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Stalin and Korean War

Sunday, July 29th, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/29/2007

On September 30, 1950, at 11:30 p.m., the Eighth Department of the Soviet General Staff received a coded message from Pyongyang. It took about an hour to decipher it, and then a courier was dispatched to deliver it to Stalin’s residence on the outskirts of Moscow. It was 2:30 a.m., but the Soviet dictator liked to work at night. At any rate, the message was so important that perhaps they would wake him anyway. Kim Il-sung had reported that the North Korean army had ceased to exist, and that the only way to save the North Korean state would be through an urgent dispatch of troops from the USSR.

Stalin was hardly surprised. He was never an enthusiast for Kim Il-sung’s invasion plans, and when in January 1950 he finally granted permission to invade the South, he did so on the assumption that the U.S. would have no time, and perhaps, no will, to interfere. Hence, when Stalin learned of the Incheon landing, he was quick to appreciate what had happened.

Thanks to the recent efforts of historians, especially Alexander Mansourov and Pak Myong-rim whose research I use for this article, we know what was happening in Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang during the fateful two weeks which followed MacArthur’s amphibious operation in Incheon.

The landing did not come as a complete surprise: the Soviet _ and, obviously, Chinese _ intelligence expected something like it, and the Chinese even warned the North Koreans about the danger.

When Stalin learned about the large-scale landing, he realized that a disaster was looming. As early as Sept. 18, he cabled his instructions to Pyongyang. He requested a stop of the push toward Busan, and demanded the withdrawal of troops from the South to reinforce Seoul’s defenses. This was a reasonable suggestion, but Stalin did not appreciate the degree of U.S. military superiority. It is doubtful whether such a withdrawal would have accomplished much.

But Stalin’s representatives in Korea, including Gen. Shtykov, the first Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, were even less appreciative of the new dangers. While the U.S. and South Korean forces were fighting their way to Seoul, soon to cut the North Korean troops off from their supply bases, both Shtykov and Kim Il-sung still hoped that the landing force could be contained. The documents confirm that even when the U.N. forces took over the Gimpo airfield and entered the outskirts of Seoul, the North Korean command still hoped to take Busan in the following few days.

The North Korean press remained silent about the landing. By Sept. 18, the sounds of battle were well heard in Seoul, but the official propaganda and communist activists assured everybody that nothing special was taking place. Kim Song-chil, a historian and author of a famous diary, described how his Communist interlocutors insisted that the sounds of distant artillery were merely produced by the field exercises of the North Korean troops.

On Sept. 20, Stalin repeated his demand, and required the withdrawal of forces from the southern part of the country to Seoul, in order to “establish strong frontline positions to the north and east of Seoul.” It indicated that Seoul should be surrendered to the U.N. forces. But Kim Il-sung, with his trademark stubbornness, kept pressing on toward Busan.

Only on the evening of Sept. 25, did Kim Il-sung admit that there was no chance of pushing the South Korean forces into the sea near Busan. He ordered a withdrawal, but it was too late. The next day, heavy battles unrolled into the streets in downtown Seoul where the North Korean forces tried to resist. They did what they could. Kim Song-chil wrote about their bravery with great admiration, and the historian was no fan of the communists.

Over the two days of Sept. 27-28, the North Korean command system disintegrated. Kim Il-sung could not even contact his own Defense Minister Choe Yong-gon, who was in Seoul doing his best to keep the city. An emergency meeting in Pyongyang created a new command structure, presided over by Kim Il-sung, himself. But he was a general without an army; after the battle of Seoul, the North Korean forces ceased to exist.

For a while, there was some hope that the U.N. troops would not cross the 38th parallel. But by Oct. 1, it became clear that such a turn of events was very unlikely. Thus, Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong, his foreign minister and future victim of the purges, wrote a cable in which they desperately asked for help. They admitted “if the enemy were to take advantage of the situation and step up its offensive in North Korea, then we would be unable to stop the enemy by our own forces.” Accordingly they asked for Soviet troops.

But Stalin did not want to launch a third World War. He hoped that the Chinese would take the military responsibilities on. After all, their stake in the situation was greater than his. He eventually succeeded, but it took much effort on his part.

Posted in Political economy, Russia | Comments Closed

North Korea’s living exports

Wednesday, July 25th, 2007

Asia Times
Bertil Lintner
7/25/2007

It has been known since the early 1990s that North Korea exports manpower to eastern Russian logging sites. But two remarkable incidents over the past years reveal that the foreign-currency-strapped nation also sends laborers to other, somewhat less expected places in the world.

When North Korea won a soccer game over Japan at the Asian Games in the Qatari capital Doha last December, its cheerleaders became so excited that they rushed on to the field and carried the players on their shoulders around the grounds. They could do that, because the North Korean cheerleaders were not, as cheerleaders usually are, young, petite women. They were all male – sturdy, middle-aged construction workers who belonged to the contingents of laborers that the North Korean government is sending to work in the Middle East.

Then, in January, the managing director of an unnamed construction firm was found slashed to death, and one of his workers hanged, in a building in the East Malaysian riverside town of Sibu, on the fringes of the jungles of Sarawak. The businessman was identified as Ri Won-gil, 52, and the worker as Kim Kwong-ryun, 47 – both North Koreans. Their company had “been doing contract work here for years”, the Malaysian Star newspaper reported, although it was not clear what kind of work that was.

As many as 70,000 North Koreans are currently working in various countries, Kim Tae-san, a defector who testified last year on North Korean migrant labor to the European Parliament, told US-financed Radio Free Asia (RFA) this year. Other estimates are considerably lower, but it is evident that labor export is becoming an important source of income for the government in Pyongyang.

Today, North Korean workers are found not only in Russia, Malaysia and Qatar but in Dubai, Mongolia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Libya, Saudi Arabia and possibly also some African countries. Many are dispatched through labor agencies based in China, and most of their salaries end up in the coffers in Pyongyang. As North Korea does not publish any economic statistics, it is not known exactly how much it earns from exporting labor to other countries, but is it believed by North Korea-watchers to be bringing in millions of US dollars annually.

In addition, tens of thousands of North Koreans are working illegally in China, and sending money home to their relatives. This may not directly benefit the Pyongyang regime, but it helps alleviate poverty in the country, and therefore stifle possible social unrest on the level that actually hit the North Korea during the great famine in the early and mid-1990s. On a more organized level, trusted citizens are sent by Pyongyang to work in North Korean-run restaurants not only in China – Beijing and Shanghai – but also in Russia, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos. Profits from those enterprises are, naturally, sent to Pyongyang, or to support the activities of North Korean diplomatic missions in those respective countries.

Russia, or the erstwhile Soviet Union, is the oldest destination for North Korean labor, and it probably began when in 1967 Soviet secretary general Leonid Brezhnev and North Korea’s Kim Il-sung reached an agreement to bring manpower to sparsely populated eastern Russia. In September 1996, Amnesty International stated in its “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea/Russian Federation: Pursuit, Intimidation and Abuse of North Korean Refugees and Workers”, one of the earliest reports on the subject: “North Korea brought in the manpower and ran the logging sites, while the Soviet Union provided the natural resources. The profit, reportedly many million dollars over the years, was split between the two countries.” Some of the income was also reportedly used to pay off North Korea’s debt to Russia.

Today, according to Moscow’s Ministry of Economics, 90% of North Korea’s “exports” to Russia consist of workers. An estimated 2,500 North Koreans are to be found in Primorye, or the maritime region adjacent to the Sea of Japan, and almost all of them work at construction sites in Vladivostok and Nakhodka. According to local sources, they sleep in dormitories and eat together under portraits of the late Kim Il-sung and his son, current ruler Kim Jong-il.

Political classes are held every week under strict supervision of members of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. The supervisors, who belong to North Korea’s security police, also collect their salaries from the Russian construction companies that have hired them, and give the workers only food and some pocket money. The bulk of their incomes are sent back to Pyongyang, or used to buy computers and other electronic equipment for North Korea’s small but burgeoning information-technology industry.

Many more North Koreans – the exact figure is not known but is believed to be at least 10,000 – work under similar conditions in logging camps in Khabarovsky krai (region) and Amursky oblast (province). The main camps in Khabarovsky krai are around Chegmodyn and Alonka in the Verkhnebureinsky region, in the wilderness some 680 kilometers north of Khabarovsk. In Amursky oblast, logging camps with North Korean workers are found in the north along the Yuktali, Yukcha and Gilyui rivers, and along the Arkhara River in the southeast. Fenced off with barbed wire, these camps are in extremely remote areas from which it is almost impossible to escape.

Some Russian logging firms – now all privately owned since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist system in 1991 – pay in cash, while others reportedly let the North Koreans keep 40% of the timber they fell as payment. Those logs are sent to North Korea by train, and resold to China, or used in North Korea itself, which has almost no forests left and therefore no timber.

According to Lyudmila Erokhina of the Vladivostok State University of Economics and Services, North Korean workers are preferred in the Russian Far East because they work hard and never complain: “They were brought up as law-abiding citizens in a strictly controlled society.” On the other hand, Chinese and Vietnamese guest workers in the Russian Far East are known to have raised demands for better working conditions, and are alleged by many Russians to be engaged in sometimes dubious local businesses, often in black or gray areas.

The good behavior of North Korean workers and their willingness to put up with harsh conditions may have been selling points when in more recent years Pyongyang began sending laborers to the Middle East, where they, according to RFA, mostly perform “low-skilled labor, such as plastering and bricklaying. The North Korean workers receive meager wages, even lower than the Nepalese workers, who have been known to receive the lowest pay of all foreign laborers” in, for instance, Qatar.

“The entire wage received by North Korean workers goes to the North Korean authorities. In order to make some money they can keep, they have to moonlight,” RFA quoted a South Korean resident in Qatar as saying. Thousands of North Korean construction workers are reported to be living under similar conditions in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

In the Czech Republic, hundreds of North Koreans, mostly women, work in factories producing auto parts, or as seamstresses in the garment industry. According to the US State Department’s 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report, the North Korean regime “provides contract labor for private industry in the Czech Republic. There are allegations that this labor is exploitative, specifically that the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] government keeps most of the wages paid to the North Korean workers and that workers’ movement is controlled by DPRK government ‘minders’.”

Since the formerly communist Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004, it has been compelled to investigate the conditions of North Korean workers in country. But according to the US report, the Czech government “to date … has not confirmed that they enjoy freedom of movement away from DPRK government ‘minders’ and are not subject to other coercive practices, such as the collection of a majority of the workers’ salaries by DPRK officials”.

Soon, however, the North Koreans in the Czech Republic may be going home because of international pressure. No new work permits will be issued to them, and those who have permits will not have them renewed, which means that by the end of this year there will be no more North Korean workers in that country. The main problem from the Czech government’s point of view is that, since it joined the EU, tens of thousands of its own workers have left to seek higher wages in western Europe, so foreign labor is badly needed. And who could be better than hard-working, compliant North Koreans?

But if they are no longer wanted in the Czech Republic, there are many other countries willing to hire North Koreans – and, as long as Pyongyang needs foreign currency, the export of labor is also likely to continue.

Posted in Banking, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Forestry, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Russia | 3 Comments »

North Korea Gets $25 Million Frozen by U.S. Probe

Friday, June 15th, 2007

Washington Post, A17
Glenn Kessler
6/15/2007

North Korea took possession yesterday of about $25 million in funds previously frozen by a Treasury Department investigation, potentially clearing the way for Pyongyang to fulfill its commitment to shut down an aging nuclear reactor.

An impasse over transferring the money had stalled an agreement announced in February that the Bush administration had hailed as a first step toward ending North Korea’s nuclear activities.

Under that agreement, which angered President Bush’s conservative supporters, the United States was supposed to end the Treasury investigation within a month and North Korea was to shutter its reactor at Yongbyon by April 14. But North Korea refused to take that step until it received money caught up in the investigation.

The reactor had been frozen under a 1994 deal with the Clinton administration, but in 2002 Pyongyang restarted it after a dispute with the Bush administration. Experts estimate that North Korea — which conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 — has obtained enough plutonium from the reactor for as many as 12 nuclear weapons.

Late this year or in early 2008, North Korea would need to produce fresh fuel to keep the reactor going, says a recent report by the Institute for Science and International Security.

The Treasury Department had targeted Banco Delta Asia, in the Chinese special administrative region Macau, alleging it was involved in money-laundering for North Korea. But the Treasury’s action had wider repercussions, essentially convincing banks around the world not to do business with North Korean firms.

Though the Treasury Department agreed to allow the return of money tainted by illicit activities, no bank was willing to transfer the money without explicit assurances that the Treasury would take no regulatory action. North Korea could have withdrawn the money in cash, but many experts suspected Pyongyang demanded a wire transfer to signal to financial institutions that it was once again part of the financial system.

U.S. officials trying to save the deal desperately searched for a willing bank, but each time an arrangement seemed possible, complications arose. Finally, after Russia indicated that one of its banks could help, the Treasury arranged for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to transfer the money to a dormant North Korea account at a Russian bank that operates in the Far East, near the border with North Korea.

“Basically all of it has been transferred,” the Macau government said in a statement yesterday. “For Macao, this incident has come to a conclusion.”

When the Treasury ended the Banco Delta Asia investigation in March, it formally ordered a broad range of U.S. financial institutions to stop doing business with BDA. But that order did not include the banks’ regulator — the Federal Reserve system — which allowed the New York Fed to handle yesterday’s transaction without requiring an exemption from the Treasury.

Still, a group of Republican lawmakers this week asked the Government Accountability Office to examine whether the transaction complies with money-laundering and counterfeiting laws.

N Korea fund transfer ‘under way’
BBC
6/14/2007

The transfer of North Korea’s funds from a bank in Macau – a key issue in nuclear disarmament talks – appears to be under way.

A Macau finance minister reportedly said $20m of Pyongyang’s $25m (£12.7m) had left a blacklisted bank in Macau.

The money was earlier reported to be going to a North Korean bank account in Russia, via the US Federal Reserve.

North Korea insists it must access its funds before abiding by a deal to begin shutting its nuclear facilities.

Q&A: North Korean money in Macau
BBC
6/12/2007

In February North Korea agreed to a timeline for giving up its main nuclear site by April – in return for badly-needed fuel and the return of $25m from a bank in Macau.

But the money has yet to be transferred, and the site remains open.

Now, though, the Russians are offering to step in and get the money to Pyongyang, which could remove a key sticking point in neutralising North Korea’s nuclear capability.

How has such a small amount of money become such a sticking point?

The money is, in a sense, only the visible part of a broader problem.

Dozens of North Korean government departments do their international business through a bank in Macau called Banco Delta Asia.

But in September 2005, the US Treasury accused BDA of being a conduit for laundering money for Pyongyang, triggering severe limits on the bank’s dealings with US financial institutions – and a freeze on $25m of North Korean money in the bank’s accounts.

According to the Treasury, BDA was a “willing pawn” of North Korea, helping process as much as $500m a year in dirty money without asking awkward questions.

The move sent relations between Washington, DC and Pyongyang – frosty at the best of times – into the deep freeze.

Between then and now, the $25m became a tool for the US to achieve a deal on North Korea’s ambitions for nuclear weapons – and an excuse for North Korea to stall.

So has a deal been reached now?

Yes, in February this year. North Korea pledged to give up its nuclear reprocessing activities in exchange for thousands of tonnes of fuel.

At the same time, the $25m would be unfrozen, and could – in theory – head back to North Korea.

But the money has yet to leave Macau, because at the same time the US Treasury cut BDA off altogether from the US banking system.

This ultimate sanction, in banking terms, was made under section 311 of the USA Patriot Act – passed shortly after the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York. Effectively, it bars any financial institution from having anything to do with BDA, if they want to do business with or in America.

Understandably, therefore, attempts to find a way of wiring the money back to North Korea have failed.

Banks in China and Vietnam have been approached and have refused to get involved.

One US bank – Wachovia – has been asked by the US State Department to consider helping out, but it points out that it will need assurances that it is not in breach of section 311 before it can do anything.

What is Russia offering to do?

Russia is one of the partners in the six-way talks over denuclearisation of North Korea, and – given that it shares a border with North Korea – has a powerful interest in moving discussions along.

Early in June, Russian officials suggested that a Russian bank might step in to get the frozen $25m from Macau to Pyongyang – directly or via intermediaries.

The US Treasury has now acknowledged the possibility of Russian assistance.

But Russia is likely to require cast-iron assurances that US sanctions against banks which carry out transactions with North Korea will not apply.

One possibility would be for the money to go first via the New York branch of the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, and then on to Russia’s own central bank before being paid into Moscow’s Far East Commercial Bank, where North Korea has a long-unused account.

But what does a country like North Korea need money-laundering services for?

North Korea, in practical terms, is flat broke.

Its trade is minimal, its agriculture is suffering, and its contact with the outside world is severely limited.

But according to the US Treasury, not to mention many experts elsewhere in intelligence and financial crime, Pyongyang has for the past two decades made up for its lack of legitimate trade by taking an unhealthy interest in faking US banknotes, smuggling counterfeit tobacco products and even the narcotics trade.

Much of the proceeds, the US claims, have been laundered through BDA, which has also facilitated huge bulk cash shipments back to Pyongyang – as well as large trades in precious metals.

BDA, it should be said, has always strongly denied the allegations, insisting its business with North Korea is above board.

Why does the US not just send the money back itself?

In theory, the US could have provided a bank with the reassurance it needs to get involved, although that has yet to happen – and could, in any case, be legally tricky. “Difficult, yes; impossible, no,” was how the State Department’s spokesman described it.

Similarly, reports have suggested that since 2001 there has been a conduit for fund transfers between the State Department’s credit union and the Foreign Trade Bank in Pyongyang.

But as far as the Treasury is concerned, the ball is now in Macau’s court. It is up to the regulators there to work out how to get the money back to North Korea – and in the meantime the section 311 rule stays in force.

In any case, after years of playing hardball with North Korea, the last thing the current US administration wants is look as if it is doing things Pyongyang’s way.

Can’t North Korea get it back any other way?

It could – for instance, through a direct withdrawal from BDA back to Pyongyang.

Alternatively, if the US is right that bulk cash shipments have been going on for years illicitly, perhaps the technique could be used for above-board purposes.

But as far as North Korea is concerned, that kind of deal is unacceptable.

It seems that the authorities in Pyongyang want the transfer to pass through the international financial system, so as to send a signal that handling North Korean money does not mean instant ostracism.

Not only that; keeping the matter rumbling on means more time to extract concessions – and, some experts fear, to keep reprocessing nuclear material.

Posted in Banking, China, Finance, Russia | Comments Closed

25 pct of Kaesong-made goods exported this year, ministry says

Sunday, June 10th, 2007

Yonhap
6/10/2007

Products made in an inter-Korean industrial park in the first four months of the year were valued at US$48.1 million, about 24 percent of which, or $11.3 million worth of products, were exported, South Korea’s unification ministry said Sunday.

Last year’s comparable figure during the cited period was 18.4 percent, or $2.3 million, according to the ministry.

The industrial complex, located in the North Korean border city of Kaesong, is one of two flagship projects the South operates with the North in the spirit of reconciliation that developed following the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000.

Over 13,000 North Korean workers are currently employed by 22 South Korean companies there. They produce garments, utensils and other labor-intensive goods.

The biggest importer of Kaesong-made goods was the European Union (EU), followed by China, Russia and Australia.

The ministry did not give figures on how many goods made in the industrial park the countries imported.

Posted in Australia, China, EU, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Russia, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | 1 Comment »

North Korea needs a dose of soft power

Wednesday, June 6th, 2007

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
6/5/2007

It is clear that the current Western approach to dealing with North Korea is not working. Some people in Washington obviously still believe that financial or other sanctions will push the North Korean regime to the corner and press Pyongyang into relinquishing its nuclear program. But this is very unlikely.

First, neither China nor Russia is willing to participate in the sanctions regime wholeheartedly. Neither country is happy about a nuclear North Korea, but they see its collapse as an even greater evil. However, without their participation, no sanctions regime can succeed. More important, South Korea, still technically an ally of the United States, is even less willing to drive Pyongyang to the corner. And finally, even if sanctions have some effect, the only palpable results will be more dead farmers. The regime survived far greater challenges a decade ago when it had no backers whatsoever.

So what can be done? In the short run, not much. Like it or not, Pyongyang will remain nuclear. There might be some compromises, such as freezing existing nuclear facilities, but in general there is no way to press North Korean leaders into abandoning their nuclear weapons.

This is not good news, since it means that the threat will remain. Earlier experience has clearly demonstrated that every time North Korean leaders run into trouble, they use blackmail tactics, and they usually work. In all probability, there will be more provocations in the future. Since Pyongyang’s leaders believe (perhaps with good reason) that Chinese-style economic reforms might bring about the collapse of their regime, they have not the slightest inclination to start reforming themselves.

This leaves them with few options other a policy aimed at extracting aid from the outside world, and regular blackmail is one of the usual tools of this approach. Thus the threat persists unless the regime or, at least, its nature is changed, but how can this goal be achieved if pressure from outside is so patently inefficient? The answer is pressure from within, by nurturing pro-democracy and pro-reform forces within North Korean society (and also pro-reform thoughts within the brains of individuals).

Of all assorted “rogue regimes”, North Korea is probably most vulnerable to this soft approach. On one hand, unlike the bosses of the assorted fundamentalist regimes, North Korea’s leaders have never claimed that their followers will be rewarded in the afterlife; they do not talk, for example, about the pleasures of otherworldly sex with 72 virgins.

Their claim to legitimacy is based on their alleged ability to deliver better lives to Koreans here and now, and Pyongyang’s rulers have failed in this regard in the most spectacular way. The existence of another Korea makes the use of nationalistic slogans somewhat problematic as well.

North Korea’s leaders cannot really say, “We have to be poor to protect our independence from those encroaching foreigners,” since the existence of the dirty-rich South vividly demonstrates that under a reasonably rational government, Koreans can be both rich and independent (and also free).

This leaves Pyongyang with no choice but to seal the borders as tight as no other communist regime has ever done before, on assumption that the common folk should not know that they live a complete lie. This self-imposed information isolation is the major condition for the regime’s survival, and breaking such a wall of ignorance should be seen as the major target for any long-term efforts directed at bringing change to North Korea.

The power of soft measures is often underestimated, not least because such policies are cheap, slow and not as spectacular as commando raids or even economic embargoes. However, their efficiency is remarkable.

In this regard, it makes sense to remember a story from the relatively recent past. In 1958, an academic-exchange agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Back then the diehard enemies of the Soviet system were not exactly happy about this step, which, they insisted, was yet another sign of shameful appeasement.

They said this agreement would merely provide the Soviets with another opportunity to send spies to steal US secrets. Alternatively, the skeptics insisted, the Soviets would send diehard ideologues who would use their US experience as a tool in the propaganda war. And, the critics continued, this would be done on American taxpayers’ money.

The first group of exchange students was small and included, as skeptics feared, exactly the people they did not want to welcome on to US soil. There were merely four Soviet students who were selected by Moscow to enter Columbia University for one year of studies in 1958. One of them, as we know now, was a promising KGB operative whose job was indeed to spy on the Americans. He was good at his job and later made a brilliant career in Soviet foreign intelligence.

His fellow student was a young but promising veteran of the then-still-recent World War II. After studies in the US, he moved to the Communist Party central bureaucracy, where in a decade he became the first deputy head of the propaganda department – in essence, a second in command among Soviet professional ideologues.

Well, skeptics seemed to have been proved right – until the 1980s, that is. The KGB operative’s name was Oleg Kalugin, and he was to become the first KGB officer openly to challenge the organization from within. His fellow student, Alexandr Yakovlev, a Communist Party Central Committee secretary, became the closest associate of Mikhail Gorbachev and made a remarkable contribution to the collapse of the communist regime in Moscow (some people even insist that it was Yakovlev rather than Gorbachev himself who could be described as the real architect of perestroika.)

Eventually, both men said it was their experiences in the United States that changed the way they saw the world, even if they were prudent enough to keep their mouths shut and say what they were expected to say. So two of the four carefully selected Soviet students of 1958 eventually became the top leaders of perestroika.

There is no reason to believe that measures that worked in the Soviet case would be less effective in North Korea. Academic exchanges are especially important, since the policy toward North Korea should pursue two different but interconnected purposes. The first is to promote transformation of the regime or perhaps even to bring down one of the world’s most murderous dictatorships. However, it is also time to start thinking about what will happen next, after Kim Jong-il and his cohorts vanish from the scene.

The post-Kim reconstruction of North Korean will be painful, expensive and probably lengthy. Right now North Korea is some 20 times a poor as the South, and the gap in education between two countries is yawning. With the exception of a handful of military engineers, a typical North Korean technician has never used a computer.

North Korean economists learn a grossly simplified version of 1950s Soviet official economics, and North Korean doctors have never heard about even the most common drugs used elsewhere. This means that in the case of a regime collapse, the North Koreans would be merely cheap labor for the South Korean conglomerates – a situation bound to produce tensions and hostility between the two societies. A North Korean who in 20 years’ time will look for a decent job should be made employable, and the best way to ensure this is to start thinking about his or her education right now.

Academic exchanges with North Korea would have dual or even triple purposes. First, they would bring explosive information into the country, hastening domestic changes (probably, but not necessary, changes of a revolutionary nature). Second, they would assist North Korean economic development, thus beginning to bridge the gap between the two Koreas even while the North was still under Kim Jong-il’s regime. Third, they would contribute to more efficient and less painful reconstruction of post-Kim North Korea.

Of course, all these scholarship programs should be paid for by the recipient countries. North Koreans have no money for such exchanges (and to paraphrase a remark by North Korea expert Aidan Foster-Carter, North Korean leaders are people who never do anything as vulgar as paying). But all three targets are clearly in the interest of the world community, and anyway the monies involved would be quite small.

North Korea’s leaders are no fools. They understand that such exchanges are dangerous, and they do not want future Korean Yakovlevs and Kalugins to emerge. Back in 1959-60 they even decided to recall their students from the Soviet Union and other countries of the Communist Bloc and did not send their young people to study anywhere but in Mao Zedong’s China until the late 1970s. In other words, for two decades Pyongyang’s leaders believed that those countries were way too liberal as an environment for their students.

However, they also understand that without exchanges they cannot survive in the longer run. Even now, Pyongyang is doing its best to increase exchanges with China, sending numerous students there.

Another important factor is endemic corruption. There is no doubt that nearly all students who will go overseas will be scions of the Pyongyang aristocrats, the hereditary elite that has been ruling the country for decades. A high-level official might understand that sending a young North Korean overseas is potentially dangerous. But if the person in question is likely to be his nephew, he will probably choose to forget about the ideological threats.

Of course, no sane North Korean leader would ever agree to send students to the US or to South Korea. However, there are many countries that are far more acceptable for them. The Australian National University a few years ago had a course for North Korean postgraduate students who studied modern economics and financial management. Australia or Canada or New Zealand might be good places for such programs.

While English-language education is preferable, since English is the language of international communication in East Asia, there is a place for European countries as well, especially smaller ones, whose names do not sound too offensive to the Pyongyang bureaucrats – such as Switzerland or Hungary or Austria.

Such programs should be sponsored by those countries whose stakes are the highest, such as the US, Japan and South Korea, but smaller and more distant countries also should consider sponsoring such an undertaking. This is not a waste of money, nor even a good-looking humanitarian gesture for its own sake. As history has shown many times, former students tend to be sympathetic to the country where they once studied, and they normally keep some connections there.

North Korea has great potential, and when things start moving, those graduates are likely to be catapulted to high places, since people with modern education are so few in North Korea. This means countries that consider small investments in scholarships for North Koreans will eventually get large benefits through important connections and sympathies that their business people, engineers and scholars will find in some important offices of post-Kim North Korea.

Scholarships for North Korean students are not the only form of academic exchanges. North Korean scientists and scholars should be invited to Western universities, and books and digital materials should be donated to major North Korean libraries in large numbers. Of course, only selected people with special clearances are allowed to read non-technical Western publications in North Korea, but they are exactly the people who will matter when things start moving.

It is well known that students and academics who come back from longtime overseas trips are routinely submitted to rigorous ideological retraining upon their return to North Korea. But does it help? Unlikely. If anything, heavy doses of obviously nonsensical propaganda make a great contrast with what they have learned and seen, thus putting North Korean society in an even less favorable light.

Of course, they will not say anything improper when they come back home, but they will see that there are other ways of life, they will see how impoverished, bleak and hyper-controlled their lives are, and they will think how to change this. Sooner or later, these people will become a catalyst for transformation – and their skills will help to ease the pains of the post-Kim revival of North Korea.

Posted in China, Civil society, Economic reform, Education, Energy, International trade, Nuclear, Political economy, Russia | Comments Closed

Fair Game?

Sunday, June 3rd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/3/2007

Kim Il Sung’s North Korea has always been a tough customer, and nobody knows who was more irritated by its constant antics: its foes or its friends. It has been a tough ally, ready to cheat and manipulate its sponsors. Since the 1950s most of its patrons have had to put up with its style _ largely because of their grand strategy, of course.

In the long run, it was probably the Soviets who were subject to Pyongyang’s diplomatic frolics most frequently, but China has the dubious honor of being the first country to enjoy such an experience in the early 1950s. Somewhat surprisingly, this happened during the Korean War when only a massive Chinese intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s regime from a sorry end.

Recent document-based research by Chinese scholars, especially by the formidable Shen Zhihua, has provided us with new insights into the early history of relations between the two supposedly “fraternal” countries. Now it is clear that the picture was anything but rosy.

When the North Korean troops invaded the South, it was implied that the Chinese forces would step in if the situation took a dangerous turn. Nonetheless, until late September, Pyongyang ignored Chinese advice and kept Beijing in the dark about the frontline situation. This drove the Chinese military attache and ambassador mad, but they could not do much about it.

The situation changed in October when Kim Il Sung had lost the war: by late October 1950, there was hardly one battle-ready battalion in the North Korean armed forces. The Chinese rushed in a large expeditionary force, but soon a question arose: who was to be in charge of the united armed forces?

Kim Il Sung clearly assumed that he would stay in command, and would have operational control over the Chinese units. This was unacceptable to the Chinese. To an extent, this was a clash of two nationalisms (and nationalisms of East Asia are notorious for being particularly virulent). However, there were real considerations involved as well.

First of all, the Chinese force far outnumbered the North Korean army. Second, the Chinese generals did not have much trust in the military competence of their North Korean colleagues. Peng Dehuai, whose task was to save the North, did not hide his outrage about Pyongyang’s style of operations. He was especially angry about the meaningless defense of a doomed Seoul, where about 30,000 North Korean soldiers were killed in late September. In late 1950, he sent a telegram to Beijing in which he labeled the North Korean style “childish”.

However, Kim Il Sung and other North Korean leaders avoided the issue, so the two armies (or, to be more precise, the Chinese army and the remains of the North Korean army) for a while acted independently–often, with sorry results. On November 4, for instance, the lack of coordination even led to a battle in which the North Korean tanks mistakenly attacked Chinese infantry, and thus unwittingly helped a semi-circled American unit escape.

At the same time, the Chinese attempts to incorporate the North Korean units into their own forces were met with resistance on the part of Kim Il Sung. He needed an army of his own, and was not ready for concessions.

It took more than a month to solve the question of joint command. Perhaps, the problems would have last longer, had Stalin not sent a cable demanding an immediate rectification of the situation. Stalin’s advice had to be taken seriously, and his intervention put an end to delays. The Joint Command was headed by Peng Dehuai, with two Chinese-speaking Korean generals acting as his deputies (incidentally, both generals were purged by Kim Il Sung a few years after the war).

However, new tensions arose in December 1950 when the railways came to be discussed. The Chinese forces could be supplied only by rail, and those lines were subjected to intense bombing. The railways had to be managed carefully, but the Chinese commanders discovered that Korean administration gave preference to cargo related to the economic needs of Korean reconstruction, rather than to military supplies. As a result, the Chinese and Koreans ran two different railway administrations, operating on the same railway network. It’s easy to imagine how this influenced the efficiency of the transportation system.

After a few months of discussion the North Koreans agreed to have a joint railroad command, but on the conditions that they would exercise overall control. By that time, most of the rolling stock had been provided by China, and the Chinese soldiers were also doing most of the maintenance work, hence the Chinese generals assumed that they should have the upper hand. But the Koreans did not agree. For them, this was an issue of their territorial rights, sovereignty, and other important symbols. For the Chinese, this was a question of their soldiers’ lives.

Once again, direct Soviet involvement was necessary to put an end to the squabbling. Stalin had no patience for the petty ambitions of his not very efficient satellite, and he was still in position to control the North. Hence, Stalin himself cabled Pyongyang demanding they agree to the Chinese conditions. In May 1951, after his august intervention, Pyongyang gave in.

These early squabbles were a sign of things to come. Over the years, North Korea has developed a peculiar diplomatic style, harsh and unbending but remarkably successful. It used to be applied to Moscow and Beijing. Nowadays the same tricks work wonders in dealing with the current sponsors of the regime, Beijing and Seoul as well as with Washington. But that is another story…

Posted in China, Military, Political economy, Russia | Comments Closed

Russia Belatedly Joins in Sanctions against N.Korea

Friday, June 1st, 2007

Chosun Ilbo
6/1/2007

According to Russia’s Itar Tass news agency on Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree imposing sanctions on North Korea in compliance with a UN Security Council resolution in the wake of Pyongyang’s nuclear test last October.

The presidential decree applies a full weapons embargo against North Korea in pursuance of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. All Russian government agencies and enterprises will be banned from exporting to North Korea tanks, fighter jets, warships, heavy artillery pieces, missiles, and missile launchers, as well as materials that can be used for nuclear weapons development.

In addition, North Korean officials involved in development programs for weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons are banned from entering Russia. Shipments of luxury goods to North Korea are also banned.

The measure will likely have no tangible effects, however, given that the current annual trade volume between Russia and North Korea is only about $200 million.

The decree comes as North Korea continues to delay implementing the conditions of the Feb. 13 nuclear disarmament agreement. The decree may put pressure on North Korea to follow the agreement.

After the UN approved the sanctions against North Korea in October last year, Russian government agencies had consultations amongst themselves and coordinated with the Russian parliament. Putin finally signed the sanctions decree on Sunday.

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Russia, North sign deal for a joint railway

Monday, May 28th, 2007

Joong Ang Daily
5/28/2007

Russia has its own dreams of a cross-border railway, linking its tracks to North Korea.

The former communist country has signed a non-binding deal with the communist country to rebuild a section of railway from the Russian border station of Khasan to the North Korean port of Najin, a Russian radio station reported yesterday.

Representatives of the Russian Railways and the North’s Ministry of Railways signed the memorandum last April at the end of the four-day talks held in Pyongyang, the Voice of Russia said.

A container terminal in Najin is the end goal of the new joint venture. After the repairs and reconstruction are completed, the two sides plan to ship freight from Northeast Asia to Russia and Europe, it said.

To solve technical and financial issues connected with this project, working groups will be set up. The first meeting is scheduled in Pyongyang next month.

After resolving practical issues, the two sides plan to organize a meeting of the leaders of the two countries’ railways to sign an agreement.

The restoration of the railway from Khasan to Najin will make it possible in the future to link the Trans Korean Railway to the Trans Siberian Railway, according to Russian media reports.

On May 17, two trains crossed the Military Demarcation Line dividing the two Koreas for the first time since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. South Korea hopes the historic test runs will lead to the connection by railway of the Korean Peninsula, China and Europe.

Posted in Railways, Russia, Transportation | Comments Closed

Inter-Korean railroad faces huge obstacles

Monday, May 21st, 2007

According to the Joong Ang Daily (2007-5-21):

It must have been the most expensive train ride in history. A ticket to cross the border between the two Koreas, a 90-minute journey over 30 kilometers, cost more than 2.7 billion won ($2.9 million) per person last week.

On Thursday, 200 South Koreans boarded two trains on the reconnected Gyeongui and Donghae lines on the west and east sides of the peninsula to chug across the Demilitarized Zone in a show of potential unity. The cost to South Korea, so far, has been 545.4 billion won to reconnect the sections of the cross-border railway severed by the Korean War.

While there are no concrete plans for further runs, the South Korean government has dreams of an inter-Korean rail network that would help the peninsula, cut freight shipment costs dramatically and link Korea by rail to the vast markets of China and the natural resources of Russia.

But to get there from here, the money spent so far on the test run is a pittance. Assuming that the enormous political obstacles to dealing with the North could be overcome, experts say it could cost as much as $10 billion to overhaul the slow, obsolete and backward rail infrastructure of North Korea.

That has not stopped some officials from insisting it can happen. On May 14, Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung announced a three-step plan for an inter-Korean railroad.

The first step would be to use a section of the Gyeongui Line, connecting Seoul and Shinuiju in the North, to serve the Kaesong Industrial Complex project. Transporting goods in and out of Kaesong and allowing North Korean workers to commute to the inter-Korean industrial complex by train is part of the plan.

The next step would be expanding use of the Gyeongui Line up to Kaesong for South Koreans, so that commuters to the complex and South Korean tourists visiting Kaesong could ride the train.

And finally, the South wants to operate trains on a regular basis between Seoul and Pyongyang.

“As of now, providing transportation for goods and commuters to Kaesong and allowing Mount Kumgang tourists to travel by train are current demands,” Lee said at the briefing. The Donghae Line, running between Yangyang and Anbyon in the North, will be used for the Mount Kumgang trip.

“More than 10 billion won worth of goods is produced in Kaesong,” Lee said. “More than 13,000 North Koreans are working there and commuting has become a serious issue.”

Lee has even more ambitious dreams ― the building of a rail line to connect Korea with Europe. “The reconnected inter-Korean railroad will be connected to Russia, one of the largest reserves of natural resources in the world, and China, to provide new economic opportunities,” Lee said. “We need a serious discussion on this with the North.”

Lee, however, admitted that there are enormous obstacles. Gaining the cooperation of the North’s hard-line military, which has been reluctant to open the border to train crossings, and modernization of the outdated North Korean rail infrastructure are among them.

Continuing his drumbeat for the project, after the test run, Lee said South Korea will gladly pay for updating the North’s railroad network ― and cost is no object. “No matter how much it will cost, it is an investment for our economy,” Lee said Friday. “The research is ongoing to estimate the cost, so it is hard to make the number public.”

Estimates vary widely about the cost of modernizing the North’s railroads. Lim Jae-gyeong, a researcher at the Korea Transport Institute, estimated that upgrading the North’s sagging rail networks, for both the Gyeongui and Donghae lines, would cost from 6.5 trillion won to 8 trillion won.

Kim Gyeong-jung, the team leader for inter-Korean railroad networks at the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, cited a Russian report that estimated it would cost up to $3.5 billion “to modernize the railroads in the North and connect them with the Trans-Siberian Railroad.”

Ahn Byung-min of the Korea Transport Institute put the figure at $10 billion for the project, also citing previous Russian reports.

Russia is enthusiastic about the prospects, though, and it conducted three surveys of the North’s railroad infrastructure between 2001 and 2003. The project may accelerate when the two Koreas and Russia begin railroad talks next month.

“We are pushing to hold talks with Kim Yong-sam, the North’s railroad minister, and Vladimir Yakunin, president of the state-run Russian Railways company, at the end of next month in Pyongyang,” said Lee Chul, head of the Korea Railroad Corporation. “The South and Russia have already agreed and the North responded positively.”

The meeting will focus on linking a trans-Korean railway with the trans-Siberia railway. By linking to the Russian lines, Vladivostok could be reached directly by rail from Busan. Researchers say the connection would enable freight to be shipped from Busan to Moscow by rail in just eight days. The transportation cost would be half of the current rate for sea shipments, which is about $600 for a 20-foot container.

The immediate challenge is the infrastructure. Rail is the backbone of North Korea’s transportation system, Ahn said. About 60 percent of passenger traffic and 90 percent of freight is carried by train. With two main rail lines running on the east and west sides of the country, Ahn said, the North Koreans have tried unsuccessfully to connect the systems since the 1970s.

“As of late 2005, the North had about 5,248 kilometers of rail, but 98 percent of them are single-track lines,” Ahn said, meaning that the traffic that can be carried is limited to one train at a time. “Most of the other infrastructure, such as bridges, tunnels, stations and communication systems, is also extremely outdated.”

The trains also run at very slow speeds, between 30 and 60 kilometers an hour. “The speed has not changed much since 1956,” Ahn said. “From Pyongyang to Shinuiju, the distance is 223.6 kilometers. By express, it would take about five hours and five minutes, so the average speed is about 40 kilometers per hour,” Ahn said. “But the regular trains take more than 11 hours.” He noted that there are also no set timetables and service is erratic and sometimes dangerous.

Ahn, who has visited North Korea several times to examine the fraying rail network, provided some extreme examples of how the North tries to cope. “Russia and China often provide food aid to the North via trains,” Ahn said. “When train cars from the two countries arrive, the North, under bilateral treaties, must send back the trains within six months. Rarely are the actual train cars returned, instead China and Russia often receive older train cars ready to retire from service.”

About 2,000 train cars sent from China and Russia have thus been marked as “made in North Korea” and put to use, Ahn said.

“North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung once said the operation of a railroad is like the circulation of blood in the human body,” Ahn said, “Based on that expression, you could say that North Korea’s rail network is a patient suffering from a serious circulatory disease.”

Read the full story here:
Inter-Korean railroad faces huge obstacles
Joong Ang Daily
Ser Myo-ja
5/21/2007

Posted in China, Railways, Russia, Transportation | Comments Closed

Koreas, Russia to Discuss Rail Link

Thursday, May 17th, 2007

Korea Times
Kim Yon-se
5/17/2007

Senior officials of South Korea, North Korea and Russia will likely meet soon to discuss linking the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) and the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), the chief executive of the Korea Railroad Corp. (KORAIL) said Thursday.

The three countries plan to hold a second round of talks for railway cooperation in Pyongyang in late June, said KORAIL President Lee Churl.

In a meeting with reporters in Munsan, north of Seoul, Lee said, “We’ve already reached an agreement with Russia and received a positive reply from the North.”

If the North accepts the proposal, Lee will meet his North Korean and Russian counterparts to discuss the matter on the basis of the first tripartite meeting in Russia in March 2006.

The connection of TKR and TSR, dubbed the “Iron Silk Road,” is expected to bring enormous economic benefits to the two Koreas and Russia.

Experts say it is expected to cut logistic costs as well as freight delivery times substantially.

First of all, inter-Korean projects including tours to Mt. Geumgang or Gaeseong, an ancient capital city in North Korea, will likely be activated .

Freight transportation fares between Incheon and Nampo in the North are expected to fall by 25 percent on average by utilizing the railway instead of ships.

It takes about 30 days and costs $2,213 for conveying 1 TEU (20-foot equivalent units) of freight between Busan and Moscow by ship. In comparison, it would take about 15 days and $1,822 if the railways were linked.

The Busan New Port has recently been designed to make Korea a logistics hub in Northeast Asia.

The port is likely to provide another advantage when the railroad among the two Koreas and Russia is connected.

It will become both the starting and ending point of the “Iron Silk Road,” crossing the Eurasian continent via the Trans-Siberian, Trans-Manchurian and Trans-China railways.

The port authority plans to build a logistics complex on a 1.2 million-square-meter lot in the northern container pier of the new port by 2008.

Posted in Railways, Russia, South Korea | Comments Closed

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