provocations. Consideration of South Korean electoral politics will probably mean that the North will try to avoid clashes with the South.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s political calculations
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2012-1-15

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