Renovation on this bar began sometime after Feb 2012. The interior (pics by Koryo Tours) looks like any of the bars in Dupont Circle:
According to Koryo Tours, beer costs 1.5 Euros (per pint/half litre). There are seven taps along the bar. I assume they serve various brands of Taedonggang Beer.
Koryo Tours also posted this image of a new shopping center under construction in downtown Pyongyang:
Plastered to the wall is a map of what the site will look like when construction is completed, however, it is too small to make out with any specificity with this image. Currently we do not know any details about this facility (or even its proper name), but hopefully it will appear in the official North Korean media before too long. Here is the location of the new facility:
The construction site sits on the former star-shaped fountain of the Mansudae Fountain Park….between the Mansudae Assembly Hall (Supreme People’s Assembly), Pyongyang Student’s and Children’s Palace, Mansudae Art Theater, and new Mansudae Street housing.
Today NK News ran this story on the unfinished “Victory in the Fatherland Liberation War Memorial Hall” (조국해방전쟁승리기념관). I thought I would add some images of the interior of the building that were shown on North Korean television:
The Korean Peoples’ Army (KPA) is increasing its air and artillery capacity in South Hwanghae Province within the vicinity of the disputed West Sea maritime border and Yonphyong-do.
To begin with, in south-west Kangryong County near Sikyo-ri (강령군, 식여리), the DPRK has established four new KPA units each with dispersed revetments which could be used to protect deployed offensive capabilities such as artillery or short range rockets (MRLs)…maybe KN-08s? I will leave it to the professionals to figure out.
According to available commercial satellite imagery, these units were built sometime between 2010-7-4 and 2012-6-20:
In the image above, just one of the four areas that has been constructed, we can see the creation of the new KPA unit as well as six revetments. These revetments lie 14-16 miles from Yonphyong-do.
To the east of this area, near Habupho, Kangryong County (하부포, 강령군), the Korean Peoples’ Army is building three lines of hardened artillery (HART) positions to protect the DPRK’s Multiple Rocket Launch (MRL) vehicles deployed to this area:
According to available satellite imagery, construction on these HARTs began in early 2011, and as of 2012-6-20, they appear to be nearly complete.
The line closest to Yongphyong-do, is 8.5 miles and contains three HARTs (Above). The second line is approximately 9 miles from Yonphyong-do and also contains three HARTs. The third line is nearly 10 miles from Yonphyong-do and contains 6 HARTs.
The DPRK is also increasing capacities at it the closest fortified air force base in Kiam-ri, Thaethan County (기암리, 태탄군).
Pictured above are two satellite images of the Thaethan air force base in North Korea. The top image is dated 2011-6-13. The lower image is dated 2012-9-21. The lower image has two highlight boxes. In the box to the right, we can see the construction of 36 revetments which would be used to shield deployed artillery positions.In the box to the right, we can see an expansion of housing for use by the soldiers stationed at this base.
UPDATE 1 (2017-5-10): Building No. 3 was completed as part of the “Ryomyong Street” project. According to the Pyongyang Times:
New building added to Kim Il Sung University
Building No. 3 has been unveiled at Kim Il Sung University located in the area of Ryongnam Hill which has been renovated along with landmark Ryomyong Street.
With an area of over 70 000 square metres, the building has well-equipped and multi-functional lecture rooms and labs, a sports field and welfare facilities.
An opening event was held on May 9.
ORIGINAL POST (2013-1-15): The campus of Kim Il-sung University has been the site of high-profile renovations and additions: the construction of the indoor swimming pool and renovation of the main building which includes an electronic library. The school also features a peculiar construction site that has made little progress over the years:
Pictured Above (Google Earth): (L) Kim Il-sung University on 2006-11-11, (R) Kim Il-sung University on 2012-6-20
Given the prestigious position the university holds in the DPRK I have often wondered what the hold up is on this site. Is it a funding issue? Is it a capacity (demand) issue? I still don’t know.
The image features a new facility called the Kim Il-sung University Building No. 3 and it bears a resemblance to the construction site shown on the satellite imagery above.
That was interesting, but not really worth blogging about. However, on 2012-10-1 North Korean television aired a show about Kim Jong-il’s guidance in helping the school grow. The footage included this scene:
The proposed “Building No. 3” in this image is not entirely consistent with the artist rendering at the Three Revolutionas Exhibition, but it is similar. It is consistent with the satellite imagery, however. We can also see that in addition to building No. 3 there are long term plans to to build yet another office/classroom building and a large stadium. Pyongyang could use another large stadium, right?
Pictured Above: Kumsusan Palace of the Sun (formerly “Kumsusan Memorial Palace”). On the left is an image from Google Earth (2012-6-20). On the right is an image from GeoEye (2012-10-14).
UPDATE 4 (2012-12-17): The Kumsusan Palace has been opened and Kim jong-il’s body has been put on display. According to The Guardian:
North Korea has unveiled the embalmed body of Kim Jong-il, still in his trademark khaki jumpsuit, on the anniversary of his death.
Kim lies in state a few floors below his father, national founder Kim Il-sung, in the Kumsusan mausoleum, the cavernous former presidential palace. Kim Jong-il is presented lying beneath a red blanket, a spotlight shining on his face in a room suffused in red.
…
North Korea also unveiled Kim’s yacht and his armoured train carriage, where he is said to have died. Among the personal belongings featured in the mausoleum are the parka, sunglasses and pointy platform shoes he famously wore in the last decades of his life. A MacBook Pro lay open on his desk.
Here is footage from DPRK television:
UPDATE 3 (2012-12-17): Well, it was the first anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s death, rather than his February 2013 birthday anniversary, which marked the opening of the renovated Kumsusan Palace. According to the Associate Press (via USA Today):
North Korea unveiled the embalmed body of Kim Jong Il, still in his trademark khaki jumpsuit, on the anniversary of his death Monday as mourning mixed with pride over a recent satellite launch that was a long-held goal of the late authoritarian leader.
Kim lies in state a few floors below his father, national founder Kim Il Sung, in the Kumsusan mausoleum, the cavernous former presidential palace. Kim Jong Il is presented lying beneath a red blanket, a spotlight shining on his face in a room suffused in red.
Wails echoed through the chilly hall as a group of North Korean women sobbed into the sashes of their traditional Korean dresses as they bowed before his body. The hall bearing the glass coffin was opened to select visitors — including The Associated Press — for the first time since his death.
North Korea also unveiled Kim’s yacht and his armored train carriage, where he is said to have died. Among the personal belongings featured in the mausoleum are the parka, sunglasses and pointy platform shoes he famously wore in the last decades of his life. A MacBook Pro lay open on his desk.
Here is footage from North Korean television on the opening of the palace:
UPDATE 2 (2012-11-9): KCNA has reported on the renovations taking place outside the palace but not those taking place inside the palace:
Lawn Spreads Out around Kumsusan Palace of Sun
Pyongyang, November 9 (KCNA) — Service personnel, officials and working people carpeted the plaza park of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun with turf of new species.
They created the lawn covering the area of tens of thousands of square meters in a short span of time with a single-minded desire to spruce up the area around the palace where the great Generalissimos Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il lie in state for perpetuity.
The lawn represents the ardent wishes of the service personnel and people of the DPRK to hold the great Generalissimos in high esteem for all ages.
They laid earth of 86 000 cubic meters on the ground to completely replace the former ground in a matter of several days.
They devoted themselves to such work as burning earth and humus soil and sowing the seeds of turf, covering up seeds with soil and taking care of them.
They provided the best conditions for the growth of the turf of new species by covering the area with fertile soil and humus of 12 000 cubic meters.
The seeds of all turfs sprouted in a matter of four-five days since their sowing and each has now two-three stems.
ORIGINAL POST (2012-11-4): A few days ago I worked on this story for Radio Free Asia. The story highlights construction work being done at Kumsusan Palace. To date this work has not been reported in the North Korean media.
What do we see? Most obviously, the large concrete plaza in front of the palace is being converted into a large park with new fountains and displays.
The former plaza was approximately 94,000 square meters of flat concrete blocks (according to Google Earth measurements). The new park in the plaza takes up approximately 57,000 square meters, or 60% of the real estate. This will prevent the sort of large scale military ceremonies that have taken place in the plaza over the years, however it will make the facility more enjoyable as a proper park.
We can also see that the main building is surrounded by debris (outlined in yellow), indicating that significant renovations are taking place within the building itself. Since the DPRK has announced that Kim Jong-il’s body will go on display like that of his father, Kim Il-sung, we can expect that exhibits on the life and accomplishments of Kim Jong-il are being added to complement the Kim Il-sung exhibits.
Given the date of the satellite image it is likely that the project will not be completed before winter temperatures arrive. It is possible that construction could come to a halt in the winter, yet I suspect that the North Korean workers (probably soldiers) will have to labor through the winter for a grand public opening on February 16th next year.
The construction work has yet to be announced in any official North Korean media outlet, and the cost and scale of the renovations are currently unknown outside of the DPRK.
The facility has not seen this scale of work since it was transformed following the death of Kim Il-sung. During the renovations, the DPRK was widely criticized for spending millions of dollars on the palace even as many experienced food shortages and starvation throughout the country during the “Arduous March”.
ORIGINAL POST: In The Armed Forces of North Korea Joseph Bermudez gives a thorough accounting of most of the DPRK’s airfields, airports, highway strips, and air force bases. Since the book was published in 2001, however, it is slightly out of date. This week I found a new North Korean runway in Kumgang County which appears to have been built between 2007-5-21 and 2012-9-22 to replace a disused runway five miles to the south.
Pictured above (Google Earth): I have outlined Kumgang County and show the positions of the old and new runways.
The former runway strip (documented in The Armed Forces of North Korea) is located just a mile north of the town of Kumgang. It appears to have fallen into disuse:
The nearby Kumgang-chon River has eroded a southern portion of the runway. It also appears a small drainage canal has been dug across a central section of the unpaved runway.
The new Kumgang Airfield is more sophisticated:
To begin with, the runway (appx 1km x 70m) is paved.
I was curious as to whether this runway is intended to serve primarily for civilian or military purposes. Evidence in favor of civilian use: The runway is close to Inner-Kumgang. Tourists could conceivably fly to this airport and drive appx 20 km (by road) to the Inner Kumgang Rest House. Tourists could also drive 35km to the Kumgang resort. Additionally, there is already a large North Korean air force base just 20km due north of the new runway in Thongchon County. I am not sure if an Air Koryo IL-62M can take off/land on this new runway, but certainly any of the commuter prop planes that carry tourists on domestic flights should not find it too difficult.
Evidence for military use: As of September, there is yet to be built any infrastructure that would serve as a “civilian” airport terminal or air traffic control tower (I use the word “civilian”, but the KPA Air Force controls all of the DPRK’s airspace). These types of infrastructure can be seen at other North Korean “civilian” airports in Pyongyang, Hamhung, and Samjiyon. It could be that construction is still ongoing. Additionally, the airport is currently protected by a small number of hardened artillery positions (HARTs) located next to the runway. Artillery, however, can be seen at other “civilian” airports in the DPRK as well. Just south of the HARTs we can also see what appears to be some tunneling or excavation work being carried out in the hillside. The purpose of this work remains unclear:
Sawiris has a 75% stake in Koryolink via his Orascom Telecom Media & Technology (OTMT) unit, with the remainder held by a company under the Ministry of Post & Telecommunications. He says revenues in 2012 should reach around €186 million ($145 million), with an average revenue per user of €8.6. The network only permits domestic calls and locally hosted data services. A separate cell network is available for foreigners in North Korea.
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FORBES: How many subscribers does Koryolink have? How extensive is your coverage in DPRK?
NAGUIB SAWIRIS: Koryolink currently has more than 1.5 million subscribers. Coverage includes the capital Pyongyang in addition to 15 main cities, more than 100 small cities, and some highways and railways. Territory coverage is around 14%, and more than 90% population coverage. The subscriber base has been increasing at a very healthy rate from 950,000 at [year-end] 2011 to an estimated 1.7 million at [year-end] 2012.
FORBES: Under your joint venture with the Ministry of Telecommunications, when will Koryolink lose its exclusivity? What will happen after this period ends?
NS: Exclusivity was granted for a period of 4 years from launch. After the expiry of exclusivity in Dec. 2012, Koryolink received written confirmation that for an additional period of 3 years (until 2015) no foreign investors will be allowed in the mobile business. However, we are continuing to expand our network and services to further solidify our position [in order] to be ready for any possible competition.
FORBES: What is your role in the construction of the Ryugyong Hotel? What other real estate interests do you have in DPRK?
NS: This is a special investment that we are maintaining through our banking subsidiary in the DPRK, where Orascom has the right to operate this facility. The construction, repair and facade installations have all been completed last summer. We are planning to relocate Koryolink headquarters into the tower very soon to bring life to the building. There are no other real-estate investments in the DPRK, however, Orabank, our banking arm in DPRK, is actively working towards developing mobile-related businesses and projects.
First, the individual wishing to obtain a cell phone must go to his or her local Communications Technology Management Office (통신통화관리국 or CTMO; in provincial capitals only) or a subordinate arm of the same (in smaller cities) to obtain a three page application form. This form, once filled in, must be stamped by the Ministry of Public Security officer assigned to the individual’s workplace or, for those without official workplaces, attached to his or her local people’s unit.
Having paid off the public security official in cigarettes or cash (more often the former, according to this author’s sources, because it arouses less friction) he or she must submit the stamped form to the CTMO or equivalent, whereupon it is sent, with all the speed one would expect of the North Korean transportation network, to the Ministry of Communications in Pyongyang. At this point there is little else to be done but go away and pitch the proverbial tent, because at best it takes a month for the staff in the revolutionary capital to process the application.
Assuming, and it should not be assumed, that those checks done in Pyongyang don’t yield any incriminating evidence of wrongdoing (don’t forget, the North Korean legal system makes every adult a criminal in one way or another, something which can come back and haunt any individual whenever “rents” are desired), the individual will eventually be ordered back to his local communications office, whereupon he will be handed a payment form. He or she must then take this form to a bank, and engage with the separate, and no less inefficient, bureaucracy therein in order to pay the majority (though not all) of the cost of a phone and Koryolink network activation fee.[1]
The payment form, duly stamped by a functionary at the bank, must then be taken back to the CTMO or equivalent, whereupon it can be exchanged for half the stamped application form originally sought from the ministry in Pyongyang. Here, finally, the individual reaches a watershed moment: this form can actually be exchanged for a cellular telephone!
However, the pain is actually quite a long way short of being over. In a moment of uncharacteristic efficiency, the actual cell phone shop is often directly outside the communications office, but in a moment of karma-balancing inefficiency, it doesn’t open much, carries a limited amount of product and is pitifully understaffed. As a result, queues are long, as are waits. Assuming an individual lives long enough to reach the front of such a queue, he or she is finally offered the opportunity to hand over another $70-$100 and depart the scene with a brand new phone.
Therefore, the source said, “Middlemen in larger cities are getting multiple phones activated in random people’s names and then taking them to smaller cities to sell. Alternatively, households that don’t have any problem getting that kind of approval are mobilizing the names of their entire families to get phones, which they are then selling on to the middlemen.”
“The end users are buying these cell phones for $300 to $500 from the middlemen or from private sellers. This saves them having to go to the trouble of applying to Koryolink,” he added.
A basic Koryolink phone can be purchased officially for roughly $270- $300, excluding bribes and extraneous costs. The price of one of these semi-legal phones depends on duration of use and model. The best product, the T1, a clamshell design, is the latest and costs more than $500. The next mid-range model is the T3, another clamshell; there is also a similarly priced phone with a slide design. The budget offerings are the T95 and T107. Differences in price are mostly attributable to differences in sound quality rather than the designs, sources assert.
In addition, there are also phones available for use within individual provinces. These products, which are similar to the so-called “city phones” that were briefly permitted in the late 90s but soon got withdrawn, cost just $70 at the time of writing.
Geoffrey See of Choson Exchange also offers some insight on Ora Bank’s mobile-related business projects:
However, it appears that Naguib, Chairman of Orascom, might have other ideas. In his words, “Orabank, our banking arm in DPRK, is actively working towards developing mobile-related businesses and projects.” The 3G network provides a platform for a range of other services that emerging market economies would need including remittances and payments through mobile banking and mobile payments. Given the primitive development of the services sector, mobile provides an opportunity for Orascom to upend the services industry in North Korea.
This was something I was originally looking at in North Korea. Payments are currently messy in the country. On a previous trip, I remembered an account of a North Korean trying to pay the handphone bill. Apparently the payment went to the wrong account, and the North Koreans spent the morning calling and shouting at some people to make the mistaken beneficiary return the money so that the payment could go to the right account. For what mobile banking and payments could potentially look like in North Korea, check out M-pesa.
Read the full story here:
Pyongyang Calling For Egyptian Telecoms Tycoon Naguib Sawiris Forbes
Simon Montlake
2012-11-18
Pictured Above (Google Earth): Two Google Earth satellite images of Hoeryong (L: 2002-4-27, R: 2008-12-25) which show the construction of residential apartments buildings as well as the town’s new main market.
Hoeryong is a town in North Hamgyong Province that lies across the Tumen (Tuman) River from China. According to North Korean political narratives it is also the childhood home of Kim Jong-il’s mother, Kim Jong-suk. It has been the the site of a large construction boom in the last five years, and now, according to the Daily NK, Chinese tourists are being brought in on very limited itineraries. According to the article:
The Hoiryeong source explained, “North Hamkyung Province ‘shock troops’ and military unit construction teams have been here for three years on Kim Jong Il’s orders for the construction, and now it is finished.” Local households were asked to contribute 12,000 North Korean Won each to the construction effort, he added.
Hoiryeong used to have few buildings with five floors, but now it has a considerable number of new four and five floor apartment buildings built around the center of the city, as well as a number of newly built commercial facilities. Buildings in the downtown core have also been spruced up with external lighting, a project that began last April.
There are a number of new restaurants in the area. One, ‘Hoiryeonggwan’, has been decorated in the style of Pyongyang’s famous ‘Okryugwan’, something that Kim Jong Il is said to have ordered in December 2010 when he visited the construction site. Elsewhere, restaurants serving spicy marinated beef, duck, dog and Chinese food have also opened their doors.
However, these restaurants only currently open on the weekend or when Chinese tour groups make an advanced reservation, according to the source, who revealed that local people regard the construction effort more as an attempt to generate tourist revenue than to make it a real ‘model city’, as the official propaganda claims.
“Chinese tourists come, then they visit the statue of Kim Jong Suk and the place where she grew up, and then they are taken to one or other of the restaurants,” the source said. “They drink and make merry then go, all without visiting any scenic spots; thus, the authorities make money.”
As with other tourist operations, it is possible that this small step will lead to a softening of restrictive tourism regulations and potentially the arrival of Western tourists. But don’t hold your breath! Chinese tourists have been visiting Sinuiju on a regular basis, but westerners are generally still prohibited from touring the city
Some 4,000 North Koreans are estimated to be working at major construction sites in a suburb of the Kuwaiti capital and living in military-style camps run by the North’s government, a Seoul diplomat said Monday.
Impoverished North Korea has recruited its people to work abroad and reportedly kept most of their earnings, one of the few sources of hard currency for the isolated regime. Along with China and Russia, the Middle East is a major destination for North Korean laborers.
“We have figured out that there are around 4,000 North Koreans working at major construction sites to build homes, hospitals and other facilities in a suburb area of Kuwait City, including Jahar,” the diplomat said on the condition of anonymity.
A North Korean worker in Kuwait earns up to US$500 per month, but nearly four-fifths of the worker’s monthly salary is directly deposited into accounts controlled by the North’s government, according to the diplomat.
“A North Korean worker is believed to actually receive $100 per month, with their jobs ranging from plasterers, carpenters, welders to drivers at the construction sites,” the diplomat said.
In April this year, eight North Korean workers were arrested by Kuwaiti authorities for allegedly bootlegging alcoholic beverages, the diplomat said. Alcohol is illegal in Kuwait, making the illicit business of alcohol bootlegging highly profitable.
This is a joint-post with Tad Farrell (NKNews.org).
Although North Korean television has yet to profile the recent changes made to the appearance of Kim Il-sung square, we have put the pieces together from a mix of recent tourist photos.
To begin with, the large painting of an austere-looking Kim Il-sung which overlooked the square for decades has been taken down. In addition, the banners featuring the symbol of the Korean Workers’ Party (which flanked the painting of Kim) have been replaced with DPRK national flags.
Top: Removal of Kim Il-sung painting [Before (R), After (L)] Bottom: Korean Workers Party drape replaced with DPRK flag [Before (R), After(L)]
Kim Il-sung’s image is not absent from the square, however. Newly mounted to the base of the square’s official observation platform are paintings of a now jovial Kim Il-sung joined by a new painting of Kim Jong-il.
Two new portraits replace the previously austere profile of Kim Il-sung
More interestingly, it appears that the square’s paintings of Marx and Lenin have been permanently removed, as first tweeted about by AP’s Jean Lee earlier this summer.
Marx and Lenin no longer adorn the square
Just how long the paintings would remain in the square has been a subject of speculation for years. Beginning in the 1970s Marxism-Leninism was deemphasized in favor of Juche, Kim Il-sung ideology, and Kimilsungism. In 1980 the Workers’ Party’s Sixth Convention formally struck “Marxim-Leninism” from the party charter and amended it to read “The Korean Workers’ Party struggles to practice Kim Il-sung’s ideology”. Finally, as part of the constitutional changes that were announced in 2009, Articles 29 and 40 were amended so they no longer referred to “공산주의” (Communism). The paintings of Marx and Lenin remained through all of this. It is unclear why now they are no longer appropriate.
UPDATE: Andrei Lankov has written more extensive comments on the DPRK’s treatment of Marxism in in the Asia Times.
